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DIFFERENCE, DIVERSITY, DIFFRACTION: CONFRONTING HEGEMONIES AND DISPOSSESSIONS

Proceedings of the 10th European Feminist Research Conference, 12–15 September 2018

edited by Astrid Biele Mefebue, Boka En, Sabine Grenz, Ksenia Meshkova, and Angeliki Sifaki
Proceedings of the 10th European Feminist Research Conference. The conference was organised by the Göttingen Diversity Research Institute and the Göttingen Centre for Gender Studies, and took place from 12 to 15 September 2018 at the University of Göttingen. It was co-organised with ATGENDER and FG Gender.

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Starting with the first European Feminist Research Conference (EFRC) in 1991, the EFRC now has a tradition of nearly 30 years. The topics debated and investigated at these conferences have included the relationship between Eastern and Western European feminist researchers (Ålborg, 1991), technoscience and technology (Graz, 1994), mobility and the institutionalisation of Women's, Feminist and Gender Studies (Coimbra, 1997), borders and policies (Bologna, 2000), post-communist feminism and the power relations between West and East (Lund, 2003), citizenship and multicultural contexts (Łódź, 2006), gendered cultures in knowledge and politics (Utrecht, 2009), the politics of location on a local as well as global scale (Budapest, 2012), and the challenges of intensified capitalism (Rovaniemi, 2015).

The focus of the 10th EFRC, entitled ‘Difference, Diversity, Diffraction. Confronting Hegemonies and Dispossessions’, was twofold. The terms ‘difference’, ‘diversity’ and ‘diffraction’ were chosen to emphasize the interdisciplinarity of the broad feminist field of feminist research and refer to a topic central to Gender Studies: the social construction of difference and inequality on the one hand, and the recognition of marginalised experiences and subject positions on the other. In the face of growing right-wing populist movements, anti-feminist and anti-queer backlashes, forced migration, austerity, and climate change, these concerns take on renewed relevance. ‘Confronting hegemonies and dispossessions’ was meant as a call to interrogate and challenge the current global situation in which economic, cultural, as well as knowledge hegemonies and social hierarchies create inequalities, unliveable environments, and precarious lives.

Each EFRC conference has introduced innovations. For instance, the second installment expanded the scope of the conference series beyond European researchers. The third invited interdisciplinarity by crossing the boundaries between the humanities and the social and the natural sciences. The fourth included practitioners and policy makers. The fifth inaugurated a new stream on archives and documentation. During the sixth conference, possibilities for merging European feminist associations were discussed. As a result of this, ATGENDER, the European Association for Gender Research, Education and Documentation, was founded in 2009, bringing together the organisations ATHENA, AOIFE and WISE. Since then, ATGENDER has been organising the triannual EFRCs together with local partners. The 10th EFRC was organised in collaboration between ATGENDER, the German Gender Studies Association (Gender e.V.) and the Gender Network of
Lower Saxony (LAGEN) as well as the local hosts, the Göttingen Centre for Gender Studies and the Diversity Research Institute at the University of Göttingen.

The 10th EFRC marked an anniversary – a very special occasion with more than 600 paper presentations organised in 190 panels as well as workshops, book presentations, and other events in English and German. The conference also featured four keynote lectures with speakers from inside and outside Europe and round tables for discussing current analyses, presenting new theoretical and methodological approaches, and debating the manifold forms of the institutionalisation of Gender Studies.

The keynotes and round tables addressed a number of different topics, usually in pairs of one keynote and one round table dedicated to each topic, including Trans and Disability Studies, ‘anti-genderism’ and anti-feminism, decoloniality and feminisms beyond Europe, as well as antiracism and border politics. Another important topic of the conference was the de-institutionalisation and de-funding of Gender Studies in Europe. The situations in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italy, where funding for Gender Studies programmes has been cut and some of them have even lost their licenses, have made it clear that this has become a serious issue in Europe.

The panels of the conference were divided into eleven thematic streams that represented various fields in Gender Studies as an interdisciplinary field: History, Literary Studies, Queer Studies, Social Movement Studies, Sociology of Work, Film Studies, Trans Studies, Feminist Theology, Violence Research, Feminist Epistemology, and many others.

The conference committee sought to invite and welcome academics, activists, and practitioners working in various fields of interest and of political concern. The conference proceedings follow the same basic goal, while focusing on contributions from the academic field. This collection brings together early-career researchers as well as established academics; theoretical, methodological, and empirical considerations; and more conventional academic articles as well as research sketches and essays.

The contributions come from two sources: eight articles were first published in the peer-reviewed, open-access Open Gender Journal. An additional nine contributions were selected by the editorial team of the conference proceedings and represent the diversity of topics, formats and approaches present at the conference, accounting for eight of the conference streams.

The collection starts with the welcome note given at the conference. In it, Sabine Grenz reflects on the development of the field of Gender Studies with a focus on the reproach of Gender Studies as being ‘too political’. She sketches out in what sense Gender Studies can be seen as political and argues that in
democratic societies, political relevance is no argument against academic value. Rather, it is a matter of fact. To be conscious of and reflect on it, is a strength of gender research.

After this, the first main section of the proceedings – ‘Social Movements, (Conflicts of) Solidarity and Hope through Collective Activity’ – includes contributions by Johanna Leinius; Sara Morais dos Santos Bruss; and Louise Barrière.

Johanna Leinius discusses the ways in which solidarity across difference can be fostered in meetings between social movements. Based on the writings of postcolonial feminists and her own fieldwork during the preparation of two feminist encounters (the 5th Dialogues between Knowledges and Movements and the 13th Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Encuentro) that took place in Lima, Peru, Leinius develops three aspects for shaping such solidarity: recognising the intersectionality of struggles, acknowledging ‘unmapped common ground’ as a shared basis for working together, and imagination as a mode for bridging the gap between oneself and the Other.

Within the field of Digital Media Studies, Sara Morais dos Santos Bruss critically examines LoSHA (the ‘List of Sexual Harassers in Academia’), a list published on Facebook containing the names of prestigious academics in India accused of sexual harassment. Tracing the controversy within the Indian feminist movement following the list’s publication, Morais dos Santos Bruss demonstrates how quotidian digital acts have the potential of giving voice to the most marginalised within local movements for social justice.

Drawing on ethnographic research at punk-feminist Ladyfest festivals in Germany and connecting them to bell hooks’ pedagogy of hope (as well as Alison Piepmeier’s adaptation thereof), Louise Barrière suggests that these festivals serve as educational spaces in which ‘hopeful activism’ regarding music scenes and society at large is fostered through engagement with feminist theory and practice. However, as Barrière shows, issues of racism and white supremacy remain under-addressed even within these spaces.

The next section – ‘Negotiating Gender and Sexuality: Representations, Self-Identification and Post-Feminist Discourse’ – includes contributions by Frauke Grenz; Willian Maciel Krüger, Marcela Alberti, and Alexandre do Nascimento Almeida; and Leila Zoë Tichy and Helga Krüger-Kirn.

Frauke Grenz analyses a working paper on the introduction of sexual diversity education into school curricula in Baden-Württemberg, Germany, as well as a petition against that working paper. Using Critical Discourse Analysis, Grenz shows how while the working paper and the petition pursue very different goals,
the latter draws on and transforms discourses from the former, which itself ties into a heteronormative approach.

William Maciel Krüger, Marcela Alberti, and Alexandre do Nascimento Almeida draw on Conversation Analysis to analyse categorisation practices in conversations among travestis and other trans people in Porto Alegre, Brazil. They examine how these categorisations are tied to body modifications and argue that globalised terms around ‘trans’ do not map easily onto local Brazilian categories such as ‘travesti’ and ‘transsexual woman’.

Drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis, Leila Zoë Tichy and Helga Krüger-Kirn examine discursive strategies in German parenting magazines. They argue that within an individualistic framework, ‘motherhood’ is both connected to conservative gender roles and aligned with an individualistic post-feminist discourse, reshaping conservative models of motherhood and gender.

The third section – ‘Recognition, Visibility and Representation’ – includes contributions by Sandy Artuso; Giulia Iannucci; and Burcu Taşkin.

Sandy Artuso explores autobiographies of trans people, analysing the role of gender and gender assignment in their narratives. Artuso shows how the moment of naming or of changing a name plays a special role in the life story and identity of the authors – be it the story behind a new chosen name or a conflict between one’s own authority and self-determination and external voices that question this authority.

Giulia Iannucci’s article discusses the persecution of lesbian women during National Socialism in Germany and argues for the inclusion of lesbians into Germany’s Erinnerungskultur (culture of remembrance). The basis for her argument is a paradox in the treatment of lesbian women during National Socialism in Germany: While they were not criminalised as ‘lesbians’, they were persecuted for being asozial (anti-social) and being deviant as women, with many incarcerated in Ravensbrück, a women-only concentration camp.

Burcu Taşkin looks at the parliamentary impact women have had in Turkey since 1999. She observes that even though parliamentary representation of women in general elections has increased from 4% (1999) to 15% (2015), women’s political impact in terms of doing substantial parliamentary work such as negotiating women’s or feminist issues has been reduced. Her analysis demonstrates the impact of institutional changes in parliament.

Section 4 – ‘Varieties of Othering’ – consists of contributions by Inka Greusing; Juliana Moreira Streva; Martina Tißberger; and Cita Wetterich.

Inka Greusing analyses the construction of Engineering as a ‘male domain’ in contemporary Germany. Based on three key concepts that she identified in her data – the ‘mathematics hurdle’, the ‘exceptional woman’, and the ‘marriage
Greusing uncovers the invisible mechanisms that constitute the field of Engineering in a male-dominated hierarchical and heteronormative way.

Juliana Moreira Streva draws on Lélia Gonzalez’ concept of articulação (articulation) to examine the interplay between colonial othering, reproductive labour, and new forms of women’s striking in Latin America, specifically in Brazil. Streva traces the history and commodification of reproductive work in Brazil and examines peripheral women’s recent collective struggles and solidarity.

Martina Tifßberger analyses the subjectivation effects of occidental politics and representations of Muslim people in Austria. She refers to two topics that have been much-discussed in German-speaking countries – the alleged sexual assaults by Muslim men on New Year’s Eve 2015 and the headscarf – and interprets them as dispositifs in which racism, gender, and sexuality intersect. Using extracts from interviews, she illustrates effects of anti-Muslim racism present in childhood, in the educational system and in the working place.

Cita Wetterich examines how male gender roles, masculinity, and manhood are negotiated within the field of Feminist Security Studies. Referring to a case study on displacement on the Central Mediterranean Route, she argues that it is worthwhile to explore men as individuals and groups not only in the role of perpetrators or soldiers but also in situations of male insecurity and victimhood.

The final section – ‘From Fiction to Reality back to Fiction: Culture as a Potential Change Maker’ – includes contributions by Saltanat Shoshanova; Orquídea Cadilhe and Laura Triviño Cabrera; and Denise Labahn.

Saltanat Shoshanova explores art projects created in reaction to the ‘anti-gay-propaganda law’ passed in Russia in 2013. Her article discusses artistic strategies used to oppose the homo-discriminatory rhetoric within the Russian society, which was strengthened by the law, focusing on works of art that appeal to subversive affirmation as a strategy of confronting the oppressive narratives set from above.

Orquídea Cadilhe and Laura Triviño Cabrera show how popular culture can be used to make male domination and gender binarism a subject of discussion in the academic classroom. Providing a comparative analysis of John Updike’s novel ‘The witches of Eastwick’ and George Miller’s film adaptation thereof, they deconstruct representations of femininity and masculinity as regimes of truth, using their analysis as a means to expand student’s critical literacy.

Denise Labahn investigates the figure of the vampire in fan fiction on ‘True Blood’ and ‘The Vampire Diaries’. Labahn argues that the connection between vampires as an Other and fan fiction as a space for experimentation and exploration allow for the emergence of queer utopian visions of kinship and reproduction. However, as Labahn shows, heteronormative ideals remain powerful even within such fan fiction.
We would like to thank all the contributors to the conference proceedings and hope that you will enjoy exploring the variety of topics and approaches that can be found in the contributions.

The editorial team
Astrid Biele Mefebue, Boka En, Sabine Grenz, Ksenia Meshkova, and Angeliki Sifaki
Difference, Diversity, Diffraction. Confronting Hegemonies and Dispossessions
Sabine Grenz (sabine.grenz@univie.ac.at)

Opening speech for the 10th European Feminist Research Conference and joint annual conference of ATGENDER (The European Association for Gender Research, Education and Documentation) and the Gender Studies Association of Germany (Gender e.V.), 12–15 September 2018 in Göttingen, Germany
Sabine Grenz

Difference, Diversity, Diffraction. Confronting Hegemonies and Dispossessions

This year, our annual conference takes place under the roof of the European Feminist Research Conference (EFRC) that has been organised since 2009 by ATGENDER in cooperation with local partners. The theme of the 10th EFRC is “Difference, Diversity, Diffraction”, pointing to the many different – and also conflicting – disciplinary, theoretical and methodological approaches within the trans-/interdisciplinary field of Gender Studies. The subtitle “Confronting Hegemonies and Dispossessions” displays one major goal of gender research: doing research that makes the world a more democratic place. The book of abstracts illustrates – on its more than 500 pages – the breadth and depth of gender research.

If we take the year 1968 as a starting point, researchers within Women’s, Feminist and Gender Studies (WFGS) have been producing knowledge for at least 50 years. The European Feminist Research Conference was first organised in 1991 in Aalborg, Denmark. Now, despite the fact that there are already institutionalized structures such as this conference, Women’s, Feminist and Gender Studies – including disability, intersectionality, postcolonial, queer, trans and even more studies in an ever-developing research field – are still an emerging field of research. The acceptance of Gender Studies within academia has increased over the years, even if the situation is not the same everywhere. Acceptance in Sweden is, for instance, higher than in Germany or Greece (at least as long as the Sweden Democrats have not taken over). Nevertheless, in some circles, Women’s, Feminist and Gender Studies still have low epistemic status and, in some areas of academia, are still met with scepticism. This is not only a subjective gut feeling but has been thoroughly investigated by scholars – some of them among us – such as Maria do Mar Pereira (2017).

If we look into the history of other academic research areas, we can see scepticism surrounding their beginning as well. I just want to give one example: mechanical engineering. Around the turn of the 20th century, mechanical engineering – now one of the “hard” sciences – was still struggling for acceptance. As we have learned from Tanja Paulitz (2010), engineers were faced with the

1 Chair, Gender Studies Association of Germany, 2016–2018
2 I take this order of the study fields and its abbreviation from Pereira (2017). For reasons of readability, I mainly use “Gender Studies” only, referring to all of them.
assumption that their work was only technical and not academic at all. Hence, their place within academia was also questioned once, though for different reasons. Where they were perceived as being “technical”, Gender Studies is sometimes seen as “political”. Recently, this analogy has crossed my mind, and I have wondered whether there could be a parallel placing of Gender Studies as one of the really “tough sciences” in the future.

Feminists have conducted intensive research on what “political” can mean in academic knowledge production. The relationship between power and knowledge is a key research area for gender scholars. What we have gained from this research so far is the insight that there is no knowledge production outside this power-knowledge connection and, thus, no knowledge production that is entirely apolitical.

One good example for this is the beginning of history as an academic discipline. As Falko Schnicke (2015) has shown, historians in the 18th and 19th centuries were eager to prove that historians could only be male. Even though from their perspective, the academic historian needed qualities that had been associated with womanhood – such as emotions and imagination – women were declared incapable of true historical research because they were perceived as easily overwhelmed by their emotions, whereas men were seen to be able to master theirs. Thus, historians tried to define history as a male science in order to exclude the possibility of women historians. Would anyone nowadays still argue that this move was not politically motivated?

Both history and mechanical engineering developed as androcentric research fields in which women have been marginalised. Women’s, Feminist and Gender Studies have positioned themselves as opposed to androcentric attitudes. They have challenged the androcentrism in engineering and history – and all other academic fields – and have made it transparent. They have also developed alternative knowledge strategies – which Sabine Hark (2005) has described as “dissident participation”.

Not only did some research fields develop as masculine. Research itself has been shaped by a dominant male perspective. In the history of science, feminist researchers have not only analysed the “special anthropology” (Honegger 1991) that was established to limit bourgeois women and exclude them from the public. They have also found that working class women were confronted with even harsher treatment. To give just one example, investigated by Katja Sabisch (2007): In the 19th century, prostitutes were used for medical experiments on syphilis. Furthermore, anti-racist feminist researchers have investigated racialised knowledge production that sexualises Black women and creates a distinction between Black and bourgeois white women. The list of such politicised
knowledge production could be continued endlessly, including the pathologisa-
tion of trans people and the devaluation of disabled people.

The problem is that these historical developments still resonate in academic
knowledge production. Gender Studies scholars have undertaken this historical
research and they have also investigated social relations – in which exactly this
kind of knowledge still plays a role. They have analysed knowledge that is prone
to support the use of power of some social groups over others and unfit for
democratic societies based on equality.

There are more political issues, such as the question of who chooses which
research is worthy of funding. (We will discuss this in the first roundtable to-
day.) Other questions include: How are knowledge traditions developed? Who
chooses which inventions and discoveries will be remembered? Why are women
researchers and other “Others” still being written out of the histories of the sci-
ences as active participants?

In other words: When someone says Gender Studies is political or too po-
litical, what do they actually want to say? I would argue that within democratic
societies, the political relevance of any research should be reflected upon. We
should want to improve our social world on a global scale with fundamental re-
search in order to enhance the possibilities of participation for everybody.

How can we imagine any social or humanities research as not being of po-
litical relevance? These fields either investigate social relations or cultural rep-
resentations. They analyse how our societies are constructed, reflect critically
on the status quo and therefore necessarily have political relevance. However,
there is a difference between being of political relevance or having a political
goal in mind generally (such as the improvement of democratic societies) and
the distortion of results by pursuing a more or less hidden political agenda or
ideology.

Some of the basic research within Women’s, Feminist and Gender Studies
has led to technical innovations that are highly valued nowadays. However,
most focus on innovations of our perspectives on the social world. They are a
driving force in the development of social relations. As such, fundamental or
basic research in Gender Studies is not necessarily per se political but certainly
of political relevance. And, like engineering, certain fields of Women's, Gender
and Feminist Studies need fields of applications as well as transdisciplinary ap-
proaches or applied sciences.

Where the engineering sciences were confronted with suspicion because
of their technicality, Women’s, Feminist and Gender Studies are sometimes
met with suspicion because of their political as well as social relevance and im-
pact. Where mechanical and other engineering fields developed as masculine research areas, Gender Studies made this androcentrism one of their fields of critical reflection. And where mechanical engineering was confronted only with academic scepticism, Gender Studies has recently become the target of political ideologues.

Political and religious ideologues fighting against Gender Studies react to changes brought about not only by women's and sexual-liberation movements but also by economic and technical globalisation and neoliberal changes – as Stefanie Mayer and Birgit Sauer (2017) have pointed out. However, one of the reasons Gender Studies is as contested as it is may well be its political relevance. Another reason might be that the term “gender” has been functioning as an empty signifier for nearly everything that people might complain about, such as economic changes that have led to precarity for many (Mayer/Sauer 2017).

In our call for papers and overall concept, we already included right-wing populism and its focus on Gender Studies: We planned round tables and a keynote to address the funding situation of Gender Studies as well as right-wing attacks against the field. However, we did not anticipate what happened during the summer, when with Hungary, a European government actually announced plans to abolish Gender Studies from its universities.

To come to the end of my speech: I believe that we are experiencing a decisive moment. Will academic scepticism towards Gender Studies finally be overcome as a result of right-wing targeting? Will academics recognise that the attacks on Gender Studies are merely a precedent for a broader interference in academic freedom? Or will they align themselves with a right-wing populist opposition to Gender Studies – either by actively pursuing it themselves or by watching it, uninterestedly and passively? The international protest against the Hungarian plans to abolish Gender Studies has given rise to some hope that it is the former that might be the case and that the general level of acceptance of Gender Studies might rise higher than it already has.

There is hope that one day in the future, we will become as “tough” a research area as others already are. One sign for such a development is the fact that this conference is fully funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Ministry of Science and Culture of Lower Saxony (MWK). This funding allows us to be more inclusive, make gender research more visible, and show that we are debating theories instead of agreeing to one imagined “gender ideology”, as right-wing populists have been suggesting.

I want to stop here and close with one nota bene: The Open Gender Journal, a new peer-reviewed open-access journal was developed as the permanent publication site of our annual conferences. Everybody presenting at this confer-
ence is invited to submit articles to the journal based on their presentations. You will find more information about it in the book of abstracts.

In this sense, I wish everybody an exciting conference!

References


Social Movements, (Conflicts of) Solidarity and Hope through Collective Activity
Constructing Solidarity Across Difference in Feminist Encounters
Johanna Leinius (leinius@uni-kassel.de)

Abstract: In this article, I discuss how solidarity across difference can be fostered in meetings between social movements. Based on the writings of postcolonial feminists and an analysis of two social-movement encounters that took place in Peru, I develop three aspects of solidarity across difference: the recognition of the intersectionality of struggles, the acknowledgment of “unmapped common ground” as a shared basis for working together, and imagination as a mode for bridging the gap between oneself and the Other. I illustrate my argument with examples from the 5th Diálogos – a meeting between urban feminist, women’s, and anti-mining movements, scholar activists and artists – and the 13th Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Encuentro to show how the discursive construction of difference interwove with organizational decisions and the hegemonic ordering of difference to open or constrict the spaces in which solidarity across difference could be developed.

Keywords: Solidarity, Postcolonial Theory, Feminism, Social Movements, Peru

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Johanna Leinius

Constructing Solidarity Across Difference in Feminist Encounters

Encountering Difference, Practicing Solidarity

The question of how to foster solidarity across difference has been a central issue for feminists for decades (Grewal/Kaplan 1994; Mohanty 2003; Vargas 2003). On the one hand, those articulating visions of global sisterhood have argued for an already existing commonality between women that can provide the basis for recognition and solidarity (Morgan 1984). On the other hand, others maintain that creating non-colonizing solidarity across difference is near impossible within contemporary structures of power and privilege (Mohanty 2003). The latter writers hold that only through the slow work of re-arranging subjectivities can solidarity be worked towards (Spivak 2009). How solidarity across difference is constructed in practice, however, is not often systematically scrutinized through empirical work.

Following Juan Ricardo Aparicio and Mario Blaser (2008, 85), I argue that the privileged sites for the analysis of how solidarity across difference is enacted are the encounters between social movements. In this article, I read two feminist social-movement encounters through the lens of postcolonial feminist theory. Postcolonial feminist theory includes the work of Black feminists (Hill Collins 2000), Women of Color (Moraga/Anzaldúa 1981), and Third World feminists (Mohanty 2002), among others, and is concerned with understanding, challenging, and transforming dominant power relations that are based on intersectional hierarchies of difference. In Anglo-American contexts, these approaches are sometimes also subsumed under the label “transnational feminism”. In Latin America, however, “transnational feminism” primarily denotes the work of feminists for international organizations and NGOs. I have chosen to use “postcolonial feminism” as an umbrella term for these heterogeneous approaches.

Bringing these approaches into a dialogue, I develop three aspects of solidarity across difference: the recognition of difference as valuable, the acknowledgment of the “unmapped common ground” as a shared basis for working together, and imagination as a mode for bridging the gap between oneself and the Other. Understanding these three aspects as more than individual dispositions, I argue that the latter are collectively created modes of encounter that shape how one meets those seen as different and how one deals with situations
that disrupt one’s expectations of how these meetings are supposed to develop. The three aspects of solidarity across difference are embedded in the power relations of the societal context in which one encounters the Other.

The social-movement encounters analyzed took place in Lima, Peru, but were transnational in scope: the 5th Dialogues between Knowledges and Movements (Diálogos entre Saberes y Movimientos, in the following: Diálogos) were a meeting between urban feminist, rural women’s, and anti-mining movements, scholar activists, as well as artists, mainly from Peru and Latin America that aimed to forge connections across previously unbridged differences. The 13th Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Encuentro (XIII Encuentro Feminista Latinoamericano y del Caribe, in the following: EFLAC) was part of a series of feminist regional encounters that have taken place in Latin America since the 1980s and are widely recognized as central in constructing a “self-consciously regional feminist political identity” (Alvarez 2000, 1).

My analysis is based on a long-term research collaboration with the activists organizing the Diálogos. During my four fieldwork stays, which lasted from one to several months, I collected documents; accompanied the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of the two encounters; conducted 31 in-depth interviews with the organizers and participants of the two encounters; and discussed my preliminary analysis with the activists involved. In accordance with the wishes of some of the activists, I have anonymized the interviews. While I was involved in all aspects of the organization of the Diálogos and developed my research in co-operation with those organizing the encounter, my role in the EFLAC was more limited. I participated in the open plenary sessions in preparation of the EFLAC and co-facilitated one of its sub-plenaries, but was not privy to all internal debates (for more information, see Leinius, forthcoming). The findings presented here are based on a situational (Clarke 2005) and poststructural discourse (Diaz-Bone 2006) analysis of the two encounters.¹ In my research, I strove to perceive difference not as an empirical phenomenon to be measured and explained, but rather to center difference as an approach to research that is aware of the colonizing bias of research that reifies, categorizes, and hierarchizes difference and seeks to challenge these tendencies. My analysis has been nourished by the conversations and discussions I had with the activists of

¹ By mapping all the actors that make up a situation, situational analysis allows the creation of a complex picture of the context in which people engage in interactions and co-produce discourses. Created from a feminist standpoint concerned with the way difference is articulated, it has been used also as a supplementary method for discursive analyses interested in the link between discourse, human interactions, and the material world (Clarke/Friese/Washburn 2015; Marttila 2015). I traced the discursive logics of the two meetings, the way in which participants of the meetings identified with or challenged the latter, and the dynamics at the plenaries of the two meetings concerning the taking of voice and the politics of translation that took place.
the Diálogos and the EFLAC, especially Mar Daza, Gina Vargas, Luna Contreras, Diego Saveedra, Raphael Hoetmer, and Agus Daguerre.

In what follows, I first sketch the contours and context of the two encounters. Second, I explain my methodological and analytical approach. Third, I identify three aspects of solidarity across difference in feminist postcolonial writing, which I trace in the discourses and dynamics before, during, and after the encounters. Fourth, I discuss the continuing influence of the hegemonic ordering of knowledge and power on the possibilities for communication across difference able to consolidate solidary relations. I end with an evaluation of the ambivalences of solidarity across difference.

The Development of the Two Encounters

Embodied Encounters Across Difference: the Diálogos

The Diálogos took place from 21–23 September 2014. This was the fifth social movement encounter organized in a workshop format by the Programa Democracia y Transformación Global (PDTG), an activist collective based in Lima that focuses on popular education as well as supporting and producing knowledge with social movements. During the three days of the meeting, a total of 60 people participated, with an additional ten facilitators. The 34 Peruvian participants were activists from eco-territorial struggles in the provinces (eleven), representatives of NGOs (four), of LGBTQ-collectives (five), leftist parties (three), art collectives (three), academia (two), and political grassroots initiatives (two). There was one feminist activist, one representative of the student movement, and one Afro-Peruvian activist. 26 participants came from abroad. The 20 participants from Latin America mainly represented eco-territorial struggles or were academic activists. There were five scholar activists from Europe and two from Africa. The PDTG’s facilitation team was composed of ten persons, of whom four were from Peru, one from Colombia, one from Bolivia, one from Argentina, and three from Europe (the Netherlands, Spain, and myself from Germany).

The Diálogos were financed by the Spanish NGOs EntrePueblos and ACSUR-Las Segovias as well as the Dutch NGO Broederlijk Delen – three organizations that have their roots in solidarity activism with the global South. The Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO) provided funding from its line of support for

2 The PDTG was founded in 2002 at the National Major University of San Marcos (Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos), one of Peru’s largest public universities, as a post-graduate program within the Faculty of Social Sciences. In 2007, the PDTG decided to leave university in order to be closer to the social movements it worked with, constituting itself as an NGO and publishing house.
international seminars and dialogues between researchers. The network of the Popular University of Social Movements (UPMS 2016), which held a meeting in Lima directly after the Diálogos, sponsored the travel and accommodation costs of their members and provided funding for other participants as well.

The Diálogos took place in a building of the Missionary Society of St. James the Apostle in Barranco, a quiet middle-class neighborhood right at the seashore in the southern part of Lima. While the building was chosen for organizational and budgetary reasons, its use as the center of the Missionary Society’s activities in Peru influenced the dynamics of the Diálogos. The presence of crosses and other symbols of the Catholic faith impacted upon several of the participants. One of my interview partners, for example, commented that she felt inhibited by the presence of the crosses, as “many times, you cannot talk freely when they take you to a Convent” (interview 21/11/2014).

On the first day of the Diálogos, the participants were encouraged to reflect on their experiences with social-movement activism, linking their personal history with social-movement history by constructing timelines, first individually and then collectively. On the second day, commonalities and divergences between the timelines were discussed and linked to the context in which the movements interacted. Based on this critical appraisal of the possibilities for articulating dissent, the struggles of social movements and the alternatives they offer were mapped in a collective cartography (Risler/Ares 2014). The meeting culminated on the third day with a debate on how to promote these alternatives.

Most of the work was done in groups, who then presented the results of their work in plenaries. The groups changed depending on the task to be completed, and participants were repeatedly encouraged to reflect on the composition of their groups. Two panels were organized for the plenaries. In one, activists and researchers presented their view on the link between extractivism, patriarchy, and coloniality; in the other, activists discussed the alternatives their movements had put into practice.

Engaging Diversity as Resource: the EFLAC

The EFLAC, attended by about 1400 women – of which 43% were from Peru – took place from 22–25 November 2014 in a public park in the center of Lima.

3 In what follows and if not indicated otherwise, quotations were originally in Spanish and have been translated by me.
4 Of the 1466 women registered, 1391 women participated in the encounter. 615 were from Peru, 117 from Mexico, 91 from Nicaragua, 88 from Colombia, and 87 from Bolivia. Some participants (including myself) were women from Europe or North America. 62% of the participants were older than 30; 20% were younger; the rest did not give their age when registering (13 EFLAC 2014c, 40-41).
The decision to convene the encounter there was, according to the organizers, “a proposal for ‘taking’ public space and invading it materially and symbolically” (13 EFLAC 2014c, 20). It was also a reaction to the criticism that the venue of the previous EFLAC in Colombia, a four-star hotel, had provoked.

Preparations began in July 2012 with a meeting attended by 40 activists. In 2013, the three most influential Peruvian feminist NGOs – the Centro de la Mujer Peruana Flora Tristán, the Movimiento Manuela Ramos, and the human-rights organization DEMUS – took charge of the process (13 EFLAC 2014c, 34). Fundraising was difficult, as the funding agencies that had financed previous EFLACs struggled with diminishing resources in the wake of the financial crisis (13 EFLAC 2014c, 21). In the end, financial support was provided by the International Cooperation Working Group on Gender (MESAGEN) in Peru, UN Women, the European Union, the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), the United Nations Population Fund, the German Diakonie, and the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ). Additional funds came from the registration fees of participants, the remaining funds of the previous EFLAC, and crowdfunding. The funds raised were, nonetheless, only about a quarter of the resources available for the previous EFLAC (13 EFLAC 2014c, 22). Stipends were given with a preference to indigenous and peasant organizations from the Peruvian provinces that had participated in one of the three pre-encounters organized in the cities of Cuzco, Huancayo, and Chiclayo. The 36 stipends available covered registration fees, travel costs, accommodation, and food.

During the mornings of the encounter, panel discussions were organized, with up to seven panelists from Peru and Latin America invited. In choosing the panelists, “the diversity of perspectives, identities, and Latin American political proposals” (13 EFLAC 2014c, 43) was taken into account. Panelists were supposed to discuss “Interculturality and Intersectionality” (day one), “Sustainability of Life” (day two), and “Body and Territory” (day three). After the panel discussions, the audience was divided into sub-plenaries to discuss in smaller groups – in practice, the sub-plenaries were organized on only two of the three days (13 EFLAC 2014c, 43). In the afternoons, self-organized workshops took place, followed by cultural events. When registering, one could apply for the organization of a workshop, providing a title, a list of organizers, a brief summary of the content, and information as to whether the workshop spoke to one of the three topics of the morning plenaries. Altogether, 120 activities were proposed.

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5 Each panelist had seven minutes for presenting their reflections on what the topic of the panel meant to them, followed by a round of comments and questions from the audience, a brief round of responses from the panelists and another round for the audience.
of which 63 were accepted – the organizers tried to accommodate all applications by proposing the merging of proposals on the same topic (13 EFLAC 2014c, 64). Most workshops did not, however, subscribe to one of the three themes (13 EFLAC 2014c, 70). The organizers explained this by pointing to the function of the EFLAC as a meeting space for transnational feminist networks and groups, which strive to present their perspectives and proposals irrespective of the overarching themes of the respective EFLAC. On the last day, the general assembly filled the morning slot; in the afternoon, the EFLAC concluded with a march.

Preparing the Ground for Solidarity Across Difference

Concerning the question of how to translate between postcolonial feminist writing and the discourses and dynamics before, during, and after the two encounters, I draw on Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier’s (1992) approach to analyzing the “lesbian feminist social movement community”. Arguing that the lesbian feminist movement in the US is a community built on heterogeneous local groups, they maintain that political solidarity is based on three aspects: the construction of boundaries that distinguish the solidary group from the groups whose domination is challenged, the creation of a shared political consciousness, and the formation of shared practices and strategies to resist domination (Taylor/Whittier 1992, 107, 110). These aspects align with poststructuralist work on the discursive construction of alliances between different subjects, as developed, for example, in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985). Laclau and Mouffe, however, assume the ubiquity of modernity; the potential existence of social worlds organized according to different logics is not part of their reflections. Poststructuralist writing also tends to introduce a distance between abstract thinking and lived experience. Guided by a poststructuralist perspective on social movements (Leinius/Vey/Hagemann 2017), I use the systematization of Taylor and Whittier as the starting point for my analysis.

The Boundaries of Intersecting Struggles

Postcolonial feminist work generally underlines the restrictive aspects of borders, be they discursive, material, or political (Anzaldúa 1987). Political solidarity, however, “foregrounds communities of people who have chosen to work and fight together” (Mohanty 2003, 7) – a way to identify who belongs to these communities is indispensable. There is no predefined solidary group, but rather a continuous construction of “mutuality, accountability, and the recognition of common interests as the basis for relationships among diverse communities”
Leinius: Constructing Solidarity Across Difference in Feminist Encounters

(Mohanty 2003, 7). Gloria Anzaldúa goes further than Chandra Mohanty in arguing in favor of inclusive identities as a basis for political solidarity: “Though most people self-define by what they exclude, we define who we are by what we include” (Anzaldúa 2009, 245). Political solidarity, according to her, is based on the embodied capacity to cross multiple borders, on *conocimiento*:

“Conocimiento es otro modo de conectarse across colors and other differences to allies also trying to negotiate racial contradictions, survive the stresses and traumas of daily life, and develop a spiritual-imaginal-political vision together.” (Anzaldúa 2002, 571)

Like Mohanty, Anzaldúa foregrounds experiential commonalities and common aims, but unlike Mohanty, does not locate them in relation to a structural position within global capitalism (Roshanravan 2014, 52; Carty/Mohanty 2015, 90pp.). For her, “difference-based alienation becomes shared identity” (Keating 2005, 247). Having experienced the policing of the boundaries of social movements based on exclusive identity claims, she concurs with Audre Lorde, who underlines that “[t]here is no such thing as a single-issue struggle, because we do not live single-issue lives” (Lorde 1984, 138).

Political solidarity, consequently, is not so much about one common cause, but about recognizing the intersectionality of different struggles as common cause. Anzaldúa frames border-crossing activists as *nepantleras*: threshold crossers that refuse exclusive forms of belonging and are involved in various struggles, sometimes having experienced the oppression that is challenged directly, sometimes struggling in solidarity. Lorde has similarly argued that the common ground for coalitional work is the “very house of difference rather than the security of any one particular difference” (Lorde 1982, 226).

Both encounters started from the acknowledgment that difference is central for struggling together. How difference was perceived, however, shaped how the encounters engaged with it and formed how and where the participants of the encounters were able to articulate difference. The central problem of the Latin American feminist movement identified by the Political Manifesto of the EFLAC, published with a call for participation as an invitation to debate (interview 09/11/2014), was that “diversity has neither been valued nor understood as a concrete possibility for confronting discrimination in all its forms” (13 EFLAC 2014b, 1). Feminists need to “learn to accept and manage the conflicts, the dissent, and the diverging visions” (13 EFLAC 2014b, 3), because difference is interwoven with inequality. Meeting those different from oneself, therefore, inevitably results in conflict. Conflict needs to be turned into dispute, because “[o]ur energy and capacity for change is sustained in political-cultural dispute, enriching it with the voices of new actors whose presence renews
and deepens democracy as far as our feminisms are being Blackened, indigenized, cholified, transgendered, lesbianized, ‘de-normalized’.” (13 EFLAC 2014b, 3)

Propelled by the presence and voices of “new actors”, dispute enables feminists to sustain their “energy and capacity for change”. The actors characterized as “new” to feminism – notwithstanding their decade-long activism in the feminist movements of the continent – are categorized as Black, indigenous, cholol, transgender, and lesbian. Latin American feminists are therefore characterized, implicitly, as ‘normal’: ‘white’, mestiza, cis-gendered, and straight. These feminists also retain the power to define who counts as different. The distinction between the unmarked feminist subject and those cast as ‘diverse’ also shaped how these groups were expected to participate in the encounter. While all participants had registered as individuals, ‘diverse feminists’ were seen mainly as representatives of social movements. Stipends to participate in the encounter, for example, were granted to organizations, who could then decide whom to send. The panelists for the morning panels were also chosen “taking into account the diversity of perspectives, identities, and Latin America political proposals” (13 EFLAC 2014c, 43). These categories were challenged during the encounter. The Declaration of the “Lesbians, Bisexuals, Transgender, Sexuality and Gender Dissidents that Participate in the XIII EFLAC”, for example, proclaims, “We want to repeat that our political and sexual identities are a project of everyday emancipation that works side by side with the strategies of feminism, because transgender, bisexual, lesbian, feminist persons are also black, disabled, indigenous, young, sex workers, and mestizas.” (13 EFLAC 2014a, §8)

The Diálogos also saw difference as a resource for emancipatory politics, but did not see it as a fixed identity category. The urge to categorize was, instead, defined as a main feature of the oppressive system, which “creates borders of identity and dichotomous positions in order to exercise more control over people’s life. It hierarchizises us” (Daza et al. 2016, 88). In this context, being able to encounter each other and build bonds is already “revolutionary” (Daza

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6 Cholo/chola denotes those who have moved to the coastal cities from the Andean highlands. In hegemonic discourse, which has equaled the Peruvian coastal cities to modernity, this means that they had to leave behind their indigenous beliefs and customs. Those characterized as cholo/chola continue to be marked as different and their rural Andean roots continue to be of importance for how they are interpellated, but they are believed to be “less provincial” than their Andean counterparts (Greene 2006, 328).

7 Mestizo/mestiza are derived from mestizaje, a notion that is part of the Latin American modernizing and civilizing project. Asserting “whiteness” as the hegemonic norm, it denotes the political and cultural project of creating a homogenous and unified nation through the “whitening” of Latin American populations through “racial” and cultural mixing (Safa 2005, 307).
et al. 2016, 88). The Diálogos, contrary to other meetings between social movements, were consequently based on the conviction that “one learns from difference and complementarity” (Daza et al. 2016, 99).

