

# Grounding the International Norm on Women, Peace and Security: The Role of Domestic Norm Entrepreneurs and the Challenges Ahead

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## Grounding the International Norm on Women, Peace and Security:

### The Role of Domestic Norm Entrepreneurs and the Challenges Ahead

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One of the gaps in the study of international norms is the process by which they are institutionalized and accepted at the national level. As the international norm negotiates its way through various national (and even grassroots) levels, a point of inquiry would be how domestic norm entrepreneurs have enabled its localization. This study looks at the narrative of a loose network of peace and women's human rights groups that worked together to localize United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security in the Philippines. Specifically, it reviews how the network evolved to become a domestic *norm entrepreneur* within the context of the creation of the Philippine National Action Plan on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the initiatives it took to localize the norm in the national arena. Within this frame, this study argues that the network continues to evolve as it responds to current and unfolding realities of peace and women's human rights in armed conflict situations. Particularly, as domestic norm entrepreneur, the network is trying to transcend the usual top-down strategy of grounding an international norm and is now shifting gears toward the value of bottom-up approaches in order to achieve desired results at the grassroots level.

### Understanding International Norms

Constructivist literature on international norms highlights the role of norm entrepreneurs in the construction of new norms or reconstruction of existing ones. Norm entrepreneurs, as Sunstein (1996, 903,929) describes, are actors who can alert people to the existence of a shared complaint and can suggest a collective solution by (a) signaling their own commitment to change; (b) creating coalitions; (c) making defiance of a norm seem less costly; and (d) making compliance with new norms seem beneficial.

Norm entrepreneurs are said to impact on international political life when they are able to push their ideas in international negotiation fora (Ikenberry/Kupchan 1993) or are able to make state actors (including their own governments) accept international agreements that may not necessarily be part of the original state interest (Sikkink 1993). This is to say that there is a strong link between the norm entrepreneur and the broader normative climate (Florini 1996, 386). At the same time, states need non-state actors in the development of norms because they provide the necessary expertise as well as render legitimacy to the norm (Stienstra 1999, 268). Non-state actors

welcome the opportunity to participate in the process of norm creation because it gives them the chance to influence political discourses on the issue and impact on the actual development of norms. This is the essence of collaborative politics – the strategic inter-action between state and non-state actors on specific political projects.<sup>1</sup> Reminiscent of Putnam's (1988) two-level games, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 893) recognize the interaction between domestic and international realms as a two-level norm game. According to this idea, international politics is a two-way street – domestic politics can shape international norms and international norms can bear upon domestic politics. In the latter, international norms have to negotiate their way through domestic institutions and institutionalized domestic politics. Negotiating through domestic spaces would be possible if enabling mechanisms such as policies and laws are established. For Risse et al. (1999) and Risse-Kappen (1996), this can lead us to understand important variations in compliance and interpretation of international norms at the domestic level. On a similar track of international-domestic interface, Acharya sees the process of international norm localization as

the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices (2004, 245).

For Acharya (2004, 247-248), the five key ingredients in international norm localization are: a positive impact on legitimacy and authority of key norm-takers; strength of prior local norms; indigenous cultural traits and traditions; credibility and prestige of local agents; and scope for accepting and refining foreign norms according to domestic contexts. Operationally, variations on the domestic acceptance of international norms depend on how it would positively accrue to the legitimacy and authority of a state's existing regime, on how it converges with or diverges from pre-existing local norms, on how it would affect the prestige of domestic agents, on how it fits or falls outside of cultural traits and traditions, and how the phase and scope of norm transplantation would be accommodated within the domestic state system. On the other hand, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) talk about international norm internalization or the process by which the norm becomes embedded in the target actors' psyche and has attained a status of being the new and unquestioned standard of action. According to them, the last stage of the norm life cycle is reached when the norm acquires a "taken-for-granted quality and no longer a matter of public debate" (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998, 895).

From the context of an international norm grounding itself in the domestic sphere, this study provides empirical data on how domestic norm entrepreneurs in the Philippines were able to advance the norm on women, peace and security as enshrined in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in the country; additionally, it examines the impact of initial initiatives on the lives of women from conflict-affected areas as well as in the space for women's participation

in peace processes. From the empirical data (documents and narratives) gathered, the study brings to light two emerging necessities: first, that for an international norm to be relevant, it must move from the project of localization to that of internalization; and second that for domestic norm entrepreneurs to make a genuine change in the lives of people from conflict affected areas, they must also put premium on the bottom-up approach and have grassroots people participate in the process of “fleshing” out the norm. These emergent necessities contribute to understanding two realities: first, the concept of international norm internalization discussed by Finnemore and Sikkink as the last stage of the norm life cycle is exemplified through the Philippine case of implementing UNSCR 1325; and second, domestic norm entrepreneurship (particularly that by embedded actors in social movements in the country) is further nuanced by critically examining how norm entrepreneurs fare in impacting changes on the ground. On both counts, the narrative of women’s activism on women, peace and security in the Philippines is brought to light.