When choosing whom to invite to the Diálogos, identity categories presuming difference were nonetheless taken as a starting point. However, the need to identify on the basis of these categories was suspended once the encounter began. In an exercise about the construction of timelines, participants were asked to put forward their own interpretation of their affiliations when choosing the struggle for which they would construct a timeline. The exercise started with the participants’ moving around and, according to the instructions of the facilitator, building groups according to their “native” language, the color of their eyes, and their main struggle, in this order. The groups talked about what their main struggle was and decided on a group name, which resulted in the four groups “Territory and Peoples’ Sovereignty”, “Peasant Urban-Rural Resistance”, “Transversality of Struggles”, and “Eco-Feminists, Killjoys and Transfeminist Diversity”. The groups then presented themselves so that participants could change group if so desired. The exercise itself started with each group member writing down a personal memory that she had lived in relation to the struggle she identified with and sharing it with the group. These memories served as the basis for constructing a timeline for the last 30 years of the struggle.

Throughout the Diálogos, the organizers repeatedly underlined that identifications were shifting, multiple, and transgressing exclusive identity categories, striving to underline the various intersections between experiences and struggles obscured by the divides set up by exclusive notions of difference.

Creating a Shared Political Consciousness Based on the Unmapped Common Ground

The recognition of the intersectionality of struggles does not, however, displace the centrality of a “politics” of solidarity as context-specific practice that is linked to specific embodied struggles and the “need to tackle multiple and ‘shifting currents of power’” (Sandoval 2000, 218; see Eschle 2004, 70). This entails, as Lorde emphasizes, the need for self-transformation as well as collective transformation:

“I urge each one of us here to reach down into that deep place of knowledge inside herself and touch that terror and loathing of any difference that lives there. See whose face it wears.” (Lorde 1984, 113)

Only through the recognition of the interdependency between women, she argues, can difference take its place as a “fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic” (Lorde 1984, 111). She continues
that “[o]nly then does the necessity for interdependency become unthreatening” (Lorde 1984, 111). The recognition of interdependency does not imply the overcoming of difference – which would run counter to Lorde’s understanding of political activism as creative work sparked by difference. Contrary to exclusive solidarity-building, as observable, for example, in nationalist or populist movements, Mohanty underlines that “[s]olidarity is always an achievement, the result of active struggle to construct the universal on the basis of particulars/differences” (Mohanty 2003, 7). As knowledge is always partial, the desire to learn from each other and find out what binds one’s experiences together becomes central. Solidarity across difference, then, is built on the “unmapped common ground” and not on what is already believed to be known. The suspension of recognition, together with the desire to de-center one’s understandings of the world provides the shared political consciousness needed.

The Political Manifesto of the EFLAC proposes positing the body as a focal point through which diverse struggles can be linked (13 EFLAC 2014b, 1). The violence that women’s bodies in particular experience “is what unites us; our struggles pass through it and it provides us with bridges”, as one of the organizers of the EFLAC underlined in one of the preparatory open plenaries. The EFLAC accordingly took place under the slogan “For the Liberation of our Bodies” (13 EFLAC 2014b, 1). All women experience this violence differently, the discourse on the EFLAC holds, which results in a diversity of identities and struggles. If engaged with correctly, this diversity can enrich the feminist movement – first, by forcing feminists to reflect on the power relations within and between movements, and second, by provoking conflict that can then be turned into dispute. The ability to critically reflect on power relations and one’s own positionality within them is put forward as the political consciousness needed to strengthen the Latin American feminist movement by turning conflict into dispute. The capacity for reflection became a marker for identifying the legitimate subjects of the encounter: Suggestions for inviting particular well-known activists of, for example, the autonomous and Afro-Latin feminist movement, were rejected because the people in question were characterized as not willing to reflect on their opinions (fieldwork diary, §334). The Diálogos started, like the EFLAC, with a recognition of diversity:

“We all have differences, but we encounter each other in this difference. We start from the knowledge we have, a knowledge situated in territory, but which is at the same time a knowledge that has to be generalized between all.” (PDTG 2014, 28) However, they drew different conclusions to EFLAC, concluding that the grounds on which alliances can be built is the recognition of the interdependency be-
between all beings: “It is the relations that constitute us; we are with others, for others, through others; life is in the relations, not in the individuals” (PDTG 2014, 67). This stance was fruitful in linking struggles that, in Peru, usually do not readily intersect, such as, for example, LGBTQ and indigenous struggles, as one of the indigenous activists I interviewed confirmed.

“The issue is to see, not only think ‘ah, because she is a lesbian, because she is homosexual’, but to see that she is a human being. And a human being needs and deserves a life in dignity. Consequently, this helps very much, for us, in understanding ourselves more. This I have learned in dialogue, the solidarity, the sisterhood; I think this is what the word ‘solidarity’ means.” (interview 21/11/2014)

Recognizing the situatedness of knowledge and the subsequent need to share knowledge in order to gain a broader view provided the shared political consciousness of the Diálogos. The unmapped common ground was visualized by actually mapping social movement struggles and the alternatives they propose onto maps of Peru, Latin America, Europe, and Africa. In addition to these four groups, one group mapped conceptual debates in Latin America. In the presentation of the maps, the group that had mapped the struggles in Peru admitted that there were many places that they had had to leave empty because they did not know what struggles were developed there. They concluded – and in the report on the encounter prepared by the organizers, this statement was marked in bold – “we need more communication, more dialogue or encounters with other organizations” (PDTG 2014, 100).

**Imagination as Shared Strategy**

For postcolonial feminists, creativity and imagination are indispensable for any practice of building border-crossing solidarity:

“Imagination, a function of the soul, has the capacity to extend us beyond the confines of our skin, situation, and condition so we can choose our responses. It enables us to re-imagine our lives, rewrite the self, and create guiding myths for our time.” (Anzaldúa 2009, 248)

According to Gayatri Spivak (2000), imagination is needed because there is a limit to one’s knowledge of the Other. Instead of making solidarity impossible, the gap between oneself and the Other foregrounds the ethical move to supplement complete intelligibility through imagination: “Radical alterity – the wholly other – must be thought and must be thought through imagining” (Spivak 2000, 99). Therefore, practices need to be built that can bridge difference without the need for intelligibility. These practices need to be based on education in
– as Spivak calls it – the “uncoercive rearrangement of desires” (Spivak 2004, 526), because there is “a limit, an unknowable alterity, an excess, which elides comparison and exchange but to which equality must extend” (Birla 2010, 97). Solidarity is a “problem of relation rather than a problem of knowledge” (Spivak 2000, 105). In practice, this means striving to supplement the gap between oneself and the Other, but recognizing that this gap can potentially never be bridged (Spivak 2009, 36fn18; Spivak 2000, 111). Consequently, Spivak is wary of social movements’ hasty claims to solidarity with oppressed groups. According to her, the basis for solidarity is the transformation of subjectivities at both sides of the colonial difference into subjects capable of ethically relating to the Other, of perceiving themselves as subjects, and of imagining a different future. This requires a sustained engagement with the Other and a persistent desire to learn. Spivak maintains that this is slow work (Spivak 2009, 35).

In both encounters, the belief in the possibility of change served as a powerful emotion able to supplement the gap with the Other. My interview partners affirmed that the Diálogos and the EFLAC were important because they opened spaces in which alternatives could be visibilized and discussed. The hope this engendered “fills you with, I don't know, this energy that yes, it must be done” (interview 05/07/2016). The mere fact of getting together and exchanging experiences of struggle mitigated the feeling of being alone. In a context dominated by the common sensation that there is no alternative to the current system (Dinerstein 2015, 186; Issa 2007), exacerbated by a state that represses social movements and denies the legitimacy of their claims, creating spaces in which experiences of struggle can be exchanged is powerful in itself.

The need to translate between different worlds and languages to achieve at least partial intelligibility created barriers for participation especially for indigenous and peasant women. This issue was made explicit in the Diálogos, for example, when an indigenous woman acknowledged that in a previous Diálogos event,

“many times we think many things but we do not say them, we do not express them for fear or because they could make fun of us or could say [things]. And another situation is that I want to say something and I do not know how to say it; therefore, I rather stay silent and accept the things that I see.” (PDTG 2010, 42)

During a conversation with an indigenous woman at the Diálogos that are at the center of my analysis, she echoes this sentiment, telling me that

“[s]ometimes, I am lacking the words. I would have liked to ask the compañeros, but I lacked the words and so I kept quiet. I would love to know more.” (Fieldwork diary, §866)
Her lack of education, which she underlines several times in the conversation, made her feel incapable of articulating her desire to learn. Listening, however, was powerful in creating hope and the feeling of sharing struggles, as she affirmed:

“I loved to learn from and listen to the experiences of the compañeros. I come from Puno and we did not know of the other struggles, we thought that it was only us who were in this, but listening to the compañeros from Bolivia, from Ecuador, Colombia, seeing that they are the same struggles, we are not alone.” (fieldwork diary, §867).

Because the Diálogos linked experience to emotion, translation – at least on an emotional level – is made possible even without intelligibility, as a trans activist that I spoke to also underlined: “[The Diálogos are] something that touches the persons very much and brings them together with love” (interview 13/11/2014). But as the indigenous woman’s comment discussed above also shows, it seems to be easier to recognize oneself in those involved in similar struggles. The Diálogos, however, hold that emotions can bridge different struggles: “It was the affects created from the sharing of our experiences that allowed the profound and sincere dialogue between lesbians and indigenous leaders, for example.” (Daza et al. 2016, 83) Recognizing the shared humanity of all participants moved participants to acknowledge proximities that had been denied before. A lesbian activist, seeing that the indigenous women present “were strong women generating political practice, generating ideas” (interview 05/07/2016), for example, acknowledged her own Andean background and used it to build bridges to indigenous and peasant struggles. Positive emotions were underlined, which created an atmosphere conducive for listening and hearing. Yet, this emphasis on positive emotions made the articulation of unease or even rage difficult, hindering the confrontation of inequalities and discrimination.

The emphasis on conflict-turned-dispute in the EFLAC allowed for these emotions to be articulated. Accepting that different political positionings inevitably lead to conflict, dispute was also centered in the way the meeting was structured and facilitated. It was, therefore, possible to articulate frustration. Positing reflection as a tool for converting conflict into dispute, however, tended to serve as a governing tool to cover the contradictions of the encounter. On the one hand, the confrontations that marked the meeting were discursively converted to dispute and used as a proof that the encounter had “worked”, but criticism that targeted the structure of the encounter could not be made to count. When Afro-Latin women staged an intervention protesting their invisibility, their intervention was taken as a call to further “commit to rethinking processes”
(fieldwork diary XIII EFLAC, 880), but did not lead to changes in the structures the women had protested against. On the other hand, the disengagement of indigenous and peasant women from the EFLAC, as evidenced by their decreasing presence in the morning plenaries as well the decrease in contributions from indigenous and peasant women, was not even recognized as an issue. In the report on the EFLAC, the organizers write:

“The indigenous women present in the EFLAC proposed to open a debate about the realities and demands from different visions and cosmovisions: it is necessary to decolonize feminism, propose new forms of relating ourselves, recognizing the contributions of both movements and establishing common points of action: the struggle against all forms of violence, discrimination and racism, the impunity, the violation of human rights.” (13 EFLAC 2014c, 74)

There was no declaration of indigenous and peasant feminists and the contributions that were made were rather heterogeneous. They, therefore, seem to have “proposed to open a debate” by their mere presence. The evaluation of the encounter by the organizers in general shows how they were able to fix the meaning of conflicts in a way that allowed them to not question their conduct or the structure of the encounter: When talking to them after the EFLAC, they overwhelmingly characterized the encounter as “lovely” and “without conflict” (fieldwork diary, 5971 pp.), even though there had been several conflicts that had structured the interactions at the encounter, among them the conflict about whether to allow male-identified trans activists to participate. Arguably, the encounter had also ended with a split in the Latin American feminist movement between the autonomous faction of the communitarian feminists and a more institutional faction (see Leinius 2020).

The Rootedness of Solidarity Across Difference

One obstacle to building solidarity across difference in both meetings was the continued influence of the “lettered city”: Literary critic Angel Rama (1996) uses this term to denote how in Latin America, notions of progress and modernity are intermeshed with processes of racialization and patriarchy to create a powerful dichotomy between the city as the “locus par excellence of modernity and the cradle of the (lettered) intellectual” (Aparicio/Blaser 2008, 71) and the countryside as a stand-in for “the traditional or primitive and its stereotyped incarnation, the Indian” (Aparicio/Blaser 2008, 71). In the logic of the lettered city, education, literacy, and urbanity are seen as characteristics of the modern, “white” individual living in the city, who possesses a “natural” superiority over
the rural or indigenous subject (Schutte 2011, 190). Class politics intermesh with the logics of the lettered city to create exclusions.

In both encounters, Spanish served as the exclusive language of communication. Translation mainly meant translation from and to other dominant languages, and not the indigenous languages spoken in Peru. In the EFLAC, translation services were organized for English, Portuguese, and French. In the Diálogos, some of the academic participants spoke a mix of Spanish and Portuguese, assuming that everyone present would understand them effortlessly. Indigenous languages were present in symbolic gestures, such as greetings, but were not intelligible as a mode of communication. The organizers of the Diálogos recognized the issue, as one of my interview partners confirmed:

“Everybody speaks Spanish, well, because normally, the Quechuas are bilingual. We are the monolinguals, in this way we are more- our communicative capacities are poorer than theirs. But at the same time, it is very different when one speaks in one’s mother tongue than when one speaks a second language, your expressive capacity frees itself, and this is particularly strong in women, because they tend to be the ones that speak less Spanish and the ones that are more marginalized in the processes.” (interview 19/11/2014).

They did not actively engage in finding a way to mitigate the exclusions tied to the normalization of Spanish, however. The “lack of words” diagnosed by the indigenous participant of the Diálogos I quoted above is, on the immediate level, a matter of language. On a deeper level, it is intermeshed with configurations of space, class, gender, and education. The “expert” panels and discussion rounds of the EFLAC, for example, mirrored the format of an academic conference. The Political Manifesto, in tone and style, was an academic treatise that, though it was framed as an invitation to debate for all women of Latin America, interpellated mainly educated feminists. While not necessarily the intent of the organizers, those not addressed were cast as lacking the capacity to engage in the dispute striven for. They were welcome to bring their difference as a resource, but were not included in the community of feminists able to make their voice count. Similarly, the Diálogos positioned “experts” in both plenary sessions, and participants were supposed to direct their contributions to the issues that were identified as most urgent by the organizers. Discussions were geared towards translating between concepts stemming from academic worlds – such as extractivism and patriarchy – and the embodied experiences of the participants. Group work, which was seen as a primary space for the exchange of experiences, the creation of affect, and of learning, was conditioned on the need to produce results to be presented in the plenaries. This privileged those familiar
with abstraction and systematization, fluent in Spanish and comfortable with speaking in front of large audiences.8

The Amazon region and its peoples remained invisible in both meetings: They were not mentioned in the report on the EFLAC, no Amazonian representative had been invited to speak at the panels, and there was only one workshop9 that referred to the Amazon as a point of identification. In the EFLAC program, the workshop is described as organized solely by Spanish feminists, invisibilizing the Amazon even further. While it is difficult to estimate how many Amazonian women attended the EFLAC, as the only marker of identity asked about when registering was country of origin, the high travel costs from the Amazon region to Lima might have inhibited the participation of those who might have wanted to attend. The conditionality of the granting of stipends – they were allocated with preference to organizations that had participated in one of the three pre-encounters, all of which took place in cities in the Andean highlands – also increased the threshold of participation. The invisibility of the Amazon is also observable in the Diálogos. The PDTG has a close relationship with the eco-territorial struggles in the Andean highlands and invited indigenous and peasant participants from these regions. There have been efforts to approach the Amazonian movements, but, as a former member of the PDTG stated, “we did not have a link to the Amazonian movement” (interview 05/11/2014). Additionally, the federations in the regions were not interested in participating in initiatives they perceived as steered by “urban” activists.

Conclusion

Solidarity across difference does not emerge spontaneously but is tied to the organizational decisions, discursive logics, and pedagogical practices that structure how subjects encounter each other. There are aspects that heighten the possibilities for solidarity across difference, among them recognizing the partiality of knowledge and experience, the interdependency between struggles, a desire to learn from each other, and a willingness to use one’s imagination to stand in for that which remains unintelligible. Encounters across difference oriented towards mutual learning, creating affect, and emphasizing the multiplicity of identities can therefore be powerful in contesting the distancing of place and

8 This was recognized as a continuing issue to be challenged by the organizers.
9 The workshop was called “Self-knowledge about Menstruation” and was organized by the feminist collective “Amazons for the Amazon” (Las Amazonas por Amazonas). Based in the city of Iquitos, they describe themselves as a “feminist collective that creates spaces for the personal and artistic development between women”. It appears to be a joint project of young Spanish and Peruvian feminists (Las Amazonas por Amazonas 2017).
history that reifies exclusive identity categories. When difference is contained in prefigured boxes and seen as the property of certain groups instead of a relationally constructed marker, the terrain for solidarity across difference shrinks, as the dynamics at the EFLAC have shown. The desire to maintain control of what was happening at all times during the EFLAC, I would argue, resulted in the encounter reinforcing the certainties of the organizers. This made “opacity feel like transparency and ignorance like knowledge”, as Marguerite Waller has described the repercussions of the feminist tendency to privilege stability (Waller/Marcos 2005, xxv). Marginalizations and exclusions were not recognized as such, which inhibited critical reflection on one's own positions within power relations that were posited as a central capacity in the organizers' discourse. To challenge this view, a perspective that asks about power and privilege is needed; a perspective that asks, “Up to what point does [the encounter] not turn into another space of specialization for some who know very well how to conduct themselves there, well, and not a place of more collective creation” (interview 22/06/2016)? This continuous critical questioning is at the root of enabling practices of solidarity-building across difference that neither reify nor mobilize difference as a resource but, instead, as a starting point for mutually discovering commonalities and intersections in the fight for emancipation.

References


Queering Feminist Solidarities.
#Metoo, LoSHA and the Digital Dalit
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Abstract: At the height of international visibility for #metoo, a crowd-sourced list was published on Facebook that contained the names of prestigious Indian academics, accusing them of sexual harassment. The list was controversial not only in that it became a viral phenomenon (and resulted in immediate questioning of the legitimacy of internet culture for politics) but also in that these accusations did not contain information on the circumstances of the alleged crimes, so as to protect the victims’ anonymity. The list was quickly dubbed “the list of naming and shaming” and was met with its strongest criticism from within the feminist movement itself, as established feminists argued publicly against such methods and against the queer Dalit leaker of the document, Raya Sarkar. This paper examines these conflicts of solidarity as conflicts between transnational and local positionalities and argues for the possibility of digital spaces as environments that invite a queering of identity politics, constructive disagreement, and transformative justice, rather than mere conflict and its resolution through a homogenous feminist identity.

Keywords: Postcolonialism, Feminism, Social Media, Intersectionality, Sexual Harassment

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Introduction

The hashtag #metoo – popularized after revelations surfaced about mainstream-media mogul Harvey Weinstein’s sexually predatory behaviour – seems to be a defining signifier for contemporary feminisms. Since the Weinstein affair, #metoo has “gone viral” and become a cipher upon which feminist movements are hanging their work on sexual and gendered violence. The hashtag has been criticized, reduced, reused, misunderstood and celebrated again and again in different locations across the globe, connecting discourses that seem geographically distant and locally distinct. Media outlets across a wide spectrum have acknowledged, commented on, or dismissed that women* are disproportionately exposed to violence and harassment on the basis of their gender. Most surprising, however, seems to be the way victimhood is articulated in a shamelessly accusatory way when it exists beyond the frame of white, heterosexual, and bourgeois femininity. In fact, the “Me Too” movement, sans the hashtag, was created for black and lower-class women* by activist Tarana Burke, who was looking to support and heal those who continue to be the least acknowledged victims of sexual violence (A Verso Report 2018). Picking up on this lineage, I argue for the strength of the internet to inform intersectional and marginalized communities of feminists through the example of an Indian list of alleged sexual harassers in academia. The list, which came to be known as LoSHA (“List of Sexual Harassers in Academia”), was crowd-sourced, managed and leaked by Raya Sarkar, a young queer Dalit anti-caste activist, who first posted it on Facebook to circulate amongst their peers. The list was quickly dubbed a campaign to “name and shame” (Menon 2017) and was met with its strong criticism from within the

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1 I understand that “woman”, as any category, can never exhaust itself and does not describe a specific or essential body or being. For this reason, I frame the category of woman* (with the asterisk) as inclusive and understand it to extend to anyone that self-defines or is read as “woman”. I understand the difficulties of juxtaposing womanhood – however constructed – with victimhood, but given that a large majority of women* across locations have, in some way or another, experienced violence, harassment, or misconduct due to their gender and (assumed) sexuality, I understand the category of woman* to be, to a certain extent, framed by violence, although I also want to stress that it is not only women* who experience such gendered forms of violence. I stand also by the category of victimhood, despite attempts to frame the encounter with sexual violence in more empowering terms. Marking a person as a victim allows the person to understand the origin of the crime within a perpetrator. It marks solidarity amongst victims, which has shown itself precisely through these shared vulnerabilities, making individuals feel less alone by providing space for sharing pain. I use the term thus in defiance of “victim-blaming” and anti-feminist stances that have made it an insult.
feminist movement itself, as established feminists expressed worry over such emerging digital methodologies. The list came to be understood as an expression of Dalit-Adivasi-Bahujan (DAB) feminism, thus situating itself at the position of India's most marginalized women*. In addition to such a reading of LoSHA as Dalit expression, the list needs to be read as the inhabitation of the “digital queer” (Gajjala 2019, 151pp.), which effectively circumvents claims to authentic singular identities, addressing instead a globalized digital public sphere.

The following article will explore the “list-statement controversy” (as this series of events came to be known) from the angle of digital media studies. I will first describe how the list-statement controversy developed to then turn to the positionalities at play in more detail. I argue that there is a public intimacy that emerged among list-supporters due to the intersectional angle and multiplicity of positionalities it could offer articulation to. What imagined positionalities and methodologies inform the LoSHA conflict and how does the digital complicate or assuage these problems?

I will argue that the non-upper-caste, non-heterosexual status of the leaker of the list, Raya Sarkar, necessitated the digital's multiplicity to become a point of rupture for Indian feminism. I read LoSHA as having its lineages in offline spaces of feminist representation as well as in a transnational digital connectivity that enables kinship networks across difference (Paik 2014). The anxieties about such a 'viral' object verbalized by upper-caste (savarna) Indian feminists inadvertently reveal and repeat historical anxieties about caste and a non-savarna subaltern national authenticity that queered the politics of identity in the post-colony. Further, given that both the accusers and the accused travel within the transnational spaces of academia and the internet, LoSHA's political relevance must be contextualized beyond the borders of Indian territory, in resonance with a global public. I will in closing argue that the list harnesses a multiplicity common in digital spaces that questions the capacity for identity politics as authentic and homogenous group expressions.

At the moment of leaking, I was a visiting scholar at the English and Foreign Language University in Hyderabad (EFLU), using the library of the Anveshi Research Centre for Women's Studies for my research. As a white-passing non-Indian scholar who had spent most of her academic life in Western institutions, my assumptions and knowledges about caste-based discrimination, India-specific stereotypes and violence are predominantly mediated either through academic texts or conversations such as the ones I had at Anveshi. My understanding of LoSHA was deepened through an array of interviews undertaken in Bangalore in the aftermath of the list. Here, I was supporting and organizing budding conversations about consent and feminist infrastructures at the Centre for Internet
and Society (CIS), as a response to the centre's former board member Lawrence Liang's being implicated by the list. I was soon discussing LoSHA at cultural institutions such as the Alternative Law Forum; the Srishti School of Art, Design and Technology; and elsewhere, and learning from the practitioners dealing with its immediate implications. I am greatly indebted to the people offering insights, including Jasmine George from Hidden Pockets, Darshana Mitra from ALF, Jasmeen Patheja from Blank Noise, and Padmini Ray Murray from Srishti, as well as, finally, numerous students, feminists and digital practitioners at Anveshi, EFLU, and CIS.

Although their perspectives were central to informing my position as a Western academic, I do not want to pit these informants against suggestions of “authentic” Indianness carried forward by the statement. Instead, the analysis presented here takes a less-travelled route, as it focuses on the digital aspects of the list and its enabling capacities for queer politics that undermine an understanding of identities as essentially authentic or static. As an early-career feminist researcher of digital infrastructures and computational imaginaries, I acknowledge and relate to the convergence of offline and online lives that the #LoSHA-feminists arguably experience on a daily basis. This suggests that communities inhabiting digital technologies in a similar manner can indeed produce ideological overlaps between them that complicate the traditions of identity politics and allow for solidarity across difference – but this by no means makes identities and expressions ahistorical or decontextualized. While the list and its subsequent defenders make clear demands about identity politics and the disavowal of caste in discussions on gender-based violence, the list also problematizes the question of being inside and outside, of activity and passivity, and of an indigenous Indian feminism that perpetuates a framework that privileges heterosexual savarna cis-women.

LoSHA in the Spotlight

LoSHA is the first object of discussion in India to visibly signal towards the supposedly already global #metoo movement. The list’s publication occurred as a response to an article by Christine Fair on HuffPost, which was taken down

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2 “Less-travelled” does not mean that I am treading in entirely unexplored territory. Radhika Gajjala’s research in particular has been incredibly helpful, and at the time of #LoSHA, I was following a group of Indian digital feminists around Gajjala on Facebook and Twitter. Some of what I learned came from these conversations, and Gajjala’s recent book “Digital Diasporas” (2019) has documented many of the discussions that took place at the time. I am thus especially grateful for this book, as these conversations have become citable references.

3 I use the hashtag here to separate the list as an object from the list as a discourse and the list- and discourse-supporters, whether they themselves contributed or not. “#LoSHA-feminists” then refers to all pro-list feminists, while “LoSHA” refers to the list itself. “#LoSHA”, in turn, refers to the discussions emerging around the object of LoSHA online, where often the hashtag was used to mark an article or statement as referring to the list.
from the website on 23 October 2017 (Dasgupta 2018). In the article, the writer names her harassers under the hashtag #himtoo and gives explicit detail as to how the continuity and systematic repetition of sexual misconduct led her to leave academia. The article marks a shift in focus; Fair argues that conversations on sexual violence should not pretend that these instances were crimes without origin but instead focus on the perpetrators (Fair 2017). Responding to this impetus, Raya Sarkar published a list of names on Facebook, warning friends and followers of academics with problematic and predatory behaviour, but also asking for further contributions. As a result, the list named around 70 prominent and left-intellectual academics as predators, beginning with one of Fair’s main perpetrators, Indian academic Dipesh Chakrabarty. The list, crowd-sourced from students in higher-education institutions across India, was said to first have been conceived of as a “whisper network” (Gajjala 2018) with which to warn students about professors that were potential predators. As such, it would not lay claim to any judicial mechanisms, but merely record instances of violence and harassment for future students. Such networks have existed for as long as sexual predators have, but this instance was quickly understood to be replacing judicial mechanisms with vigilantism.

Shortly after LoSHA had appeared and “gone viral” in the format of a Google Doc, Sarkar took responsibility for crowd-sourcing, managing and leaking the list, giving it a face and a target towards which to direct its criticism. Immediately, the feminist publishing collective Kafila issued a statement that criticized and dismissed the list as “naming and shaming” and demanded it be taken down in the name of the “larger feminist community” (Menon 2017a). The statement questioned the political valence of internet culture and read LoSHA as testimony to an insurmountable gap between India and the West.

Predominantly, there seemed to have been a worry that LoSHA would dismantle the mechanisms of due process and natural justice that feminists had built over the course of decades, as explained in the statement written by Nivedita Menon (2017a), which was signed by 11 other prominent feminists. The statement and its subsequent annex (Menon 2017b) suggested there could be flaws in evaluating certain cases as harassment; unfair accusations could be made against innocent people because a lack of both detail and evidence made it impossible for outsiders to evaluate the circumstances. The way LoSHA was set up, it was argued, led to a lumping together of different degrees of harassment without nuance, as descriptions and resolutions were left blank – even for people already found guilty through institutional mechanisms.

Feminists and left-intellectuals saw the danger of enabling right-wing conservatives in going “on the rampage naming every ‘anti-national’ as a sexual ha-
rasser” (Menon 2017a). Pro-statement feminists further questioned the viability of contributors’ anonymity, the lack of context, as well as the format – the list had been put up on Facebook through Sarkar, who was now acting as a proxy and seemed to have sole editing power, while the Google Doc could virally circulate. Arguments against the list framed the digitality of the object as opening the gates for an internet culture that knew only trolling and shaming, was flip-pant in its judgment, and produced no real way of moving forward politically. The statement’s signees argued to instead return to strengthening due-process mechanisms, which would validate harassment claims and support a fair and just outcome for all involved.

The Internet Universal and Indian feminism

This conflict makes it necessary to look at Sarkar more closely as the proxy of the list, beyond the supposed divide of feminisms along notions of “generations” or “waves”. As suggested initially, younger feminists growing up with the internet as a firm part of their lives may have developed a more intuitive and diverse engagement with online spaces and thus may have acquired a different form of media literacy. However, age cannot be the only avenue of explanation for the chasm between supporters of the list and supporters of the statement. As many voices have since suggested, the divide between list supporters and statement supporters is ideological rather than generational (e.g., Ayyar 2017; Roy 2017). And yet, the arguments provided by the statement and its follow-ups questioned the list’s legitimacy and the methodology behind it, reading it as uninformed and dismissing its activist potential because of its digital format. Expressing this technological scepticism, Menon called out “finger-tip activists with no historical memory” (Menon 2018), claiming that LoSHA was ineffective “slacktivism”. At the same time, the list was being read as “mob justice” (Chachra 2017) and even compared to a Gulag (Visvanathan 2018). Further, Menon’s statement insinuated that the list ahistorically broke with Indian feminist tradition for the sake of a neoliberal global subjectivity.

However, not only does “calling out” and “taking back” have historical lineages within feminist methodologies, Menon’s suggestion of rupture misunderstands the temporalities of the digital, and falls short of the labor behind the interface. Any form of expression on digital social-networking sites such as Twitter or Facebook is often mistakenly read through myths of discontinuity.

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4 I am thinking of movements such as Take Back the Night, Hollaback, and others that originated in the feminist “Second Wave” of the 1970s and 1980s, and, especially in India, were very suspicious of the institutionalization suggested to be of relevance here (Chaudhuri 2017).
(Balsamo 2011). Because cyberspace is imagined as a space of radical newness and innovation, the initial assumption that it is breaking with all histories and modalities of the physical world (Barlow 1996) continues to have currency. Media technologies are fetishized as constant innovators through monikers such as “new media” (Chun 2016), instead of being seen in their historical lineages in terms of design, purpose, content, and usage. As Wendy Chun (2016) has claimed, digital archives have been said to turn memory into storage, meaning that knowledge becomes stowed away and detached from its political relevance and historical lineages. The internet is now often read merely in terms of interface, where whatever is not immediately present is assumed to be lost in the depth of cyberspace, to no longer be accessible on new media turned old.

The same shortsightedness registers with political content in digital spaces. The “Global Village”, meant to bring online users closer together, has instead glossed over difference, meaning that the interfaced encounter is usually assumed to happen with an unmarked universal user (Srinivasan 2019). When specific identity markers are not immediately accessible, online objects are always first assumed to iterate a hegemonic position, meaning that a user in India would usually assume content to come from a user that is savarna and middle class before other options. As contexts constantly collapse online (boyd/Marwick 2011), it becomes increasingly difficult to follow the lineages that digital politics call upon, because the assumption is that what you see is all you get. However, this view regards the interface as the only space on which politics happens, which creates a rigid boundary between offline and online activities and negates the processes of labor and care that enable the digital object to appear in the first place.

Instead, I read LoSHA as an object that evoked connection only amongst those who populate the digital intimately and could thus decipher it beyond what the interface seemed to suggest. This intimacy is revealed only in a deeper engagement with LoSHA beyond the interface. As Lauren Berlant has put it: “To intimate is to communicate with the sparsest of signs and gestures, and at its root intimacy has the quality of eloquence and brevity. But intimacy also involves an aspiration for a narrative about something shared, a story about both oneself and others that will turn out in a particular way.” (Berlant 1998)

As Berlant phrases it, the forms of attachment that such communication proposes is relational; normative ideologies may very well reconfigure, but also contest such forms of attachment. I read the attachment of the digital, perhaps unusual for the usual habitus of the pro-statement feminists, to have negotiated LoSHA’s methods of circulation and contribution more ‘naturally’ for those
who agreed with the methodologies or contributed directly. Sarkar later stated that they had vetted every contribution personally, often verifying the individual stories through a comprehensive consultation of the Indian Penal Code (Gajjala et al. 2019). The pro-statement feminists did not consider the complexities behind the interface, and thus expressed ignorance over the offline labor and historical continuities that made an object such as LoSHA possible in the first place.

In part, I see this occlusion facilitated by the notion of the digital object as “viral”, and thus contagious, polluted, alienating, but also passing to, at one point, disappear. Following Chun, I suggest an understanding of bodies that “inhabit” the digital through their interfaced objects, rather than proclaiming digital objects to travel as infectiously “viral” (Chun 2016). This shifts a reading of the digital as contagious and frivolous toward the acknowledgement of offline labor, but also provides an understanding of the embodied situation from which such objects are produced. Seeing LoSHA as an object that is “inhabited” through more and more bodies joining a collective rather than something in “virality” allows an understanding that LoSHA did not simply travel – implying that it left nothing behind or that it comes from polluted origins and “infects” people. Instead, I argue that it grew to include more and more people in different ways, either as contributors or via the traditions of consciousness raising, when read as a “whisper network”.

Those arguing against the list seemed unable to see the internet as a serious site for activism, despite earlier acknowledgements of the importance of the digital in the protests after the now-infamous Delhi gang rape of 2012. At the time, the mass protests in solidarity with the victim were all organized online, via the same social-media channels that Sarkar then used and by the same people who then shamed online engagement as nothing but hysterical tipping (Dey 2018; Jha/Kurian 2018). In fact, the event has been said to mark a turning point for Indian feminism toward the internet and “to a global vocabulary of rights” (Kurian 2018, 16) that resonates with mainstream media outlets on a transnational scale.

Menon’s problematic evaluation of social media, seemingly dependent on who uses them, accumulated in her understanding that it should not matter whether or not the leaker was Dalit (Menon 2017b). I read this statement as grossly negligent of what it means when a queer young Dalit lawyer becomes the face of a critical feminist object and subsequent target of an ideological battle initiated by supposed allies. Mirroring these claims, Radhika Gajjala, Padmini Ray Murray, and others have shown how Dalit communities in particular connect and are enabled to speak online and inhabit the digital (Gajjala 2004, 2019; Nayar 2014; Ray Murray 2018) to escape home-grown hierarchies and critique
localized universalisms. When we remind ourselves of the Gandhian call that Ambedkar and the Dalits should not argue for separate electorates so as not to divide Hindu society (Ambedkar 1946), Menon’s statement offers a reading suggested by Shailaja Paik (2014) that marginalized communities across the world (in her example, Dalit and African-American women) struggle similarly with homegrown hierarchies and a feminism that occludes them in comparable manner. Contrary to Menon’s appeal to what was read as feminist universalism, the LoSHA-advocates devised rules according to a global community of marginalized people otherwise excluded in the umbrella-terms of movements supposedly intended to liberate them (Garza 2014).

The digital can hence be a place for those who are otherwise omitted. LoSHA departs from its national context to build “margin-to-margin” solidarity networks, and even received a statement of support from Tarana Burke herself (The New Indian Express 2017). Such differentiation seems necessary, especially for feminism, which has often had to withstand claims that it is an elitist project that has omitted women* of color, queer and trans women*, sex workers, working-class women*, disabled women*, and Dalit women*.

Despite possible flaws, LoSHA must thus be read through an understanding of digital social movements that have lineages in and continuities with offline histories. In such a reading, conflict can be made productive through its potential to disrupt norms, and social-media content can be seen to frame new spaces for the marginalized subject to remain, rather than to appear and disappear, when read as “viral”. The list must be read as an anti-caste and queer feminist object – one that does historicize but has rejected a flaccid struggle under the umbrella of “the larger feminist community” for the sake of a critique of Indian elites that are seen to perpetuate, rather than disrupt, caste hierarchies (Bargi 2017). Instead of reading it as dangerous, frivolous or troubled, the list, in its digitality, offers a new point of departure for addressing and critiquing Brahmanical (and other) heteronormative patriarchies on a systemic level and allows subaltern positionalities to become authors of their own narratives and connect in solidarity and care. LoSHA is, therefore, an incident that has enabled a local, subaltern voice to travel across the globe and place itself in the path of #metoo.

**Nothing Natural about Justice**

Entangled into the question of digitality was the fear that LoSHA was aiming to replace judicial mechanisms of natural justice. Natural justice is meant to guarantee that judicial mechanisms function without bias, including an impartial ruling after a fair hearing. With Sarkar coming forward as an anti-caste activ-
ist, the Indian caste-class nexus that gives “some men a sense of entitlement and access to young women’s minds and bodies” (Gopal 2018) became one of the central axes of discussion of the list. As Pallavi Rao has argued, sexual harassment cannot be seen “in isolation from other forms of systemic violence” (Rao 2018) and omitting the context when a Dalit comes forward to land in the eye of a storm is highly problematic. Sarkar’s Facebook profile positioned them as an Anti-Caste activist long before LoSHA, and the list cannot but be read in lineage with Sarkar’s preceding posts. While this conjecture has been discussed in great detail, I do not want to omit its implications here, given that caste is so important in this context. As many presented due process as the central reason for their opposing LoSHA, I want to shortly address its shortcomings, especially in relation to the aforementioned caste-class nexus that inflects any ability to address gender issues.

For many, the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) and Gender Sensitisation Committee Against Sexual Harassment (GSCASH), the central committees in charge of ensuring that due process is carried out at Indian universities, have more potential for redressal than filing a police report. Certainly, efforts to instill mechanisms of due process independently from the state have been central achievements that can only be attributed to the now well-established feminists that supported the Kafila statement. These mechanisms are more sensitive to victimhood than a patriarchal state would be; they incorporate and rely on feminist knowledge on sexual assault and misconduct, rather than merely on judicial factors or cultural myths. However, to pretend that these mechanisms serve all victims of gender-based violence equally would be naïve at best. Students experiencing discomfort with the actions of professors rarely file reports, especially when they do not evaluate the behaviour as hard harassment (Das 2017). Due-process mechanisms are difficult enough to navigate as a student or young academic, as accusations of false allegations, backlash from perpetrators or

5 “Economic and Political Weekly” has put together a whole number of articles in a special feature on “Power and Relationships in Academia” accessible online (EPW engage 2017). Further, in fall 2018, the journal “Communication, Culture & Critique” included three articles on LoSHA by Ayesha Vemuri, Pallavi Rao, and Radhika Gajjala that I quote throughout this article. This only names a few of the articles that deal with caste explicitly; others are cited throughout this subsection.

6 Like elsewhere, sexual assault victims often struggle to be believed and cases often get dismissed on the basis of lacking evidence. Against this background, women’s complaints have regularly been disregarded, especially when directed towards upper-caste men. Corrupt police officers may refuse to file reports on assault; pretend to file them, only for the reports to then get lost; or file them and have victims see them get thrown out in court (Krishnan 2017). Against these all-too-familiar scenes, the Indian political climate is increasingly toxic and turned against marginalized communities, which are searching for Indian authenticity through neo-conservative to fundamentalist Hindu-nationalist homogeneity and, therefore, paradoxically, joining a global shift towards what is largely considered to be the “political right”.
their peer groups, and refusal to work with accusers in the future are only some of the repercussions that any person naming their assailters may face. In addition, these committees mostly do not include representatives from all marginalized communities and therefore create a heterosexual and upper-caste matrix that may unwillingly perpetuate biases towards lower-caste, indigenous and non-Hindu minorities (Ayyar 2017).