### **The International Norm on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)**

In times of war and armed conflict situations, civilian populations or unarmed groups are the ones most affected. Women, as part of the civilian population, become victims of violence much the same way as men. However, as women, they are primarily targeted because of their gender and thus, they suffer comparatively more than the men. Gender-based violence in the context of war deploys rape as a weapon of war, uses sexual assault and slavery as a form of torture, and systematically increases the vulnerability of women in order to undermine the gender-biased cultural construction of the community or society (Kesic 2001; Morris 2000; MacKinnon 1994).

The international community, although definitely lethargic in recognizing the plight of women during wartime, nonetheless (thankfully) began talking about this issue as contained in the declaration of the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, in the provisions of the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and in the 1996, 1998 and 2000 reports of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences. Responding to the need to correct the historical inadequacy of international legal instruments to protect women in conflict situations, the International Criminal Court (ICC) – which came into force in July 2000 – finally codified violence against women (VAW), specifically rape and sexual violence, as war crime, crime against humanity, and crime constitutive of genocide (Copelon 2000). Supposedly, this stage of institutionalization will end the culture of impunity for gender-based crimes against women during situations of armed conflict. In October of the same year, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 which specifically acknowledged that the maintenance of international peace and security must involve the protection of women and must include them in post-conflict reconstruction and peace processes. UNSCR 1325 came to be known as the codified international norm on

‘Women, Peace and Security’ (WPS). What this particular development implies, in general, is that women’s security has become part of the broader security discourse at the international level (Hamber et al. 2006, 490).

The Resolution 1325 emphasized “the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls” and stressed “the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions” (Operative Clause 11). In a nutshell, within the framework of Article 25 of the UN Charter<sup>2</sup>, UNSCR 1325 obligates states to protect and respect the human rights of women and girls, open opportunities and guarantee the participation of women in all levels of decision-making; and provide for gender perspectives in peace processes. The UN, on the other hand, is obligated to mainstream gender in Secretary General and Security Missions and explicitly recognizes the need for gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping work (Hudson 2005). Thereafter, two other resolutions were passed by the UNSC to add force to UNSCRs 1325 and 1820. UNSCR 1888 was adopted in September 2009 calling for a Special Representative to the Secretary-General on ending sexual violence in conflict. UNSCR 1889 was adopted in the same year calling for a range of measures to strengthen the participation of women in all phases of peace processes.

Taking all these progressive developments together, one must not forget the role of various international women’s groups and transnational feminist networks that worked hard to place the realities of women in the discourse of peace and security (Hill et al. 2003). The challenge is to ensure that the discourse will be translated into practice.

### **The Philippine Armed Conflict Context and the Protection of Women in Armed Conflict Situations**

The on-going armed conflicts in the Philippines have been rooted in the country’s colonial past as well as in its reality of continued disenfranchisement of peoples. Conflicts with two distinct armed groups have been part of the country’s contemporary political history: the communist and Muslim insurgency movements.

The communist insurgency, embodying a national-democratic revolutionary struggle, emerged in the 1930s with the establishment of the Partido Komunista Pilipino (PKP). After the Second World War, PKP integrated with Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap), a grassroots people’s movement that fought against the Japanese. Two decades later, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was established in 1968 followed by its armed group, the New Peoples Army (NPA) in 1969. In over 40 years, the communist struggle seeking to establish an egalitarian society through a protracted people’s warfare against imperialist and reactionary forces/actors continues despite attempts to bring parties of the conflict to the negotiation table. Currently, the ideological underpinning of the struggle has been fused with specific contexts of indigenous peoples’ rights, agrarian reform, oppression of

political authorities and their hired militias, and resource-based claims such as mining and corporate wealth. According to the International Crisis Group (2010), the communist insurgents have strongholds in Central and Northern Luzon, the CALABARZON (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon), Bicol, Eastern Visayas, Negros Occidental, and Eastern and Southern Mindanao (the Caraga, Compostela Valley, and Davao).

The armed conflict in Muslim Mindanao, on the other hand, can be traced from the historic struggle of self-determination and nationhood of the Moros. Prior to the colonial period in the country, the process of Islamization had already taken its roots in the south, particularly in the sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu. Combining this politico-religious process with the failed political project of conquest by the Spaniards and the Americans in the area, the people in the south, heterogeneous as they were (Moros<sup>3</sup>, Lumads<sup>4</sup>), developed their own consciousness as a “nation”. Thus, the armed conflict frame that emerged was that of the people defending their homeland and the Philippine state (as a legacy of its colonial “upbringing”) defending its territorial integrity (Santos 2006) – a classic clash of “imagined communities”.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the continuing struggle of the Moros has also been a response to the sustained disenfranchisement of their people as a result of strategic/systematic migration of non-Muslims (from Luzon and the Visayas) that removed them from their lands. The Moros also fall victim to collective discrimination and exploitative extraction of their resources without leaving them any sustainable livelihood benefits. Two groups emerged which advanced the Bangsamoro<sup>6</sup> struggle, namely, the Muslim National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Muslim Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Efforts have been enhanced in order to end four decades of internal civil conflict in the Philippines. On the side of ending communist insurgency, the Philippine Government opened peace talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF and managed to sign the Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in 1998. This was the first substantive agreement signed between the communist insurgents and the government. But subsequent negotiations were stalled and by April 2013 officially suspended. As for the Moro insurgency, the Philippine Government negotiated with the MNLF and MILF separately. During the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the Government and the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement in 1996 and in accordance with the autonomy provision in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Congress passed the 1989 Republic Act (RA) 6734 for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. In the case of the MILF, the Government signed with them the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) last October 2012. For both agreements, implementation and moving forward to attain genuine peace are still wanting.