Taking into consideration a dominant discriminatory stereotype that frames Dalits as hypersexual and constantly available, especially to upper castes (Paik 2014), the question is how sensitive such committees are to their own biases. The perseverance of caste-discrimination, coupled with the preponderance of upper-caste Hindu women* on gender-sensitivity committees, makes the mechanisms of due process and natural justice almost inaccessible to everyone at the lower end of the social hierarchy (Gupta/Dangwal 2017). These flaws in processes of natural justice within Indian academia were not new revelations, and yet, they made for little lenience on the part of statement supporters. The insistence on due process and only due process thus intensified a wound already felt amongst the younger and socially marginalized students supporting the list. Statement supporters seemed oblivious or indifferent to the caste-based inequalities that continue to exist, even perpetuating discrimination, as caste was further invisibilized through the statement.

As India’s caste hegemony hardens once more under Hindu-nationalist rule, Dalit and Adivasi communities have found little distinction between the domination of the British Raj, the violence of institutions with Hindu-Nationalist inflections, and the Brahmin-centric heteropatriarchy that normalizes both (Mondal 2018; Thomas Danaraj 2018). Dalit lynchings and gendered violence based on caste or religious discrimination have made it unsafe for these communities to protest in public spaces or university institutions. Names such as Chuni Kotal, Rohith Vemula, J Muthukrishnan – an Adivasi woman and two Dalit men who, after long episodes of institutionalized harassment, committed suicide – have become central to university-based Dalit struggles. Their bodies are evidences of the violence with which non-Brahmins are faced even in supposedly progressive university institutions. Protesters mourning their deaths have also been shut down, often violently.

The last decade has hence seen the arrival of a multitude of online presences in which Dalits attempt to re-write histories of India from the point of view of their oppression – often under the violent scrutiny of the state and its drift to the right, but also of public universities as governmental institutions and even India’s political left (Bargi 2017; Thomas Danaraj 2018). Internet formats, often met with suspicion within the upper-caste heteropatriarchy, thus serve as a vi-
tal point of knowledge production and critique from a Dalit perspective. Digital platforms have become one of the central spaces for Dalits to connect, organize and historicize (Nayar 2014).

The question of the harassed queer further complicated the call to due process at the time. Non-heterosexual sexual relations were decriminalized only in 2018, after the LoSHA leak (Paletta/Anh Vu 2018). Theoretically, queer victims of gender-based violence – where the perpetrator was of the same sex as the victim – if they had been acknowledged at all, would, at the time, have run the risk of being criminalized. On the other hand, Sarkar’s self-identification as “queer” also posits them in relation to the globalized queer movement originating within Western Europe and North America, rather than with the various indigenous queer and non-binary communities in India such as hijras or kothis. As there is an obvious lived difference to these communities, predominantly in terms of class hierarchies, the term queer invariably opens itself up to the accusations of neoliberal appropriation and a reification of Western superiority (Puar 2007). However, as Gajjala states, queer bodies that are read as female learn to pass and invisibilize their specificities more often than those that are assigned the male sex at birth (Gajjala 2019). For this reason, flocking to the digital happens more intuitively for these groups, as the anonymity of interfaces is arguably already familiar (Dean 2016). But the invisibility of Sarkar’s queer-femme sexuality made other identifiers hypervisible in the Indian discourse: read-as-male Dalit rage, read-as-femme Asian migrant in the US, read-as-Western technology to criticize savarna Indianness. Instead of reading these critiques of Sarkar and LoSHA in isolation, Sarkar’s queerness transcends their sexuality and comes to signify their outsideness in the statement-discourse.

I propose that LoSHA should be read outside of a paradigm that perpetuates feminism as monolithic and authentically situated. In this affirmative reading, the fluidity of the internet can portray identities as in flux, relational and porous. Through LoSHA, I propose a queer reading of the digital as a space that, in opposition to the notions of disembodiment that fuels the cyberspaced imaginary, is material and inhabited (Chun 2016; Ray Murray 2018). As a result, LoSHA should be read as an infrastructure that allowed for the digital queer to

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7 These communities are perhaps differently queer, as they consist of intersex and transgender people, often living in abject poverty or making a living through sex work. They are also predominantly bodies moving from their male-assigned birthgender to a feminine/female appearance and thus have different experiences with discrimination, stereotypes, and being invisibilised, even by the gay movement (Gajjala 2019, 156). The term queer, although sometimes also used to address these communities, comes with class-connotations, but also seems more befitting to describe a femme-appearing law graduate of Asian origin living in the United States than the arguably less cosmopolitan indigenous queer communities.
inhabit public space, to become visible and intelligible – and thus to have the capacity to reveal existing conflicts within the Indian feminist movement.

**Transnational Digital Feminisms and the Politics of the Local**

Given these complications, the question of naming vs. due process is arguably misplaced. Rather, one might ask how valuable due process may have been to Dalits at the point of the LoSHA revelations, how willing the committees might be to have a close look at one of their own, and how adequate the repercussions would be, should all of these steps even be taken. Paired with a tonality that was understood as patronizing and dismissive, the statement and the discourse around it seemed to sever the ties between disappointed contributors to the list on one side and their former mentors and idols on the other. LoSHA disrupted the notion of a united Indian left-intellectual front and revealed to some what others were unable to admit – that even *they* – intelligent, anti-nationalist and “feminist” men* – felt an entitlement to younger women*'s bodies in a way that caused conflict and muddied consent.

The very public occurrences mentioned above ease a reading of LoSHA as a critique of Brahminical heteropatriarchy, connecting struggles of sexuality, gender, and class/caste in one object. Sarkar, instead of aligning with the histories of (upper-caste) feminism in India, chose to put the guerrilla tactics associated with Adivasi and lower-caste communities to the forefront. Given that the Naxalbari uprising had its 50th anniversary in 2017, just months before LoSHA appeared, it is not too far-fetched to speculate on Sarkar’s sympathy with the communist armed guerrillas, whose political aim was to uplift DAB communities by putting guns in their hands. Indeed, there have also been references to the revolutionary Dalit in other writings that defend LoSHA. Drishadwati Bargi, in responding to the Kafila statement, says:

“For instance, the Dalit–Bahujan man can play with the figure of the ‘angry/militant/revolutionary male’ and gain legitimacy and acceptance in a culture that valorises men with ‘strong personality.’ The same can make the Dalit–Bahujan woman a greater outcaste, desexualised and perhaps, a little too queer for these spaces. This, in turn has its resonance in building friendships or feminist solidarities across caste.” (Bargi 2017)

While, at the time, there was much speculation on the true status of Sarkar’s roots, the patronizing sentiments expressed in the statement underline rather than discredit that line of argument, as Sarkar and LoSHA are dismissed due to the supposed ahistoricity of the internet and a misrecognition of Dalit tactics.
Waging Sarkar’s vulnerability against their supposed privilege when situating them in the US again forsakes questions of accountability and care for a fetishization of authenticity. Thus, insisting on more proof and insight into the occurrences rearticulates the colonial legacies of positivistic knowledges that fetishize truth as an objective fact.

However, as complex cases such as that of Aziz Ansari and Avital Ronell have shown, it is impossible to objectively assert a situation where sexuality is negotiated in line with power hierarchies. Here, consent becomes a grey area that is spread out between aspiration, desire, and integrity, where the accuser is often read as the problem. LoSHA underlines the allegorical nature of truth and the judicial mechanisms that perpetuate an understanding of truth as objectively accessible. As Sarkar came forward to defend the list, other contributors were enabled to remain in the sheltered anonymity Sarkar had provided for them, but they could still take a public stand in solidarity with #LoSHA, without the danger of being retraumatized through victim blaming and intricate questioning.

Despite its critics, LoSHA added intersectional inflections to Indian feminism – in composing what I read as a structural critique rather than in expecting punitive measures against individuals. It is only in this reading – transformative rather than carceral – that LoSHA may release its potential to speak to the hybrid intersections of discriminatory practice.

Precisely because of its collectivity, its connection to Me Too, and the centrality of Raya Sarkar as the queer Dalit leaker – their position in the US protecting and enabling them – LoSHA systemically identified faults in Indian feminism’s caste discourse. Because the Dalit is either desexualized or hypersexual, Bargi (2017), as cited above, suggests reading the Dalit position in itself as queer – a position that, according to María do Mar Castro Varela et al. (2011), always includes a struggle to move from spaces of invisibility to legitimacy and representation. As Mimi Mondal (2018) has stated, a Dalit with a voice is no longer seen as an authentic Dalit. Sarkar is thus read as “too Dalit” for feminism, and “too queer” for Indian sexual politics. While Ashley Tellis (who was also added to the list) has lamented that the Indian queer movement did not stand with Dalits, laborers, farmers or sex-workers (Tellis 2012), I argue that speculations about Sarkar’s identity posited them as constantly in-between, and effectively, their queerness was read as foreignness, thus echoing precisely the type of affirmative national discourse Tellis so deeply criticizes.

LoSHA as digital testimony does not pretend, therefore, to replace the law, but critiques its gaps and interpretations within feminist movements. Instead of lacking nuance, I read LoSHA as a comment on the structural quality of sexual and gendered inequalities, which can also manifest in friendships, mentorships
and quotidian forms of personal exchange. Sarkar acknowledges the systemic quality of harassment on their Facebook page, which exemplifies their reading of sexual and gendered violence not as a singular act but as a cultural fact:

“[...] people are within their right to discredit the list and call it false despite mounting public testimonies from survivors but they may not harass any of us to reveal details for their own lascivious entertainment. Some folks claimed that it is unfair to clump all alleged harassers together because some of them may have harassed “less” than the rest. Rape culture is when people grade your trauma. There is no such thing as sexual harassment lite™. If an act falls within the scope of sexual harassment, then it’s sexual harassment. Period.” (Sarkar 2018, on Facebook)

Sarkar defies the constant inquiries for further details of occurrences that led to names being put on the list, invoking a critique of judicial procedures that often undermine feminist support by fetishizing proof. Instead, Sarkar stressed the necessity of acknowledging the right of victims to have their own scale for the trauma they have had to live through, therefore attesting to cultures of violence rather than to individual perpetrators, to notions of healing rather than punitive measures. In a conversation in Gajjala’s most recent book, Sarkar attests to the intricate details that went into compiling the list (Gajjala et al. 2019).

As Ayesha Vemuri mentions in this conversation, discussions around LoSHA have often omitted the fact that Sarkar was trained as a lawyer and, therefore, has expertise on what falls within the scope of sexual harassment and vetted the contributors to LoSHA accordingly, even offering support should any of the contributors want to take legal action (Gajjala et al. 2019, 192). This again allows for a reading of LoSHA as accompanying and at best transforming the legal system, not dismantling it.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have argued for an understanding of digital space beyond notions of virality and crisis, as a transnational arena that both influences and challenges local positionalities as bounded, authentic, and separable. LoSHA exemplifies how quotidian digital acts can give voice to and form solidarities for those marginalized within local umbrella-term movements for social justice. In terms of the iterative space it creates for those whose trauma is least recognized within public discourse on violence, objects such as LoSHA allow marginalized expression to critique naturalized hegemonies within political groups. As a digital object, the list was open to many different forms of engagement and can be read as a hypertextual manual that invites its contributors and readers to
connect to it on a range of identity levels (as discussed above) – arguably, at the same time. LoSHA must be read as a queer object, as it attests to the multiplicity of identities that inform and iterate each body, yet also permeates the boundaries of neoliberal individuation in its collective form.

The list has since affected more nuanced conversation about sexual violence and patriarchy, which have spilled beyond the left-intellectual academic landscape of LoSHA and paved the way for constant questioning of positionali- ties within workplace institutions and across caste-boundaries. Since LoSHA, the question of Brahmanical patriarchy has become central in India’s social-media landscape. In light of new hashtags such as #smashbrahmanicalpatriarchy8 and movements that offer online sex-education, self-help and community consultation, centring increasingly on Dalit perspectives, I argue that the list has produced affective solidarities that allow for dissent and discussion beyond the law. These new discussions work without framing feminist solidarities and kinship formations as fragile, juvenile or volatile for finding representation in a digital form. Looking beyond sensation, LoSHA can give way to a new language of care and intimacy, of connection and allyship, across age, caste, class, and any other category that may seem to divide feminisms into unlikely enemies but actually only addresses lacks within feminisms that should always strive to better their scope – whether or not standards and methodologies are met or revised. No one owns feminism.

It is not uncommon for articles written at and after hour zero of leaking to include side notes, edits and mentions of accusations of sexual harassment but also of more intersectional readings of violence. After the sense of crisis had died down, the list effectively opened a space to continue these old and yet-to-be-resolved struggles. However, it has also allowed for #metoo to resurface within Indian cyberspace in ambivalent ways. The same methodology of naming and shaming has been implemented within a recent resurgence of the movement. And yet, savarna feminists have not only hailed this round of #metoo, it has commonly been marked as its very first arrival in the country – LoSHA and Sarkar’s efforts simply erased (BuzzFeed India/Kandukuri 2019; Rasul 2018). Only after fervent critiques have Twitter feeds and articles included acknowledgement of Sarkar’s labor, without which #metoo would not have happened for India in this way. The internet thus reveals what was already there – the fact that lived realities and solidarities transgress and circumvent monodirectional identity categories on multiple levels, but that violence can also and very often does express itself “merely” in forms of unquestioned privilege or quick omissions.

8 This hashtag was initated by Dalit activist Thenmouzhi Soundarrajan, @DalitDiva on Twitter, in the aftermath of the list.
LoSHA and other lists that have appeared to target a culture in which silence is the trade-off for supposed safety and where sexual violence seems like a crime without origin. Especially for victims of intersectional violence, these objects mark a moment not only of community building but of breaking precisely that codex of silence and of demanding not only protection but a response and acknowledgement of hurt, beyond a formal or institutional frame that often fails or ignores the most marginalized bodies in their community.

Finally, LoSHA, Me Too, and #metoo must, therefore, be read through histories that depart from women*-of-color feminist networks of care that were laboring away, unacknowledged, long before these hashtags travelled across the globe. It is thus a systemic critique not only of patriarchy but also of a feminism that continues to consider only the most hegemonic concept of “womanhood” as viable for victimhood. Certainly, the digital does not alleviate these pains but instead serves to rein in those otherwise omitted by problematizing, if not queering, the notion of authentic and unitary identities.

References


Underground Pedagogy of Hope?  
German Punk-Feminist Festivals as Education in Feminist Theories and Actions  
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**Abstract:** In this article, I approach German punk-feminist festivals as underground spaces for informal teaching and learning practices. In doing so, I participate in a discourse of understanding festivals not merely as events where an audience socializes and consumes live music, but also as an educational stage. Drawing on former research on grrrl zines activism, I question the influence of bell hooks’ “pedagogy of hope” on punk-feminist movements. I demonstrate how German punk-feminist festivals foster a hopeful activism that aims to transform both the independent music scenes and the society at large. Yet, I also explore the ways in which these festivals keep centering white people’s experiences, which limits the forcefulness of their activism.

**Keywords:** Pedagogy, Social Movement, Women's Movement, Feminism, Music

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Introduction

I attended a Ladyfest for the first time in Germany during the summer of 2017. At that time, I had just completed my MA in Arts and Cultural Industries and was about to start a PhD. I had already begun studying these punk-inspired feminist festivals, but I had not yet had the chance to visit one and could only imagine what they were like based on their program booklets. The first activities I attended were presentations and debates, organized for the afternoon. There, we had the opportunity to discuss LGBTQ struggles, feminist movement history, and women’s representation in music. Yet, the first thing that struck me was a sense of similarity to academic conferences. I remember being amused by how each presentation was accompanied by a slideshow. The audience was waiting until the speaker had finished talking to ask questions. Some people were taking notes. On the door of the room, someone had hung a paper asking for silence during the presentations. Everyone seemed quite serious. Only the punk looks of people in the audience and the surrounding atmosphere of the autonomous center where the event was held made it seem different, if not uncanny, as the walls of university rooms are not usually covered with graffiti.

Looking at a different type of punk-inspired feminist activism, Alison Piepmeier’s account of grrrl zines (2012) extensively draws on bell hook’s pedagogy of hope (2003). Considering both (1) that grrrl zines were a huge part of the Riot Grrrl movement’s activities (Dunn/Farnsworth 2012) and (2) that the Ladyfest network shares a lot of features with the Riot Grrrls (Schilt/Zobl 2012), this article seeks to determine to what extent a similar pedagogy of hope may be found to be an influence in the contemporary punk-feminist festival network. To investigate this question, I will focus on the German scene, in which I am conducting my PhD fieldwork.

In the following, I first recount the Ladyfest network’s history and explain my methods of investigation. Later, in “theories and concepts”, I outline the main features of bell hook’s pedagogy of hope and Piepmeier’s application of the concept to grrrl zines. Moving on to my own analyses, I explain how German punk-feminist festivals foster a hopeful activism that encourages its participants
to engage with different feminist theories and actions in relation to both independent music scenes and society at large. Finally, I explore the limits of this connection by addressing the invisibilization of racism and white supremacy.

The Ladyfest Network and the Punk-Feminist Scene

The first Ladyfest was organized in Olympia, Washington, in 2000, 10 years after the birth of the Riot Grrrl movement in the same city. The event was introduced as “a non-profit community-based event designed by and for women to showcase, celebrate and encourage the artistic, organizational and political work and talents of women” (Ladyfest.org 2000). The idea eventually spread to the rest of the world, reaching Germany in 2003. During that foundational year, three festivals were organized – Berlin, Leipzig, and Hamburg. The number has kept growing ever since.

A great majority of these festivals are based around a shared schedule: The evenings and nights are dedicated to concerts and spectacles, while during the daytime, the audience is encouraged to attend workshops, debates, and discussions on a large range of topics, including feminist history, anti-racism, and anti-fascist struggle as well as music and fanzine making.

The field of punk-feminist festivals has already been investigated by Elke Zobl (2005), Susan O’Shea (2014), and Alexandra Ommert (2016). All of them draw on previous work that either focused on the Riot Grrrl movements (Rosenberg/Garofalo 1998; Wald 1998; Marcus 2010; Dunn/Farnsworth 2012; Downes 2012) or looked at alternative music scenes through gender studies (Cohen 1997; Griffin 2012; Sharp/Nilan 2015). None of the researchers mentioned confronted this topic in relation to education, but feminism, the punk movements, and early forms of the Riot Grrrl movement all have links with a certain conception of pedagogy.

Before I get deeper into that topic, it seems important to outline how these events relate to the concept of gender. German punk-feminist festivals conceptualize gender at the crossroads of a materialist approach and a queer, deconstructionist approach. Putting it in very simple terms, a materialist perspective considers gender to be a social structure opposing two classes, with one (men) socially and economically dominating the other (women). A queer perspective sees gender also as a social construct but considers that labeling people “men” and “women” is an oppressive norm, which is why such a perspective calls for the deconstruction of these categories. Emeline Fourment (2017) found that within contemporary German feminist movements, these two approaches intersect and influence each other. As a result, activist collectives have, for instance, adapted their inclusion policy, founding “women, lesbians, and trans” groups in-
stead of “women-only” groups. I have been able to observe similar apparatuses during Ladyfest and other punk-feminist festivals.

**Method**

My research relies on a mixed-method approach. I combine a statistical analysis of the programs of 86 Ladyfest-inspired festivals held in Germany between 2003 and 2019 with a qualitative study of the events’ promotional materials (flyers, posters, websites) and ethnographic fieldwork at 10 festivals organized between 2017 and 2019. Drawing on feminist and queer approaches to ethnomusicology (Barz/Cheng 2019; Koskoff 2014), my ethnographic observations have so far focused on gender in relation to both the music and the social context and aims of the festivals and I have paid specific attention to the ways in which the events’ organizers and participants describe the weight of gender norms in their daily lives. I have also sought to observe how the Ladyfest-inspired scene aims to build an environment free of these social rules. To do so, I have observed music workshops as well as group practices focusing on daily-life themes. In this article, I will draw on two specific observations of a DJing workshop and a group discussion on motherhood. The qualitative study of the event’s promotion materials complemented the ethnographic analyses and has been used to underpin an understanding of the festivals’ aims and self-depiction.

I selected the festivals that were titled Ladyfest, made a reference to the culture of punk-feminism in their promotion materials, or had a feminist focus and followed the typical Ladyfest schedule with workshops during the day and concerts in the evening.

Once the limits of the sample had been established, programs were collected from the festivals’ promotional materials (websites, social media, flyers, posters), and gathered in a database. That database allowed me to extract quantitative information from the resulting corpus. Moreover, it also helped me identify less recurrent but nonetheless interesting elements within the festivals’ programs and engage in further qualitative analysis. Traces of the history of these festivals were found thanks to online calendars and databases such as [http://ladyfest.org](http://ladyfest.org), the Ladyfest Wikipedia page, and [http://grassrootsfeminism.net](http://grassrootsfeminism.net). Most of the current festivals were identified through social media or by word of mouth.

During fieldwork, I tried to attend different types of workshops, debates, and concerts. Following Luis Manuel García’s (2019) advice to researchers conducting fieldwork in queer nightlife, I never recorded nor directly took notes during the events. Nevertheless, I tried to write notes down as soon as I returned to the place in which I was staying. I used my notes to complete my
analysis of the festivals’ programs, for they allowed me to compare the events’ advertisement to their effective organization.

Theories and Concepts

This article draws on bell hooks’ (2003) concept of “pedagogy of hope” and its application to the analysis of grrrl zines by Alison Piepmeier (2012). I begin this theoretical section by explaining what hooks understands by a pedagogy of hope. I first lay out what the concept is opposed to and then move on to discuss its main guidelines. In a second subsection, I show how Piepmeier adapted the concept for application to grrrl zines and pursue that discussion regarding punk-feminist festivals.

Pedagogy of Hope

According to bell hooks, who first conceptualised a “pedagogy of hope” in her book “Teaching Community. A Pedagogy of Hope” (2003), education is a site for radical political work.¹

Indeed, hooks develops her concept in opposition to a pedagogy of domination led by cynicism, authoritarianism, and competition between students. As she argues, a pedagogy of domination reinforces the structures of capitalism, sexism, patriarchy, racism, and white supremacy. Such a pedagogy of domination is spread in society by mass media, amongst other sites. hooks draws on examples such as the aftermath of 11 September 2001, in which mass media spread fear among people, reinforcing the structures of racism and participating in a pedagogy of domination (hooks 2003, 12).

Cynicism reinforces this framework by making any possibility for transformation invisible, as if everything were doomed by the structures of social domination and resistance were impossible. According to Piepmeier,

“[f]ailure of imagination seems integral to this phenomenon: hope and a vision of a better future can come to seem almost pathetically naïve. In this way, cynicism forecloses social justice activism; it functions to make all forms of challenge to the status quo seem hopeless in the sense that many of us are unable to imagine something better, or to imagine that better thing actually coming into being. This translates into a cultural moment in which resistance seems limited or impossible.” (2012, 252)

¹ Such a claim might be widespread in educational sciences. Nonetheless, I find it worth remembering, especially when addressing music education, a field that often hides its proselytizing for white middle- and upper-class male composers behind an “art for art’s sake” perspective (Schmidt 2005, 5).
Within classrooms, an authoritarian education relies on “contempt, disdain, shaming” (hooks 2003, 87) hidden behind claims of “seriousness”. Yet, according to hooks, this only “dehumanizes and thus shuts down the ‘magic’ that is always present when individuals are active learners” (43). Similarly, competition encourages a culture of fear that “undermines the capacity of the students to learn” (132), especially when these students are from oppressed groups (for example, women, LGBTQ people, and people of color).

On the contrary, a call for a pedagogy of hope is a call to “teach with love, combining care, commitment, knowledge, responsibility, respect, and trust”, developing values that “[do] not reinforce systems of domination, of imperialism, racism, sexism or class elitism” (xiv). hooks’ pedagogy emphasizes the importance of joining theory and practice and looks forward to making students actors in their own education. Additionally, hooks draws on Paulo Freire:

“Speaking of the necessity to cultivate hope, Brazilian educator Paulo Freire reminds us: ‘The struggle for hope means the denunciation, in no uncertain terms of all abuses … As we denounce them, we awaken in others and ourselves the need, and also the taste, for hope.’ Hopefulness empowers us to continue our work for justice even as the forces of injustice may gain greater power for a time.” (xiv)

With this, hooks shows a conception of hope that is strongly connected with social struggles and transformation. She writes, “My hope emerges from those places of struggle where I witness individuals positively transforming their lives and the world around them.” (xiv)

Although hooks has spent a fair part of her career teaching at North American universities and colleges, such a feminist and anti-racist pedagogy is not aimed only to take place in traditional classrooms. To achieve its political goal, advocates for a pedagogy of hope have to “seek to write theory that would speak directly to an inclusive audience” (xii). This inclusive audience may very well be found in colleges or universities but is without doubt also present in feminist activism and community spaces.

Grrrl Zines, Grrrl Activism, and Pedagogy of Hope

The Riot Grrrls’ engaging in zine making was also a form of feminist pedagogy. Indeed, Piepmeier argues that grrrl zines might “[model] a hopeful, resistant subjectivity – what I term a ‘pedagogy of imagination’ – and invites its readers to try it on. This pedagogy is doing political work.” (Piepmeier 2012, 251) Here, Piepmeier draws on bell hooks’ concept that “[describes] the creation of hope and possibility within the realm of the classroom”, but she states that the con-
cept has “viability far beyond literal pedagogical spaces” (252) and adapts the term in order to “encompass the political work of grrrl zines” (252).

In her essay, Piepmeier looks at one specific series of zines titled “Doris”. She aims to “consider the cultural and political work that zines like Doris do, the kind of interventions they make into the world around them” (251). She further describes these interventions as “hopeful”.

Yet, if “Doris” is a hopeful zine, it is not concealing structures of domination or their impact on individuals’ lives. But rather than looking at them with cynicism, following hooks, Piepmeier posits that “grrrl zines like Doris are uniquely situated to awaken outrage and – perhaps more crucially – imagination” (252) and declares that the zines show their readers “ways to resist the culture of domination” by “emphasizing self-reflection and becoming fully human” (251).

Moreover, Piepmeier explains that “pedagogies of hope – manifested in a variety of ways in grrrl zines – function as small-scale acts of resistance. By modeling process, active criticism, and imagination, grrrl zines make political interventions.” (252) According to the author of “Doris”, Crabb, grrrl zines carry the possibility “of helping people ‘to explore more options in their life’” (258). In doing so, the effect of “Doris” on its readers directly refers to political work and, more specifically, to a pedagogy of hope.

Yet, by taking the pedagogy of hope outside of traditional classrooms, grrrl zines also reinvent the teacher-student relationship. Indeed, according to Piepmeier, “[grrrl zines] break away from linear models” (253). Here, I understand that statement as not only referring to grrrl zines’ opposition to pedagogies of domination but also as related to the way in which they step away from the classroom organization. This is, in my opinion, also how “[z]ines like Doris can [give] individuals a sense of their own power, helping people ‘not just go where they’re told to go’” (258).

While framing this article within the scope of bell hook’s pedagogy of hope, I will – like Piepmeier – not use the terms “teacher” and “student”, because blurring the boundaries between the traditional roles of teachers and students is part of the ways in which grrrl zines and punk-feminist festivals sometimes develop a feminist pedagogy. Later, I will show how this is possible with an analysis of consciousness-raising groups.

Reinventing Music Scenes and Industry through Punk-Feminist Festivals

Having set the theoretical and methodological grounds of this article, I will now begin my empirical analysis with a look at how punk-feminist festivals seek to
reinvent music scenes and the music industry outside of gendered norms. Their programs offer, side by side, theoretical reflections on music scenes and the music industry as well as concerts and music workshops dedicated to women and marginalized people.

In the first subsection, I explain how these events analyze the gendered division of labor within music scenes and the music industry and thereby make the structures of male domination visible. In the second subsection, I move on to music practice and demonstrate how music workshops help to counter “shame as a barrier to learning” (hooks 2003, 93) and how they stimulate women and queer people to hope for, imagine, and build more inclusive music scenes, following hooks’ pedagogy of hope.

Shedding Some Light on Gender Inequality in Independent Music Scenes

The idea driving punk-feminist festivals is that men are more visible than women within the punk scene. The few active women in the scene are often charged with services positions, while men occupy creative and visible positions (men take care of booking or sound, they stand and play on stage, etc.), allowing other bands or the audience to identify them for what they do.

Punk-feminist festivals therefore aim to tip the gender inequality scales within the punk scene, as this abstract from the Ladyfest Darmstadt manifesto illustrates: “When it comes to organizing cultural events, women often cook, build decorations or take care of finances and budgets while men are standing on stage, booking bands or taking care of sound and lights, etc. Thus, we reclaim our right to occupy these key positions too.” (Ladyfest Darmstadt 2012)

Indeed, women in subcultural scenes, when they are not absent, are often denied their technical knowledge. The work seems thus divided into two parts: The men’s part is technical and visible, while the women’s is made of invisible services positions. And while the tasks usually assigned to women are absolutely necessary in order to set up a concert properly, they happen to come with less prestige than the roles assigned to men. Various studies have backed this perception and shown that women are underrepresented in alternative music scenes (for example, Cohen 1997; Downes 2012; or, more recently for the metal scene, Berkers/Schaap 2018). While I was able to find some exceptions, according to both the experiences related by feminist festival organizers and academ-

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2 Especially straight white men. Similar movements, such as Queercore and AfroPunk, also emerged in the 1990s in opposition to the dominance of straight white men.
ic analyses, the gendered division of labor in music scenes globally tends to disadvantage women and queer people. And while these results are easy to explain, punk-feminist festivals aim at going further and acting concretely for more equality. Their organization can be separated into two steps, the methods and goals of which differ.

In the first place comes theory. Theoretical debates in punk-feminist festivals are generally open to everyone regardless of their gender. They aim to present and argue the aforementioned ideas. The goal is to make everyone – including men – more aware of gender issues in the scene. Some of these discussions are aimed at questioning the masculine hegemony in underground music scenes. For example, the Ladyfest Berlin 2010 organized a “Masculinity & Hardcore” talk (Ladyfest Berlin 2010), the Ladyfest Leipzig 2011 a “Männerrollen im Hardcore” (men’s roles in the hardcore scene) presentation (Ladyfest Leipzig 2011), and the Antifee Festival held a debate in Göttingen about “Männlichkeit und Whiteness im Emo/Hardcore” (masculinity and whiteness in emo/hardcore scenes) (Antifee 2012). Meanwhile, other talks have sought to enhance women and queer people’s visibility within music-scene spaces: Ladyfest Leipzig 2011 organized a “Frauen im Hip Hop” (women in hip-hop) presentation (Ladyfest Leipzig 2011), Ladyfest Berlin 2006 a “Vom Riot Grrrl zu Ladies: Geschichte und Geschichten” (From Riot Grrrls to ladies: history and histories) talk (Ladyfest Berlin 2006), and Ladyfest Kiel 2017 a discussion entitled “A stage of her* own?! – queerfeministische Lichtblicke und Strategien in Punk und Pop” (“A stage of her* own?! – Shedding some light on queer-feminist presence and strategies in punk and pop music) (Ladyfest Kiel 2017).

In her account of a pedagogy of hope, hooks identifies “shame as a barrier to learning” (2003, 93) and explains that “members of subordinated groups [must] cope with the negative stereotypes imposed upon them in practically all circumstances where dominators rule” (94), leading these members of subordinated groups to internalize negative stereotypes and self-shame. hooks further identifies that “[m]ass media messages equate blackness with being bad, inadequate, unworthy” (94). Similarly, Marie Thompson (2016) has highlighted that music media equate female musicians with bad and noisy musicians – a noisiness that is, moreover, “intensified by certain co-constitutions of race and class” (86).

hooks (2003, 100) also draws on “Coming out of Shame”, a book written by therapists Gershen Kaufman and Lev Raphael, who “state that ‘the principal effects of shame on the self are hiding, paralysis, and a feeling of being transparent’”. Similarly, in white male-dominated music scenes such as those identified by the Ladyfest Berlin, Ladyfest Leipzig and the Antifee Festival, women, queer people, and people of color may feel as if they were transparent, hidden
from a potential audience by the structure of patriarchy and white supremacy that forces them into invisible service positions – as also stated in the Ladyfest Darmstadt manifesto.

But instead of looking at the situation as if nothing could change and drowning in cynicism, punk-feminist festivals offer their participants the possibility of making a difference.

**Music Practice toward Feminist Empowerment**

Approximately 44% of the festivals in my database gave their attendees the opportunity to join workshops concerning music practice or sound techniques, placing this topic among the most addressed. These workshops are generally open to only a specific part of the audience: women, lesbians, and trans and queer people. Sarah Cohen (1997, 20–22), in her research about the indie music scene in the UK, states that music-related knowledges (technical set-ups, production, etc.) usually spread in men-only groups. Women, who are left out of these circles, struggle to access the same competences, as do queers who do not fit the idea of traditional and hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1995). The idea behind punk-feminist festivals is to give all of these people the keys to tip that scale.

In 2018, I attended the DJing workshop at Ladyfest Karlsruhe (2018). It took place at a local radio station that usually did not have any specific access policy. Nonetheless, at this particular occasion, the space we occupied was dedicated to women and queers. It brought us to a place where we could discover, try out, and practice DJing in a “safe space”, without being mocked or watched by an experienced male audience. Though I am myself a musician, I had never touched a turntable, but I had been curious about DJing for a long time. As a teenager, I taught myself how to play the guitar. As I was close to discovering a new musical activity, I could only remember how hard my first steps in learning an instrument had been alone. Getting help from a person who had mastered the practice of DJing, and for free, was more than welcome. The person who was holding the workshop gave us documentation concerning the DJ equipment, showed us the basics and, at each step, let us ask questions, choose music from a wide repertory (we could also bring our own vinyl discs), and try things out ourselves. Trying was not mandatory and succeeding even less so. Knowing that we were not going to be evaluated based on our skills might have helped us feel more comfortable in the space.

While the theoretical debates on masculinity in independent music scenes I highlighted earlier attempt to render the sexist structure of those environments more visible, practical workshops offer a possibility for reinventing a more in-
clusive music scene. By centering and celebrating women’s presence in music scenes and the music industry, punk-feminist festivals counter the “feeling of being transparent” (hooks 2003, 100) that comes with shame, as identified by hooks, following Kaufman and Raphael. And while hooks explains that “[i]n many cases simply the experience of being ‘judged’ activates deep-seated feelings of shame” (101), punk-feminist festivals constantly try to offer their participants a space to experiment with music making without having to face the fear of being judged on their lack of experience. The fact that none of us felt compelled to try something we were not comfortable with during the DJing workshop affirms music education “as the practice of freedom” (103).

Following the principles of a pedagogy of hope, punk-feminist festivals do not only question male dominance and the gendered division of subcultural labor, they also and even more importantly offer the possibility of reimagining the punk scene. Additionally, the music workshops help participants to network together and form bands or music collectives, drawing their inspiration from the Girls Rock Camps (for more information on these camps, see Ali 2012). In fact, while it is hard for women and queers to gain access to technical musical knowledge, they might also strive for finding like-minded individuals with whom to practice music. Not only are punk-feminist festivals introducing themselves as counter-acts to masculine homosocial music networks, they also participate in building feminine or queer equivalents. In doing so, they oppose a cynicism that would lead to leaving the punk scene because it is doomed by male dominance and look instead to build spaces where they can teach themselves and learn music. In this way, they are “helping people ‘not just go where they’re told to go’” (Piepmeier 2012, 258), driven by the hope for better music scenes and a better music industry.

Yet, though I emphasized here the “punk” part of “punk-feminism”, these collectives are not only interested in gender (in)equality within music. They also address everyday life issues.

Feminist Knowledge in Action

The anecdote I recounted as part of the introduction to this article aimed to highlight similarities between punk-feminist festivals and academic conferences. Yet, most of the activities and workshops organized during punk-feminist festivals rarely resemble university conference rooms. Rather, they draw on methods developed in activist circles.

In this section, I explain how punk-feminist festivals draw on the feminist second wave and on grrrl zines to re-enact consciousness-raising through workshops and on the concert stage. I show how, by collectively framing personal
experiences in a structural view and encouraging participants to take action, consciousness-raising is related to a pedagogy of hope. Nonetheless, in the final subsection of this article, I also highlight the limits of the connection between a pedagogy of hope, grrrl zines, and punk-feminist festivals.

**Consciousness-Raising in the Punk-Feminist Scene: from Zines to Workshops**

In a 2005 article, Elke Zobl establishes a first connection between Ladyfest and the history of consciousness-raising groups. Indeed, consciousness-raising is not a tool that was developed within the punk-feminist scene. Its invention goes back to the late 1960s and the concept further developed in 1970s through collectives linked to second-wave feminism.

Consciousness-raising groups were first launched by New York Radical Women and, later, the Redstockings Collective before they spread all over the US and beyond. In 1968, Kathie Sarachild presented the concept to the First National Women’s Liberation Conference in Chicago. Her “Program for Feminist ‘Consciousness Raising’” was later published in the radical feminist journal “Notes from the Second Year” (New York Radical Women 1970). Similar publications were released in the following years. For instance, the Women’s Action Alliance published “Consciousness-Raising Guidelines” in 1975. Such media helped the circulation of the concept during the 1970s and after.

Such consciousness-raising groups have been defined as “voluntary, usually women-only, regular discussion groups focused on recounting and interpreting the experiences of participants, generally by presenting members’ experiences around a defined topic, then drawing out similarities and structural relations to the oppression of women” (Firth/Robinson 2016, 346). Consciousness-raising groups had nothing to do with therapeutic meetings. Rather, they aimed to be rooted in political dynamics and become tools for social change, drawing on “round[s] of personal experiences and reflections” (346) in order to place personal experiences “into a structural picture” (347).

Before the development of punk-feminist festivals, Stephen Duncombe had already qualified zines as “[tools] for consciousness raising” (1997, 190). This description seems even more true when it comes to feminist zines. By producing queer-feminist materials, Riot Grrrl and Queercore activists allowed girls, women, and queer youth to become aware of the impact of their own social condition (Creasap 2014).

Without directly mentioning consciousness-raising, Piepmeier engages in a similar reflection about the grrrl zine “Doris” and its author. She explains how
“Doris” showcases Crabb’s mental-health terrain and “lets her readers see inside her own efforts at processing and making sense of the world” (Piepmeier 2012, 257) in order to invite her readers “to emulate her process of self-reflection, because she shows all the seams there, as well” (257). Crabb shares stories with her readers as a participant of a consciousness-raising group would. The readers are then encouraged to reflect on the zine’s content via their own life experiences and reproduce the author’s process. Both the “conversation” between Crabb and her readers and the process of consciousness-raising workshops in punk-feminist festivals recall, once again, hooks’ concept of democratic educators, who are central to the development of a pedagogy of hope. Indeed, hooks states that “[c]onversation is the central location of pedagogy for the democratic educator. Talking to share information, to exchange ideas is the practice both inside and outside academic settings that affirms to listeners that learning can take place in varied time frames” (44). The importance of conversation and sharing our stories also reflects what happens during some punk-feminist festival activities.