During the same decade that armed struggle began in different parts of the country, the dictatorship period in the Philippines in the 1970s gave rise to a social movement that fought to end authoritarian rule in the country. Women were part of the movement – mostly integrated into the nationalist democratic struggle. According

to Roces (2000, 122), the focus on the national democratic struggle tended to undermine women's concerns in a way that they were seen to be not priority issues in the fight for "social injustice, dictatorship, class struggle, democracy, violence and revolution". However, this marginalization within the movement itself did not deter the women's movement to come into being on its own. The late 1970s leading up to the People Power Revolution in 1986 saw the vibrancy and strength of the movement – fighting against human rights violations as well as worsening social and economic disenfranchisement, advancing the rights of women workers as well as making women's concerns visible through media, and moving towards collectivizing the strength of women in the political sphere (Veneracion-Rallonza 2008, 221).<sup>7</sup> This is not to say, however, that the women's movement in the country advanced in a singular path; additionally, the narrative of contentious politics was not a monolithic one. As Francisco (1998, 13) explains, women's groups in the Philippines were either socio-civic oriented or activist oriented: the former concentrated more on assisting women through issue-specific programs while the latter focused more on protests, lobbying and other forms of contention strategies.

To a large extent, the women's movement concentrated on women's human rights while women in peace movements advanced the project of peace and espoused for non-violent social change. Each had its framework of analysis and political agenda – but only the women's movement had a distinct gender advocacy and feminist frame. Gender analysis was a natural discourse for the women's movement but was mostly applied to advancing the cause of violence against women (VAW); on the other hand, the women in peace movements did not consciously apply a gender analysis in their call for the end of conflict and creation of a culture of peace.

In terms of the institutionalization of their advocacies, the women's movement became more prominent. For example, by the 1990s, the vibrant and dynamic women's movement in the country paved the way for the passage of several laws on women's human rights: (1) Women in Development and Nation-building (RA 7192); (2) The Philippine Plan for Gender-Responsive Development (PPGD) 1995-2025; (3) Anti-Rape Act of 1997 (RA 8353); and the (4) Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998 (RA 8505). The following decade, the women's movement was also instrumental in the passage of the Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA 9208), Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (RA 9262), the Magna Carta of Women in the Philippines (RA 7190) in 2009, and the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RA 10354). Interestingly, of all these progressive women's human rights laws, only RA 7190 specifically provided for the protection women from gender-based violence in situations of armed conflicts and their participation in peace-building processes. Not even the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity of 2010 (RA 9851) was explicit about women's protection and prevention of crimes against them during armed conflict. It is in this regard that the political opportunity structure enabled the peace and the women's human rights movements to come together.

## Localizing UNSCR 1325 and the Role of Peace and Women's Groups

On 15 September 1993, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) was created by virtue of Executive Order (EO) 125. Additionally, the National Unification Commission (NUC) was also established and it identified the key strategies to a comprehensive peace process:

implementation of reforms; consensus-building and empowerment for peace; negotiated settlement with rebel groups; rehabilitation and reintegration of former rebels into society; addressing immediate concerns in areas affected by hostilities; and building and nurturing a climate conducive to peace. (WE Act 1325 2011, 24).

An Executive Order enacted in 2001 reaffirmed these strategies for peace. Three years later, the National Peace Plan (NPP) was adopted with the goal to end hostilities between the government and armed insurgents, focus on enhancing human security in conflict-affected areas, expand the constituency of the peace process to include citizen participation, and enhance the policy environment to promote spaces conducive to human security and peace. These efforts, however, did not fully acknowledge the gendered face of war or the gender dimension of peace – both of which have been the contextual frames of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 – and for all intents and purposes, they were gender-blind.

### Conception, Actors and Process of Crafting the National Action Plan

In 2007, three women – namely, Jasmin Nario-Galace, Mavic Cabrera-Belleza and Miriam Coronel Ferrer of the Center for Peace Education (CPE), International Women's Tribune Center (IWTC) and Sulong (Advance) CARHRIHL – just happened to see each other at Miriam College. In this rather incidental meeting, they got to talk about UNSCR 1325 and came to realize that there was absolutely no action in the Philippines about the seven year old Security Council resolution. Right there and then, they decided to spearhead efforts to raise awareness on UNSCR 1325. At this very moment, the space for the peace, women and human rights movements to converge on a collective project emerged – these movements organically and strategically coalesced to become domestic norm entrepreneurs of women, peace and security.<sup>8</sup> Individually, Nario-Galace has been known in national and international circles for her peace advocacy and anti-small arms campaign, particularly, in the International Action Network Against Small Arms (IANSA) Women's Network; Coronel-Ferrer, a university professor heavily involved in research and advocacy on human rights and peace, including her current role as the Chair of the Philippine Government peace panel in the negotiation with the MILF; and Cabrera-Belleza, a veteran women's movement activist both locally and internationally who is now working for the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) in New York.

By December 2007, the process on UNSCR 1325 began with an initial consultation workshop for government agencies and civil society organizations organized by these women and their respective groups along with the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW). The following year, they concentrated their efforts on lobbying the OPAPP to lead the government's creation of a national action plan on UNSCR 1325.

In March 2009, CPE, IWTC, Sulong CARHRIHL and OPPAP created a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) to prepare, organize and facilitate multi-stakeholders and regional consultations to craft a national action plan and its implementing strategies. To assist in the organization of regional consultations, other groups were brought into the PrepCom: for Luzon, it was the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG), an NGO that advocates for peace and justice through good governance; for Visayas, Paghiliusa sa Paghidaet-Negros (PsPN), a citizens' action group involved in peace-building work in Negros Occidental; and for Mindanao, the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID), another peace-building civil society organization. Another peace organization – namely, the Gaston Z. Ortigas (GZO) Peace Institute – joined the PrepCom as well as several women's human rights groups such as Women and Gender Institute (WAGI),<sup>9</sup> Mindanao Commission on Women (MCW),<sup>10</sup> and Lupasug Bangsa Moro Women Association, Inc.<sup>11</sup> Of all the groups that eventually comprised the PrepCom, only IID and WAGI had prior initiatives in popularizing UNSCR 1325 in the context of armed conflicts.

The women who are instrumental actors within their organization are well known in their respective movement circles. For example, Paz Bumogas of CCAGG, is a prominent woman leader and advocate of indigenous peoples rights; Sister Arnold Noel of Sulong CARHRIHL is a Servants of the Holy Spirits (SSps) nun and has been a lead figure in the convening of various peace and human rights groups in the country; Delia Locsin of PsPN is well known in Negros Occidental for her decades-long humanitarian and community development work primarily in the province's armed conflict-affected areas; Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan of IID leads her organization's initiatives on women and peacebuilding; GZO is led by Karen Tanada, daughter of an anti-Martial Law and democracy icon in the Philippines and is herself a major figure in the country's peace movement; Irene Santiago of MCW and convener of the group Mothers for Peace is one of the main movers of women's human rights in the country and served as the Philippine government peace panel negotiator with the MILF from 2001 to 2004; Aurora Javate-De Dios of WAGI is not only known in the Philippines as a leading women's human rights defender but also internationally because of her work as the Special Rapporteur in the Committee on the Status of Women in the UN among others; and Fatimah Salapudin of Lupasug Bangsa Moro Women Association Inc. is a prime mover of Muslim women's peace and development concerns in Southern Philippines.<sup>12</sup> These women, through their organizations and various involvements in peace and women's human rights issues, were also instrumental in lobbying for national legislations and policies.

Reflective of civil society engagements with the state, peace and women's groups have been active in advancing their advocacies and campaigns and having them translated into laws.<sup>13</sup> Since the 1986 People Power Revolution that overthrew an authoritarian regime, civil society groups have been constructively engaging the state to advance their political projects – on the one hand, they were still critical of the state; on the other hand, they also acknowledged the need to work with the state through legislative and collaborative politics. More recently, the latter has been prominent as indicated by women movement leaders serving in government positions, an example of which is Teresita Deles, another prominent women's movement icon and peace-builder, who now serves as the head of OPAPP. In the early 1980s, Secretary Deles helped establish PILIPINA, one of the first women's groups that distinctively carried a feminist line as well as Abanse Pinay, a women's party that participated in the first party-list elections in 1998. Additionally, the party was also a co-founder of the Coalition for Peace and served as the Executive Director of GZO. Internationally, Secretary Deles was elected as an expert-member in UN Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

Part of the process of collaborative politics is that of consultative and participatory practices that involved the cooperation between government and civil society actors. This paradigm was followed in the crafting of the national action plan on UNSCR 1325. The PrepCom thus organized several regional consultations in 2009 that were meant to map out the general situation of women, peace and security, women's peace-building initiatives, and recommendations on matters that should be included in a national action plan. For this purpose, the PrepCom prepared a working document that was used during the six regional cluster multi-stakeholders' consultations. These consultations targeted the participation of frontline peace and security government agencies such as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), OPAPP, PCW, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA), and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as well as peace and women's human rights NGOs.