During Ladyfest Mainz/Wiesbaden in 2019, I attended a workshop on motherhood, the organization of which reminded me of the settings and goals of consciousness-raising. After a short presentation, the participants were split into small groups of four to five people. We were given an envelope in which we found several questions, written on small pieces of paper. One after the other, we were invited to pick a piece of paper, read the question, and discuss it within our groups. The questions were quite personal: How do you grasp household labor divisions? How is mental workload distributed in your relationship? What does “free time” mean to you? For what kind of changes would you wish for yourself?

All of them were somehow linked to parenthood or, more specifically, motherhood. Though some of us did not have children, the discussion formed a favorable moment for us to share our personal experiences and frame them in an implicit political scheme: the gendered division of household labor and parenthood. As we talked, we identified temporary solutions to the gendered division of household labor, especially in heterosexual couples. Sometimes, the question of sexist double-standards was also raised by the participants: Who is seen as a good mother in a patriarchal society? Who is seen as a good mother by feminist activists? Such questions mostly target the case of stay-at-home mothers.

During the workshop – because we were talking to each other, exchanging our points of view on a variety of topics, and sharing counter-strategies – we came to analyze and learn about the structures of patriarchy. Some discussions highlighted the possibility of different kinds of parenthood – for instance, com-
munal parenting. As we were learning about them, we were able to outline how we would like to see things change on personal and social levels. This resonates with a pedagogy of hope. But the links between punk-feminism, consciousness-raising, and progressive pedagogies might need further elucidation here.

By re-enacting consciousness-raising groups, punk-feminist festivals also inscribe their action into the “herstory” of feminist movements as defined by bell hooks, who writes that “[f]eminist scholars, and this includes black women, were the ones who resurrected ‘herstory,’ calling attention to patriarchal exclusion of women and thus creating the awareness that led to greater inclusion” (2003, 4). More importantly, they also cross boundaries between the so-called second and third waves of feminism.

**Consciousness-Raising to the Front!**
**Bringing Consciousness-Raising to the Concert Stage**

Punk-feminist festivals not only re-enact the “traditional” consciousness-raising group process, they also invest in songs as consciousness-raising material, as one of the musicians of the German band Friend Crush, who played the Noc Walpurgii and the Antifee festivals in 2014, explained in “Our Piece of Punk” – a book that gathers stories of those involved in the DIY queer-feminist punk scene in Germany:

“We mostly sing about encounters with various forms of violence and love. And talking openly about my own experiences of violence makes that other people with their own experiences can connect with them. These are in my opinions the most magical moments, when people with their own experiences can relate to mine. Yet I feel really connected and feel like we can collectively make things change.” (Lüdde/Vetter 2018, 73)

For Piepmeier, pedagogies of hope and imagination may also discuss traumatic narratives (260), not framing them with a cynical conclusion but instead drawing on them to call for change. They carry “the faith of activists” (261). The statement made by the musician of Friend Crush recalls a similar commitment. Placing the consciousness-raising process onto the stage modifies all of its basic principles in line with the way punk musicians approach the concert space and time: Not only do they give political talks between the songs, but I have also observed that they often make themselves available for personal discussion with their audience after each show, offering special moments where their experience sharing allows them to connect, relate, and give rise to attempts to “make things change” (Lüdde/Vetter 2018, 73).
After consciousness has been raised comes the time for action. Punk-feminist festivals therefore sometimes encourage their participants to take their concerns to the streets. In 2011, the first year of the international Slutwalk movement, Ladyfest Berlin offered its attendants the opportunity to take part in the Slutwalk that was organized in town the same week (Ladyfest Berlin 2011). The festival also held workshops for making signs and banners in order to give its attendants all the tools needed to march.

Though they mostly remain small-scale events, punk-feminist festivals encourage their participants to take action to change the world and structures of domination. As much as the grrrl zines that interested Piepmeier, these events seem to “offer tools for awakening outrage and engaging in protest” (253). They invite participants “to step into their own citizenship” (253), and thereby, once again, connect theories with democratic actions.

De-Centering Whiteness?

There is nonetheless a gap between hooks’ theory on pedagogy of hope and Piepmeier’s adaptation of the concept to grrrl zines. Piepmeier does not address the question of race at all, which is central to hooks’ work and various initiatives, from the fanzine “White Girls, We Need to Talk” to academic work by Mimi Thi Nguyen (2012) and Kristen Schilt (2014), who have highlighted that the worlds of Riot Grrrls and Ladyfest have mostly been the worlds of white middle-class feminists. This is worth investigating regarding punk-feminist festivals as well.

33% of the festivals I have studied offered at least one workshop addressing race or racism. Contrary to the music-practice workshops, which were only open to women, lesbians, and trans people, the large majority of workshops, discussions, and debates addressing race and racism were open to white people and people of color without distinction.

In some cases, race was introduced through “critical whiteness” workshops. Indeed, 14% of the festivals engaged with the topic from the angle of critical whiteness only – meaning that no other workshop was dedicated to racism.

At festivals such as Ladyfest Karlsruhe 2016 and Ladyfest Heidelberg 2015, the critical whiteness workshops were held by activists of color. However, when

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3 The Slutwalk is a form of feminist protest that first appeared in Toronto, Canada. Joetta Carr (2013) relates that, after a police officer had told a group of students that if women wanted to avoid rape they should “stop dressing like sluts”, a group of women organized and held the first Slutwalk in order to protest sexual violence, rape and rape culture, and victim stigmatization. The word that made this protest happen does not represent a simple and isolated accident; rather, it referred and still refers to an idea of women as “sluts” that is widely spread and commonly accepted – hence the international development of Slutwalk protests the very next summer.
the Antifee festival proposed a similar workshop, the program of the event stated, “We would like to focus on a common development of strategies of interaction with our own privileges in the everyday life. Therefore, people with experiences of racism are also invited to get actively involved.” (Antifee 2013) It should be noted here that this workshop sheds less light on people of color than on white people, as it seems to be aimed at explaining to the latter how to become good allies to the former.

While the organization of such a workshop was probably motivated by social justice and a will to deconstruct the privileges of whiteness, the workshop nonetheless appears to center the experiences of privileged people (here, white people), thereby sending people of color back to the margins of the anti-racist struggle. This kind of engagement resonates with hooks’ analysis of how white people sometimes engage with race and racism:

“White folks who talk race, however, are often represented as patrons, as superior civilized beings. Yet their actions are just another indication of white-supremacist power, as in ‘we are so much more civilized and intelligent than black folks/people of color that we know better than they do all that can be understood about race.’” (hooks 2003, 27)

According to hooks, considering as “all-white” a group in which people of color form a tiny minority contributes to erasing their presence. While punk-feminist festivals seem to perfectly understand and apply this idea to gender by emphasizing the minority of women and gender non-conforming people in independent music scenes/music industry, some of them fail to do the same with race and instead maintain whiteness in the center of their activities. Moreover, almost none of the festivals I have studied fostered spaces for women and queer people of color only⁵, while most of them offered at least one workshop for women and queer people only.

**Conclusion**

In this article, I first looked at music. I explained how punk-feminist festivals provide analyses of male dominance in independent music scenes and music industries through manifestos, presentations, debates, and theoretical workshops. According to the events’ organizers, men in independent music scenes are more likely to hold visible and creative positions, while women are often

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⁴ This text was available online until 2018. Unfortunately, the website of the festival is currently down, and the Internet Archive does not provide access to the page. I personally accessed it in 2017 and saved its content to my personal computer.

⁵ One exception to this is Ladyfest Karlsruhe 2019 and its “Empowerment für Frauen* of Color” (empowerment for women* of color) workshop (Ladyfest Karlsruhe 2019).
stuck doing invisible work. Yet, in order that the festival’s participants not cynically see the future of their music scenes as doomed by male domination, they try to step away from that scheme and offer a music education dedicated to empowering women, lesbians, and trans people. This way, they counter the feelings of shame and fear that people can experience when they are marginalized in traditional education spaces – as I have been able to observe by participating in a DJing workshop.

Next, I drew a link from consciousness-raising groups of the late 1960s and 1970s to punk-feminist festivals via grrrl zines. While punk-feminist festivals mostly re-enact consciousness-raising groups during workshops, some bands and musicians also bring the concepts to the concert stage, making a link between activism and music making. Drawing on my participant observation of a workshop on motherhood, I highlighted the importance that punk-feminist festivals give to self-reflection and personal experience sharing, thereby crossing the boundaries that separate them from the second wave of feminism. This practice allows the framing of the personal within a structural picture but also underpins personal and social solutions to counter the pedagogy of domination. In doing so, I have shown that consciousness-raising workshops and their facilitators also act as democratic educators. Finally, a connection with social movements also aims to encourage festival participants to take their concern to the next level and engage in larger-scale protests.

Both of my analytical approaches show how punk-feminist festivals encourage imagining a music scene, and a society, free from the structures of domination. They join theory and practice and look forward to making their participants actors in their own education. They participate in “helping people ‘to explore more options in their life’” (Piepmeier 2012, 252), which may involve learning how to play music, exploring new forms of parenthood, or engaging in social protest. In doing so, punk-feminist festivals continue the work of grrrl zines and engage with a pedagogy of hope.

Yet, Piepmeier’s analysis of grrrl zines and pedagogies of hope invisibilizes the question of race, which is central to hooks’ work. Similarly, race remains at the margins of punk-feminist festivals’ field of action. But while in the last few years, new events dedicated to punks of color have happened, such as London’s Decolonise Fest, one can expect that the coexistence of both types of events will give women and queers of color better visibility and recognition in the punk scene. In their manifesto, the Decolonise Fest organizers mention two import-

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6 While I am only mentioning the Decolonise Fest collective here, it should also be noted that, throughout punk history, there has been a variety of “punks of color” movements, not all of which had shared goals (see, for instance, Duncombe/Tremblay 2011).
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ant things regarding the analysis I provided earlier. First, they claim that they “will talk about racism but not in a way that centres whiteness or prioritises the feelings of white people” (Decolonise Fest 2020) (contrary to what I have observed in the German punk-feminist festivals programs). Second, they also emphasize that they “will not tolerate racism, ageism, sexism, transphobia, classism, ableism, homophobia or fatphobia” (Decolonise Fest 2020), underpinning the necessity of an intersectional approach.

References


Negotiating Gender and Sexuality: Representations, Self-Identification and Post-Feminist Discourse
Sexual Politics on Behalf of LGBTIQ?
Re_Production of Heteronormativity in the
German Debate about the Implementation
of Sexual Diversity as a Topic in School
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Abstract: In the fall of 2013, a working paper by the German federal government of Baden-Württemberg became public, revealing the intention to introduce the topic of sexual diversity across all school subjects. This was followed by a public outcry: Almost 192,000 German citizens signed a petition against the planned curriculum reform; between February 2014 and February 2016, every few months, thousands took to the streets to demonstrate against “gender-ideology and [the] sexualization of our children via the curriculum” (Demo für Alle 2014). In this paper, I analyze the working paper as well as the petition from a discourse-analytical perspective. Specifically, I work out how knowledge about gender and sexuality is re_produced and transformed in the two documents. I do not only show the petition's use of so-called “anti-genderist” rhetoric but also the ambivalence of the specific LGBT*I*Q representation in the working paper. Despite their contrary intentions, both documents contribute to the re_production of a heteronormative order.

Keywords: Education, Discourse, Heteronormativity, Antifeminism

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Sexual Politics on Behalf of LGBTIQ?¹
Re_Production of Heteronormativity in the German Debate about the Implementation of Sexual Diversity as a Topic in School

Introduction

After the German federal state of Baden-Württemberg had been governed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) for over 50 years – for the last 15 years, in coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) – the political situation changed; in the 2011 federal election, the CDU was still the strongest party, but even together with the FDP no longer had a majority of the seats. This electoral result led to the first federal government in Germany to be led by the Green Party. The Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) became the second largest party and formed a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which took over the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport (Ministerium für Kultur, Jugend und Sport).

Soon after the election, the ministry began working on a reform of the state curriculum. In the fall of 2013, a working paper concerning this reform was leaked to the public. The document revealed an intention to introduce the topic of sexual diversity across all school subjects. This was followed by public outcry: Almost 192,000 citizens signed a petition against the planned reform of the curriculum and from April 2014 onward, every few months, thousands took to the streets to demonstrate against “gender-ideology and [the] sexualization of our children” (Demo für alle 2014, transl. by FG). The debate soon reached national attention. In the end, the new curriculum was delayed but ultimately passed in 2016, with changes compared to the leaked working paper. This 2016 curriculum includes a guideline with the title “Education to Tolerance and Acceptance of Diversity” (Curriculum 2016, transl. by FG); however, the term “sexual diversity” no longer appears anywhere in the document.

For this paper², I have conducted a detailed analysis of the working paper

¹ See Petition 2013.
² The analysis in this paper forms part of my PhD project, in which I analyze discursive statements in different enunciative contexts of the Baden-Württemberg debate, such as the working paper that was leaked in 2013, the discussions in the federal parliament of Baden-Württemberg concerning the curriculum, the curriculum that was finally passed in 2016, the petition against the curriculum, the self-representation of the opponents of the curriculum (e.g. the alliance Demo für alle), as well as the press coverage of the debate from a discourse-analytical perspective. I am not only interested in the arguments of the opponents of the curriculum. Rather, I aim to work out how knowledge about gender, sexuality, and educa-
that was leaked in 2013 as well as of the petition against the planned reform of the curriculum. Specifically, I have analyzed how knowledge about gender and sexuality is re-produced\(^3\) and transformed in the two documents. Before I present the results of this analysis, I give some insight into how the two documents fit into the larger social, political, and scientific context in chapter 1. In chapter 2, I present the main theoretical concepts on which I base my research and briefly explain how I conducted my analysis. Chapters 3 and 4 are dedicated to the presentation of results. I close with a conclusion in chapter 5, in which I summarize the results and point towards different possibilities for thinking about gender, sexuality, and education.

**Contextualization and State of the Art**

The two documents I have analyzed for this paper represent two sides of a paradox and a simultaneous development that has taken place over recent years. On the one hand, questions about diversity and equal rights have become one of the major issues for public and private institutions as well as for social science\(^4\). Ann-Kathrin Stoltenhoff and Kerstin Raudonat identify a new paradigm of heterogeneity in German educational systems (Stoltenhoff/Raudonat 2018, 236). The draft for the curriculum reform in Baden-Württemberg (the working paper) appears to fit right into this new paradigm, as it focuses on the acceptance of diversity, more specifically of sexual diversity. On the other hand, there has been an increase in fascist and right-wing populist movements in most Western societies. Many of these movements focus on questions concerning gender and sexuality and have been analyzed as neo-conservative, fundamentalist, and anti-feminist (see Lang/Peters 2018; Kuhar/Paternotte 2017; Hark/Villa 2015).

The protests against the planned reform of the curriculum in Baden-Württemberg have been analyzed as part of these so-called anti-genderist movements. For instance, in identifying the mobilizing mechanisms and argumentative strategies of the French alliance Manif pour tous as well as the German Demo für alle – which played a central role in the demonstrations against the curriculum in Baden-Württemberg – Imke Schmincke (2015) analyzes how the image of the “innocent child” is used as a moral weapon of neo-conservative movements. Similar to Schmincke’s analysis, Elisabeth Tuider (2016) shows how

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3 I use the underscore in order to emphasize that I focus on both the production as well as the reproduction of knowledge.

4 For detailed analyses of neoliberal debates about diversity, gender, sexuality, and equal rights, see, for example, Pühl/Sauer 2018; Voß/Wolter 2013; Engel 2009.
the desire to protect “innocent, asexual children” is used to re-produce a heterosexual and racialized norm of sexuality.

Meanwhile, drawing on affect studies, Jutta Hartmann (2016; 2017) takes a closer look at how emotions function as a central motor for processes of inclusion and exclusion within the Baden-Württemberg debate. Hartmann shows how the sexualization of the curriculum as well as of LGBT*I*Q ways of life is used as “a strategy of generating outrage that aims at reducing the emancipatory character of the debate and at producing ‘indecency’” (Hartmann 2016, 122, transl. by FG). Furthermore, Hartmann analyzes normative processes of subjectivation that follow a “we vs. the others” logic. Finally, Vivien Laumann and Katharina Debus (2018) identify anti-feminist obstacles for an emancipatory gender pedagogy and go on to formulate counter arguments and elaborate on possible resources for a diversity-oriented pedagogy.

All of these studies focus on the anti-feminist and anti-genderist protests against the reform of the curriculum. The working paper, which forms the first draft of the reform, appears to represent the opposite perspective, because it propagates acceptance of sexual diversity. In this paper, however, I argue that the working paper also takes part in the re-production of a heteronormative order.

Analyzing the Discursive Re_Production of Heteronormativity

The focus of my analysis is the re-production of heteronormativity in both the working paper and the petition. Specifically, I identify through which discursive strategies knowledge about gender and sexuality is re-produced and transformed in the two documents and which gendered subject positions are discursively constructed in them.

The term heteronormativity was popularized by Michael Warner in 1991 (Warner 1991, 3). The concept has since been understood as the hegemonic gender order of Western societies, in which heterosexuality and gender dualism are perceived as the norm. According to Judith Butler, this hegemonic order is discursively reproduced via a heterosexual matrix “through which gender identity has become intelligible” (Butler 1990, 24). It “requires that certain kinds of

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5 The acronym LGBT*I*Q stands for “lesbian, gay, bi, trans*, inter*, and queer”. I use the asterisk to denote different ways of identifying as trans* (e.g. transgender, transsexual) or inter* (e.g. intersex, intergender). The letter q for “queer” aims at including further and different queer identifications. However, the documents I have analyzed use different versions of this acronym. In the respective passages, I have taken over the respective authors’ acronyms and spellings.
identities’ cannot ‘exist’ – that is, those in which gender does not follow from sex and those in which the practices of desire do not ‘follow’ from either sex or gender” (Butler 1990, 24). This means that only cisgender and heterosexual subjects are produced, while LGBT*I*Q people function as the constitutive outside of the heteronormative order. The “exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet ‘subjects,’ but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject” (Butler 1993, xiii).

Drawing on the works of Butler and Michel Foucault, I understand discourse as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972, 49). However, discursive practices do not merely denote the act of speaking or writing but signify the constitution of knowledge and truth (Fegter et al. 2015, 14). In this paper, I analyze through which discursive strategies a heteronormative truth is re-produced. The term “discursive strategies” is not meant to constitute intentional tactics by the documents’ authors. Drawing on Foucault’s “Archaeology of Knowledge” (1972), I use the term “discursive strategies” to describe the discursive practices that I have identified as regulated ways of re-producing knowledge and truth about gender and sexuality.

Furthermore, I am interested in the different subject positions that are constituted through these powerful knowledge constructions. According to both Foucault and Butler, the subject can be understood as the effect of power relations; the subject does not precede discourse but emerges through a process of subordination. Thus, “[s]ubjection’ signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject” (Butler 1997, 2). The term “subject position” refers to a discursively or symbolically defined speaking position (Wrana et al. 2014, 394). While Foucault (1972) suggests focusing on the status of the speaking person (“Who speaks?”), according to Butler, individuals become subjects through discursive interpellations that operate through identity categories (Butler 1993, 81pp.). Drawing on both theories, I focus on the question of the position from which one could legitimately speak according to the respective documents.

For the analysis of the two documents, I loosely follow poststructuralist figuration analysis as developed by Katharina Scharl and Daniel Wrana (2014). While I do not use the term “figuration”, I draw on the three analytical steps they suggest: differentiation, attribution, and transformation. In the first step, one focuses on the differences between concepts or objects. Such discursively constructed differences are usually marked by a hierarchy in which one side of

6 To stress this point, I deviate from an established scientific citation practice: For the analyzed documents, I do not cite the authors but (a shortened version of) the documents’ titles.
the difference is revalued and the other is devalued. Quite often, this follows an “us vs. them” logic. Thus, in the second step, one analyzes what is attributed to the two sides of this difference. In a possible third step, one focuses on how the previously constructed knowledge is transformed through a shift of the difference or a reattribution of the two sides of the constructed binary (see Scharl/Wrana 2014, 354).

In the following chapter, I focus on my analysis of the working paper. It will become apparent how knowledge about gender and sexuality is constructed in this document along the difference of “us heterosexual and cisgender people” vs. “them queer-identified Others”. However, the reproduction of this difference is not exclusively consistent and the construction of different subject positions is ambivalent. In chapter 4, I analyze the petition against the reform of the curriculum. There, I focus on how the discursively constructed knowledge about gender and sexuality in the working paper is transformed through different discursive strategies. With the analysis of the working paper and the petition, I am able to show that the discursive statements of the Baden-Württemberg curriculum’s opponents do not come “out of nowhere”. They are based on a hegemonic heteronormative discursive order that is reproduced even in documents that aim at acceptance of rather than discrimination against sexual diversity.

Working Paper

The 32-page Working Paper for the Curriculum Committees as a Foundation and Orientation for the Introduction of the Guiding Principles (Arbeitspapier für die Hand der Bildungsplankommissionen als Grundlage und Orientierung zur Verankerung der Leitprinzipien) (Working Paper 2013, 1) presents five guiding principles for the planned reform of the curriculum: Vocational Orientation, Education for Sustainable Development, Media Literacy, Prevention and Health Promotion, and Consumer Education (Working Paper 2013, 1). The first four pages contain general information on the new curriculum as well as on the individual principles. Subsequently, the “Competences and Contents of the Individual Guiding Principles” (Working Paper 2013, 5) are introduced in the form of tables. Below each of these tables, there is a section with the headline “Additionally to be Considered under the Aspect of Acceptance of Sexual Diversity” (Working Paper 2013, 9, 12, 23, and 32). The only exception is the guiding principle Prevention and Health Promotion. Here, the corresponding information is included in the table.

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7 All quotes from the working paper have been translated by the author.
In this table, one can also find a definition for sexual diversity: “Diversity in sexual identity and orientation (hetero-, homo-, bisexuality; transsexual, transgender, and intersexual people)” (Working Paper 2013, 26). In this quote, heterosexuality is explicitly listed as a part of sexual diversity. In the rest of the working paper, however, only LGBTTI\(^8\) people are addressed under the aspect of sexual diversity. For example, students are supposed to get to know “the different forms of living together of/with LGBTTI people” (Working Paper 2013, 12). Further, they should familiarize themselves with the “distinctness/expressions of gay, lesbian, transgender, and intersex culture” (Working Paper 2013, 29, see also 12). Students are also expected to learn about “exceptional historical and contemporary LGBTTI people” (Working Paper 2013, 29), the “history of suppression of bi-, homo-, trans-, and intersexual people, the movement of emancipation and liberation” (Working Paper 2013, 29), as well as the “rights of LGBTTI people (derived from basic human rights as well as international and national law, e.g. the UN Charter, European Law, the German constitution, the General Act on Equal Treatment, the Act on Transsexuals)” (Working Paper 2013, 29). Additionally, students should concern themselves with “classic families, rainbow families, single people, couple relationship[s], patchwork families, single-parent families, extended families, [and] chosen non-biological families” (Working Paper 2013, 12).

With these statements, the working paper breaks with the concealment of the existence of LGBT*I*Q people and their discrimination and explicitly attributes rights to those who identify as homosexual, bi, trans* or inter*. The non-representation of LGBT*I*Q people has a long tradition. In many schools, homosexual forms of desire are still only mentioned in the context of sexual education, and then almost always in association with HIV/AIDS. Bisexuality, trans*, inter*, and other forms of queerness are usually not addressed at all (see, for example, Kleiner 2015; Hoffmann 2015; Hartmann 2014; Bittner 2011; Hilgers 2004). The working paper, however, renounces this tradition on several levels: Non-heteronormative identifications are not reduced to homosexuality, and addressing sexual diversity is not limited to the context of sexual education, but is considered a cross-cutting issue that should be addressed in connection with all five of the guiding principles. This repeated interpellation of LGBT*I*Q issues produces lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans*, and inter* subject positions.

However, this representation of queerness is highly ambivalent. The representation of queer ways of life is restricted to clear-cut lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, transgender and intersexual identities and lacks ambiguity.

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8 The working paper uses the acronym LGBTTI, which is explained to stand for “lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, transgender, and intersexual people” (see Working Paper 2013, 32).
Moreover, heterosexuality and cisgender are still reproduced as norms through the unilateral marking of LGBT*I*Q. According to the working paper, students are also supposed to learn about heterosexual and cisgender culture, history, rights, etc. However, these are not marked as such but appear as “the normal”. Heterosexuality is only named once as part of sexual diversity, while cisgender is not mentioned at all. The only gendered positions that are explicitly named are transsexual, transgender and intersex people; the words “woman” and “man” do not appear.Implicitly, they are merely featured under the aspect of “family” where they are alluded to in “classic families” in opposition to “rainbow families” etc. With the adjective “classic”, heteronormative father-mother-child(ren) families are marked by a positive connotation.

As Scharl and Wrana (2014) emphasize, “there are often subject positions affiliated with markings: The pole constructed as unmarked becomes the place which is taken as a position from which to speak” (Scharl/Wrana 2014, 360, transl. by FG). This can also be observed with regard to the markings of LGBT*I*Q people in the working paper. The students who are directly addressed are implicitly positioned as heterosexual and cisgender, whereas LGBT*I*Q identities function as the constitutive outside (Butler 1993, xiii). They are referred to the position of the Other – an Other that is to be accepted, but an Other nonetheless. This becomes especially apparent in the guiding principle of Media Literacy, where – in reference to the acceptance of sexual diversity – students are supposed to recognize “that standing up for potential victims in digital media is an essential part of moral courage in a pluralistic society” (Working Paper 2013, 23). Here, students are addressed as people who stand up for potential victims of homophobia and transphobia. The potential victims, though, are Others.

However, the subjectivation of students as heterosexual and cisgender and the construction of LGBT*I*Q as the constitutive outside becomes brittle in other parts of the working paper. Under the guiding principle of Vocational Orientation, students are expected to “meet their own and other sexual identities without prejudice” (Working Paper 2013, 9). This suggests that students could potentially hold prejudice against their own sexual identity. Prejudice concerning sexuality and gender is mostly directed against non-heteronormative identifications. Therefore, this quote opens up the possibility that students might position themselves as other than heterosexual and/or cisgender. This possibility is reinforced by the expectation that students understand their own sexual identity and respect other sexual identities and ways of life (see Working Paper 2013, 9).

All in all, the representation of queerness in the working paper is highly ambivalent. For the most part, LGBT*I*Q people form the constitutive outside...
of a heterosexual norm and it remains unclear what is to be understood by the terms sexual/gendered identity/orientation. Moreover, gender and sexuality seem to be the only social categories the working paper focuses on; an intersectional perspective cannot be found.

Petition

This vacancy and conceptual vagueness are taken up in the petition Future – Responsibility – Learning: No Curriculum 2015 under the Ideology of the Rainbow (Zukunft – Verantwortung – Lernen: Kein Bildungsplan 2015 unter der Ideologie des Regenbogens) (Petition 2013). The text starts with a short summary of the working paper, which is followed by a general distancing from the acceptance of sexual diversity. In the main part, the petition presents six short demands, each of them accompanied by an explanatory footnote.

The petition differentiates between a status quo that is to be protected and a threatening future that the implementation of the planned reform of the curriculum would begin. The petition starts out declaring that the signatories support the “prevention of discrimination” (Petition 2013) against LGBT*I*Q people. However, the introduction of “acceptance of sexual diversity” in the curriculum would “overshoot the target” (Petition 2013) and aim at a “pedagogical, moral and ideological reeducation at general schools” (Petition 2013). The German Umerziehung (reeducation) has a strong negative connotation and is associated with a forced transformation of an assumed previous or current education. Thus, the petition draws a picture of a negative and threatening reeducation towards acceptance of sexual diversity. Against this backdrop appears the assumed education towards heteronormativity or non-acceptance of sexual diversity.

In my analysis, I have identified six discursive strategies through which heteronormativity is reproduced and legitimated in the petition.

Sexualization

First, as Hartmann (2016; 2017) has demonstrated, LGBT*I*Q ways of life, as well as the content of the working paper, are sexualized in the petition. While in the working paper, sexual diversity is addressed with regard to sexual orientation and identity, in the petition, the focus is shifted towards sexual practices: “The LGBTTIQ groups propagate the focus on different sexual practices in school as

9 All quotes from the petition have been translated by the author.
a new normality” (Petition 2013)\(^\text{10}\). The planned reform of the curriculum would represent “sexual politics on behalf of LGBTTIQ [people]” (Petition 2013) and the “cornerstone of a new sexual ethics” (Petition 2013). By contrast, the petition demands a “stop to the propagating new sexual morals” (Petition 2013). Hartmann points out that this implies that

“it is the sexual that is supposed to become the new educational content. However, the curriculum does not address sexual practices. It has been possible to address these in an age-specific way already since the introduction of sex education in schools in the 1970s” (Hartmann 2017, 35, transl. by FG).

This shift of focus from identities and ways of life to sexual practices relies heavily on a shift in terminology. The working paper does not address different pleasure-generating and/or coital practices. Rather, it propagates the acceptance of non-heteronormative self-constructions and social relationships. The petition, however, introduces new terms, such as “sexual practices”, “sexual politics”, and “sexual morals”. This shift in terminology constitutes a transformation of the constructed knowledge about sexual diversity; a transformation that has proven rather successful, as the public debate following the petition was no longer focused on acceptance of homosexual, bi, trans*, and inter* people, but rather on the question of whether students should be “forced” to learn about and be encouraged to engage in different types of coital and pleasure-evoking practices.

**Pathologization**

People who identify as homosexual, bi, trans* or inter* are pathologized in the petition. This is a well-known strategy that Foucault analyzed in his studies on the deployment of sexuality (Foucault 1978, 75pp.). Additionally, following Butler, this strategy questions the legitimacy of the existence of certain people: “To the extent the gender norms […] establish what will and will not be intelligibly human, what will and will not be considered to be ‘real,’ they establish the ontological field in which bodies may be given legitimate expression” (Butler 1990, XXIVpp). The petition addresses the “negative concomitants of an LGBTTIQ lifestyle” (Petition 2013). According to the petition, these include

“the higher suicide rate among homosexual adolescents, the higher susceptibility to alcohol and drugs, the remarkably high rate of HIV infections among homosexual men, the distinctly lower life expectancy of

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\(^\text{10}\) The petition uses the acronym LGBTTIQ. Its meaning is not explained.
homo- and bisexual men, the pronounced risk of mental illness among women and men who live homosexually” (Petition 2013).

In addition, it claims that “the psychic and somatic problems of [transsexual] people are reduced to questions of social acceptance” (Petition 2013). In this quote, the pathologization is somewhat implicit but no less clear. Drawing on the socially constructed distinction between nature and nurture, it is suggested that the negative experiences of trans* people could not be explained by a lack of social acceptance (nurture). Therefore, the causes are allocated in the supposedly different nature of trans* people who are thus biologized and pathologized. The authors of the working paper surely did not intend for such a perception of people who identify as homosexual, bi, trans*, or inter* – on the contrary. However, a link can be drawn between the construction of LGBT*I*Q people as abject beings in the working paper and the pathologization in the petition. In the working paper, it becomes obvious that there is something different about LGBT*I*Q people. They seem to be “in need of” special attention. It is not explained what constitutes this specialness, though. In the petition, this vacuum is seized upon. Their “specialness” is explained through a biologized difference between “them” and “normal” people, i.e. cisgender heterosexuals. Regarding the “risk of suicide among homosexual adolescents” (Petition 2013), the petition claims there to be “no empirically provable connection between suicide risk and discrimination that would explain this to be a result of non-accepting attitudes towards adolescent homosexuality” (Petition 2013).

Science vs. Ideology

The phrasing “empirically provable” points towards another discursive strategy: The differential figure of gender and queer studies as political ideology vs. “real”, “hard” science has already been analyzed in a number of studies (see, for example, Lang/Peters 2018; Kuhar/Paternotte 2017; Hark/Villa 2015). In the petition, this figure is re_produced by distinguishing between a “scientifically-oriented pedagogy” (Petition 2013) that it demands and the “ideological battle cries and theoretical constructs” (Petition 2013) that it sees represented in the working paper. For the signatories of the petition, these supposed “theoretical constructs” include “so-called ‘sexual identity’, such as transsexuality” (Petition 2013). The word “so-called” constitutes a distancing from the statement and thereby calls the existence of trans* people into question. By contrast, the petition demands an “unrestricted ‘yes’ to the scientific principle in school, teaching, and teacher-training” (Petition 2013). According to the petition, “questioning the genders
Reversal of Perpetrator and Victim

Another strategy through which the planned reform of the curriculum is portrayed as a threat is the reversal of perpetrator and victim. While LGBT*I*Q people are constructed as potential victims in the working paper, according to the petition, it is heterosexual cis women and men that are in danger. The signatories demand an “orientation towards the values of our constitution that defends the protection of marriage and family as a democratic achievement” (Petition 2013):

“The “Introduction of the Guiding Principles” derives rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, transsexual and intersexual people that do not exist. A change of articles 3 and 6 of the constitution that these groups hope for is anticipated in the curriculum 2015” (Petition 2013).

Article 3 on equality before the law and article 6 on marriage, family and children of the German constitution are subject to different interpretations. Recently, this has been shown by the introduction of the so-called “marriage for all” in 2017, which – finally – allows homosexual couples to get married. The petition, however, assumes that the two articles of the constitution should only protect the rights of heterosexual cis women and men. LGBT*I*Q people, on the other hand, are denied equal rights, since equal treatment is seen as a threat to the protection of heteronormative privileges. Furthermore, the petition deplores the alleged stigmatization of teachers: “The accusation that schools are ‘homophobic places’ put Baden-Württemberg’s teachers under general suspicion of discrimination” (Petition 2013). Following this logic, it is no longer homophobia itself that is threatening but rather the stigmatization of being accused of homophobia.

Parental Sovereignty of Education

The focus on teachers and parents in the petition constitutes another discursive transformation. In the working paper, students are constructed as agentic subjects who actively accumulate knowledge about sexual and gender diversity and tackle their own orientations and identifications. In the petition, however, students are named only once and appear merely as passive recipients of edu-

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Tuider (2016), among others, identifies narratives in which the white, heterosexual, cisgender, bourgeois man is constructed as the new victim.
cation: “A so-called ‘sexual identity’, such as transsexuality, is supposed to be conveyed as an expression of socially wanted/accepted sexuality to the students of Baden-Württemberg” (Petition 2013). This denial of students’ agency already points towards the depiction of children as “innocent” and “in need of protection” as analyzed by Schmincke (2015) and Tuider (2016). The petition focuses on teachers, who are portrayed as stigmatized and overtaxed, claiming the new curriculum would demand teachers stand up against homophobia, force them to “introduce the next generation to a new sexual ethics” (Petition 2013), and “oblige them to base their teaching on LGBTIQ ideas” (Petition 2013).

Thus, teachers are portrayed as mere executors of a threatening curriculum, which undermines the sovereignty of parents over education. This parental sovereignty is stressed by the claim that “the cooperation between schools and parental homes that has been built through decades of constructive collaboration becomes subject to negotiations” (Petition 2013) and a demand for the “preservation of the trustful relationship between schools and parental homes” (Petition 2013). Through the figure of a once “trustful relationship”, the subject position of parents is limited to cisgender and heterosexual parents. Homosexual, bi, trans*, inter* or other queer-identified parents who have been fighting for recognition of their reality of life by schools and curricula are denied the subject position of parents.12

LGBT*I*Q vs. other Others

Finally, the petition takes up the non-representation of other social identity categories in the working paper. Instead of criticizing the lack of an intersectional perspective, however, the petition plays off different discriminated-against groups against each other in its sixth and final demand. The petition argues that the curriculum not only threatens the privileged position of heterosexual cis people but also “conceals other forms of exclusion” (Petition 2013): “In vain, one looks for a similar engagement in the areas of ethnic origin, disability, age, gender, or worldview/religion” (Petition 2013). Here, people who have experienced racist, ableist, ageist, religious, and – interestingly – gendered discrimination are used to legitimize the protection of hetero and cis privileges. The fact that discrimination based on gender is specifically listed reinforces the shift from a focus on people to a focus on practices. As described above, cisgender subject positions (cis man, cis woman) are not mentioned in the working paper.

12 Even though the petition does not specifically address other forms of discrimination until the last demand (see chapter 4.6), this also applies to parents of color, parents with low social-economic status, dis_abled parents, and many others who have been denied recognition by educational institutions.
In the petition, trans* and inter* are not recognized as gendered subject positions and homo- and bisexuality are not viewed as gendered identifications but are exclusively associated with “perverse” sexual practices. Thus, in the petition, knowledge about sexual diversity is transformed into an understanding of the term that does not address questions of gender.

Conclusion

Detailed analysis of the two documents shows that even though they clearly pursue different – if not opposite – targets, they are connected, not only because the petition constitutes a reaction to the working paper. The knowledge about gender and sexuality constructed in the working paper is transformed in the petition through different discursive strategies.

One of these strategies, which has also been analyzed with regard to other anti-feminist and anti-genderist movements, is claiming the knowledge produced by studies of and theories on gender to be unscientific. While the working paper draws on terms and concepts coined by gender and queer studies, the petition deems these perspectives to be “ideological” rather than “scientific”. Thus, any knowledge produced in the working paper is discredited by the petition.

Other discursive strategies of the petition focus on constructing LGBT*I*Q people as perverse as well as physically and mentally ill. These discursive constructions seize upon the knowledge constructed in the working paper. The working paper focuses on (acceptance of) LGBT*I*Q people and uses terms such as “sexual diversity”, “sexual identity”, and “sexual orientation”. However, the meaning of these terms is not fully explained. In the petition, this conceptual vagueness and the repetition of the word “sexual” is used to shift the focus towards the sexual practices of LGBT*I*Q people. Through the use of other terms such as “sexual politics”, “sexual ethics”, and “sexual morals”, these kinds of practices are constructed as unnatural and perverse.

Similarly, the pathologization of LGBT*I*Q people relies on a transformation of the knowledge constructed in the working paper. As I have shown, the representation of LGBT*I*Q people in the working paper is highly ambivalent. Queer-identified people are represented, but are restricted to the position of the constitutive outside to a heterosexual norm. They are marked as “Other”. While the working paper explains this otherness with social discrimination, the petition claims the reasons for it to be found in the different, abnormal, sick nature of LGBT*I*Q people.

According to the petition, LGBT*I*Q people and ways of life are overemphasized in the working paper. This claim is backed by the observation that oth-
er discriminated groups are hardly addressed in the working paper. Thus, the working paper's failure to include an intersectional perspective on discrimination is seized upon in the petition. The focus on LGBT*I*Q people is turned into an overemphasis of certain groups which is claimed to put other groups at a disadvantage.

The construction of LGBT*I*Q people as perverse, ill, and over-represented ultimately serves the discursive reversal of perpetrator and victim. While in the working paper, students are addressed as subjects who actively engage in different issues, they are constructed as passive recipients of education in the petition. Thus, the focus is shifted towards teachers and parents. In the petition, these (assumed to be) heterosexual and cisgender teachers and parents are constructed as the actual victims. In the working paper, LGBT*I*Q students are identified as (potential) victims of discrimination. In the petition, however, the (potential) victims are those who are (at risk of being) accused of discriminating against LGBT*I*Q people. According to the petition, the real threat is not homo- or transphobic discrimination, but the stigmatization of being (seen as) homo- or transphobic. Ultimately, these discursive strategies serve the purpose of defending heterosexual and cis privileges and reproducing a heteronormative order.