A total of six regional cluster meetings were held beginning August 2009. After these consultations a consolidated draft national action plan was formulated and submitted to a national validation workshop for civil society organizations organized by the IWTC, held on 19 October 2009. A similar national validation workshop was held for government agencies on 26 October 2009. The resulting inputs from these national validation workshops were integrated in the draft national action plan and the preliminary text which was sent back to consultation and validation workshop participants for additional suggestions/recommendations. The resulting text, which would be the content of the country's national action plan on UNSCR 1325, was thus a product of collaborative politics. The regional consultations served as the space

to institutionalize women, peace and security. Procedurally, it weaved the various priority areas of women's concerns in armed conflict and peace-building from the perspective of *both* government and civil society; substantively, the language of the action plan was drawn from the voices of the participants. The creation of the national action plan on UNSCR 1325 was unprecedented in so far as government-civil society collaboration and consultative processes are concerned. Both instances are a far cry from contentious politics and protest strategies usually attributed to the women's movement. What emerged was a form of dialogic politics that integrated the voices of those who were part of the consultation processes.

As the PrepCom worked on the final draft at the end of the consultation process, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created the National Steering Committee on Women, Peace and Security (NSCWPS) in 2010 to institutionalize WPS through the implementation of a national action plan in the country. The respective Executive Order 865 is formally entitled "Creation of a National Steering Committee on Women, Peace and Security to Implement the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 and Providing Funds Thereof". Organizationally, the NSCWPS is headed by the OPPAP chair and is assisted by the chair of the PCW as co-chair. Members of the NSCWPS include the Secretaries of the Department of National Defense (DND), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as well as the chair of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and the head of the Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA). Operationally, it is mandated to "provide over-all policy direction, as well as manage, coordinate, monitor, evaluate and report on the implementation of the NAP and tap domestic and international donor agencies and NGOs for technical assistance and financial support" (WE Act 1325 2011, 26-27).

#### Women Engaged in Action on UNSCR 1325

Towards the tail end of Women's Month of 2010, the Philippine National Action Plan (NAP) on 1325 was launched at Miriam College on 25 March. During this year, 26 countries had their own national action plans and the Philippines was the first one to launch in the whole of Asia.<sup>14</sup> By November 2010, OPAPP enhanced the action plan indicators to make them bases for concrete targets for the next five years (We Act 1325 2011, 25). The finalized PNAP has four pillars – namely, protection and prevention, empowerment and participation, promotion and mainstreaming, and capacity development and monitoring/reporting. It contains fourteen action points that respond to key commitments under UNSCR 1325 framework.

Complementing the launch of the NAP in March 2010, the Women Engaged in Action (WE Act) on 1325 was established on 17 March 2010 as a loose national network of civil society groups working on peace and women's rights.<sup>15</sup> Of the 29 organizational members, 14 are largely peace NGOs, twelve are women's groups and

three are human rights and atrocities prevention organizations. Boxes 1-3 show the categories of these groups.

Additionally, four organizations that participated in the regional workshops also became founding members of the network.<sup>16</sup> Most of these organizations were also present during the National Validation Workshop on the Philippine National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 held on 19 October 2009. To date, the network has maintained its loosely-structured character: it does not have a formal organizational structure in order to move away from hierarchization (which is a distinctive feminist organizational principle) but has several focal points to serve as communication conduits for the network members. These focal points are: CPE and *Sulong* CARHRIHL as national focal points while the regional focal points are AKKAPKA for Luzon, PsPN for the Visayas and MCW for Mindanao.

### Boxes 1-3. Categories of Groups within the WE Act 1325 Network

#### Box 1. PEACE GROUPS

1. Center for Peace Education (CPE)
2. Aksyon sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan (AKKAPKA) or Action for Peace and Justice
3. Balay Mindanaw Foundation, Inc. (BMFI)
4. Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc.
5. Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG)
6. The Conflict Resolution Group (The CoRe Group)
7. Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (GZO)
8. Generation Peace Youth Network (GenPeace)
9. Initiative for International Dialogue (IID)
10. Kutawato Council for Justice and Peace, Inc.
11. Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC)
12. Panaghiliusa sa Paghidaet-Negros (PsPN)
13. Philippine Action Network to Control Arms (PhilANCA)
14. St. Louis College of Bulanao (SLCB)-Cultural Heritage Center

#### Box 2. WOMEN'S GROUPS

1. Al-Mujahidah Development Foundation, Inc. (AMDF)
2. Asian Circle 1325
3. Isis International
4. Katungod Han Samarena Foundation, Inc.
5. Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women's Association
6. Mindanao Commission on Women
7. Nisa Ul Haqq Bangsamoro, Inc.
8. Pilipina, Inc.
9. Pinay Kilos (PinK)
10. Saligan
11. Teduray Lambangian Women's Organization
12. Women and Gender Institute (WAGI)