However, this heteronormative order is not only reproduced in the petition. As I have shown, the discursive strategies of the petition rely on the knowledge constructed in the working paper. While the working paper clearly claims acceptance of sexual diversity as its goal, it takes part in the re-production of heteronormativity by restricting LGBT*I*Q identifications to the position of the constitutive outside to a heterosexual norm. This may not be all that surprising: The hegemonic gender order of German society (and most Western societies) is a heteronormative one and, as Butler points out, “all signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat” (Butler 1990, 198). In the case of the debate about the Baden-Württemberg curriculum, the discursive transformations initiated by the petition proved effective not only among the opponents of the curriculum but also within the public and political debate in general. This becomes especially apparent in the fact that sexual diversity is no longer addressed as such in the curriculum passed in 2016.

However, as Butler elaborates, “[t]he task is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat” (Butler 1990, 202). As discourse-analytical interventions are able to show, there are possibilities for thinking about gender, sexuality, and education from a different perspective. For example, a definition of gender and sexual diversity that does not focus only on LGBT*I*Q people but denotes different ways of life, including cisgender and heterosexual ones (see Hartmann 2002), could
constitute a discursive transformation that would “open up the field of possibility for gender without dictating which kinds of possibilities ought to be realized” (Butler 1990, viii).

References


The Interactional Production of Narratives on Trans Categories. The Role of Body Modifications

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Abstract: In this article, we investigate how participants self-identified as travestis and transsexual women negotiate gender identity categories during meetings of a support group in a non-governmental organization in Porto Alegre, Brazil. We are interested in (a) how trans categories become relevant in talk-in-interaction and in (b) how these categories are constructed vis-à-vis biomedical discourse about transsexuality. The corpus of this research is composed of seven hours of video-recorded interaction, which were analyzed and transcribed following Conversation Analysis (CA) theoretical principles and methodological procedures. Our results point out that participants oriented to the role of body modifications in stressing identity category differences among travestis, transsexual women and gay men. We noticed that narrative analysis inspired by CA emerges as a powerful apparatus to understand the process of membership categorization. Data are in Brazilian Portuguese.

Keywords: Gender, Membership Categories, Transsexuality, Travestility, Biomedical Discourse

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The Interactional Production of Narratives on Trans Categories. The Role of Body Modifications

Preliminary Considerations: Gender Categories as Conversational Traits in Everyday Interactions

Historicizing gender as an analytical category rebuilds important epistemological changes that have occurred across recent decades. These changes marked the development of a science focused on understanding society as a gendered grouping, in which labor, language, education, religion, and other social institutions conform to significant sexual division (Scott 1995). Such theorization, which took place in sociological discussions in the 1980s and 1990s, represented not only a useful way to mediate social dynamics in a common academic vocabulary but also the condensing of multiple scientific objects into a unified tropology for theoretical investigation (Mariano 2005). The feminist discussion focused mostly on reinterpreting the power relations between women and men, initially as complementary and different dimensions, later as relational substrates of the same discursive order (Harding 1986). This theoretical field attempted not only to reconsider the power inequality between men and women in modern society but also to reassess how knowledge was being produced in androcentric 20th century science, a tendency that continued to be pushed in Western culture into the 21st century.

While acknowledging the large contributions these theoretical strands have made to the social sciences and humanities, we cannot avoid pointing out that such attempts have had consequences for the conceptualization of femininity – as it correlates to and complements masculinity – by scholars in the so-called feminist academy. Most such consequences relate to the implementation of inductive theoretical presuppositions (Stolcke 2004). The feminist social agent could not encompass all gendered socialization systems; therefore, this agency displayed categories of men and women that invoked colonialist meaning schemes (Hall 1992; Boatcă/Roth 2015).

Linda Nicholson (1999) showed that this virtualization, especially for the category “woman”, brought difficulties for feminist discussions concerning sociological speculations that endeavored to be universal. The theorization of gender relations started to increasingly face problems with the understanding of idio-
syncratic social milieu, mostly where masculinity and femininity were not fully represented by the typologies\(^1\) provided by the European and North American academy (Harding 1986). This scene would be deepened by late-1980s studies on intersectionality and the urgency to understand gender roles in relation to race and sex, especially in environments where such dynamics were quite subtle within social interactions (Crenshaw 1989).

With Judith Butler's (1990) “heterosexual matrix” and the notion of gender, sex, and desire as a genealogical continuum (performed under particular social conditions), feminist discussions were pushed once more to face the dilemma of bringing together theoretical conceptualizations and empirical reasoning in the same explanatory system. If the post-identity-perspective presumptions are right and gender categories are not conceived as something individual but rather as a socially shared construction process (Butler 1990; 2011), that should be shown less with inductive theory and much more with empirical, methodologically grounded interpretations.

The main core of such discussion, then, lay in the complexity of dealing with categories that are part of a common, shared culture and at the same time biographical elements of everyday interactions. It was of great interest to the feminist program to understand how such categories would operate when they were being displayed and assigned during social encounters. These methodological standards are important, especially to gender studies, for comprehending counter-hegemonic constructions of gendered social roles. These constructions represent both political “slumbers” in the state of the art of social sciences and humanities and fruitful spaces for scientific development and the social empowerment of oppressed groups (Borba 2017).

In terms of methodology, many authors in the 20th century developed and improved what has been called “Empirical Qualitative Research” (Potter 1996). Among them, Harold Garfinkel (1991) was the first who tried to comprehend the methods social agents use to understand each other in everyday encounters and, from that point on, how they build up belonging to social categories within common-sense knowledge. At the same time, Erving Goffman (1967) developed a sophisticated theorization of how agents fulfill social roles within systems of interactive rituals. Due to these authors’ methodological refinements, a new metacritical model of social science was inaugurated, one more useful to

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1 Stolcke (2014) discusses the notion of intersectionality and gender relations based on her historical analysis of colonial Cuban society. She argues that gender relations are not fully encompassed by sociological and anthropological theorization. Dealing with intersectionality serves much more as a sensitizing concept (Blumer 1954) for social sciences and humanities seeking to understand institutions’ social roles and their relations to the construction of reality for any grouping in any geographical context.
pragmatic approaches to qualitative research methods, allowing researchers to observe the “process” of generating knowledge about some given social phenomenon within a self-critical and interactional perspective.

Inspired by these models, especially by Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis (CA) emerged in the late 1960s as a theoretical and methodological approach that conceives of interaction as the main substrate for socialization (Goodwin/Heritage 1990). In this sense, group membership is understood by CA as a linguistic interactional process in which categories are displayed by social interactants and used for producing belonging to a certain group or culture (Sacks/Schegloff/Jefferson 1974).

As these authors have demonstrated that the study of psychosocial categories involves a paradox between micro and macro levels of qualitative social research (Sacks 1992; Hopper/Lebaron 1998; Nicholson 1999) – and that gender is, par excellence, a unit for feminist ontological speculations (Scott 1995) – it is reasonable to say that contemporary science has to focus on social interactions at a molecular level of investigation, at least if scholars want to properly analyze gender relations in different groups and cultures with similar topologies. Representing a microethnographic level of empirical analysis, CA becomes a powerful tool for gender studies.

Such an apparatus stresses the detailed analysis of social and cultural processes that shape what is considered appropriate for both men and women in some circumscribed political social order (Erickson 2014). Gender membership categorization, when comprehended as a linguistic process that operates through microsocial interactions (Stokoe 2012), unveils the dynamics behind the sexed-bodies discursive machinery and the performative processes of being men and women within a specific social milieu in intersection with other social constructs (such as race and social class). Paired with empirical reasoning, such an approach would, therefore, enable a fluid and non-essentialist gender maneuver. This methodological and theoretical model could also provide understanding of gender-stigmatized groups that often challenge both the heterosexual matrix and biopolitical discourses (Foucault 1978).

Travestility and Transsexuality in Brazil: Historical and Sociological Aspects

Aligned with these discussions, travestis’ and trans women’s experiences in Brazil present a diverse, challenging and suitable environment for CA-based research within the scope of gender relations. In the Brazilian context, trans categories reveal a complex dispute over the T in the LGBT acronym (lesbi-
an, gay, bisexual, transgender). The term transgender – commonly used in English to refer to trans people – is rejected by many social trans activists for not being able to capture the diversity of trans categories in Brazil (Carvalho/Carrara 2013).

Travesti emerged as a gender category in Brazil in the 1970s as a way to overcome the dichotomy between different gender identities used to refer to both effeminate and masculine homosexual men (Carvalho/Carrara 2013). Being a travesti involves a series of modifications on a sexed body assigned as male at birth. These modifications include feminine body features, dressing, language, silicone injections, breast implants, hormone therapy, and social roles (Kulick 1998; Bento 2006).

The distinction between gays and travestis resulted from the changes that homosexuality went through in Brazil in the 1970s (Carvalho/Carrara 2013). The debate on the difference between “travesti” and “transsexual woman” became public in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The fight for the inclusion of the T in the LGBT acronym then gave way to the dispute over the T in the social movement. While travestis fought against police violence and for access to health care, transsexual women worked to get closer to hospitals in order to guarantee that the Brazilian public health system would not only offer medical transition to trans people (Carvalho/Carrara 2013), but also provide psychological assistance and legal counseling, among other services, which led to the establishment of what is currently known as The Transsexualization Process.

To better understand this debate over trans categories in the Brazilian context, we investigated how participants who self-identified as travestis or trans women negotiated gender membership during meetings of a support group in a non-governmental organization (NGO) in Porto Alegre, Brazil. We were particularly interested in (a) how trans categories became relevant in talk-in-interaction and (b) how these categories were constructed vis-à-vis biomedical discourse (i.e., the DSM-5 and ICD 10) about transsexuality.

Considering that research focused on participants’ emic perspective (such as studies inspired by CA) is not widespread in the Brazilian academic context, we see our study’s potential in revealing how membership and common-sense knowledge are constructed through language use by participants’ categorization work in naturally occurring interactions.

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2 We adopt the expression “trans categories” to refer to gender categories that have emerged in social movements in Brazil and that cannot be understood under the term “transgender”.

3 Some non-governmental organizations adopted pedagogical interventions directed at the medical staff of hospitals treating trans women. These interventions aimed at reinforcing the importance of understanding transsexuality beyond procedures such as sex reassignment surgery.
Furthermore, our contributions may add to gender studies the notion that *interactional categorization work* (here used as a substitute expression for *identity construction*) should be taken as sensitizing theoretical and methodological machinery (Blumer 1954), not as an inductive theoretical explanatory scheme. A detailed sequential analysis of talk-in-interaction can thus demonstrate how people construct their own gender membership and resist dominant discourses in everyday life.

**Method**

Our study was conducted in an NGO in Porto Alegre, in the south of Brazil. The NGO was founded in 1999 and aims at advocating for travestis and trans people’s human rights, as well as at promoting campaigns focused on citizenship and health care. We followed ethnographic procedures (Lamnek 1989), such as participant observation, for 2 months before we started audiovisual recording. We then video-recorded the weekly meetings of a support group for travestis and transsexuals from May to June 2016, which generated a research corpus of 7 hours of interaction. We adopted Conversation Analysis (CA) as our theoretical and methodological framework and used interpretative microethnographic procedures in the data segmentation phase (Erickson 1992; Garcez/Bulla/Loder 2014).

The weekly meetings were held at the NGO every Wednesday as part of psychological services provided via the NGO’s partnership with a private university located in Porto Alegre. Each meeting lasted between 30 and 50 minutes and there was neither a predefined topic to be discussed by the group nor a predefined order or hierarchy for turn-taking to be followed in the course of interaction. For this article, we analyze two different group meetings in which both NGO workers and occasional participants were present. We follow CA transcription conventions (see Table 1, Appendix) and first transcribed the data in Brazilian Portuguese before translating it into English.

In regard to ethical aspects of our study, we have anonymized participants’ names by using pseudonyms. Each pseudonym is based on the number of syllables, intonation, and grammatical gender of the respective person’s actual name. It is important to mention that all participants knew they were being recorded and had signed an informed consent form for participating in our study.

We considered any interaction (verbal and non-verbal) with researchers during the recording as interactions and any mention of the recording as such as a part of an interaction itself.
Results and Discussion

Narratives and Categorization Analysis: Making Sense and Being Social

Narratives on body modification and its relationship to the expression of masculinities and femininities within trans categories in Brazil were frequent in our data. Associations between gender categories such as “gay”, “travesti” and “transsexual” became sequentially relevant, being collaboratively constructed in talk-in-interaction.

Excerpt 1 (divided into two parts, 1A and 1B) is one example of such an occurrence, as it shows how participants orient themselves in relation to ongoing narratives and affiliate with their interlocutors throughout the meeting. This first excerpt comes from a meeting held on 11 May 2016, in which participants Nina, Adriana, Helena, Denise, Douglas, and Aline were present, sitting around a table.

Excerpt 1A: We are not that little gay, that little fairy man anymore
Studies in CA conceive a narrative from an *interactional* perspective (Jefferson 1978; Schegloff 1997; Hyvärinen 2008). Through communicational movements of alignment, such as verbal and non-verbal ratification, turn-of-talk orientation, and sequentially located assessments (Jefferson 1978), interactants work together to produce intersubjectivity (i.e., sociability and intelligibility) during the course of a narrative (Erickson 2014). Producing intersubjectivity grants agents the possibility of legitimizing their knowledge (turning something individual into something social) and, then, making sense of experiences to others and to themselves (Bamberg 2012). By all means, producing intersubjectivity is a phenomenon, *ipso facto*, of membership categorization. In order to understand our experiences, we have to mediate them through other social agents, which requires us to be exposed to interactional membership work.

In excerpt 1A, Nina initially explains to the participants (lines 60 and 62) that families normally reject trans people because a travesti or trans woman is not recognized as “that little gay” and “that little fairy man” anymore. In lines 71, 73, and 77, she says that a travesti or trans woman embraces her identity because she “feels good”, i.e., feminine. Adriana, in line 75, verbally aligns with Nina (“uhum”) and nods affirmatively. We notice that Nina associates the category gay to some category-bound features such as a “fairy”, “little man”, and “with a limp wrist”. Nina produces a narrative in which she rejects the association of these features with travestis or trans women. Instead, she associates the gender categories “gay”, “travesti” and “trans woman” with attributes that contrast different types of masculinities and femininities.

---

153 Nina (0.6)
154 a gente toma hormôni:os (.) a gente (.) coloca
155 we take horm:ones (.) we (.) put
156 pró:tese a gente coloca silico:ne (.) a gente coloca
157 i:mp:ant we put silico:ne (.) we put
158 isso (.) >°aquil-°< a gente modifica (0.7) o nosso
159 this (.) >°tha-°< we modify (0.7) our
160 co:ro (0.5) pra assumir aquela identidade que ta
161 body (0.5) to embrace that identity that is
162 que a gente tem aqui ó dentro da cabeç- .hh=
163 that we have here you see inside the head- .hh=
164 Adriana "u:rrum° ((acena positivamente com a cabeça))
165 "uhum° ((nods affirmatively))
166 Nina =porque eu acho que a nossa identidade tá aqui
167 =because I think our identity is here
Nina recognizes the importance of hormone therapy and silicone implants as procedures to enable travestis and trans people to embrace their gender identity. She emphasizes that “travesti” and “trans women” are subjective and self-perceived gender categories and she refuses their association to the biological-sex preponderance (line 175).

We notice here that participants do not conform to the heteronormative perspective present in biomedical discourse (Foucault 1978), which conceives of trans identities as a phenomenon in which people have an aversion to their genitalia – as stated in documents such as the ICD 10 (World Health Organization 2016) and the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association 2013).

Interactants work transsexuality’s and travestility’s categories as similar “family” categories. The narrator, Nina, and her interlocutors produce category consistency between “gay” and “fairy little man” as well as between “travesti” and “trans woman” by marking them with similar membership categorization devices (Sacks 1992; Stokoe 2012). These devices are normally seen as an apparatus that encompasses shared associated attributes among categories, such as category-bound activities (e.g., body-modification procedures for both travestis and trans women) and category-tied predicates (e.g., travestis and trans women feel feminine). Category consistency is a method for speakers to add meaning to social categories and events during talk-in-interaction and consequently to present interactants’ association with these elements to others participants (Stokoe 2012).

For example, the sentence “The woman picked up the baby.” – a purposeful derivation of Sacks’ (1992) canonical example “The baby cried. The mommy picked it up.” – shows that the consistency between two categories – in this case, “woman” and “baby” – provides a myriad of possibilities for participants to associate with shared common-sense knowledge. This sentence expresses a relationship between the woman and the baby, e.g., a family bond (if the woman is understood as “mother”, “aunt”, “godmother”, among other possible categories); a professional bond (if the person picked up the baby because she is a “doctor”, “nurse”, “teacher” etc.); or any other type of social attribution intelligible for the interactants. The action of establishing consistency between two or more categories expresses a direct association between speakers and the categories they are displaying during the conversation (Stokoe 2012): “I know/saw/heard/… that the woman picked up the baby, and therefore I can express that to you, here and now, because I am related to that woman, or to that
It is important to notice in this first excerpt that participants acknowledge body modifications and femininity as attributes associated with travestis and trans women. In contrast, gay men are pictured as effeminate and associated with what has been described as non-desired traits in hegemonic or complicit masculinities (Connell 1995; 2000). Nina demonstrates her association with these categories by producing consistency between them (e.g., “fairy little man-gay” in lines 60, 62, and 66; “we-travesti-transsexual-feminine” in lines 71, 73, and 77). The use of possessive adjectives and/or personal pronouns (for example, “we” in lines 155, 157, 159, and 163 and “our” in line 167) makes such a relation explicit.

Gender in Talk: Debunking Discourses in Everyday Interactions

In this section, we discuss the subtleties of belonging to different trans categories by focusing on an extract from the first day of data generation, which occurred on 4 May 2016. In this excerpt (divided into three parts, 2A, 2B and 2C), participants discuss the history of the trans social movement in Brazil, the differences between travestis and trans women, as well as the contemporary political scene in the country. At this meeting, Martina, Morgana, Lia, Carolina, Helena, Denise, Nina, and Douglas were present.

Martina: and us morgana and the girls everybody here ok
(0.4) we:ll we decided ok that we are
mulheres travestis and women and
travesti women and women transsexuals
Lia: sim
Martina: got it? that thing transgender got it
então a gente nem fala ma- ai é uma palavra
so we don’t even speak anymo- oh it’s a word
boni::[ta] uma palavra france::sa uma pala:[vra ]né=
so be:uti[ful] a fre:nch word a wo::[rd] right= baby, or to something else on a professional or family level, or via any other bond." That type of interactional work provides information about speakers’ own selves (or memberships). It is also notable that each chosen category corresponds to a certain type of social intelligibility for the objects that are being described (e.g., for the “woman” category, most of the times, a “proper” family bond would be within the spectrum of “mother/feminine” roles but not “father/masculine” representations).
Martina brings the categories “travesti women”, “women” and “transsexuals” into the conversation (line 403) by saying that she and the other girls identify themselves with these gendered terms. After Lia’s alignment elocution (line 405), Martina rejects the category “transgender” as a representative term for trans categories in Brazil. She associates this term with a beautiful French word, emphasizing how foreign it sounds (lines 407, 409, and 411).

“Transgender” as a gender category characterizes the political context of the 1970s, in which the theoretical and political structuration of “the transsexual phenomenon” (Castel 2001) in Europe and in the United States went through different historical and cultural phases. It played an important role for LGBT social movements and empowerment. However, it could not be captured by social movements in countries such as Brazil and other South American nations that were facing different political issues and were not fully engaged in the international social-activism scenario (Carvalho/Carrara 2013).

In our data, the rejection of the term “transgender” exemplifies the use of a linguistic category as a term that captures the political and ontological substrate of belonging to a specific group within a specific society (Antaki/Widdicombe 1998). Within the categorization process, “transgender” is rejected as a potential category because it does not represent the possibility of dealing with the common-sense knowledge that is locally constructed by participants.
In this excerpt, Carolina (lines 424 and 426) asks the participants if there is any difference between a “travesti” and a “transsexual woman”. Martina takes the turn-of-talk (line 429) and states that there is a huge difference. After Martina's production, Lia takes the turn (line 437) and asks for an opportunity to express her idea. She is then ratified by Carolina (line 439). Lia states that the difference is that a “transsexual woman” is the one who undergoes the surgery right.

We notice here that Lia refers to sex-reassignment surgery as the surgery that makes the difference between trans women and travestis. After a brief period of silence, Martina corrects Lia's assumption by stating that trans women do not need surgery (lines 446 and 450). Lia accepts this correction by aligning herself with Martina (“yes”), reformulating her previous elocution, and stating that a “transsexual woman” is “the one that feels feminine” (line 454). We can see here that resistance to biomedical discourse is collaboratively produced by participants through recurrent interactional strategies, such as constant reformulation of previous talk in order to show affiliation with interlocutors and to build up a cohesive gender category.
Here, Nina is asked by Carolina to explain how she feels about being a transwoman and travesti. Carolina invites the participant to establish possible differences between these two gender categories. Nina then agrees with Martina, saying that a “transsexual woman” does not need to undergo sex-reassignment surgery (lines 509 to 513).
After a brief turn dispute between Nina and Morgana (lines 517 to 523), Nina gets the floor and says that she feels “like that”, a “transsexual woman”. After Carolina ratifies Nina's production (line 530), Nina says that travestis were not born “transsexuals” (line 536). In the same turn, she states that they (“we”) were born “a travesti”, they were born “a man” and “came from” there.

This extract exemplifies how people use categorization to produce belonging. Nina, in another moment in the interaction, tells the others that she has not undergone sex-reassignment surgery. Here, however, she self-orients to the category of “transsexual woman”, being ratified by her interlocutors. With this movement, Nina dissociates the category-tied predicate sex-reassignment surgery from “transsexual women”. She also distinguishes trans women from travestis by stating that travestis were “born a man” and implying a gendered (male) body from which a travesti “comes”.

Nina's view on travestility has been described in various ethnographic work, e.g., by Don Kulick (1998) and, more recently, Julieta Vartabedian (2018), in which travestilities are associated with a spectrum of men's homosexuality. It is interesting to notice, however, that Martina, in a contrasting discursive strategy in excerpt 2B, associates travestis with “women” and “transsexual women”, rejecting for both travestis and trans women the category-tied predicate sex-reassignment surgery. Doing so, Martina increases the consistency between travestis and trans women within the feminine spectrum by stating that undergoing sex reassignment surgery is not necessary for someone to feel like a woman. In summary, Martina's and Nina's actions show how fluid, dynamic, and context-sensitive gender categories can be, since they have different views on the same trans categories. The extended categorization work conducted by the participants shows how defiant or even unusual for some interlocutors such categories may seem, especially for their representation in the common-sense knowledge.

**Final Considerations**

While LGBT social activism has led to historical changes such as listing “transsexuality” in a new category called “Gender Incongruence” in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD 11) (a different and less pathologizing chapter), the path to full social rights and equality for LGBT people is still long. This is especially relevant for those who live in a context of severe violence and social stigmatization such as travestis and trans people in Brazil.

Belonging to a category is conversational work in relation to different social structures that starts with people's access to shared common-sense knowledge.
As we have seen in our participants’ rejection of “transgender” as a term capable of representing the idiosyncrasies of trans experiences in Brazil, there is need to study categorization work within the microsocial level of interaction. In the complex process of group membership, “transgender” was linked to a different membership categorization device from other local trans categories in Brazil. Participants associated the units “travestis-transsexual-women” and “transgender-French-word” with different category consistencies. We observed that, even in the same group, different membership categorization processes occur for the same categories, denoting how polysemic and context-sensitive gender categories can be. Interactants’ discussions of body features and masculine/feminine traits for travestis, trans people, and gay men are a good example of that.

For the Brazilian academic context, we believe theoretical and methodological improvements can be achieved by focusing more on empirical and local research in lieu of theoretical hegemonic concepts and discourses inherited from research agendas from the Global North. As our data shows, the external political and academic theorization of gender relations may not accurately describe what people are doing in everyday interactions. This greatly impacts the applicability and effectiveness of political interventions, which often do not predict how laws and public services will be understood and accessed by interactants in their daily routines.

In regard to this last aspect, our findings point out the need to reassess public health policies and create new forms of access to the Brazilian public health system that more adequately address the diversity of the country’s population. This is even more important when this same population is systematically labeled almost exclusively by static heteronormative categories and discourses. In our data, however, such categories and discourses were challenged by interactants through language use.

The understanding of gender categories as fixed analytic units can lead human and social sciences to a weak and cynical political criticism. We can resist this monolithic view of society by taking a turn to locally-based research, giving voice to participants’ emic views of what is going on in the here and now of everyday interactions, especially when participants challenge the heteronormative matrix in which gender categories are culturally constructed.

References


Stolcke, Verena (2014): ¿Qué tiene que ver el género con el parentesco? In: Cadernos de Pesquisa 44 (15), 176–189.

### Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>falling intonation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>rising intonation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,</td>
<td>continuing intonation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>abrupt cut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑↓</td>
<td>substantial movements in pitch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>::</td>
<td>extended sound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_</td>
<td>emphasis on syllable or word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORD</td>
<td>talk louder than surrounding sounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;word&quot;</td>
<td>spoken more quietly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;word&lt;</td>
<td>speeded-up talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;word&gt;</td>
<td>slowed-down talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hh</td>
<td>expiration or laugh</td>
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<tr>
<td>.hh</td>
<td>audible expiration</td>
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<td>[]</td>
<td>overlapping talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>latching elocutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.4)</td>
<td>length of pause (seconds and decimal seconds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>micropause, up to 2/10 decimal seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>()</td>
<td>inaudible passages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(word)</td>
<td>best guess for inaudible passages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((looking up))</td>
<td>description of non-verbal activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1: Transcription Conventions
The “Do-It-All Mother” – Discursive Strategies and Post-Feminist Alliances in Parenting Magazines
Leila Zoë Tichy (leilazoetichy@gmail.com)
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Abstract: This article analyses discursive strategies in current German parenting magazines and argues that “motherhood” is connected to conservative gender roles and, at the same time, aligned with an individualistic post-feminist discourse. The analysed texts reshape conservative models of motherhood and gender, especially concerning the mother-child relationship, the question of the “compatibility” of unpaid and paid work, and gendered parental positions. As a result of the discursive strategies and alliances, the political and structural dimensions concerning care-work, gender equality, and intersectionality are buried under an individualistic framework. We bring this depoliticisation to light and make space for new feminist perspectives on motherhood.

Keywords: Motherhood, Gender Roles, Post-Feminism, Discourse, Individualisation

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Leila Zoë Tichy and Helga Krüger-Kirn

The “Do-It-All Mother” – Discursive Strategies and Post-Feminist Alliances in Parenting Magazines

Recent research in Germany shows that although forms of living as a family and of motherhood are becoming more diverse and images of motherhood more fluid, the classic bourgeois concept of family remains predominant: the father as the main “breadwinner” and the mother as primarily occupied with so-called “maternal” work (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2017, 87). Compared internationally, women in Germany are less likely to be in paid employment, less likely to be mothers, and even less likely to be both than women in other Western countries (Scheuer/Dittmann 2007). At the same time, parental and family structures have changed as a result of social and reproductive developments. In addition to adoption, patchwork constellations and co-maternity, the techniques of reproductive medicine offer new paths to maternity.

More people have the intention of sharing reproductive work equally. Yet, the reality after the birth of a child shows a backlash of traditionalisation instead (Maierhofer/Strasser 2016; Kortendiek 2010). This same contradiction exists in relation to the phenomenon of the “new fathers”, which is a highly valued concept that, however, does not result in a shift in fathers’ behaviours (Nave-Herz 2007; Sabla 2012). In both Germany (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2012, 2017) and the US (Maume 2008), men are less likely than women to adapt their work efforts to the demands of parenting. It seems that recent concepts such as the ‘new father’ can co-exist with conservative or traditional gender roles in parenting (Kerschgens 2009).

This paper aims to show how seemingly conflicting concepts fit together in popular discourse concerning motherhood as found in recent parenting magazines. Trending topics connected to motherhood discourse in the public media range from the role of the “new father” and family policies to working mothers and their career opportunities (Berner 2018; Wall/Arnold 2007). For Angela McRobbie (2015), the figure of the middle-class working mother embodies a shift from liberal to neoliberal feminism in the UK. Likewise, in Germany, the “career mum discourse” (Berner 2018, 50) and the image of the “top mum” (Malich 2014) represent this discursive trend. However, parenting guidebooks still rely heavily on heterosexist constructions of motherhood (Höher/Millschützke 2013, 254; Rinken 2012; Sabla 2012).
Analyses of special-interest magazines for parenting and parenting sections in newspapers from the US and Canada confirm this result and, furthermore, show how through the representation of parental responsibility and hegemonic masculinity, the mother is constructed as the primary carer and the father as the “helping hand” (Wall/Arnold 2007; Sunderland 2006). These discourses are historically informed by the concept of the nuclear family, childhood and the “myth of mother love” that was produced in bourgeois circles around the time of industrialisation (Badinter 1985). Constructions of motherhood, combined with conceptions of a specific femininity, remain, therefore, strongly normatively charged to this day.

The role of the mother, however, has undergone changes throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, including through trending concepts such as “intensive mothering” (Hays 1996) and a new form of “naturalisation” of mothers and breastfeeding (Freudenschuß 2012; Badinter 2010; Thiessen/Villa 2009). Thus, it seems that ambivalences between trends of modernisation and traditionalisation exist concurrently. Trends of modernisation include postfeminist perspectives (McRobbie 2009) and the implementation of the “language of consumerism” (Salecl 2010) in the discourses of motherhood. However, the studies that include a perspective on the individualised liberal discourse focus on daily or weekly newspapers (Salecl 2010; McRobbie 2015; Orgad/De Benedictis 2015), which are not primarily directed at women as mothers. Parenting guidebooks and parenting magazines, on the other hand, specifically address women as mothers and, therefore, include an in-depth construction of mothering and mothers. Up until now, there have been no analyses of current German parenting magazines, although they are positioned at the intersection of public mass media and, as special-interest magazines, the specific topics of motherhood and parenting. We want to close this research gap and analyse how these magazines, through the combination of different discourses, reshape the figure of the mother.

**Analysing Parental Magazines: Methods and Data**

Guidebooks and magazines represent an archive through which explicit and implicit knowledge, discourses and norms can be reconstructed. Knowledge, following Michel Foucault, is historically situated and connected to power structures (Foucault 1977, 1973). To make visible such knowledge and its rules, the material of this study was analysed with the help of analytical instruments derived from Critical Discourse Analysis (Jäger 1993; Jäger 2008).

This version of Critical Discourse Analysis is focused, in particular, on ideological assumptions and discourse strategies, as well as the collective symbols
and stereotypes relevant to the category of gender. Our data consisted of 91 articles from three different German parenting magazines (“Nido”, “Baby und Familie”, and “Eltern”) in the years 2010–2017. The three magazines address parents, mainly mothers, as their audience. “Nido” addresses higher-income middle-class families (0.24 million; AWA 2017), the magazine “Eltern” has existed since 1966 and specifically addresses mothers in their editorial (1.07 million; AWA 2018), and “Baby und Familie”, being a free pharmacy magazine, has the highest circulation (1.77 million; AWA 2018). The specific research design was oriented along the research interests of the REVERSE research project.

REVERSE investigates, in various fields of practice, how anti-feminist movements and discourses have developed in Germany, which target groups they address, and whether this has led to a (de-)thematisation of social questions. The sub-project “Motherhood and Gender Relations” expands the focus to include debates on the mother-child relationship and the compatibility of paid and family work.

In line with these research interests, we focused on three discourse strands in the parental magazines. First, the mother-child relationship and the construction of “maternal” behaviour. Second, gendered parental positions – including responsibilities, activities, traits, etc. – and the contrast between mother and father roles. Finally, third, the reconciliation of paid and family work.

If discourse strands are understood as correlating to trends and topics in the magazines, then the first two discourse strands do not represent single or explicit strands but are, rather, reconstructed from various topics and strands.

It is interesting to note that while the reconciliation of “paid work” and “family work” and the topic of the “new father” (which is included in second strand) are popular and explicit discourse strands in the magazines, the role of the mother is rarely discussed as such but, rather, forms a kind of self-evident base of most discourse strands. The articles from which we extracted the first and second discourse strands mainly address topics concerning child-rearing and child development, household themes, health issues, pregnancy, and becoming a parent. In general, the analysed articles regularly use the gender-neutral word “parents” to address the readers, while the given descriptions and images mostly depict mothers. Moreover, arbitrary switches from “parents” to “mother” occur regularly. Hence, the gender-neutral, seemingly modern language used here tends to conceal the heterosexist setting.

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1 “Crisis of gender relations? Antifeminism as a threat to social integration” (REVERSE), funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Science and conducted at the Centre for Gender Studies of Philipps-Universität, Marburg (Germany).
With regard to all three strands of our discourse analysis, it can be said that heteronormative, gendered attributions determine the construction of the mother and father roles. Conservative and traditional attributions are obscured by a neoliberal discourse that draws on individualisation and a motive of doability. Individualisation includes the topos of free choice: “How does it work? By thinking carefully about when to become a mother” (Baby und Familie 2.2013). The motive of doability is shown through the focus on the advice that is given in the magazines and, additionally, through claims such as “It’s hard, but mothers and fathers still get it done because they want it” (Eltern 4.2015).

The Mother-Child Relationship and the Construction of Maternal Behaviour

All articles analysed were based on a biologistic concept of motherhood. This concept rests on three central premises: First, the relationship between mother and child and the mother’s behaviour towards the child are biologised through a constant reference to the mother’s body as an actor rather than to the mother as a person. This, second, establishes and reinforces the hormone discourse. Hormones are considered to be “actors” in the mother’s body that evoke relationship and attachment. This way, maternity is represented as an automatism. Third, “nature” is personalised and presented as a mystical force that acts deterministically. Mystification also shows through numerous references to magic, gifts, invisibility, infinity, and so forth.

The biologisation of relationships and maternity implies that the relationship to the child is determined by the gender of the parent. The mother, as the one who is under the influence of hormones, appears as the primary and unique bonding figure. Hormones are presented as the protagonists and “secret directors” (Baby und Familie 4.2013) of the mother’s body. The active behaviour of the mother is reduced to biology. A widely used image, for example, is that of hormones “flooding” the mother’s body. In one case, it is stated that “a major attack is launched by hormones before birth. They flood the female body to prepare it for the role of the mother” (Nido 7/8.2012).

Gendered attributions of responsibilities are usually made implicitly via a supposed biological or natural correlation of femininity and motherhood.

2 “Wie das klappt? Indem man sich gut überlegt, wann man Mutter wird” (Baby und Familie 2.2013). All translations of quotes from the magazines are by the authors.
“Motherly love” is still constructed as bound to biology and being natural, female, and unique. The psychological concept of bonding is mainly connected to the female parent, which creates a boundary between the mother-child bond and the “outside”. Although it is often claimed that bonding is also important for fathers, it is rarely mentioned when the role of the father is discussed.

Another argumentation strategy uses the child’s well-being as the rationale for the parent’s behaviour. Behind this well-being seems to lie the child’s performance, as well as a functionalisation of the mother. This “child well-being discourse” (Berner 2018, 48; translated by the authors), as shown in claims such as “love makes the child healthy, social, stress-resistant, and smart” (Baby und Familie 12.2011), entails the functionalisation of the relationship between parent and child and the tying of the child’s development to success in various domains.

Gendered Parental Positions

The second discourse strand refers to the gendered parental positions constructed in the magazines. Given the popularity of arguments aiming at the equality and free choice of father and mother and the presence of the topic of the “new father” – who is not only responsible for the family income but also cares for the child – the magazines seem, at first sight, to have incorporated feminist claims.

The “new father” is advertised and idealised as the modern model of fatherhood, and the contradiction between the popularity of the “new fathers” and the lack of such fathers in real life is discussed. Discussions of fatherhood seem to try to promote fathers’ engagement in “family life” and mainly cover positive aspects of fatherhood. The father is constructed as the playful parent who can discover the child in himself. Influenced by psychoanalytic theories from the 20th century, the father’s role is constructed as freeing the child from the symbiotic mother-child bond and introducing the outside world to the child. Fathers’ lack of commitment is explained by their lack of role models.

Fathers can, as implied by the magazines, model themselves on their own fathers, but apparently not on their mothers or on a “motherliness” as a gender-neutral skill. This lack of role models constructs fathers as victims of society and modernity. They still have to learn and adapt, so mothers are told to be patient and to help them. This has problematic consequences: The mother is, once again, made responsible for the father’s behaviour, and the father is infantilised and victimised. Although the magazines state that fathers should care for their children – for example, change diapers or bathe them – these activities do not appear as parts of fatherhood when it is discussed. It is often proclaimed that
even if a father fulfils the same tasks as a mother, he will do so “differently”. Fatherhood is thus strongly connected to traditional models of masculinity, which limit the activities prescribed to fatherhood.

On a latent level, motherliness and tasks connected to femininity are presented as threats to the father’s masculinity that, therefore, have to be repelled. In a nutshell, the complementarity of the mother and father figures repeats the heterosexist construction of masculinity and femininity. The mother is given the role of loving, caring, nursing, feeding and consoling – all bodily and emotional tasks – as well as doing the housework. It is rarely stated explicitly that mothers are obliged to fulfil these tasks. Instead, mothers are simply described as doing them constantly anyway.

Maternal activities are constructed via a norm of naturalness. The mother should – in accordance with the biologising and personification of nature – listen to her gut feeling or instincts, her intuition and natural love for the child. In relation to the father, the mother is held responsible for his engagement in both child-rearing and housework. It is often proclaimed that mothers have to “learn to hand over” (tasks) to fathers (Eltern 08.2017). This deferral of the father’s responsibility to the mother goes hand-in-hand with individualisation on the one hand and the idea of “free choice” on the other. As women today can control reproduction, their criticism and suffering is downplayed by the argument that they “have chosen it that way”. Hence, they are told, “Ladies, take it easy” (Nido 9.2010).

The Reconciliation of Paid and Family Work

The problem of the (in)compatibility of paid work with household and family work (Vereinbarkeitsproblem) is the third discourse strand from our analysis. The difficulties concerning this “(in)compatibility” are regularly discussed in the parental magazines. There are different basic characteristics of the discourse that determine the topic of “(in)compatibility”.

First, this discourse is embedded in a view that relies on individualisation and free choice. Questions that have structural-political dimensions are constructed as questions about individual living conditions and private decisions. This is reinforced by the motive of doability, which entails encouraging statements and tips for mothers about how they can improve their chances on the labour market. Through the lens of individualisation, the question of “(in)compatibility” is negotiated as a question of individual “work-life balance” (Knapp 2012). The same shift from structural and political problems to individual choices can be

6 “Meine Damen, machen Sie sich locker.” (Nido 9.2010).
found concerning the distribution of house and family work. The unequal distribution of house and family work at the expense of mothers is a problem that is often mentioned but then obscured by a shift from these equality issues to relationship problems. The “(in)compatibility” of paid work with household and family work is enforced on a symbolic level through the construction of these two spheres as substantially different and mutually exclusive.

This exclusion also results in contradictory expectations placed on mothers. On the one hand, it is expected that mothers take part in the labour market to prove their success as modern and autonomous women. On the other hand, motherly activities are constructed as unlimited, which means that paid work, or any time spend without the child, is seen as a decrease in motherly activities. Therefore, the gender of the parent determines the starting point for the Vereinbarkeitsproblem.

The father’s role is constructed with a focus on income. Therefore, the main question for him is how he can spend time with his family on top of his paid work. A small effort in the family realm – e.g., ten minutes of reading a book each night – is conceptualised as sufficient proof of being a dedicated father. The mother’s starting point, on the contrary, is that she is the primary carer for the child, rendering the question of whether she goes on parental leave obsolete. The main question for the mother, therefore, is how she can perform paid work in addition to her maternal activities (i.e., organise her re-entry into the job market). Hence, the paid work of the mother is conceptualised as a surplus. This surplus has to be “worth it”, because it is understood as subtracted from the time she could spend with the child.