#### Box 3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ATROCITIES PREVENTION GROUPS

1. Sulong CARHRIHL
2. Asia-Pacific Centre on the Responsibility to Protect
3. Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court

In reviewing the background and work of these organizations, it can be inferred that the scope of their work is from the grassroots all the way to the national level (some even have international links). With regard to organizational strategies, these networks are heavily involved in advocacy work, education and training, community-based involvement, networking, lobbying for legislation, research, and multi-

sectoral/actor dialogues. Many of them have also worked with government agencies such as the PCW, OPAPP and have been involved in training various state service providers. Additionally, there has been collaborative work between them in the areas of human rights advocacy, peace building and conflict resolution, and women’s human rights. In integrating the implementation of NAP in their work, much of their strategies involved education on UNSCR 1325 and other women’s human rights instruments as well as advocacy for women peace and security. Graph 1 compares the priority strategies of these groups as individual organizations and their strategies to advance the NAP.

**Graph 1. Organization and NAP Strategies**




### Network Initiatives

Individually, network members have programs on Women, Peace and Security (WPS); collectively, they advocate for the PNAP and monitor its implementation. Since its establishment, WE Act 1325 has been holding capacity-building and trainers’ training for its members, UNSCRs 1325/1820 and PNAP seminar workshops for its various constituencies including local government partners and security sector actors deployed in the Philippines and abroad (for UN Peacekeeping Operations). It has also worked with some local government units for the legislation of local action plans (LAP), and has networked with regional and global civil society organizations on various WPS activities. According to the most recent report of We Act 1325, the strengths of the network are in the areas of “policy review; capability building and training of various stakeholders; engagement with negotiators of on-going peace

processes; advocacy to increase women’s participation in peacebuilding in national and local levels; peace education; and media campaigns” (WE Act 1325 2012, 1). Placing these identified strengths with the action points of the PNAP, it becomes evident that the network has placed tremendous effort and resources on specific actions points under pillar 1 (protection and prevention), centering on training and localization initiatives. As for individual members’ initiatives on advancing the NAP, the most prominent additional areas of focus are pillars 2 (empowerment and participation) and 3 (gender mainstreaming). Graph 2 illustrates the tabulation of both WE Act 1325 and individual members (WE Act 1325 2012, 7-58).

Graph 2. Network and Members’ NAP Initiatives



Both collectively and individually, WE Act 1325 and its members are strong in education/training strategies to promote UNSCR 1325 and other relevant mechanisms on women, peace and security. In this regard, their strength as domestic norm entrepreneurs has been on championing WPS through knowledge-sharing and capability training. Currently, in the absence of any organized group to monitor WPS in the country, WE Act 1325 acts as the unofficial watchdog for the implementation of the NAP by the Philippine government. This is the case primarily because of the simple reason that the instrument mainly seeks to promote and embed WPS among state ac-

tors. In terms of assessing the impact of the network on popularizing the NAP, WE Act has yet to embark on an evaluation research. However, as of this writing, they are involved in assessing the implementation of the NAP by government agencies.

#### Localization But Not (Yet) Internalization

In light of international politics, the international norm on WPS emerged in the discursive arena of the UN. As mentioned earlier, the significance of the UNSC to come out with a specific resolution on WPS reflected the acknowledgement that the specific concerns of women in armed conflict situations as well as in conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building are central to international peace and security. Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, 41 countries have crafted their own national action plans. The Philippines, in 2010, was the first one in Asia to have done so.

The Philippine process of crafting the NAP was a product of two main components. First, the role of peace and women's rights organizations as domestic norm entrepreneurs was vital to ensure that the effort would not fall into the tragedy of government rhetoric. Taking on the call of the government to assist in mapping out a national situation on women, popularization of UNSCR 1325 to various constituencies, and consultations with multi-stakeholders on the content of the envisioned national action plan, these groups consolidated their efforts to realize these goals. The regional cluster consultations and the feedback mechanisms that ensued gave the whole process credibility and legitimacy. Second, the support provided by the Philippine government through OPPAP and the willingness of the civil society groups to work with them on the WPS political project was a clear indication of collaborative politics between state and non-state actors at the national level. In this light, it has become evident that working for peace is neither the monopoly of the government nor civil society but a political project of both. At the same time, collaborative politics was also evident in how the network evolved by having two distinct social movement groups – peace and women's human rights – converged in advancing the protection of women in armed conflict situations as well as ensuring a space for them to participate in various peace-building mechanisms and processes. Their discursive frame was clear – that of placing women in the country's peace and security discourse and practice.

The Philippines have been known to have several laws on women's human rights. These women-centered laws reflect the country's commitment to its international commitments, particularly, CEDAW and its Optional Protocol as well as other consensus instruments such as the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. The operationalization of commitments through its national legal frame essentially means that women's rights issues and concerns – particularly violence against women– have been institutionalized. This institutionalization paved the way for gender-consciousness to be part of the norma-

tive mindset of key actors advancing changes in society. In this regard, the normative contextual milieu for the peace and women's human rights groups to converge became possible. For example, in the process of crafting the NAP, they were seen as norm entrepreneurs that linked both national and local levels in the construction and (subsequent) implementation of the NAP. The presence of OPPAP as the institutional actor backing up the process reflected a government committed to the plight of women in conflict situations and its obligation to include women in the process of securing peace. The creation of the NSCWPS was instrumental in sending the message that the government, in collaboration with civil society actors, was serious in pursuing a gender-responsive peace process. Additionally, the presence of women in the government's peace talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF and the MILF indicated that the government was conscious of their commitment to institutionalized norms.

In terms of government panel membership in the last few years, women's participation has been increasing, as well as in the support system (secretariat, legal staff etc). For example, the government panel in talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF have two women negotiators – namely, Jurgette Honculada and Lourdes Tison – and the secretariat is also headed by a woman, Carla Villarta. The head of the government panel in the negotiations with the MILF is Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, from Sulong CARHRIHL and one of the conveners who organized for the NAP. Several members of the WE Act 1325 network also became part of this panel – Yasmin Busran-Lao as negotiator and Johaira Wahab as head of the government's legal team – are members of Nisa-Ul Haq Bangsamoro Inc. along with Raisa Jajuri who is part of the MILF legal team. Additionally, Fatimah Salapudin of Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women's Association and Froilin Tenorio of Teduray Lambangian Women's Organization are government representatives of Moro and indigenous groups respectively in the Transition Commission to flesh out the details of the FAB. In a conversation with some of these women, the common thread that ran across their message was that WPS has been an integral part of their work in the peace process. In fact, the FAB is the very first peace agreement of the Philippines that explicitly mentions the word 'gender' and provides for the rights of Moro women.<sup>17</sup>

With regard to the text of the WPS action plan, it was evident that the essence of the NAP resonated with the key thematic areas of UNSCR 1325, particularly, protection, prevention and women's participation. Owing to the gender-conscious mindset that resulted from the institutionalization of women's human rights norms in the country, both civil society and government actors essentially spoke the same protective and empowerment language. Thus, not many contentious points were raised in the crafting of the NAP.

Taking these points together, it can be said that the international norm on WPS was localized in the Philippine setting. However, it has yet to be internalized. For as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim, internalization reflects a "taken-for-granted" or unquestioned status of the norm that would bring about significant changes in the behavior of actors. Operationalizing this in the Philippine case means that the protec-

tion of women and girls in conflict situations, the participation of women in peace-building efforts, and the gender-balance in all levels of decision-making have been realized. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Women and girls continue to be the vulnerable sector of the civilian population in armed conflict situations. Whenever they are forced to evacuate their communities because of encounters between armed groups and temporarily seek shelters in evacuation areas, their burden of survival multiplies. At the same time, grassroots women in conflict-affected areas are deeply marginalized – they neither have the voice nor the opportunities to articulate their concerns. Although some may be “represented” by civil society groups or NGOs, their identified need is that of participation – unfortunately, gender dynamics in their community (and familial) contexts have prevented them to do so. There is no question that they want peace to be achieved – regardless whether they are included in the process or not. What they are more concerned about is daily survival for them and their families. These are the realities on the ground and these are the voices from the bottom that need to be brought up. Women from conflict-affected areas quite poignantly point out that it is good to know about UNSCR 1325 and the NAP but they do not seem to feel a lasting or sustainable impact on their lives. In their minds, it is important for those who are on “top” to take note of what their real needs are on the ground. It is in light of these ground insights that WE Act 1325 is stepping up its work as WPS domestic norm entrepreneur. In addition to conducting trainings to various sectors and stakeholders, they are now focusing their efforts on monitoring government responses in conflict-affected areas. This is a very important re-framing of their work particularly in the context of escalating violence in various parts of the country after the peace talks between the government and the CPP-NPA-NDF broke down as well as the military’s renewed pursuit of other armed groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in remote areas in southern Philippines. The network has realized that for WPS to resonate with its intended beneficiaries, the political project must move from localization to that of internalization of the norm.

## Notes

- 1 This term was used by the author in an unpublished doctoral dissertation entitled “The Evolution of Norms in International Relations: A Study on the Development of the Norm Against Wartime Rape in the International Criminal Court”.
- 2 As stated in Article 25, Chapter V of the United Nations Charter, “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”.
- 3 The Moros are subdivided into Iranun/Ilanun/Ilanum, Jama Mapun, Kalagan, Kalibugan, Maguindanao, Maranao, Sama, Sangil, Tausug, Yakan.
- 4 The Lumads have been considered as the indigenous communities in Mindanao and historically have not been converted to Christianity or Islam. They are composed of 19 groups inhabiting 19 provinces in Mindanao.