Symbolically, these two subject positions – mother and working woman – are positioned as mutually exclusive, which results in contradictions when women have to satisfy both. This is one reason behind the often-cited “bad conscience” of working mothers. Additionally, house and family work, which is still mostly undertaken by women, is being dismissed as uninteresting and unqualified. Since unpaid work in the family is not named as work but constructed as a “break” or “time-out”, it is not only made invisible but also devalued. Wage labour is presented as an upgrading of the mother, as a form of recognition, a path to more self-esteem and self-actualisation. It is proclaimed that “maternity talk is not enough for me” (Eltern 12.2015). Going back to work is presented as “redemption”, “thinking again” or “having experiences of success”. By contrast, not doing so is presented as “sitting around at home and twirling your thumbs” (Nido 6.2010).

7 “Müttergespräche reichen mir nicht” (Eltern 12.2015).
The extensive catalogue of tasks for which the mother is held responsible, although described as time-consuming and strenuous, is nevertheless bound to love and femininity. The devaluation of family and household work corresponds to the devaluation and precariousness of feminine-coded work on a broader level. The “Care Crisis” (Thiessen 2017; Fraser 2013) also manifests itself in the outsourcing of care and household work – primarily mentioned by “working mothers” in the magazines – to minoritised women working in precarious jobs. This is described in the concept of “extensive mothering” (Christopher 2012), in which the working mother remains responsible for the household and the upbringing of children through the delegation of work to others. The term contrasts with “intensive mothering” (Hays 1996), in which the mother fulfils all these tasks herself. Both these “solutions” for the compatibility problem are sides of the same coin that tie the responsibility for children and household to women.

In addition to the implicit devaluation of family work, there is an explicit devaluation in the form of ridicule, devaluation and diminution of mothers not in paid employment, so-called “housewives”. These mothers are often portrayed as naive and irrational. In this respect, obstacles to compatibility are often attributed to the individual mother and her behaviour. In line with this portrayal of obstacles as the results of mothers’ attitudes, the presented coping strategies for the Vereinbarkeitsproblem are adaptation and lowering one’s expectations.

Adaptation is often constructed as a creative force. The child is conceived as part of the mother’s professional life that initiates ruptures in the mother’s career, which is itself interpreted as a chance for change. This pattern corresponds to the concept of empowerment and individualisation whereby structural disadvantages are presented as opportunities or failures based on the individual’s coping strategies. Another influential discourse at work here is the “mindfulness” discourse – represented in the magazines by the figure of the “relaxed” or “mindful” parent – which increases individualisation even more. “Mindfulness” as an individual coping strategy masks socio-cultural structures and shifts responsibility for overwhelming life circumstances to individuals’ behaviours and thoughts. Individualisation and “mindfulness” promise success to those who adapt to adverse circumstances as well as possible. Furthermore, individualisation makes individuals’ satisfaction the benchmark of justice. However, the fact that adaptation to unjust living conditions is necessary for the individual or family from a pragmatic point of view does not mean justice is done through these adaptations.

We conclude that the discourses in the parenting magazines make use of neoliberal tropes, such as individualism, empowerment and choice, and, at the
same time, advertise conservative gender roles and family structures through biologising arguments. By proclaiming gender equality and free choice in a highly individualistic manner, political perspectives on questions concerning the division of labour in the family – and gender equality in parenting in general – become disarticulated. This creates a gap that the mother – in the guise of the “do-it-all mother” – has to fill.

The “Do-It-All Mother” – A Post-Feminist Myth

The construction of the mother as responsible for the family's flourishing combines individualisation with conservative stances on motherhood. This results in the image of the “ideal mother” as a successful woman who manages the endeavour of caring for her family and household, re-entering the labour market at the expected time while also advocating mindfulness and thus keeping her good mood and looks. Since she has to “do it all” (McRobbie 2009, 80) we propose the term “do-it-all mother” for this ideal.

To compose this ideal, parenting magazines combine the idealisation of motherhood on the one hand with post-feminist tropes of individualism, free choice and doability on the other. The inherent contradictions within this ideal cannot be resolved individually, and, therefore, every mother is doomed to fail. Furthermore, the orientation of the ideal mother toward the “white, married, middle-class mother” (Akass 2012; McRobbie 2015) further excludes other family structures, which are rarely represented to begin with. Single mothers, lesbian or gay parents, parents who do not a form a couple, and other social groups, such as parents of colour and parents from poorer backgrounds, are rarely represented in the parenting magazines, and when they are represented, then only with a paradoxical reference to their status as “different but normal”.

The attributions to mothers explained above form the normative background for all mothers, including those who are unable to meet these norms' requirements. As already shown by research from the UK (McRobbie 2015; Akass 2012; Orgad/De Benedictis 2015), the post-feminist mother becomes a seemingly strong figure who lives her motherhood in a self-determined and responsible way, based on free choice. Our analysis of German parenting magazines reproduce these findings and show that, as a result, overburdening, stress, and anxiety are interpreted in terms of personal failure or poor decision-making. Criticism, complaints, and confessions of suffering by mothers are then presented as “whining”. Social and political solutions for problems that mothers face today are thus pushed aside by individual “solutions” such as “self-care”.

“Self-care” is a trope that is used in line with the “mindfulness” discourse and
is – as a preventive measure against overstraining – ascribed to the mother. By means of the rhetoric of individualisation, choice and responsibility, the distinction between the unattainable status of the “good mother” and the failure of the “bad mother” is maintained (McRobbie 2009, 19).

In this environment, childcare becomes a private affair and a question of “work-life balance”. Structural problems, such as the labour division inside the home or the devaluation of care work, become disarticulated and remain unchallenged (McRobbie 2009, 43, 81; Krüger-Kirn 2018). This is reinforced by the reproduction of heterosexist gender roles and the biologisation of motherhood (Eldén 2012; Adkins 2002). We argue that this “entanglement” (McRobbie 2009) of both liberal and conservative stances results in a disarticulation and depoliticisation that can best be described as post-feminist.

Rather than being a simple backlash, this entanglement has to be understood in a more complex way, because feminist elements such as empowerment and choice are already incorporated in it, but through the individualism of neoliberal subjectivity and a political culture that leads to “undoing feminism” (McRobbie 2009, 9). Post-feminist concepts of neoliberal subjectivity and governmentality (Rose 1999, 2007) are brought together with a claim towards feminist politics (Gill 2007; McRobbie 2004; Scharff 2016). In general, the claim that women are already autonomous, agentic and empowered subjects (Rutherford 2018; McRobbie 2009) is accompanied by an affective politics (Gill 2016; Rutherford 2018) that is designated by the regulation of feelings, thoughts and “work on the self”. These affective politics engage with individualisation and tend to replace political perspectives.

Rosalind Gill (2006, 2007) elaborates on the characteristics of “post-feminist sensibility” as an object of analysis. All aspects of this sensibility were relevant in our analysis. First, the notion “that femininity is a bodily property” (Gill 2007, 147), which can be found especially in relation to the biologisation of the mother and her body as well as mothering activities. Second, the “emphasis upon self surveillance, monitoring and self-discipline, a focus on individualism, choice and empowerment” (ibid.), which characterises the discourse on the “(in)compatibility” of paid work and family work, as well as the overall depiction of the mother figure. A third aspect defined by Gill is the “resurgence of ideas about natural sexual difference” (ibid.). In our analysis, we found both post-feminism as a cultural landscape – which forms the base for the discourses used in the magazines – and specific markers that make post-feminism detectable as an empirical phenomenon. As in former analyses of post-feminism, the female subject is understood as being the subject of post-feminism (Gill 2007; Rutherford 2018; McRobbie 2009). Hence, women are required to work on the self and prove their
self-determination to a greater extent. In the analysed parenting magazines, the characteristics of individualisation and affective politics are mainly used in relation to female parents. Not only is it the mother who is mainly addressed in these cases, but the infantilisation and helplessness of the father – which is paradoxically used to guard his masculinity from the feminine-coded work connected to mothering – allows him a space in the realm of the family where he can evade responsibility. The mother has no room for herself, and the “can do it all” position instead implies a “must do it all” imperative throughout the discourse.

The rhetoric of choice conceals the normative placement of the mother as the centre of reproduction – a structure through which the responsibility for the realm of reproduction is ascribed to women. Post-feminism is, therefore, not only focused on girls and young women but has moved on to these girls and young women as (soon-to-be) mothers (McRobbie 2015; Orgad/De Benedictis 2015). Interestingly, in the German parenting magazines we analysed, this post-feminist discourse is attached to the collective stereotype of the idealisation and naturalisation of motherhood and the mother-child bond. Taken together with the depoliticisation induced by the individualised rhetoric and discourses of choice, the heteronormative family and the ascribed roles therein do not appear as coercion but as a result of personal free choice. Hence, as millennial girls are becoming mothers, the “do-it-all mother” brings together traditional images of motherhood with a post-feminist discourse.

References


Recognition, Visibility and Representation
Namenskunde. Gender(re)konstruktionen in Autobiografien von trans Personen
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Schlagwörter: trans, Queer Theory, Autobiografie, Narratologie, Gender
Namenskunde. Gender(re)konstruktionen in Autobiografien von trans Personen

Whose story is this, anyway?


Autobiography's primary purpose is to correspond life to textual form, to order the disorder of life's events into narrative episodes. In autobiography the desultoriness of experience acquires chronology, succession, progression—even causation; existence, an author. In other words writing endows the life with a formal structure that life does not indeed have. Published transsexual autobiography is no exception to this rule of autobiographical composition. (Prosser 1998, 116)

Plot und Macht


„Angesichts der generellen Arbitrarität sprachlicher Zeichen ist es eine Besonderheit von Personennamen, dass das bezeichnete Objekt den Namen auch verlässlich auf sich selbst anwenden und mit sich verbinden („seinen“ Namen aneignen) soll, und dass die Bezeichnung eine zentrale Rolle in einer sozialen Beziehung zwischen Sprecher und Referenzobjekt spielt, nämlich auf den Beziehungssinn von Namen verweist. Namen sind Wörter, durch deren Gebrauch man – andere Sprecher be-

zeichnend – auf diese zugreift, also über sie verfügt: Es sind Humangreifzeuge.“ (Nübling/Hirschauer 2018, 6)

Besonders interessant ist hier der Hinweis auf die implizite Verfügungsmacht des Gegenübers, das durch den Namensgebrauch über die adressierte Person verfügt. So betont auch Miriam Schmidt-Jüngst im selben Band die besondere Rolle des Namens bei der Geschlechtsindizierung im Kontext der Vornamenänderung von trans Personen:

„Der Namenswechsel wird, erfolgt er zum richtigen Zeitpunkt, zu einem Akt der Herstellung und Darstellung der neuen Geschlechtszugehörigkeit und kann eine Person dauerhaft in ihrer Geschlechtsklassenzugehörigkeit verankern, da der Vorname wie kaum ein anderer Marker Geschlecht indiziert. Keine andere soziale Information ist so tief in Rufnamen eingeschrieben wie Geschlecht, was als Erklärung dafür dienen kann, dass die Geschlechtstransition der einzige Umstand ist, der eine juristische Vornamenänderung erfordert.“ (Schmidt-Jüngst 2018, 66.)


Die Journalistin Sam Riedel unterstreicht in einem Artikel im Online-Magazin „The Establishment“ die für Transpersonen komplexe Beziehung zu Namen, da diese bezeichnend ist für das normative Machtgefälle, dem Transpersonen durch die Sprache ausgesetzt sind:

„What we're called has power, and hearing a blatantly masculine or feminine name applied to you when you're trying to realign your gender in a different direction can be a source of profound, dysphoria-inducing anxiety. Hearing or seeing one's old name can induce a visceral sense of terror that no matter how much progress one makes in their transition, the person they used to be (or pretended to be) is still there. Hence the term “deadname”⁵: a name that shall not be spoken, for it invokes a restless spirit.“ (Riedel 2017)

Riedel führt weiter aus:

„Trans people all have different relationships to the concept and even terminology surrounding deadnaming—and that's okay, because this

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⁵ „Deadnaming“ bezieht sich auf die Nennung des alten Namens, eine Handlung, die für viele trans Personen eine Verletzung der Selbstbestimmung und somit einen gewaltvollen Akt darstellt.
is an integral part of our struggle to self-determine our identities. The problems come when cisnormative media and society at large decides [sic] to make those decisions for us.“ (Riedel 2017)

Diesen letzten Punkt gilt es besonders hervorzuheben, da er selbst einen „restless spirit“ darstellt, der sich durch meine Forschungsarbeit zieht: das Trans*narrativ. Damit gemeint sind sowohl der toxische mediale Diskurs über Transgeschlechtlichkeit und Transpersonen, der geprägt ist von Fremdbestimmung und Pathologisierung, und sein Pendant, der internalisierte, transnormative Diskurs, der sich auch durch die Autobiografien zieht und sich unter anderem im oben erwähnten prototypischen Plotaufbau spiegelt. Julia Serano fasst dieses Phänomen in einem im „The Guardian“ erschienenen Artikel auf den Punkt zusammen: „It is so common for trans people to be compelled to provide such an account that the phenomenon has its own name: it’s called sharing your “trans narrative” – the story of how you went from being “born a boy” to “becoming a woman” (or vice versa)“ (Serano 2015).

Dem konstituierenden und empowernden Moment der selbstbestimmten Namensgebung soll nun anhand von Textbeispielen aus dem Autobiografien-Korpus nachgespürt werden.

„Der erste wirklich sichtbare Schritt nach außen“


Berger beschreibt, wie ihn schon früh als Kind Unbehagen überkommt, wenn er seinen ‚Mädchennamen‘ hört, konfrontiert ihn das doch mit der Erkenntnis, dass sein Geschlecht von der Außenwelt nicht in seinem Sinne wahrgenommen wird:


⁶ Im behandelten Korpus von 67 Büchern finden sich lediglich zehn von trans Männern verfasste Autobiografien.
⁷ An diesem Beispiel zeigt sich die bereits erwähnte prototypische Fokussierung der Erzählung auf die Transition als einzigen relevanten Aspekt der Lebensgeschichte. Solche Berichte sind in diesem Sinne weniger Lebensberichte als Transitionsberichte.
Namen mag ich nicht und hab ich noch nie gemocht. Mir ist aber auch noch nie ein anderer eingefallen. KEIN Mädchennname wär am besten. Am Besten wär, ein Bub zu sein. Das hab ich mir schon immer gedacht.“ (Berger 2016, 9f.)

Hier findet sich also bereits eine Illustration für den oben erwähnten Konflikt mit dem „deadname“. Berger betont demgemäß im folgenden Zitat die Wichtigkeit des selbstgewählten Namens:

„Ich bin ja auch so froh, dass ich mir meinen Namen selber wälen [sic] hab können. Wie man zu seinem Namen kommt, das war ganz wesentlich für mich. Der erste wirklich sichtbare Schritt nach außen. Der Name sagt aus, ob männlich oder weiblich[,] und der Name klingt.“ (Berger 2016, 81.)


Die Aneignung des neuen Namens ist ein langwieriger Prozess, nicht nur in der Auseinandersetzung mit der unkooperativen Außenwelt, sondern auch mit dem eigenen Verständnis von Geschlecht und Geschlechts(re)konstruktion.

Betrachten wir nun ein weiteres Beispiel: Mit der Geschichte ihres Vornamens beginnt Jaquelin G. die Erzählung ihrer Lebensgeschichte in ihrer 1999 erschienenen Autobiografie „Ich habe viel geliebt. Das rastlose Leben einer transsexuellen Tänzerin“.


(G. 1999, 7)


**Verlagerung der Deutungsmacht**

Mühlberger beschreibt im Nachwort, dass das Buch nicht ein getreues Abbild der Realität, sondern eine Interpretation sei, was für Jaquelin G. insofern nicht gravierend sei, da sie selber nicht immer die Wahrheit sage (vgl. G., 109). Beide Aussagen stellen natürlich bereits einen Vertragsbruch des autobiografischen Pakts im Lejeune'schen Sinn dar. Die eigentliche Brisanz ist jedoch nicht nur er-

Während beim Beispiel von Colin Bergers Namensgebung das selbstermächtigende Moment erkennbar ist, offenbart sich im Fall von Jaquelin G. das Eindringen eines „Anderen“ im Versuch, die Erzählung der (oft so bezeichneten) höchsten Erzählinstanz in Frage zu stellen. So spricht Mühlberger von „Widersprüchen“, die auf die „Grundproblematik transsexueller Identität“ zurückzuführen seien und versucht, die Notwendigkeit eines chirurgischen Eingriffs zu reflektieren, um dann „Antworten in der Fachliteratur zu suchen“ (vgl. G. 1999, 111). Was jedoch an diesem Nachwort am meisten frappiert, ist die Verlagerung der Deutungsmacht über Jaquelin G.s Körper und Geschlecht:

„Jaquelin G. hat nie eine psychologische Beratung erhalten, sie hat keine Standardwerke über Transsexualität gelesen und sich bei Georges Burou in Casablanca ohne »Weiblichkeitsbeweis« operieren lassen. Dennoch scheint sie genau zu wissen, was eine Frau ist. Wenn sie versucht, das in Worte zu fassen, greift auch sie auf Stereotype wie Sinn für Schönes, Einfühlksamkeit oder Sorgen für andere Menschen zurück.“ (G. 1999, 114)

Mühlberger ist offensichtlich erstaunt darüber, dass ein Mensch ganz ohne Expert*innenwissen (hier: psychologische Beratung, wissenschaftliche Literatur, medizinische Kompetenz) genau zu wissen scheint, „was eine Frau ist“. Auch dies ist eine Frage der Deutungshoheit: die Frage, wer das Geschlecht einer Person validieren kann. Die Person selbst oder externe sogenannte Expert*innen? Mühlbergers Haltung ist insofern problematisch, als dass sie lediglich transgeschlechliches Wissen um das eigene Geschlecht in Frage stellt. Um es pointiert zu formulieren: Mühlberger selbst scheint ja genau zu wissen glauben, „was
eine Frau ist“. An dieser Stelle mögen die oben zitierten Worte von Sam Riedel nachhallen, wonach es die cisnormative Gesellschaft ist, die Entscheidung über die Selbstbestimmung von trans Personen hinweg macht.

Ähnliche Situationen des steten Legitimierungskampfes kennen trans Personen aus ihrem Alltag. So erörtert auch Jean Lessenich die Diskrepanz der Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung in ihrer Autobiografie „Die transzendierte Frau“:


Zwei Punkte müssen in Bezug auf dieses Zitat hervorgehoben werden. Zum einen Lessenichs Betonung, dass es eine bewusste Unterlassung der anderen Person ist, sie nicht in ihrem Geschlecht anzuerkennen: „er oder sie weigert sich“. Zum anderen, wie diese Weigerung Lessenichs eigene Wahrnehmung beeinflusst: „Sie verzerren meine Eigenwahrnehmung“ – sie entsagen ihr die Selbstbestimmung und somit auch die Deutungsmacht über ihre Geschichte. In einer weiteren Textstelle erklärt Lessenich, wie dieses Verhalten sie frustriert und beschreibt mit sarkastischem Scharfsinn den Rechtfertigungsmechanismus ihres Umfeldes:


An Lessenichs Ton ist zu erkennen, dass sie tatsächlich kein Verständnis für diese Art der Mikro-Aggressionen hat.
**Whose agency is this, anyway?**

Diese Passagen und Diskussionen sollen Momente der Selbstermächtigung zeigen, Momente der Emanzipation anhand der selbstbewussten und selbstgewählten Namenswahl. Sie sollen aber auch zeigen, dass diese Momente ein ständiges Iterieren und Legitimieren mit sich bringen, eine konstante Reaffirmation des Geschlechts. Dies fußt auf gesellschaftliche Umstände, die trans Personen immer noch im Alltag diskriminieren, aber auch auf die pathologisierende Natur sexualmedizinischer und psychologischer Diskurse über trans Personen, was beides zusammen letztlich auch zur Devalidierung und Delegitimierung der Stimmen von trans Personen führt.

All diese Probleme benennt Sandy Stone bereits im eingangs erwähnten „Posttranssexual Manifesto“, wenn sie im Abschnitt „Whose story is this, anyway?“ den Kampf um die eigene agency benennt, dem trans Personen alltäglich ausgesetzt sind:

„Bodies are screens on which we see projected the momentary settlements that emerge from ongoing struggles over beliefs and practices within the academic and medical communities. [...] In other words, each of these accounts is culture speaking with the voice of an individual. The people who have no voice in this theorizing are the transsexuals themselves. As with males theorizing about women from the beginning of time, theorists of gender have seen transsexuals as possessing something less than agency. As with genetic women, transsexuals are infantilized, considered too illogical or irresponsible to achieve true subjectivity, or clinically erased by diagnostic criteria.“

(Stone 2014[1987], 11)


**Literatur**


“Inhuman Acts of Lesbian Love”.
The Stigmatization Process of Lesbianism from Weimar Germany to KZ Ravensbrück
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Abstract: Given the current interest in the persecution of lesbians during Nazism and the obstructionism that activists are suffering in the attempt to erect a commemorative orb in Ravensbrück in order to remember them, this paper investigates the extent of the presence of lesbians in Germany between the end of the Weimar Republic and the sedimentation of Nazism, notably focusing on the dialectical perception between negation and (in)visibility that characterizes the stigmatization process undergone by the lesbian prisoners in KZ Ravensbrück, the only concentration camp entirely for women. During the “Golden Twenties”, the absence of female homosexuality in law was incongruous with the real presence of lesbianism within Weimar society, culture, and art. In fact, female homosexuality was not only generally and scientifically understood, it could also be observed in sociological, topographical, and public terms. Following Adolf Hitler’s rise to power, the “lesbian issue” was faced in a controversial way. While female homosexuality remained uncriminalized, lesbians began being persecuted in “unorthodox” ways and interned in concentration camps. In particular, the Ravensbrück camp was the place where lesbians – together with women sex workers, socialists, gypsies, communists, and Jewish women – were detained on the grounds that they were considered asozial (“antisocial”) and, therefore, deviant from the norms set for women by the Nazi government. Consequently, lesbianism was contextualized within a new (forgotten) environment in which the role of women was manipulated by a patriarchal system aimed at standardizing, normalizing, and repressing the “lives unworthy of life”, most of which still remain invisible.

Keywords: Lesbianism, Weimar Republic, Nazism, Ravensbrück, Stigmatization

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“Inhuman Acts of Lesbian Love”. The Stigmatization Process of Lesbianism from Weimar Germany to KZ Ravensbrück

Introduction

The debate concerning the persecution of lesbians and their consequent imprisonment within the Ravensbrück concentration camp ("KZ Ravensbrück") still raises controversies that minimize the issue in either heteronormative or androcentric ways. On the one hand, many heterosexual women who were imprisoned in Ravensbrück strongly opposed references to lesbianism in relation to the camp over the years, such as on the occasion of the Conference of Women Surviving the Holocaust, held in New York in March 1983, where some ex-prisoners stated that they felt “deeply insulted that anyone could even think of such a possibility in the midst of their terrible suffering” (Saidel 2004, 37). On the other hand, as reported by the activists of the Autonomous Feminist Lesbian Women from Germany and Austria, the placement of a lesbian commemorative orb inside the Ravensbrück concentration camp – to create a memorial and a space of resistance for the lesbian women interned – has always been boycotted by the Brandenburg Lesbian and Gay Association Germany (LSVD). This attitude is motivated by the fact that, although Nazism did not accept female homosexuality, lesbians were not directly persecuted by Paragraph 175, the law punishing male-male intercourse. Consequently, according to the LSVD, the creation of a concrete symbol representing lesbian women would give credit to the legend of lesbian persecution during Nazism, which, since it can be documented only in rare, rather doubtful cases, would lead to an altered representation of history (see Steininger 2017b, paragraph 19). Therefore, and because of political interests, the creation of the memorial would reveal a need probably linked to a sort of attempted lesbian-matriarchal coup d'état to the detriment of the current homo-patriarchal hegemony.

In the meantime, however, and mainly thanks to the support of the International Ravensbrück Committee, the group of Autonomous Feminist Lesbian Women from Germany and Austria has been able to give visibility to the orb that was initially exhibited temporarily, for a few days every year, but has been on display continuously since the celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Liberation of the Women's Concentration Camp Ravensbrück in 2015. The orb has
now turned into a symbol of the battle against the remembrance of those women who should be recognized as victims of Nazism even if lesbianism, being an accessory element, would have been considered only an aggravating circumstance and not a punishable crime in itself. It is exactly because of these considerations that the core of the question lies in raising consciousness in relation to the recognition and visibility of lesbians as a victim group during the Nazi dictatorship.¹

Likewise, the lack of visibility and recognition methodologically influences the present speculation that moves from the time of the Weimar Republic, for which it is still possible to draw on direct testimonies concerning the social presence of lesbian communities, to the historical moment following it, the Nazi dictatorship, where lesbians had to disappear from public life while suffering because their sexuality was considered a perversion and a vice. For this reason, during and after Nazism, they are no more the narrators of their lives, which are instead to be told through the heteronormative and homophobic accounts of their heterosexual coprisoners.

Lesbianism during the Weimar Republic: Legal Invisibility and Social Visibility

From 1919 to 1933, in Germany, the numerous processes of sedimentation and establishment of the homosexual movements and community stabilized. First, male homosexuality needed a proper standardization in order to both be counted as a legitimate object of medical study – a natural disposition of the individual – and fight, through the use of literary and scientific instruments, its illegality, ratified by §175 of the German Criminal Code, according to which “[u]nnatural fornication, whether between persons of the male sex or of humans with beasts, [was to be] punished with imprisonment, with the further punishment of a prompt loss of civil rights”². This law, valid from 1871 to 1994, lacks reference to one of the two dialectical aspects strictly connected with homosexuality: lesbianism. As reported by Sabine Hark (see Hark 2018, paragraph 18) and explained by Judith Butler,

“to be prohibited explicitly is to occupy a discursive site from which something like a reverse-discourse can be articulated; to be implicitly proscribed is not even to qualify as an object of prohibition. And though homosexualities of all kinds in this present climate are being

¹ A lesbian commemorative orb was installed in Nuremberg on Magnus-Hirschfeld-Platz in May 2019. For more information on the history of the lesbian commemorative orb, see the most recent work by Insa Eschebach (2019).
² §175 of the German Criminal Code(08.05.1871). Translations of quotes by the author.
erased, reduced, and (then) reconstituted as sites of radical homophobic fantasy, it is important to retrace the different routes by which the unthinkability of homosexuality is being constituted time and again.”

(Butler 1993, 312)

Therefore, not including lesbians in the Criminal Code meant not making the issue visible by activating a mode of contrast, that of denial, that is subtler than the one activated through §175, showing, de facto, a discrepancy between public and private life.

Indeed, lesbianism, as much as male homosexuality, was present and deeply rooted within the Weimar Republic. Aspects of the female homosexual movement were numerous: associations, bars, magazines, novels, movies. Everywhere, especially in Berlin, references to the presence of lesbians can be found – everywhere but in the law. Such a lack corresponds to a concrete impossibility for lesbian women of owning/enjoying their rights: since the rights were not denied, they could not be affirmed.

The reasons that led to this exclusion are to be addressed in relation to several concurrent causes that refer to a patriarchal attitude described as “phallocentric fixation” (see Pieper 1984, 121) and relate to the exclusion of female homosexuality from German law. Indeed, since the legislation was exercised by men, the contamination of the “pure and fair” woman – their mother, wife, or daughter – could not be tolerated. This figure of the woman had to be preserved and could not be associated with any kind of abnormal deviations. Moreover, it has been observed that “for the most part, women were not considered to have a sex drive, nor were they seen to be able to have sexual relations without a phallus” (Myers 2003, 7). Likewise, Anna Hájková and Birgit Bosold (2017, paragraph 12) explain that female homosexuality was not legally persecuted because women were not perceived as sexual subjects. In addition, the power of women had to stay “dormant”. As explained by Mecki Pieper, the fundamental requisites to the development of bourgeois society referred to a family ideology based on a strict dichotomy between the male and female spheres, i.e., between production and reproduction. Female sexuality – when it was permitted to women – was limited to the inside of the house and preferred to be absent at all or at least subordinated to the triad of “children-kitchen-church” (see Pieper 1984, 121).

Despite numerous unsuccessful attempts to criminalize women’s homosexuality (see Schoppmann 1997, 82pp.), deriving from both a male reaction toward the female movement that was growing quickly, hence threatening the

3 In reference to the importance of the Berlin alternative scene, see Lücke (2008) and Föllmer (2013).
old patriarchal authorities, and the many scandals and crime-news events\(^4\) that occurred during the Weimar Republic, no sanction was ratified. Historian Laurie Marhoefer refers to a legal structural impossibility linked to §175 – the “sodomy law” – and the use of the word “sodomy” to refer to penetrative sex:

“[T]he lack of a penetrating penis in lesbian sex [...] led to a persistent difficulty in criminalizing it. This definitional problem came up when lawmakers in imperial Germany debated and declined to criminalize lesbianism. Some argued against doing so because lesbian sex could not, they alleged, be ‘similar to intercourse.’ By the 1920s, lesbian sex had bewildered lawmakers in the German lands on this count for hundreds of years. When the question of criminalizing lesbian sex came up in 1929, the Reich Minister of Justice advised against it because of the difficulties with the definition of ‘acts similar to intercourse.’” (Marhoefer 2015, 74)

Women's homosexuality was instead determined to be “a substitute for sex” (Marhoefer 2015, 74) and thus not punishable by the law.\(^5\)

However, although lesbianism was invisible according to §175, the lesbian community was working to create a safe environment, a real “private property”, dislocated in several real and fictional urban performative spaces. If the legal ignorance of female homosexuality cannot be associated with its real presence in society, city, and arts, referring to lesbianism during the Weimar Republic does not merely mean considering the issue from a general scientific point of view, notably through the work of Magnus Hirschfeld and his Institute of Sexology, but – specifically – in sociological, topographical, and even esthetic terms, since the characterization of lesbianism shows a wide range of different types sedimented within specific metropolitan areas.

Indeed, homosexual women were gathering as a specific group and it was necessary to define a perception of the group itself so that the members would be able to perceive who belonged to it through an urban localization (see Schader 2004, 26pp.).

At the very beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century, Hirschfeld had already started the process of topographical and social identification of Berlin homosexuals in the 1904 book “Berlin's Third Sex”\(^6\), which investigated the real queer topography of the city. A similar analysis was carried out in the 1914 book “The

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4 One such scandal refers to the German steel manufacturer Friedrich Alfred Krupp (1854–1902); a second one concerns the events connected with Philipp zu Eulenburg (1847–1921), a Prussian diplomat, and Kuno von Moltke (1847–1923), a Prussian general, both members of the Liebenberger Circle, the most private circle of the German Emperor Wilhelm II.

5 Nevertheless, dildos “were illegal under Paragraph 270 of the Criminal Code, which banned the sale of ‘an object that is intended for obscene [unzüchtig] purposes’” (Marhoefer 2015, 73).

6 See Hirschfeld (1904) for the German version of the book.
Homosexuality of Men and Women”, in which Hirschfeld also presents the theory of sexual intermediaries. Certainly, Hirschfeld’s analysis played an important role for members of LGBT communities at the time who lacked perceptible clues in identifying each other, helping them to better understand themselves and their identity-making positions. In fact, Berlin was both reference and evidence for the movement and sedimentation of homosexuality in the city.

At the beginning of the Weimar Republic, the events and bars connected with the homosexual subculture systematically reopened while placing themselves in specific areas of the city that, with the implementation of the 1920 Greater Berlin Act, reached 4,000,000 inhabitants across 20 districts. Through the geographical expansion of the city, the district of Schöneberg, initially inhabited by the middle class, turned into the queer neighborhood par excellence of the Weimar Republic (see Gordon 2011, 59). Other important places in the city for LGBT people were in the center/east – Friedrichstraße, north Kreuzberg – and in the north-east around Alexanderplatz, together with the Tiergarten park, where the Institute of Sexology was located (north-east of the park). At the beginning of the 1930s, there were approximately 85 bars exclusively aimed at lesbians. The most fashionable were in the west, in the north of Schöneberg, and around Friedrichstraße. In the east and around Alexanderplatz were the more working-class bars (see Kokula 1988, 160).

This excitement was the reason why writer and journalist Ruth Margarete Roellig wrote the 1928 guide “Berlin’s Lesbian Women”, which focused on the main bars of lesbian Berlin. The introduction to the book by Hirschfeld magnetized the attention of the homosexual community while informing its individuals about their shared life conditions and the places where it was possible to gather together. The bars for women, as explained by Roellig (1928), despite the freedom of female association, were intentionally wrapped by a veil of secrecy and not advertised except for on the pages of lesbian magazines. For the same reason, most of these places restricted entry to regular customers and maintained a limited clientele.

The most active bars of the lesbian community numbered about 30, excluding the most famous bars, such as the “Eldorado”, which offered a wider kind of entertainment addressed to trans people, gay men, lesbians, and, surprisingly, curious straight “Berliners” and international tourists.

7 See Hirschfeld (1914) for the German version of the book.
8 Some of the most famous bars were the “Café Domino” on Marburger Straße 13; “Der Töppkeller” run by “Zigeunerlotte” on Schwerinstraße 13; “Die Hohenzollern-Diele”, one of the first cafés offering a shelter to and protecting the lesbian community, on Bülowstraße 101; “Dorian Gray”, a meeting point for the homosexual community on Bülowstraße 57; and “Mali und Igel” at the corner between Wormser Straße and Lutherstraße, gathering place of the women’s club “Monbijou des Westens”.
The other places in which the creation of a lesbian private sphere was possible were official associations, such as organizations, the press, and clubs, which were constantly monitored by the authorities and worked to create a real subversive “class (gendered) consciousness”.

Nevertheless, in 1933, with Hitler’s rise to power, the people and places that became symbolic of the homosexual social movement suffered the consequences of Hitler’s regime. First, serious steps were taken against male prostitution. Afterwards, the Decree Against Public Immorality was released to newspapers on 24 February 1933, mandating the closure of all clubs and bars for homosexuals. In addition, on 4 March 1933, the newspaper “Berliner Tageblatt” stated, “Night clubs closed. Restrictive regulations for dance halls and bars. A few days ago, the police chief threatened harsh measures against inns and taverns, against which moral complaints had been raised.”

The official closure of the bars and clubs was, gradually, followed by the closing of other pubs, publishers, and organizations supporting the homosexual movement. The same happened to Hirschfeld’s institute, which was sacked and seriously damaged on 6 May 1933.

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9 For example, the League of Human Rights, founded by Friedrich Radszuweit in 1923, was the biggest and most important homosexual organization of the time (with about 48,000 members) and included a section for women with more than 1,500 members.

10 The press was an actually free environment in which women were eventually able to share their thoughts, be informed, and get in contact with other women. The foremost magazines were “Die Freundschaft”, for both women and men, the first magazine that dealt with the “homosexual issue” focusing on society, politics, education, and entertainment; “Frauenliebe”, “Frauen, Liebe und Leben”, “Garçonne”, and “Liebende Frauen”, edited by the German Friendship Association; “Die Freundin”, and “Lediqe Frauen”, connected with the League of Human Rights, exclusively for women; the “Blätter für ideale Frauenfreundschaft. Monatsschrift für weibliche Kultur”, the only independent magazine, created by activist Selli Engler (1899–1982), written by and addressed to women. Nevertheless, on 18 December 1926, with the Law to Protect Youth from Trashy and Dirty Writings, some actions had been taken in order to hinder the homosexual community. Indeed, “the censorship boards established by the Filth and Trash Law ruled rather consistently that periodicals about lesbianism (particularly innuendo-filled personal ads) threatened to infect young women with lesbian desires” (Marhoefer 2015, 77).

11 Among the most active lesbian feminists was the Überbubi Charlotte (Lotte) Hahm. She wrote for the most important lesbian magazines, was the owner of the bars “Manuela” and “Monokel”, and the director of the circle “Violetta”, an eclectic association with about 400 members and a section for transvestites, offering lesbians a kind of shelter. Other important circles were “Monbijou des Westens”, whose members met at the “Dorian Gray”, the “Mali und Igel” and who were headed by Amalie Rothaug and Else Conrad as well as “Monbijou des Ostens”, which organized events together with “Violetta” in the “Zauberflöte”.

12 In addition, many artistic endeavors prove the existence of lesbian communities during the Weimar Republic, e.g., works by painters Jeanne Mammen, Christian Schad, and Paul Kamm or, in literature, books by Anna Elisabet Weirauch, “Der Skorpion” (1919, 1921 and 1931), Maximiliane Ackers, “Freundinnen” (1923), Grete von Urbanitzky, “Der wilde Garten” (1927), and the play by Christa Winsloe, “Gestern und heute” (1930), followed by the famous film “Mädchen in Uniform” (1932), directed by Leontine Sagan.

13 Osnabrücker Tagesblatt, 18.02.1933.
14 Berliner Tageblatt, 04.03.1933.
Lesbianism during Nazism: Social Invisibility and In/Visible Persecution

Starting in 1933, and lasting until the end of the dictatorship, lesbianism remained legally ignored, even if new attention was being paid to the issue. First, from a legal point of view, the possibility of criminalizing lesbianism in exceptional instances, such as lesbian acts through violence, with minors, or in public, was introduced via sections 174, 176, and 183 of the Criminal Code (see Schoppmann 2010, 16). Second, although §175 was strengthened in order to enable the “catching” of more homosexual men, a long debate arose again on the possible penalization of lesbianism. The majority of the jurists agreed on a non-inclusion approach – Himmler himself perceived lesbianism as only an esthetic issue (see Kokula 2010, 25) – for three main reasons:

“First, women were frequently described as ‘pseudo-homosexuals’ who could be cured by heterosexual intercourse. For this reason, female homosexuality did not seem to pose a serious threat to population growth. [...] Second, the emotional relationships between women made it difficult to draw a clear line between what was permissible or prohibited behavior. It was thus impossible to satisfactorily establish that a woman had indeed committed a crime. Third, because of the subordinate position of women in the Nazi state, female homosexuality did not appear seriously to threaten public life.” (Schoppmann 2005, 58)

Similarly, as explained by Marie-Jo Bonnet (2010), Nazi laws did not consider female homosexuality from a criminal perspective. As German women already possessed subordinate status, being excluded from important political and administrative positions, lesbian sexuality did not threaten the “purity of the race” or male power. Furthermore, intimate relationships between women were difficult to identify reliably. Finally, it was deemed that the best way not to encourage the spread of an “epidemic” homosexuality among women was to let it pass in silence (see Bonnet 2010, 84).

On the other hand, criminalization was particularly supported by jurist Rudolf Klare (1913–1946?), according to whom women’s homosexuality was as contagious and dangerous as men’s and thus could lead to the “degeneration of the race” and the German people (see Schoppmann 2010, 17). In addition, as suggested by Ilse Kokula (2010), since the persecution of lesbians during Nazism was strictly connected to the Nazi perception of the German woman’s essence, Klare also argued that female homosexual activities were a character-

15 In reference to the lives and persecution of lesbians during Nazism, see the rich bibliography by historian Anna Hájková (2019).
istic feature by no means intrinsic to a German woman, which supported their criminalization (see Kokula 2010, 24).