- 5 The term "imagined communities", as coined by Benedict Anderson (1983), pertains to the social construction of a community as advanced by people to believe that they belong to a specific or distinct collective.
- 6 According to the 2012 Government of the Philippines (GPH) and Muslim Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Framework Agreement, the Bangsamoro identity pertains to those "who at the time of conquest and colonization were considered natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands including Palawan, and their descendants whether of mixed or of full blood shall have the right to identify themselves as Bangsamoro by ascription or self-ascription".
- 7 Some of these groups were: Association of Women in Theology, Kapisanan ng mga Madre sa Kamaynilaan (Organization of Nuns in Manila), Women in Media Now, Samahan ng mga Kababaihang Manggagawa (Association of Women Workers), Samahan ng Malayang Kababaihan (Association of Free Women) and General Assembly Building Women for Reforms, Equality, Leadership and Action or GABRIELA.
- 8 Organizationally, CPE is a center focused on peace education and conflict resolution house in an academic institution while IWTC is an international non-governmental organization established after the 1976 UN World Conference on Women in Mexico City and Sulong CARHRIHL is a third party citizens' network that monitors compliance and non-compliance of CARHRIHL parties.
- 9 WAGI is a training, research and advocacy institute for women's human rights based at Miriam College.
- 10 MCW is a group composed of Christian, Muslim and indigenous women leaders in Mindanao that seeks to influence policies, particularly in the areas of peace and development.
- 11 Lupasug Bangsa Moro Women Association Inc. is a tri-people (Muslim, Christian and Lumad) women leaders group based in Mindanao that advances peace and development with a gender perspective.
- 12 As of this writing, Lauzon-Gatmaytan is a consultant for OPAPP; Javate-De Dios is a commissioner of the ASEAN Commission for Women and Children; and Salapudin is a member of the Transition Commission on the FAB.
- 13 For example, the women's movement did not waver in their resolve to have vital legislations to be passed: the Anti-Rape Law took five years to be legislated while the Anti-VAWC law took nine; the Reproductive Health Law was thirteen years in the making.
- 14 As of this writing, there are 41 countries that have their own national action plans. See National Action Plan Implementation at <http://www.peacewomen.org/naps/>.
- 15 See <http://weact1325.org/> for additional information about these groups.
- 16 These were AKKAPKA, MPC, PCICC and Pilipina, Inc.
- 17 Part VI (Basic Rights) of the FAB provides for "(g) Right of women to meaningful political participation, and protection from all forms of violence;" and "(i) Right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination in social and economic activity and the public service, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender and ethnicity".

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## Postkoloniale Gouvernementalität und „die Politik der Vergewaltigung“: Gewalt, Verletzlichkeit und der Staat

NIKITA DHAWAN<sup>1</sup>

In regelmäßigen Abständen finden sich auf den Straßen Indiens Protestierende in großer Anzahl zusammen, um ihren Groll über eine Vielzahl an Problemen auszudrücken, die von Korruption bis zu Stromausfällen, vom Preisanstieg der Zwiebeln bis hin zur US-Außenpolitik reichen. Protestversammlungen kommen recht häufig vor und werden von Demonstrationen, Aktionen des zivilen Ungehorsams, Hungerstreiks und der Verbrennung von Symbolen begleitet. Die indische Mittelschicht ist jedoch eher bekannt für ihre politische Teilnahmslosigkeit und ihrer Ablehnung von Straßenpolitik, weswegen sich die Teilnahme an diesen Versammlungen größtenteils auf AktivistInnen und Personen aus marginalisierten Gruppen wie der Arbeiterklasse, religiösen Minderheiten, Dalits<sup>2</sup> und Tribals (indigene Gruppen) beschränkt. Dies ist oftmals auch in Bezug auf feministische Anliegen der Fall, obwohl geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt (wie Mitgiftmorde, Ehrenmorde, Abtreibung, Kinderheirat und Vergewaltigung in der Ehe) Frauen über Kasten, Klassen, Religionen und über die Stadt-Land-Gegensatz hinweg betreffen. Trotz einer lebendigen Frauenbewegung und einer starken Zivilgesellschaft mit einflussreichen NGOs sind an feministischen Kampagnen gegen geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt und wirtschaftliche Ungerechtigkeit, welche versuchen, ein Bewusstsein für die verfassungsmäßigen Rechte von Frauen zu schaffen und den Staat unter Druck setzen, um Gesetze zu reformieren, nur wenige Frauen aus dem Mittelstand und aus höheren Kasten beteiligt. Die jüngsten Anti-Vergewaltigungsproteste in Indien, die als Reaktion auf die Gruppenvergewaltigung und den grauenhaften Angriff auf eine junge Studentin im Dezember 2012 in der Hauptstadt des Landes stattfanden, waren daher eine Ausnahme in jeglicher Hinsicht. Die beispiellosen landesweiten Demonstrationen, an denen ein breites Spektrum der indischen Bevölkerung – von jungen AkademikerInnen bis zu Hausfrauen teilnahmen – bestätigen Lauren Berlants (2009) These, öffentliche Sphären seien Affektwelten, in denen öffentliche Wut, Empörung und Frustration einen deliberativen