Surprisingly, the legal issue became even more problematic after the annexation of Austria on 11 March 1938. Austria had been punishing both male and female homosexuality legally since 1768, reaffirming the illegality of “same-sex fornication” in the 1852 Criminal Code through its §129Ib (valid until the 1970s). Therefore, the discrepancy between the two legal systems corresponded to a persecution of lesbians in Austria; notably, in Vienna, between 1938 and 1943, 1,100 men and 66 women were sentenced (see Schoppmann 2010, 17) to jail, castration, and camps (see Rieder 2010, 37).

As a result, while a few clubs and pubs were still run secretly, such as “Bart” in Charlottenburg or “Ellis Bierbar” in Kreuzberg, allowing homosexual couples to dance together (which was also forbidden by law) in covert places (see Kokula 2010, 34), lesbians started hiding themselves in their everyday lives, marrying gay or heterosexual men, limiting their movements with their closest friends or moving to another city or other neighborhoods where no one knew them and their lives.16 Indeed, lesbians could not feel safe just because they were excluded from the Criminal Code. On the contrary, they were equally aware of the “unorthodox” ways in which they could be persecuted. In fact, the word persecution does and did not limit itself in its meaning to the official victim groups or to imprisonment in jail and detention in concentration camps. To better understand the extent of the Nazi persecution of lesbians and other “minor” groups, such as trans people, the term has to be widened in order to include passive actions aimed at “catching” all those considered deviant.

As explained by Marhoefer (2019), the concept of risk should be considered. Although gender non-conformist women, some trans men and women, and lesbians were not subjects of an official state campaign, they risked the suspicion of the neighborhood, acquaintances, and state officials. This suspicion could ultimately lead to violence (see Marhoefer 2019, 47pp.). As a consequence, and despite few direct testimonies, the structural persecution of lesbians is evident in patriarchal power structures and sexist laws, in the persecution of lesbian lifestyles, in the destruction of lesbian magazines and bars, in dismissal and termination of leases, in the stigmatization and persecution of lesbians as “anti-social”, “criminal”, or “crazy”, and in the punishment, torture, and eventual deportation and murder of lesbian women in concentration camps (see Steininger 2017b, paragraph 20).

16 In a surprising turn, during the 1936 Olympic games in Berlin, Hitler allowed homosexual bars to open in order to show the “well-known” Nazi tolerance. In reference to the process of lesbians hiding in their everyday lives, see Schoppmann (1993).
Indeed, given the extent of “the female issue” – also referring to women who were Jewish, Sinti, or Jehovah's Witnesses as well as women political prisoners and sex workers – the first female camps were established. The very first was Moringen – 22 km north from Göttingen – which operated as a jail for 1,350 women between 1933 and 1938; then, Lichtenburg in Sachsen with 1,415 female prisoners, active between 1937 and 1939 (see Schoppmann 1997, 232).

Ravensbrück, in Fürstenberg/Havel, Brandenburg, was opened on 15 May 1939 and was the biggest camp for women who were interned and marked by different triangles: yellow for Jewish women, red for political prisoners, brown for gypsy women, purple for Jehovah's Witnesses, green for criminals, and possibly pink for homosexuals – but very few accounts of Ravensbrück refer to pink-triangle prisoners. Most of the lesbians targeted had been deported through other stratagems, e.g., reported for small crimes (see Vermehren 1979, 51) and marked with the black triangle, i.e., as “anti-social”. In order for this to be possible, in 1937, the police were given special permission to intern individuals regarded as “deviant from the norm” (but who had not committed any crime) because of their “anti-sociality” (see Schoppmann 2010, 20).

Despite the scarceness of direct testimonies on the experience within Ravensbrück or other camps, one can read about many lesbian relationships in the stigmatizing and often homophobic accounts given by heterosexual coprisoners. For instance, Wanda Półtawska, a Ravensbrück political prisoner from 1941 to 1945, and her friend Krysia were horrified by the “terrifying” lesbians:

“[T]hey stole everything we had: only half our camp rations ever reached us and soon those last souvenirs of freedom – our toothbrushes and combs, together with a few treasures we had brought with us from prison – vanished irretrievably. We couldn't wash, because they wouldn't let us into the wash-room. We couldn't go to the sleeping quarters during the day, because the woman in charge wouldn't let us. She was always ‘re-making’ our beds, stealing anything she could find and spitting on the sheets.” (Półtawska 1989, 57pp.)

She adds, “[A]t first, I couldn't credit what was happening, and watched wide-eyed, torn between curiosity and despair. The last shreds of humanity were slowly disappearing. Lesbian love… love… love…” (Półtawska 1989, 58) – “inhuman acts of lesbian love”.

17 When Sarah Helm, journalist and author of the book “Ravensbrück: Life and Death in Hitler’s Concentration Camp for Women”, interviewed Wanda Półtawska, something had to be asked: “Sitting in her Kraków apartment, overlooking the central square, I asked Wanda about the ‘inhuman acts’. A portrait of Pope John Paul II stared down on us from the wall, and Wanda stared too, saying nothing. She asked if I had travelled all the way to Kraków to ask her that. But there was a time when Wanda Wojtasik was haunted by the ‘inhuman acts’ of lesbian love as much as she was by other acts the camp was known for” (Helm 2015, 174).
According to Póltawska, among them, there were also the *many or julots*, “shaved masculine women with rigid collars, high-heeled shoes, male voices, and sometimes even with a little beard. Those [...] stood in front of the blocks, looking at the women who passed by. They were always more. On Sunday, behind the blocks, real orgies took place. Some young gypsies danced and the *Many* beat the time.” (Póltawska 1989, 143)

Moreover, in the accounts by Ravensbrück prisoners Margarete Buber-Neumann, Georgia Tanewa (see Schoppmann 1997, 247), and Irma Trksak, it is possible to observe a common prejudicial, bourgeois point of view (see Meier 1999, 22pp.) according to which the lesbian relationships of the political prisoners remained platonic, while the criminals and “anti-socials” had actual lesbian intercourse. As reported by Buber-Neumann – who was a young German communist when she was interned, in 1940, in Ravensbrück, where she met Milena Jesenská, Kafka’s friend – there was also a lesbian prostitute in Ravensbrück:

“[H]er name was Gerda, but she called herself Gerd. She serviced a number of women, but not for money. Every Saturday and Sunday her customers brought her their rations of margarine and sausage, which were distributed only on weekends.” (Buber-Neumann 1988, 40)

Likewise, Nanda Herbermann, a German political prisoner deported to Ravensbrück in July 1941, underlines a similar attitude in reference to the wards, categorized as former prostitutes or criminals:

“Many of my wards were completely morally ruined in this environment. They performed the most depraved acts with each other, since sexuality was the only thing left for them. They could no longer be helped by goodness and patience. They were totally ruined; physically, too, they were unkempt and dirty.” (Herbermann 2000, 136)

Nevertheless, lesbianism remained illegal within the camps and the heteronormative attempts to hinder it were extremely humiliating for those affected by them. According to the 17th disciplinary regulation of the camp, “anyone who approaches other prisoners in a lesbian manner or who engages in lesbian obscenities, or who fails to report such activities” was to be punished (see Mailänder 2015, 210) in the punishment block or with 25, 50, or 75 strokes (see Buber-Neumann 1963, 288).

In addition, as reported by Bonnet and confirmed by Germaine Tillion’s (2012) account, it was very common to send lesbian “anti-socials” to the camp brothels with the promise of release after six months. But, to add insult to injury, the lesbians who spent six months in the brothel were deceived by the Nazis twice, undergoing a process of forced heteronormativization and eventually being killed (see Bonnet 2010, 94).
The connection of lesbianism with crime, prostitution, and vice in the accounts of the heterosexual political prisoners shows a shared stigmatization of lesbians within the camp as a reflection of its societal perception. Lesbianism was considered an epidemic disease that was breaking through the whole camp and, therefore, as explained by Hájková and Bosold (2017), the figure of the perverted lesbian prisoner plays an outstanding role in the narratives of the survivors after the war. Not surprisingly, not a single testimony from one of the lesbian survivors has survived. They were sentenced to silence; the lack of self-testimony of lesbian women and the massive homophobia that characterizes the majority of the surviving testimonies still determine the politics of remembrance and research (see Hájková/Bosold 2017, paragraph 11).

Indeed, even if, on the one hand, it is possible that lesbianism was exploited for personal gain by some women (who probably had a privileged position in the camp), on the other hand, the reported testimonies cannot be considered in any way representative of either the real number of lesbians in the camp or their attitude because, on the contrary, to be known as a lesbian also meant to be oppressed by the SS and the other prisoners (see Janz 2019, 20).

**Conclusions**

The posthumous invisibility of lesbian women and the silence that surrounds their lives are the reasons it is still impossible to quantify their number and the way in which they were persecuted, interned, or murdered in the camps. As a consequence, the evidence found – such as that referring to Elli Smula and Margarete Rosenberg; Henny Schermann, Elsa Conrad, and Margarete U.; Mary Punjer (see Schoppmann 1997, 233pp.); or Ilse Totzke – is still too little and lacks detailed information.

What can be known for certain is that lesbians were subjected to both “alternative” and “classic” persecution, including stigmatization, which resulted in the representation of the lesbian community as the summation of a never-ending set of societal and cultural stereotypes. Its members were – in almost any account – German, as if the collective stigma of German lesbians corresponded to the need to oppose the German enemy itself (see Bonnet 2010, 96pp.) – public enemies, parasites of the people. They were *jules* and *julots* (pimps); obviously prostitutes; criminals; “anti-socials”. Their love was a vice, a defect, never congenital but always a compensation given by the absence of

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men and, contextually, a substitution and a reproduction of the heterosexual matrix (see Eschebach 2012, 67). Lesbianism was an illness, a contagious epidemic disease.

Such a situation does not allow the analytical evaluation of real experience, which is, unfortunately, mainly reported on via constant stigmatization carried out in the accounts of the women who were (un)consciously reactivating the patriarchal system of external society within the camp. “These descriptions”, as explained by Schoppmann (1997, 244), “mostly stigmatizing and pejorative, have something in common: they are external images, alien images, third-party images, ascriptions. [It] is further problematic that the fictional extent of these accounts cannot be assessed with certainty”. Such a confusion results from the impossibility of drawing on directs reports, which, if it had been possible, on the one hand, would have been extremely helpful for understanding the real extent of the phenomena, but, on the other hand, would have caused problems for these women (who could have been stigmatized again because of their lesbianism).

Ravensbrück could have represented the possibility of building an internal secret matriarchy (see Kokula 2010, 36) among female prisoners within the Reich and to give rise to a shared matriarchal consciousness. Instead, it was a “successful” attempt to reiterate the general perception of the heteronormative lesbophobic and homophobic context in which individual lives are leveled to a patriarchal vision. The continuous stigmatization of lesbians in Ravensbrück, therefore, corresponds to a shared social discrimination strengthened within the camp experience (see Kokula 1984, 159) but dating back to the Weimar Republic, where lesbianism had emancipated within itself but not within the new German society.

Although nowadays, the debate regarding the visibility of lesbians persecuted under Nazism is increasingly analyzed, it is still hindered. The dynamic inherent in today’s denial of lesbian commemoration seems to relate precisely to the Weimar past; since lesbians were not included in the German Criminal Code and were therefore not categorizable as a victim group, they were not prosecutable because of their sexuality during Nazism and, today, there is no reason to remember them with a celebratory monument. Now, finally, it is clearer – but still conflicted – as to what extent the lesbian legal invisibility of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi era is deeply connected to the invisibility that still today does not allow us to remember lesbian women and create their commemorative spaces.
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Political Representation of Women in Turkey. 
Institutional Opportunities versus Cultural Constraints

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Abstract: This paper analyzes both the descriptive and the substantive sides of women's representation in Turkey and argues that although the proportion of women politicians in the Turkish Parliament increased from only 4% in 1999 to 17.6% in the 2018 general elections, this has not been reflected in an increase in women MPs' effectiveness. This article mainly argues that as electoral competition increases, women candidates' chances of being elected decrease. On the other hand, more equal distributions of seats between parties positively influence women's representation. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, women's movements and grassroots demands for women's rights in Turkey, which coincided with the highly welcomed EU accession process, complemented these institutional opportunities to foster women's representation and break traditional patron-client relations. Overall, however, cultural constraints, such as high polarization between parties and the clash of Islamist and European values inhibit women MPs from cooperating on policies concerning women, and strict party discipline reduces the parliamentary effectiveness of Turkish women politicians.

Keywords: Women's Representation, Political Polarization, Party System, Majoritarianism, Turkey

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Political Representation of Women in Turkey. Institutional Opportunities versus Cultural Constraints

Introduction

In Turkey, the empowerment of women was first discussed in the 1980s, while the 1990s provided the foundations for transforming power relations and economic, social, and political structures for gender equality. Since the 1980s, three aspects of women's empowerment and development efforts have attracted particular attention: education, employment, and political participation (Afshar 1998; Kalaycıoğlu/Toprak 2004). In the 21st century, the evaluation of democracies requires considering the implementation of gender equality as well as economic development.¹ The political presence of women is essential, in particular for consulting with them when taking the necessary steps to protect women's and children's rights and protecting women and children from violence.

During the early Republican period of the 1930s, Turkey made reforms and implemented many modern, secular policies, which were forward-thinking even for contemporary Western societies, aimed at improving women's participation in politics, work, and senior executive positions. Thus, it is interesting that, according to the UN's development program, women's parliamentary representation now lags far behind the average for EU member states as well as some Islamic and African countries.² While the number of women MPs, spread across five different parties, increased from 4% to 17.6% between the 1999 and 2018 national elections, this is still not satisfactory. Moreover, their representation

¹ Turkey, with an index value of 0.806, was ranked 59th of 189 countries and territories by the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI), ascending for the first time ever to the “very high human development category”, up from the “high human development category” in the previous report. Norway maintained its top position at 0.954 in the HDI ranking, followed by Switzerland at 0.946, Ireland at 0.942, and Germany and Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region, China) both at 0.939. In the Gender Development Index (GDI), Turkey ranked 66th of 162 countries at 0.305, which revealed a loss in human development due to inequalities between women's and men's achievements. (https://www.tr.undp.org/content/turkey/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2019/12/HDR-post-release-pr.html, 9 December, 2019).

² United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/hdi-female), and The World Bank Data, “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments” (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sg.gov.parl.zs). In the 2018 Turkish national elections, the percent of seats held by women politicians was 17.6% compared to an EU average of 32%. Women's parliamentary representation in recent national elections was 47.3% in Sweden; 41.1% in Spain; 39.7% in France; 37.4% in Denmark; 37.2% in Austria; and 30.9% in Germany.
is largely ineffective as they fail to address women's issues, such as protecting women rights, preventing violence against women, providing support for childcare, or addressing the exploitation of domestic labor – measures that would empower women in economic and social life. Finally, some women MPs are even acting against existing women's rights on the basis that Turkish men have allegedly been disadvantaged by, for example, the ban on early marriage or indefinite alimony. Recently, when some Turkish women started a campaign on Twitter to create awareness of some commonly used phrases that insult women, President Erdoğan's daughter, Sümeyye Erdoğan – who is one of the founders of Kadın ve Demokrasi Vakfı (Women and Democracy Association; KADEM) – made a public declaration that “this initiative has reached the level that harms the values in which we believe” (6 June, 2020). These examples show that the social cleavage between Islamists and secularists in Turkey hampers the empowerment of women and supports the argument that pious women quit the struggle for women rights and now defend the patriarchal status-quo since they came to power in 2002 with the pro-Islamist JDP (Turam 2008).

The question, then, is why Turkish women parliamentarians have not used the opportunities of their position to cooperate on issues affecting women's empowerment, given that they currently have the highest level of representation throughout the history of the Turkish nation-state. This article aims to examine the institutional factors – such as the party and electoral systems and the candidate-nomination process – that are believed to have fostered Turkish women's involvement in parliament so far and discuss cultural and political dynamics – such as strict party discipline, clientelism, high political polarization, and the majoritarian and uncompromising attitude of the right-wing alliance – that have hindered women's cooperation in parliament on issues relating to gender-sensitive policies.

The article first reviews general literature on women's political representation and briefly analyzes women politicians since the Republican period to show how changing institutional factors and a rising feminist wave in Turkey since the 1990s have encouraged women's participation in political life. In its main focus, the paper then scrutinizes the cultural and political dynamics in

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3 Some petitions were given by women MPs to the commission of the Committee on Equality of Opportunity for Women and Men (KEFEK) of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) that tended to concentrate on two priority issues: indefinite-alimony victims and early-marriage victims (see KEFEK report 26 July 2018).
4 The campaign #Erkekleryerinibilsin (“men should know their place”) uses an adapted Turkish phrase, replacing “women” with “men”.
5 KADEM was founded in 2013. It is the incumbent Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP) government-organized non-governmental organization (GO-NGO).
6 “Bir empati vurgusu olarak ortaya çıkan #erkekleryerinibilsin akımı inandığımız değerleri zedeleyecek boyuta ulaşmıştır. Bu durumu kınıyor ve reddediyoruz.” Translated by the author.
Turkish politics that prevent women politicians from cooperating and working effectively in the parliament. In other words, the paper's first part focuses on 'descriptive representation', whereas the second part evaluates 'substantive representation'. The article concludes by discussing the future of the women's movement in Turkey under the hegemony of the right-wing alliance and the new presidential system.

The Political Representation of Turkish Women: Institutional Factors

The political representation of disadvantaged groups, such as minorities or women, is both critical for democratization and a tool that such groups can use to protect their rights. Studies of women's political representation show that women who are represented by women are more politically interested, participate more in political matters, and have a greater sense of political efficacy and political competence (Atkeson/Carrillo 2007; High-Pippert/Comer 2008; Burns/Schlozman/Verba 2001).

On the other hand, once women enter parliament, their struggle is far from over because they enter a male domain, numerically, culturally and institutionally. The “new institutionalism” approach claims that institutions are primary determining factors in our political behaviour. Research shows that such institutional factors include both micro- and macro-level elements. While micro-level factors focus on a group’s own characteristics, macro-level factors include a country’s electoral system, tools, and processes. Karen Bird's (2003) analysis of the effect of institutional opportunities and obstacles for political representation is very important; however, some elements may need revision for countries such as Turkey with high political polarization, strict party discipline, high electoral thresholds, and party fragmentation. Although there are studies on the relation between the gender gap and party-based limitations, such as nomination processes for office in Turkish local politics (Yıldırım/Kocapınar 2019; Sumbaş 2020), the literature remains weak on the relationship between women’s direct representation and party competition as well as on measuring and increasing women MPs' parliamentary effectiveness. The present study is, therefore, important for filling this significant gap in the literature.

7 The literature on women and public office has developed along two central strands: descriptive and substantive representation. Descriptive representation involves identifying the reasons why so few women are elected to legislative bodies and the importance of barriers (such as the electoral system), the role of party recruitment processes, and the resources and motivation that make women seek elected office. Substantive representation involves the related question of whether, once elected, women make a difference in legislative life and political leadership.
Regarding women in Turkey, political solidarity, mobilization, and candidate nomination are all significant factors influencing political representation. However, this study also reveals that while women's previous work within their party organization and election candidate rankings do not directly determine their electoral success, they do influence how effective women are once they enter parliament. As party leaders determine the election candidate list of the parties and the structure of the parties is oligarchic rather than democratic (Çakır 2013), women's being in a party organization for a long time may not always render them candidates for elections. Women who are nominated for higher rankings in the party list are naturally more likely to be elected than those who are nominated for lower rank. Besides, even if female candidates are nominated from the lower ranks in the party list, they can receive a chance to be elected with the contribution of the election system. In this case, however, it was observed that women nominated from lower ranks were less active in parliament than those elected from higher ranks.

Regarding the electoral system, proportional representation (PR) generally increases women's electoral chances compared to more competitive pluralist electoral systems. However, if competition between parties is more severe, then women candidates are less likely to be preferred. This is especially evident in local elections and rural areas. Extreme polarization between parties and strict discipline within parties hinder women's representation – the chance women will be preferred as candidates by party leaders – and hamper the collective work of women politicians. Therefore, institutional opportunities and obstacles are shaped by cultural-political patterns, which lead to limitations on the effectiveness of women MPs because of features such as intolerance, polarization, and patriarchal norms and values.

Based on these links between institutional and cultural factors and women's political representation in parliament, the following arguments will be analyzed in relation to the case of Turkish women deputies:

1) Candidate nomination and election
   a) The longer women have worked in the party organization, the greater the effectiveness of that party's women MPs.
   b) As the rank of women candidates in the party's list increases, their floor-work in parliament increases.
   c) Women politicians nominated from large cities are more likely to gain seats in elections.
   d) The more important patron-client relations are, the less likely women candidates are to win elections.
2) Party system and inter-party competition  
   a) As party fragmentation increases, women become less likely to gain representation.  
   b) As party discipline becomes stricter, women MPs have less impact in parliament.  
   c) As ideological divisions and polarization increases, cooperation between women MPs decreases.

3) Electoral system  
   a) Proportional representation increases women's parliamentary representation.  
   b) A closed-list electoral system decreases competition between the candidates, increasing women's parliamentary representation.  
   c) A closed-list electoral system makes party discipline stricter, reducing the effectiveness of women's parliamentary representation.

Studies of the relationship between women and politics explain the political representation of women in relation to various factors. These include quotas, PR systems, the power of women’s movements, party ideologies, and the level of democratization within a country. A majority of studies generally focus on women's parliamentary representation, particularly quantitative representation rates and reports as well as other written documents (Paxton/Kunovich 2003; Ballington/Karam 1998). At the parliamentary level, studies of participation highlight problems such as intra-party practices and the impact of socio-economic, political, and cultural factors (Ballington/Mattland 2004; Bari 2005). Scholars who see ideology and cultural factors as causes of unequal participation claim that women cannot participate equally due to traditional societal structures influenced by religion (Shedova 2005; Norris/Inglehart 2001).

A number of important studies in Turkey that have examined women's political participation, nomination, and the competition processes have shed light on the obstacles and opportunities faced by women in Turkish politics (Tekeli 1985; Arat 1989; Çakır 2013; Çağlayan 2007; Arslan 2019). Several studies have focused on local government and gender relations (Yıldırım/Kocapınar 2019; Alkan 2003; Sumbaş 2020), while others have investigated the level of women's political representation, how women are included in party programs and regulations, and how they are represented in the print media (Cansun 2009; Yaraman 2015). Previous studies of women deputies in Turkey are notable for analysing political representation in relation to modernist Kemalist reforms, the conservative patriarchal structure, and women’s movements (Arat 1989; Tekeli 1985; Toprak 1990;
Arat 2000). However, these analyses ignore the impact of institutional factors that enable us to compare changes in the support for women politicians between political periods.

Table 1 shows the percentage of seats held by women in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), organized by election year; the percentage of seats held by the winning party; competition between the first and second largest party; and the rate of fragmentation. Competition is measured as the vote gap between the first and the second parties and suggests that elections are competitive if the vote gap between the first two parties is lower. Its relationship to the winning party’s seat percentage is defined based on the electoral system and determines the party system in general. In one-party systems, as competition is very limited, the winning party’s seat percentage will be very high. In two-party systems, the vote gap is small; however, the winning party is expected to get the majority of seats in order to form a single-party government. In these systems, fragmentation (the effective number of parties, ENP) is also low – below three points. For instance, the 1950 election indicators show that the percent of women MPs in parliament went down to 0.6% of MPs despite the fact that the number of total deputies in the assembly increased. Moreover, although the vote gap between the first two parties was low (around 13%), due to the electoral system (block-vote pluralist system), the winning party received more than 85% of the seats in parliament. The ENP indicates that there were two main parties and additional small parties in parliament following the 1950 election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of national elections</th>
<th>Total MPs</th>
<th>Women MPs</th>
<th>Women MPs (in percent)</th>
<th>Competition (vote gap between largest two parties in percent)</th>
<th>Winning party’s seats (in percent)</th>
<th>Fragmentation (ENP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>72.30</td>
<td>84.90</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>85.40</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>22.21</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>69.50</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: Women MPs and party competition (1935–2018). Source: Compiled by the author.

According to these indicators, parliaments under single-party governments (those that have more than 50% of seats in parliament) include more women deputies than those existing under coalition governments or parliaments where seats are divided among several parties. In other words, the party system itself affects female representation. As the party system shifts from a multiparty system dominated by a single party or from a pluralist party system to an over-

8 “One-party system” is different from a single-party government, which gets the majority of the seats (or support) to form the government alone in a competitive system. A “two-party system” (or bipartism) is duopolistic in that two “major” parties that have a roughly equal prospect of winning government power dominate it. In this system, although a number of “minor” parties may exist, only two parties enjoy sufficient electoral and legislative strength to win government power. A multiparty system is characterized by competition between more than two parties, thus reducing the chances of a single-party government and increasing the likelihood of coalitions. Moderate pluralism exists in countries where ideological differences between major parties are slight and where there is a general inclination to form coalitions and move toward the middle ground. In Sartori’s classification, for a system to qualify as a predominant party system, the same party has to win the absolute majority of seats in three or more consecutive elections.
ly fragmented party system – an “atomic” party system as classified by Sartori (1976) – women have fewer chances to reach higher positions in candidate lists and therefore a lower chance of being elected.

In Turkey, following three decades of a one-party government, the party system changed from bipartism (1950–1960) to moderate multipartism (1961–1980), moderate multipartism with one dominant party (1983–1991), extreme multipartism with no dominant party (1991–2002), and, in 2002, to a multiparty system with one dominant party (predominant party system) (Sayarı 2016). As this study argues, the structure of the party system – how fragmented and competitive it is – is a significant factor influencing women’s representation. Table 1 shows that, except for the elections held in 1957, 1977, 1995, and 2015, there is a negative correlation between fragmentation (measured as the ENP) and the proportion of women in the National Assembly. In other words, women’s representation increases when there is a stable party system.

When women first entered the Turkish parliament in 1935, through Kemalist “state feminism”10, women politicians can be successful both in national and municipal elections only via the “support of male politicians”. In the period between 1935 and 1950, which had a single-party regime ruled by the RPP (CHP), only the candidates nominated from the RPP’s list could be elected.11 During this period, women’s political participation was fostered as a symbol of the Kemalist project, because as Arat (2000, 109) asserts, “women were crucial in the reinvention of the national culture [in which] women had been considered equal to men among the pre-Islamic Turks in Central Asia [and] efforts to improve women’s status were used as a means to cultivate Turkish nationalism and adopt Western notions of equality and secularity”.

In addition to the effect of the party system (which is usually determined by the electoral system), changes in the proportion of women parliamentarians are strongly correlated with changes to the electoral system. Within the period of bipartism, from 1950 to 1960, Turkish elections used the block-vote method, perhaps the most inequitable system since Turkey’s introduction of a multi-party democratic system in 1946. In this electoral system, the party that receives the

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9 The effective number of parties (ENP) is a concept introduced by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) that provides for an adjusted number of political parties in a country’s party system. In a competitive democratic regime, if the ENP is lower, i.e., between 1 and 2, it is called a two-party system; around 2.5 points, it is called a two-and-a-half party system; and between 2.5 and 4 points, the system is called moderate multipartism. If the ENP is higher than 4 points, the system is called extreme multipartism.

10 The term “state feminism” refers to the fact that women’s rights are given and fostered by state (cf. Tekeli 1985).

11 Because this was a one-party regime, the ENP is given as ‘1’ for the early republican period (1935–1946). Moreover, although there were independent minority MPs within this period, they were also preferred by the ruling RPP, hence the party’s seat share is given as 100%.
highest number of votes in a constituency takes all the related seats. The number of female MPs declined radically after 1946 due to the increasingly competitive political environment. As presented in Table 1, although the winning Democrat Party’s (DP) seat share was 85.4% in 1950 and 94% in 1954, the percentage of women MPs fell to its lowest level – 0.6%. This situation is interesting insofar as it shows that even though this period was remarked upon as the first stage of transition to democracy, the DP did not nominate any women, and so, democratic gains did not occur equally for women and men. Moreover, this reduction also suggests two related issues: Given the same socio-economic qualifications, women politicians are not successful in competing with their male rivals, and the end of the single-party regime demonstrated that Kemalist reforms, especially the rights granted to women, were not internalized. Turan (1984) asserts that, with the transition to multi-party politics in the 1940s, the tendency to pay heed to voters’ religious preferences was considerably enhanced.

For the post-coup period of 1961–1980, characterized as a period of moderate multipartism, the percentage of women MPs remained the same, but was far lower than it had been during the single-party regime of the 1930s. Since 1961, Turkey has used a PR electoral system. Because this system also increases competitiveness, in the 1961 elections, the vote gap between the first two parties was 1.94% and women accounted for 0.7% of MPs, i.e., women politicians were not the preference of the political parties. In addition to this, determining candidates in a closed-list system encouraged excessive intra-party discipline. Accordingly, during the 1970s, the number of women MPs fell again slightly, especially when ideological conflict between left- and right-wing parties accelerated. Closed-list elections also limit the autonomy of male MPs.

When the party system changed to multipartism with a dominant party after the second transition to democracy with the 1983 elections (following the 1980 military coup), the rate of women deputies increased. In this post-1980-coup period, with the implementation of a very high 10% threshold for seats in addition to a ban on existing parties, the new right-wing Motherland Party (ANAP) succeeded in gaining the majority of parliamentary seats. When the ban on pre-coup political parties and politicians was lifted for the 1987 national elections, the dominance of ANAP ended, and the party system shifted to extreme multipartism, which continued until 2002 and led to another decline in the proportion of women politicians (to 1.3%).

By the late 1980s, women politicians had become more active, in line with growing women’s movements and demands from both feminist and Islamic fundamentalist grassroots (Berik 1990). Turkish women began voicing their demands in organized marches, while protests over domestic violence against
women signalled the rise of feminist movements and made women more visible in Turkish political discourse. Finally, Turkey's attempts to become a member of the European Union forced state policies to become more sensitive to gender equality. Significantly, Turkey had a woman as Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, from 1993 to 1996. Although Çiller had had little political experience before her recruitment by the centre-right True Path Party, she rapidly became its leader. Her selection as Prime Minister can be interpreted as reflecting gender-equality achievements during the 1980s. We can see that there is an increasing trend in the number and effectiveness of women deputies since the 1990s. During the 1990s, other women politicians with longer political careers also served as ministers. This decade is significant as four women ministers took places in the cabinet (during the Çiller and Erbakan governments). Meral Akşener served as Minister of Internal Affairs between 1996 and 1997 in the coalition government formed by the Welfare Party and True Path Party. Ayfer Yılmaz and Türkân Akyol (who had been, as of 1971, the first female minister in Turkish political history) also served as Ministers of State during this period.

The post-2000 period saw increases in women’s representation in Turkey. In the 2002 elections, the JDP won 66% of the parliamentary seats with only 34% of the total votes, establishing the presently dominant features of the Turkish political system. In the 2007 and 2011 elections, the JDP again won an absolute parliamentary majority, which enabled women candidates to win seats despite being nominated lower on the party list. On the other hand, growing majoritarianism (in the parliament, commissions, cabinet, and local administrations) started to reduce the need for cooperation between parties. Moreover, the fragmentation of the political opposition and the ideological distance between the secular social-democrat RPP, the nationalist NMP, and the pro-Kurdish PDP have been obstacles to the formation of a coalition government (Sayarı 2016). However, after the 2013 Gezi protests, increased ideological camping broke new ground for reconciliation between the women deputies across different parties. As Table 1 shows, the dominant party system has positively affected the representation rate of women in parliament in general. Yet, this positive increase, both in quantitative and qualitative representation, cannot be explained only as a result of the party system.

By the 2000s, awareness of gender equality had increased, especially after Turkey’s EU membership candidacy was approved in the 1999 Helsinki Summit. In 2001, 2004, and 2010, as part of the EU harmonization, various regulations and constitutional amendments were passed regarding gender equality (Müftüler-Baç 2005). In 2009, the parliamentary Commission for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (KEFEK) was established with the participation of women
and men MPs from several parties. The commission has undertaken significant studies and produced reports with the participation of academics and NGOs. The two most important were prepared between 2007 and 2013: the National Action Plan for Combating Domestic Violence in 2008 and the Gender Equality National Action Plan in 2013. Significantly, two women social-democrat politicians, Çağdem Mercan (DSP) and Canan Kaftanoğlu (CHP), were elected as Istanbul province chairs in 2016 and 2018 respectively. In short, the conspicuous rise in the number of women MPs by the 2010s highlights the success of efforts during the late 1990s and early 2000s inspired by the rise of grassroots women’s movements.

In the 2010s, women’s representation benefitted from the JDP’s active women’s branches and the PDP’s (HDP) co-presidency system, which increased its voter-mobilization potential. Indeed, the pro-Kurdish leftist PDP nominated the most women candidates in the 2015 and 2018 national elections and 2019 municipal elections. Meanwhile, the JDP nominated those women candidates who had worked actively and for a long time in the party’s (mostly women) branches. Half of the JDP’s women MPs wear headscarves and have found their place in politics with this identity. This suggests that the claim by Yeşim Arat (1989) that women mostly enter politics through the intercession of male politicians, as window-dressing, no longer applies in Turkish politics. Although for some of them, their interest in politics can be initiated by their male kin – husbands, fathers, or, as may be the case for pro-Kurdish party members, tribal affiliations (Çağlayan 2007) – they are not recruited as window-dressing.

Figure 1: Number of Women MPs and Winning Party’s Seat Share

For the 26th Parliament (from November 2015 to July 2018), some of the examples include the JDP’s Kayseri deputy Hülya Nergiz; Kahramanmaraş deputy Nursel Reyhanlioğlu; Adana deputy Fatma Güldemet Sarı (who also served as the Minister of Environment and Urban Planning); Ankara deputy Jülide Saneroluğlu (who also served as the Minister of Labor and Social Security); Ankara deputy Lütfüye Selva Çam; Antalya deputy Gökçen Özdoğan Enç; and Balıkesir deputy Sema Kırıcı.

Until 2013, women MPs were forbidden from entering parliament with a headscarf. The headscarf was banned in public institutions in accordance with the “public clothing regulation” issued after the 1980 coup and began to be implemented in a radical way after the 1997 military memorandum.

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Earlier, I argued that the number of women MPs declines as electoral competition increases (i.e., as the vote gap between the first two parties decreases). However, figure 1 shows that, in Turkey, the number of women MPs increases when seats are shared more proportionally between many parties rather than when the winning party gains a substantial parliamentary majority. If the largest party’s seat share is higher than 50%, one should expect a single-party government to be formed. Although fragmentation decreases as the share of the votes obtained by the governing party increases, the system diverts to a more majoritarian and authoritarian character. Conversely, if the largest party holds less than 50% of the vote, a coalition government will likely be formed. Hence, for the Turkish case, existing theory suggests that, except in the 1950s (the period of transition to a competitive democratic regime and rising authoritarianism of the DP), women’s representation increases under the rule of single-party governments (compared to periods of coalition government). Yet, the democratic parliamentary representation of more parties under a single-party government (when the winning party’s seat share decreases) enhances the likelihood that women will be elected. In other words, it is stable and pluralist rather than majoritarian political systems that foster women’s parliamentary representation.

**Parliamentary Effectiveness: Substantive Representation under Cultural Constraints**

Research shows that the presence of even one woman can change the behaviour of her male colleagues. However, long-term significant change is most likely when there is a substantial number of women in parliament who are motivated to represent women’s concerns and not only “stand as” women but also “act for” women (Phillips 1995; Bellington/Karam 1998).

Although more women from a range of parties have become MPs in Turkey since the 1990s, this improved descriptive representation has not been reflected in the form of substantive representation. This is primarily due to cultural and social factors, such as the clash between Islamic and European or secular values, the ideological distance between parties, high social polarization and strict party discipline. This has prevented women MPs, especially pro-Islamist JDP members, from effectively acting for women. They do not discuss problematic policies and abuse of women as issues in parliament and they rarely criticize the government for violations of women’s and children’s rights.14 This ineffec-

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14 While, in 2019, conservatives campaigned against the Istanbul Convention that pushed the JDP for withdrawal, in February 2020, JDP women MPs opposed president Erdoğan’s proposal to amend the Istanbul Convention (BBC Türkçe, 28 February 2020, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-51667766)
taiveness of women politicians who came from women's branches to parliament supports Çakır's study, which says that parties' women's branches, “rather than being places that prepare women for politics, [...] are considered to be helpful places to bring the mass of women into the party” (2001, 407).

While strict party discipline is a more prominent obstacle for the JDP's women deputies, all women politicians share one problem: Their opportunity to actively participate in politics usually comes later than men's due to family responsibilities. Furthermore, parties tend to expect and relegate women branches to only express interest in women's issues (Arslan 2019). Women participate in politics either “before they get married or when they get older”, even if they are better educated than their male counterparts (Çakır 2013, 229). Even when they are active, women’s greater engagement with family responsibilities continues to hinder their political participation and excludes them from decision-making processes because crucial party decisions are taken at gatherings in restaurants or hotels (Arslan 2019).

Another influential institution that hinders women politicians in Turkey is the patron-client relationship. Patronage relations and clientelism have developed in particular in Turkey's rural areas, where land ownership is heavily concentrated in the hands of a relatively small and powerful group that can monopolize wealth, political power, education, and means of communication (Sayarı 1977). Kemalist reforms in the early Republican era, which were often secularist, widened further the gap between the centre and the periphery (Turan 1984). The periphery's dependence on the centre encouraged personal dependencies in the form of accepted clientelism that proliferated until the first competitive elections of 1946 (Ayata 1994). Patronage is more commonly understood as the distribution of state resources by office holders. In short, finding jobs is a very important function of clientelistic networks, and in a study by Arat (1989, 103), one male politician suggests that “being an MP is an arduous task. A woman cannot endure this. A voter [...] for example, cannot tell a woman that he is unemployed. He won't believe that the woman can shoulder the necessary fight. Also, man is more of a demagogue.”

In the 1990s, Tansu Çiller became the first female politician to successfully manipulate political patronage to maintain her position (Ağduk 2000). Çiller joined the True Path Party (DYP) in 1991 at party leader Demirel's request before then serving as Minister of the Economy. Within two years, she was elected as party leader and became Turkey's first woman Prime Minister in 1993, despite Demirel's opposition. Ümit Cizre (2002) suggests that Çiller's modern, Western lifestyle enabled her to influence both the West and Turkey. Çiller strengthened relations with the United States to secure her position, tried to
use patronage-based support within the party, and removed members close to Demirel from the party. Moreover, she adopted populist policies by promising “a house and car” for each voter. Her ability to utilize patron-client ties just like male politicians shows that Çiller, acting and promising as a woman, tried to overcome the disadvantage of being a woman in politics as it had been highlighted by Arat (1989, 28) for the women politicians of the earlier periods. In addition, she adopted a militarist attitude to fighting the terrorist organization PKK during the 1990s, which made her seem more like other, male politicians (Ağdük 2000). She also preferred labels such as ‘sister’ (baci) or ‘mother’ (ana) to suppress any perceived sexual aspect to her femininity. This gender neutralization of women's visibility in public and politics supports Çakır’s (2013) conclusion that political parties, regardless of their ideological differences, tend to preserve the patriarchal structure and traditional division of labor.

Clientelist politics remains more common in rural areas than in the cities, especially in the southeast and eastern regions, where tribal or clan systems are still dominant and mobilize mass blocs of votes or nominate members of the same tribe for different parties. However, this began to change with the pro-Kurdish PDPs (BDP-HDP) co-president policy. Nowadays, women politicians from the southeast and eastern regions dominated by Kurdish voters are being nominated with high percentages in both national and municipal elections. Nevertheless, without internalizing equality policies or incorporating women’s perspectives into politics, political representation alone will not strengthen equality.

The ranking of women candidates, also determines how women MPs work in parliament. Until 2007, women politicians were focused on so-called women’s issues such as child rearing, health, and education policies (except for DTP deputies). Even today, women politicians are still usually allocated to the Family Ministry or sometimes the Education Ministry, concerned with the well-being of families and children. Except for a few examples from the 1990s as mentioned earlier, women are still not being appointed to more technical, political, or economic positions related to transportation, finance, the economy, foreign affairs, or internal affairs. Thus, despite taking power with the largest share of the vote ever (46.58%), the JDP did not nominate any women MPs at the top of its lists. In the 2015 election, only three of 34 women MPs were chosen from the first rank and only five took the floor. The JDP gained 53 women MPs after the 2018 elections, of whom 24 were nominated from the first three ranks in the list. With the transition to a presidential system, there are only two women ministers who work in the JDP government’s 17 ministries: Labor, Social Services, and Family Minister Zehra Zümrüt Selçuk and Trade Minister Ruhsar Pekcan.
Figure 2 shows the uneven distribution of women MPs across Turkey’s 81 provinces. Although women increased their share of parliamentary seats from 14.4% to 17% in the 2015 national elections, 37 provinces (marked black) had no women MPs at all. These provinces are concentrated in the conservative and nationalist Black Sea and Central Anatolia regions. Conversely, women were more likely to be elected in major cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara, Bursa, Adana, İzmir, and Kayseri. Figure 2 also shows that economic development does not necessarily predict women’s political representation. Specifically, East and Southeast Anatolia elected women MPs despite being economically less developed than provinces on Turkey’s European side, such as Tekirdağ, Edirne, and Çanakkale, which did not elect any women. The main reason for this is the PDP’s (HDP) electoral success based on its nomination policy whereby one woman and one man are nominated as co-presidents. Research into political participation by Kurdish movement parties (Çağlayan 2007; Arslan 2019) indicates that these parties’ so-called “women’s councils” are independent units whose decisions are not discussed in mixed units. This shows that women’s branches positioned as “subsidiaries” in other parties are not a place that “refuses to make real politics” for women in pro-Kurdish parties.

As outlined earlier, the substantive representation of JDP women MPs has been hindered by strict party discipline and tensions between Islamist and secular values. In addition to the pre-dominant party system discussed above, deep social and political cleavages in Turkey have also prevented cross-party cooperation between women politicians. Table 2 compares the proportion of women MPs from each party after the 2015 and 2018 elections to the number of written and oral parliamentary questions (interpellations) they asked (26th term and 27th term first session respectively). After Turkey shifted to a presidential...

15 A parliamentary question is a way of obtaining information from the Prime Minister or a minister through a motion on matters concerning the duties and activities of the government. Questions can be oral or written, depending on the required form of reply.
system in 2018, the authority to issue an oral interpellation in parliament was eliminated. As table 2 shows, the PDP (HDP) had the largest proportion of women MPs after both elections, followed by the ruling JDP. Both the JDP and PDP increased the percent of MPs who were women between 2015 and 2018, whereas the percentage decreased for the secularist PRP. The (nationalist right-wing) Good Party only ran in the 2018 election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Women MPs</th>
<th>Women MPs (in % of party seats)</th>
<th>Women MPs with interpellation</th>
<th>Number of deputies with no interpellations</th>
<th>Total interpellations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JDP (AKP)</td>
<td>32 / 53</td>
<td>10.76 / 18.28</td>
<td>4 / 0</td>
<td>28 / 53</td>
<td>22 / 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP (CHP)</td>
<td>21 / 18</td>
<td>14.5 / 12.5</td>
<td>21 / 8</td>
<td>0 / 10</td>
<td>1,887 / 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP (HDP)</td>
<td>19 / 26</td>
<td>35.19 / 38.81</td>
<td>18 / 10</td>
<td>1 / 16</td>
<td>2,051 / 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMP (MHP)</td>
<td>3 / 4</td>
<td>8.33 / 8</td>
<td>3 / 1</td>
<td>0 / 3</td>
<td>191 / 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP (İYİ P.)</td>
<td>– / 3</td>
<td>– / 7.3</td>
<td>– / 0</td>
<td>– / 0</td>
<td>– / 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Parliamentary Contribution of Women MPs in the 26th (bold) and 27th Terms. Source: Compiled by the author based on the GNAT archive by the author. Bold numbers refer to the 26th parliamentary term.

Table 2 shows that secular left-wing women MPs (PRP and PDP) were more active than their counterparts from the nationalist conservative alliance (the JDP and its partner NMP). Women’s issues and the role of women and men in the private and public sphere create the main ideological difference and conflict between the parties. Thus, despite being led by a woman, the Good Party both nominated and elected the fewest women MPs. None of its women deputies offered any written questions during the first parliamentary term. The NMP, which contrary to other parties has no procedures for equal representation in its charter, has often been called the “men’s party”. Yet, its three women deputies were more active compared to JDP’s women MPs. Despite having the most women MPs, in the 26th term, only four of the JDP’s women MPs asked questions, and among the total 22 interpellations (10 of which were given by Istanbul deputy Bihlun Tamaylıgil), only six were related to women’s issues. Although women MPs are expected to fight more for women’s and children’s rights, some might have political attitudes that do not see improvement in these areas as necessary. This inactiveness on women’s issues can be a deliberate choice. JDP’s women MPs
do not oppose their party leader Erdoğan's claim that gender equality means “different in nature, but equal in rights”. That is, they believe that “to be equal” means “to be identical”.16 Again, JDP’s KADEM adopts the concept of “gender justice” instead of “gender equality”.

Another critical question is whether women politicians “act for women”. Of the 4,314 interventions by women MPs during the 26th term (4,241 written; 72 oral), only 300 (7.6%) concerned issues directly related to problems of women and children. For the first period of the 27th term, only 5 out of 46 written questions concerned women issues. These were all asked by the PDP’s Istanbul MP Filiz Kerestecioğlu Demir. Other questions given by PDP women MPs mostly concerned regional and economic problems, class inequality, and relations between the state and Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. Yet, many opposition MPs have been stripped of their title and some remain under investigation or in custody. This makes it neither easy nor scientifically meaningful to collect data on their parliamentary work and it is not reasonable to expect them to be able to “act for women”.17

Conclusion

This study of Turkey’s experience reveals that women politicians have begun to break down traditional patron-client ties as their parliamentary representation has increased since the late 1990s. The study also finds that institutional factors, such as inter-party competitiveness, the party and electoral systems, and candidate nomination procedures, determine the collective descriptive representation of women in the Turkish parliament. However, substantive representation is more directly determined by cultural and political factors, such as strict intra-party discipline and deep Islamist-secularist divisions. In Turkey, traditional Islamist-secularist and Turkish-Kurdish ethnic divisions deepened further following the 2013 Gezi Park protests, the 2014 Kurdish Kobani uprising, the 2015 ISIS and PKK terrorist attacks, the 2016 abortive coup, and the 2018 de-jure transition to the presidential system. Despite a significant increase in women MPs since 2015, these social and political developments have prevented women representatives from cooperating to address women’s issues.

The statistical data on the relationship between women’s representation and the party system and inter-party competitiveness is significant. The transition


17 Between November 2016 and November 2018, 16 of the Peoples’ Democratic Party’s (HDP) MPs were arrested. The party’s joint leaders, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, have been detained along with the other MPs because of their reluctance to give testimony for crimes linked to “terrorist propaganda”. They are also accused of harbouring sympathies for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and of acting to further its interests.
to a presidential system in Turkey has led to the formation of electoral alliances, transforming the party system into a bi-polar structure in which two competing blocs (pro-presidential/pro-Erdoğan and anti-presidential/anti-Erdoğan) exist in parliament. The ruling right-wing JDP-NMP alliance, which represents the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, has alienated and excluded other parties from decision making and introduced an intolerant, uncompromising political attitude toward opposition parties. Moreover, with its inside and outside institutions (such as the committee KEFEK and the GO-NGO KADEM), the JDP have reemphasized the image of Turkish women as wives and mothers. Hence, a more pluralist and tolerant political approach is necessary to reduce political polarization in both Turkish society and parliament to create a peaceful bridge with room for women politicians to cooperate across party lines.

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References


Varieties of Othering
Learning from Peripheric Feminisms. Othering, Reproductive Labor and Strike Action
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Abstract: Moving beneath the globalization of anti-gender agendas, this article examines the material grounds of the interplay between colonial Othering, reproductive labor and the reinvention of women's strikes today. It situates colonialism as the baseline for reading the Othering mechanism as responsible for dualistically categorizing, hierarchizing, and marginalising certain groups of people as “Others”. Confronting such a dialectical rhetoric, the present analysis adopts the notion of “articulation” for further examination of the nuances and complexities of the colonial division of labor and the neo-colonial devaluation of reproductive work by framing the precarious conditions of empregadas domésticas (female domestic servants). In its final section, the article focuses on the reinvention of strike action as an on-the-ground strategy of women's articulation that disputes the meanings of work and class, while articulating a wider scope for peripheric solidarity and care. In doing so, it brings to the forefront a decolonial, racialized, and gender-based epistemology rooted in Latin American and, more specifically, Brazilian contexts.

Keywords: Feminism, Colonialism, Domestic Work, Social Reproduction, Women's Strike, Brazil
Introduction

Debates on identity and diversity have been at the core of recent crises of democracy. A transnational authoritarian tendency can be identified in recent elections, permeated by conservative and far-right discourses. Despite its various shapes, the current globalization of authoritarianism seems to present one common element: wide-ranging attacks against peripheric groups including Black people, indigenous people, immigrants, women, LGBTIQ+ communities and refugees. Against this background, this paper employs “peripheric feminisms” as an umbrella term that includes non-hegemonic women's mobilizations, e.g., Black, “third-world”, communitarian, and decolonial feminisms.

Departing from the current crisis, I propose materially examining the ongoing strategies of peripheric resistance and their entanglements with the colonial legacy in modern formations of identity and the division of labor. To do so, the analysis adopts a decolonial and gender-based epistemology with the aim of disrupting epistemic violence and the epistemicide against peripheric women's experiences and knowledges (see Carneiro 2005, 61; Mendoza 2010, 20; Oyarzún 2010, 50). In this analysis, Latin America and, more specifically, Brazil are perceived as pivotal sites for examining colonial legacies manifested in terms of the Othering mechanism, the international division of labor, and strategies for survival and social transformation.¹

From Othering to Articulation

The notion of Othering is understood here as a foundational mechanism in the formation of modern ontologies and political subjectivities. Modern European rationality, exemplified by Cartesian and Hegelian theory, reads the world through a binary division of “either/or” in which to affirm One, it is necessary to deny the Other (Hegel [1857]1997, 134–135). Human or non-human; civilized or

¹ Brazil had the longest and largest slavery regime in the Western world and is part of the first cycle of colonial dispossession and expansion (from 1450 to 1825) that only later reached Africa and Asia (cf. Reis/Klein 2011, 181).
savage; developed or primitive; rational or irrational; people with or without history; subject or object; man or woman; white or non-white; central or peripheric

One is defined necessarily in opposition to the Other. That is to say, the Other represents the very condition of existence for the One.

The mechanism of Othering produces not only dialectical oppositions but also verticalized hierarchies within a new dimension of temporality. In a linear timeframe, Europe placed itself as “the One” located in the future of civilization, in the adulthood stage of development. In stark contrast, the invaded territories, “the Others”, were considered primitive, infantile, savage, and underdeveloped. By drawing on such a complex Othering mechanism, “universal truth” can be situated within the categorization of certain bodies as superior and others as inferior; certain temporalities as universal and others as particular; certain knowledge as neutral and scientific and other knowledges as biased and experiential.

Through this, the colonial regime complicates the feudal caste system. Instead of the classic tripartite system (clergy, nobles, and peasants), the colonial regime divides society into multiple possible articulations of race, gender, sexuality, class, dis-ability, religion, geographic location, etc. The mechanism entails multiple lines of differentiation, hierarchization, marginalization, and embodiment. That is to say, instead of a simplistic opposition between oppressor and oppressed, colonial modes of domination encompass structures that simultaneously locate bodies in different arrangements. One element connects and integrates the other, forming and shaping the individual as one unified being that experiences different layers of social privilege and marginalization that cannot be separated from one another. In other words, the separation of class, race, and gender is the outcome of an analytical thought process that should not be mistaken as a reflection of experience (Arruzza 2017, 195).

Therefore, identity is understood here as a historically situated narrative, a representation, as something contradictory and ambivalent, composed of multiple discourses, silences, desires, social relations, and structures. In other words, identity is not a fixed category or a closed totality in itself. Rather, we are composed of multiple identities throughout our lives and within the social relations of which we are a part.

Drawing on this, the concept of “intersectionality”, coined by the US-American legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw, has been widely invoked by feminist activists and within academic debates. In its foundational moment, the term was used to indicate how racism and sexism have been legally interpreted exclusively within the dominant spectrum of Black male and white female nor-
mativity, which has consequently excluded Black women from the protection of anti-discrimination laws (Crenshaw 1989, 149). In a more specific manner, the notion primarily highlighted the way in which “Black woman” embodies a multi-dimensional entanglement of both racism and sexism, a positionality that should neither be dismissed by feminists (centered on white women) nor by Black movements (centered on Black men), nor by the courts and legal doctrine. After the initial definition presented in “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex” (1989), Crenshaw extended the spectrum of intersectionality to also include other forms of burden and inequality (1991).

Similar concepts have been adopted by feminists to address the same issue, such as “simultaneous oppression” (Combahee River Collective 1977; Mohanty 2003), “borderline” and “crossroad” (Anzaldúa 1987), “matrix of domination” (Collins 1990), and “coloniality of gender” (Lugones 2008). In an attempt to move beneath the established canons of knowledge and to re-frame the mechanism of Othering within Latin American feminisms, I adopt the concept of articulação (articulation) employed by the Brazilian Black feminist Lélia Gonzalez (1984, 224). Through this notion, Gonzalez explicitly recognizes the inseparability of racism, sexism, and class within its historical connection grounded in colonialism and the emergence of capitalism.

Moreover, I argue that the concept of articulation presents a particularly interesting reference to three relevant features for the present analysis. First, it refers to the physical connection (“joint”) of the pieces of the body together, bringing the analytically fragmented pieces of skin, bones, flesh, organs, and systems into the form of a whole body of existence. Second, it alludes to the social notion of “joining”, through which an individual body is connected to a larger social body in the sense of articulating bodies together in collective actions and movements. Last but certainly not least, the same word invokes public discourse, the act of communication, the action of voicing, speaking, expressing ideas, and articulating thoughts – the articulation of vowels and consonants in the formation of clear and distinct sounds in speech.

With these three dimensions of articulation and a systematic reading of Gonzalez’s works, it is possible to outline three major domains of “articulation”: i) the ontological body in terms of race, gender, sex, and class; ii) the mechanism of Othering that refers to systems of marginalization translated as racism, sexism, and classism; and iii) the collective organization of bodies in the form of social movements. These three domains are the very flesh of this analysis as it moves from ontological Othering to the collective organization of bodies.
Commodification, Women Workers, and Social Reproduction

The Othering mechanism articulates together body, law, and property in its function of commodification and racialization. In “Capitalism and Slavery”, Eric Williams (1944) argues that the reason for modern slavery was economic and not racial. Features of docility, incapacity, hair type, and skin color were later rationalizations to justify an economic fact. “Colonies needed labor and resorted to Negro [sic] labor because it was cheapest and best” (Williams 1944, 20). In this sense, racism is not reducible to “a social evil perpetuated by prejudiced white people” (hooks 1982, 120) but instead refers to a political and legal institutionalization of power. The mechanism of Othering institutionalized a white power structure, which associates “white” with “a place of power, of systemic advantage in societies structured by racial domination” (Williams 1944, 20).

Referring to theories of natural legal order, Portuguese colonizers justified slavery in Brazil on the basis of domination by the “superior” and “civilized” white men over the “inferior” and “primitive” native people. As a result, legal discourse was used to sustain the non-recognition of native people as human beings and therefore as subjects of rights, and instead institute them as bodies that could be commodified into objects (see Schwartz 1973, 129–131; Wehling/Wehling 2004, 480–481; see also Césaire 1950; Fanon 1952; Bhandar 2012, 113). In this regard, native and Black bodies were inserted into an economic system of labor that Karl Marx termed “primitive accumulation” ([1867]2015, 507–508) and to which David Harvey later referred as “accumulation by dispossession” (2003).

However, different from Marx, this paper joins Rosa Luxemburg ([1913]2003) in reading the processes of colonial domination and slavery in the context of the emergence of capitalism as grounded in the imperial expansionist process of globalization, not as a system prior to capitalism (Luxemburg [1913]2003, 350). In this way, the first machines of the industrial revolution were not the steam machines, nor the press, nor the guillotine; they were enslaved Black bodies.

Whether in Marxist theory or in the popular imaginary, the notions of “worker” and “working class” have been historically associated with the figure of the male factory worker, placing female bodies outside of the productive role in

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2 In his foundational work addressing capitalism, “Das Kapital”, the struggles and wishes of the age were seen mostly as European ones. In order to understand the process of producing capital and the capitalist society, Marx addresses the colonial issue only a few times in “Das Kapital”. Colonialism received attention especially in the first volume entitled “The Process of Production of Capital”, in which Marx explains his concept of “primitive accumulation”. In short, this concept is based on Adam Smith’s idea of “previous accumulation” and denotes “the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the prehistoric stage of capital and the mode of production corresponding with it” (Marx [1867]2015, 507–508).
modern capitalism. In the book “Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State”, Friedrich Engels ([1884]2010) highlights that the first division of labor was that carried out between man and woman, a division considered by Engels to be the first class opposition and oppression in history (Engels [1884]2010, 174).

By complementing the relevant readings of Carole Pateman (1988) and Silvia Federici (1998) – since neither makes a precise differentiation of labor conditions between enslaved people and European wives – this paper recognizes the profound differences involved in the racialization and engendering of work.

The notion of “reproductive labor” or “social reproduction” refers to the work of pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding, housekeeping, and care labor involving, primarily but not only, children and ill or elderly people. It therefore includes domestic tasks (cooking, cleaning, nursing) as well as the very making of the workforce. As argued by Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, “the commodity [women] produce, unlike all other commodities, is unique to capitalism: the living human being – ‘the laborer himself’” (1972, 10). In this sense, the labor dispensed to produce people has been “analytically hidden by classical economists and politically denied by policy makers” (Bhattacharya 2017, 2). All in all, “reproductive labor” embraces the isolated, invisible, repetitive, and exhausting tasks required for the maintenance of our daily living in society.

Domestic and reproductive labor constitute a circular vulnerability that historically keeps women, especially indigenous and Black women, in poorly-paid or unpaid work isolated within the private realm, away from public visibility and institutional politics, and in a highly vulnerable position, particularly in regard to physical and sexual assault.

I frame *casa grande* (master’s house) here as the territory in which white, Black and native women came physically together yet from realities shaped in completely separate manners (Giacomini 1988, 51). Indigenous women lost their political and religious role inside communities; Black women were placed in a completely different borderline, barely recognized as women; white women were instructed to maintain chaste sexual behaviour. All women were drastically disconnected from esteemed social and political positions in the community, since colonial modernity was built around a “male-centred official belief system and authority structure” (Kellogg 2005, 78). In addition to the social devaluation of domestic labor, the private sphere of *casa grande* disguised violence and precarity, isolating women from other workers.

In this regard, the assumption that the work inside *casa grande* automatically gave preferential treatment to indigenous and Black enslaved women should be confronted. Domestic slaves were surely subjected less to the physical hardships that injured field workers. However, they were at the same time much more vul-
vulnerable to sexual assault, endless cruelty, and torture due to their closeness to mistresses and masters (Giacomini 1988, 80–81; hooks 1982, 22–24).

Colonialism provided the grounds for the emergence of the “housewife”, responsible for defining women as “the guardians of a devalued domestic life” (Davis 1983). All in all, the work attributed to women was not even acknowledged as work as such by society at large. When done inside the house, it was named “housekeeping” or “housewifery”. When done outside, it was the precariously paid or even unpaid job of the *empregada doméstica* (female domestic servant). Despite the different positionalities of native, Black, and white women, the colonial division of labor submitted all three to the structural devaluation of reproductive work and the devaluation of the social position of women (Segato 2016, 147–148). The colonial regime considered women to be “communal goods”. In this view, women’s “bodies and labor are mystified as personal services and/or natural resources. They are a territory that can be utilized because they guarantee social reproduction and provide common services” (Gago 2017, 91–92).

After the abolition of slavery in Brazil (1888), Black women went straight from the *senzala* (slave quarters) to “remunerated domestic service” (Pereira de Melo 1989, 249). The *empregada* often lived and worked in the same place, the family house, where she was allocated a very small room, poorly ventilated, next to the kitchen. Such architecture configuration symbolizes the neocolonial *casa grande* in Brazil. Not by coincidence, domestic workers have been one of the most neglected sectors of the working class in Latin America (Chaney/ Castro 1989, 4).

Historically, domestic service work has not received the same legal guarantees provided to any other ordinary work under the Brazilian Labor Law of 1943. For example, in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, of the 34 outlined principles concerning worker’s rights, only nine stipulations were applicable to domestic workers. Consequently, their labor conditions have been among the most neglected and precarious.

The *patroa* – the head of household responsible for hiring, paying, and giving instructions and tasks – has been a position attributed to women, commonly the white wealthy women working outside the home, while the role of the empregada – the precariously-paid domestic servant – has been performed by poor, Black, and indigenous women. Ergo, it is possible to reconstitute the modes of intensive exploitation of domestic labor within the historic continuity of colonial structures of power.

In this respect, the dynamics of *patroa* and *empregada* have been grounded in the neocolonial exploitative relation of the *casa grande* family (Nascimento 1976; Gonzalez 1984). By this, I mean that there has been continual attempt to cover
up the true labor relations through the substitution of a family relation which, at first glance, might be seen as more humane. This is easily noted in the often-heard comment by *patroas* that their *empregada* is considered to be “part of the family”. This narrative has been the mask for neocolonial exploitation and the non-recognition of the labor rights of *empregadas* as a working-class category.

Similarly, Angela Davis (1983) describes how, in millions of white homes in the United States, Black women who have been hired as housekeepers, are in a position akin to surrogate wives and mothers. Indeed, according to Silvia Federici ([1999]2012), this context territorialized a global process called the “new international division of labor”, which presents strong antifeminist characteristics. In Federici’s words:

Starting in the early 90s there has been a leap in female migration from the Global South to the North, where they provide an increasing percentage of the workforce employed in the service sector and domestic labor. [...] [T]his “solution” is problematic as it creates a “maids-madams” relation among women, complicated by the biases surrounding housework: the assumption that it is not real work and should be paid as little as possible, that it does not have defined boundaries and so forth. The employment of a domestic worker, moreover, makes women (rather than the state) responsible for the work of reproduction and weakens the struggle against the division of labor in the family, sparing women the task of forcing their male partners to share this work. (Federici [1999]2012, 71)

Drawing on the above, the notion of the housewife has been updated by the neoliberal form of precarious, low-wage and socially depreciated domestic work performed by women in today’s families – or by the *empregada* hired to replace the work allocated to the wife in terms of social reproductive labor. In other words, even when financially independent, women are still the ones responsible for taking care of household tasks or hiring, as a *patroa*, another woman to take care of them. Such a neoliberal “solution” fosters increased privatization and exploitation of female bodies and reproductive work (see Nascimento 1976, 105).

**Re-Articulating Resistance, Reinventing the Strike**

In this final section, I add to the dialog the third dimension of articulation, the collective organization of bodies in the form of social movements, by focusing on the reinvention of women’s strikes in Latin America.
In the book “La Mujer y La Organización”, Bolivian union leader Domitila de Chungara (1980) delineates exactly how to politically organize the struggle by basing it on a recognition of domestic work as work. Addressing women as compañeras, de Chungara asserts that “the first thing we need to do in our communities, compañeras, is to organize” and that, in her words, “the government says ‘no politics’, but we, compañeras, are political since we were born” (1980, 48–50, my translation).

In this way, de Chungara opens up the very concepts of exploitation and working class to recognize the house and family as relevant elements in their construction. Similarly, in the classic “The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community”, Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James (1972) define community as “the other half of capitalist organization, the other area of hidden capitalist exploitation, the other hidden source of surplus labor” (1972, 11). This is to say that the community is perceived as a “social factory” in which the mainstream notion of a capitalist society is more broadly framed as containing the entire social body and not just the workers.

Brazil was a pioneer country in its creation of the first Union of Domestic Workers in 1936, headed by Laudelina Campos de Melo, member of the Brazilian Black Movement. Today, there are at least 37 unions of domestic workers across the country. In 2015, as a result of the continuous mobilization of domestic workers, labor rights were extended to the category of domestic workers (see Chaney/Castro 1989, 4; Werneck 2010, 15; Biroli 2018, 186; Severi 2018, 115).

Traditionally, a strike refers to a collective strategy of halting work adopted by the working class to resist exploitation and precarious labor conditions. Rosa Luxemburg conceptualizes mass strikes as fluid and bottom-up political action that originates spontaneously from local causes and then expands to greater movements. Rather than an event, a strike is a process, a “method of motion” directed toward revolutionary transformations (Luxemburg 1906).

“Strike”, here, is conceptualized beyond the mere act of stopping work. This is because individualized resistance is a remedy that very few bodies can afford in the economic regime of production, dispossession, and accumulation. Rather than tackling the malady (modes of domination), individual strategies are often expressions of the neoliberal rationale itself. Drawing on that, women from the global peripheries are transnationalizing resistance while disputing classic notions of strike. In 2017, women from more than 55 countries united to undertake strike action on 8 March, International Women’s Day. The activist and scholar Cecilia Palmeiro (2017) described it as “the biggest and most radical process we have ever experienced collectively”.
Instead of laborizing women's struggles, these women redefined the very meaning of working class, while denouncing the non-valued and non-paid modes of exploitation based on gender, race, sexuality, and class. By confronting colonial legacies, they criticized the national structures of violence and “the state's complicity with projects of the dispossession of bodies-territories and by accounting for the historical and lasting misencounters between a certain liberal feminism and popular struggles” (Gago 2018, 667).

Likewise, this new signification of strike reactivates the intersectionality of anti-racist, anti-imperialist, anti-heterosexist, and anti-neoliberal struggles within transversal, transnational, and global articulations. It challenges the liberal definition of feminism as a “women's issue" by framing it as a movement necessarily concerned with society as a whole (Arruzza/Bhattacharya/Fraser 2019, 14).

Moving further, my examination poses some critical points for reflecting on the ongoing process of reinventing the strike, also named the “fourth feminist wave”, “new international feminist movement”, and “feminism of the 99%” (see Arruzza 2017, 196; Draper 2018, 686). The purpose of asking critical questions is neither to disqualify the movement nor to offer simple solutions to complex issues. Rather, it is to seriously analyze and deeply nurture the on-the-ground strategies of today’s peripheric articulations. In this regard, it is necessary to pose three main inquiries: Who can actually strike against the social-reproduction work of care and domestic tasks? How does the articulation between national and international women’s movements operate in terms of process rather than just the event held on 8 March? What are the common claims shared by transnational movements and how could strikes contribute to achieving their demands?

First, the previous analysis of social reproduction and the feminization of poverty already pointed to the importance of considering the precarious conditions in which women have been materially inserted. There are huge obstacles to striking for women situated at the periphery that involve formal and informal, paid and unpaid forms of labor, including precarious labor conditions; the necessity of daily income to survive; problems with immigration status; and taking care of children, seniors, people with disabilities and people with serious health issues (Gago 2018, 664). These obstacles should certainly not be overlooked in current redefinitions of strike as a transformative tool. Yet, the right to collectively strike is a historically powerful tool, especially for those who are not able to strike individually. In this way, the collective domain of the strike constitutes the very grounds for challenging the individualized precarity of living. This does not solve the obstacles listed but recognizes the potential for reinventing forms of collective resistance.
Second, perceiving strike as a process and a method of motion (instead of as an event) requires continuous organization, cooperation, and articulation to collectively build new forms of radicalism worldwide. The cyber age of digital technology offers still unexplored possibilities for a global articulation of peripheric movements.

Finally, what would constitute the common ground responsible for binding together women from various positionalities in collective mobilizations? In the book “Women and Social Movements in Latin America”, Lynn Stephen suggests that

the unity of women’s organizing experience [...] is the combination of daily-life survival issues specific to women’s experience with a questioning of various forms of gender subordination including rape, domestic violence, and a lack of reproductive knowledge and control. This convergence of issues found in many of the organizations studied here is perhaps the best evidence of how women can incorporate a wide range of issues and experiences into one struggle that might not appear logically compatible to outsiders (Stephen 1997, 275).

In this sense, the common ground for the reinvention of strike is the struggle against the continuous maintenance of the Othering mechanism that encompasses the social, political, economic, ontological, legal, and epistemological dimensions of violence. Ergo, the strike brings to the forefront not only the social reproduction of life and work, but violence against female bodies historically impacted by it. Current forms of exploitation against women still conceive of their bodies as territories to invade, conquer, control, exploit, and possess.

Final Considerations

In 2018, Brazil staged the largest women-led march in its history. During the national elections, women chanted Ele não! (“Not him!”) against candidate Jair Bolsonaro, placing misogyny at the center of the election’s debates. Protests spread to more than 114 cities across the country and also to New York, Paris, London, Barcelona, and Berlin, among others (Gomes/Candido/Tanscheit 2018, 80).

In 2019, Brazil experienced general strikes in approximately 189 cities, with the call-to-strike flyer showing a Black and an indigenous woman holding hands. In August of the same year, Brazil had its first march of indigenous women, called “Território: nosso corpo, nosso espírito” (Territory: our body, our spirit). There, more than 2,000 indigenous women marched in Brasilia/DF, capital of Brazil. Days after, the sixth Marcha das Margaridas (March of Margaridas) gathered 100,000 women fighting in Brasília against femicide, the dispossession of...
indigenous lands, and the government's rampant authorization of agrochemicals and the poisoning of food. It has been considered the largest rural worker mobilization as well as the largest mobilization of women in Latin America (see Peduzzi 2019; Gonçalves 2019).

Recently, Brazilian feminists have invoked the saying “uma sobe e puxa a outra” (one rises and pulls the other up), understood here as a peripheric articulation of survival in which one woman helps the others in a collective struggle. The organization of peripheric women in communities demands a set of support, care, and new economic forms of cooperation that re-signifies the macro dimension of production as well as neoliberal competition based on radical individualism and accumulative meritocracy. Blurring the dualistic division between equality and difference, peripheric women have been resisting the neoliberal economization and individualization of care in Brazil. They have been transforming colonial spaces of dispossession into collective care communities.

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The Performative (Re)Production of Heteronormativity in Engineering
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Abstract: Engineering in 21st century Germany is still a male domain, despite the normative ideal of gender equality. I interviewed engineers based on the following research question: To what degree does the gender imbalance in this field originate in the contents and cultures of the engineering sciences themselves? In line with the Grounded Theory research style, I link the analytical category of gender knowledge with Bourdieu's gendered habitus and professional habitus and then go on to connect it with Butler's heterosexual matrix. As a result of my research, I have developed the three key concepts of the mathematics hurdle, the exceptional woman and the marriage market. With this, I can reveal invisible mechanisms of reconstitution that repeatedly gender the field and professional habitus in a hierarchical and heteronormative way, thus contributing to the perpetuation of the field as a mathcentered male domain. I will illustrate this using my material. As a result, I emphasize the need to address the cultures of the engineering disciplines in order to dismantle engineering's linkage – which has far-reaching consequences – with a heteronormative, binary and hierarchical gender identity. I close with a discussion of specific areas which require action.

Keywords: Heteronormativity, Gender, Engineering, Male Domination, Heterosexual Matrix, Habitus
Inka Greusing

The Performative (Re)Production of Heteronormativity in Engineering

Engineering in 21st century Germany is still a “male domain”. That this is perceived as a problem is demonstrated by, for example, the fact that many universities offering engineering degrees have introduced measures for “female empowerment” aimed at achieving a better gender balance. Are these efforts an expression of a gender-equality norm that, according to Angelika Wetterer (2005), shapes modern society? And what mechanisms can be identified within the field in order to explain the continued male dominance of engineering programs despite these efforts?

For the purposes of my project, I am interested in examining how agents within the field of engineering explain and interpret the status of their own fields as “male domains”. I start from the assumption that these interpretive patterns can contribute to an understanding of the extent to which the asymmetric gender relationship originates in the content and culture of the engineering sciences themselves. With this in mind, I interviewed six engineers (two women and four men). All of them were working in engineering departments at higher-education institutions in Germany and were involved in at least one project targeting female secondary-education school students aimed at increasing the proportion of women in their respective subject.

In line with Grounded Theory research (Strauss/Corbin 1996), I link the analytical category of “gender knowledge” (Andresen/Dölling/Kimmerle 2003) with Pierre Bourdieu’s “gendered habitus” (Bourdieu 2005) and “professional habitus” (Bourdieu 1992; 1993) and then go on to connect these with Judith Butler’s “heterosexual matrix” (Butler 1991).

Following Bourdieu (1992; 1993), I understand the engineering sciences as a social field that is mediated through social practice in a continuous process of co-constitution and mutual reconstitution with the professional habitus of the field’s agents. With Bourdieu, I understand the interviews I conducted as a narrative social practice in which, as Butler (1991) has it, performative utterances are produced.

With reference to the concept of gender knowledge (Andresen/Dölling/Kimmerle 2003), I analyze reflective and pre-reflective knowledge of gender difference in order to understand processes of gendering and hierarchization in the field. With Butler, I assume that these processes are influenced by the norm

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1 This article is based on research published in “Wir haben ja jetzt auch ein paar Damen bei uns” – Symbolische Grenzziehungen und Heteronormativität in den Ingenieurwissenschaften” (Greusing 2018).
of heterosexuality, which – via the heterosexual matrix – both reconstitutes and is reconstituted by the norm of binary gender difference.

As a result of my research, I have generated three key concepts: the “mathematics hurdle” (an in vivo code\(^2\)), the “exceptional woman”, and the “marriage market”. These three concepts allow me to reveal invisible mechanisms of constitution and reconstitution that repeatedly gender the field and the professional habitus in a hierarchical and heteronormative way, thus contributing to the perpetuation of the field as a mathematics- and technology-focused “male domain”. In the following, I will illustrate this with my data.

1. Key Concepts

1.1. The Mathematics Hurdle

Through the analytical combination of professional habitus and gendered habitus together with gender knowledge, I can show how the subject of mathematics plays a key gendered role in symbolic demarcations within the social field of engineering. It acts as a kind of interface between the field, professional habitus, and gender.

As a first point, I worked out the hegemonic interpretive pattern of women’s supposedly genuine lack of interest in mathematics that asserts that women cannot do mathematics or are not interested in it. This idea features in all the interviews. Mathematics emerges as a naturalized element of “masculinity”. The engineering sciences, then, are defined through mathematics in a specific way – they are “mathematized”. Interest and ability in mathematics appear to be the most important and often the only prerequisite for accessing the field and belonging to it. This is expressed, for instance, in the function of mathematics as a subject that “filters out” “weaker” students. In other words, if you do not pass the mathematics exams, you cannot become an engineer, regardless of gender. On the basis of these phenomena, I generated the in vivo code “mathematics hurdle” as a key concept that shows how field and professional habitus are at the same time gendered “male” and “mathematized”.

1.2. The Exceptional Woman

Women within the field who are good at engineering contradict the “male”-gendered and mathematized hegemonic field order created by the mathematics

\(^2\) In vivo codes are terms used by informants that are adopted as names for codes, interpretive patterns, categories and/or key concepts.
hurdle. This contradiction is resolved by constructing these women as exceptions, whereby they are ascribed markedly “male”-gendered and mathematized skills. Terms such as “strong woman” (starke Frau), “technical woman” (technische Frau) or “man-woman” (Mannweib) demonstrate that these women are constructed as sexual hybrids, as people with “female” bodies who are gendered as “male” by the attribution of “male” abilities, i.e., mathematized skills. On the basis of these phenomena, I introduce the “exceptional woman” as a key concept that serves to support the mathematics hurdle and thus to preserve the “male”-dominated hegemonic field order.

Additionally, “female” coworkers are, qua gender, attributed with contributing “social warmth” (soziale Wärme). A woman is only welcomed into the field because of these supposedly “genuinely female” qualities to which she is reduced, while her professional expertise is overlooked. As a result, in the narrative, she is dismissed from the field as a “typical women”. She still has to overcome the mathematics hurdle, however. Hence, she must prove her mathematic skills again and again.

1.3. The Mathematics Hurdle and the Exceptional Woman

The two closely interlinked key concepts of the mathematics hurdle and the exceptional woman are informed by hegemonic everyday gender and technical knowledge. This knowledge provides a backdrop to all the interviews, usually in the form of pre-reflective knowledge.

According to the concept of gendered habitus (Bourdieu 2005), a person is born into a world that is pre-structured in accordance with this gender knowledge. The ascribed “female” lack of interest and “male” interest in mathematics help constitute the formation of a gendered habitus. By linking mathematics closely with engineering, boys are given, along with their ascription to the “male” gender, a symbolic position within this social field, and girls are positioned on its outside. In order to be able to successfully train as an engineer, however, an ascribed interest in mathematics is not enough; one must also be able to do mathematics, otherwise one will be filtered out, regardless of gender. Nevertheless, women retain their “symbolic” position outside the field even if they work as trained engineers. This is because “female” engineers are continually reduced in narratives to contributing “social warmth” and are thus dismissed from the field as “typical women”. Women engineers must repeatedly overcome the field boundary symbolized by the mathematics hurdle in order to be recognized as

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3 The terms “social warmth” as well as “typical woman” and “sister”, which are used later in this article, are in vivo codes.
an “exceptional woman” and thus as belonging to the field, while competing narratives also demand that they fulfill the role of providing “social warmth”, a role that would see them dismissed from the social field as “typical women”.

1.4. The Marriage Market

In some narrative threads, “female” engineers are refused the opportunity to overcome the mathematics hurdle in any case. This occurs when they are recognized as (potential) heterosexual partners. In these narrative threads, they are ascribed a “lack of interest” in the subject and are, therefore, perceived as “typical women”, even if they are simultaneously recognized as highly qualified in the subject. When perceived as a heterosexual partner, a “female” engineer is irreversibly narratively dismissed from the social field of engineering and cast as a “typical woman” operating in a social field of care.

With Butler (1991), I can show how my research data is pervaded by a hidden structure of heterosexual desire. From this phenomenon, I have generated my third key concept, the “marriage market”. This concept refers to the positioning of men as professional subjects and subjects of desire within the field of engineering and the reduction of women to objects of desire within the field of care.

The marriage market’s organization of the heterosexual relationship economy in the field is illustrated by the following quotation from one of the interviews:

“In electrical engineering, most of them [the male students], who maybe didn’t even have a sister, had no contact with women at all. [...] there were some who were so uptight [...] when our three women [...] when one of them came through the doors of the auditorium [...] all heads turned, following this person and almost drooling [...] It was like an object that people were watching [...] so that somehow there was both an attraction and a fear of having to deal with this person [...] where I just thought, well, maybe it wouldn’t be so bad if you put a few more women in among these people, so that it would become normal [...] on the other hand [...] so many single guys here. There are other programs where there are no men around [...] and really it would be a good idea to bring them together; then more couples would get together. I think it is in-

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4 One of the few places where the implicit heterosexual desire within the social field of engineering becomes explicit is in the answer to the question of how my informants perceived the fact that they were studying in a “male domain”. This question is largely interpreted in terms of women as sexual objects and of heterosexual, monogamous relationships. (Greusing 2018).

5 See (Greusing 2018) for the derivation of my key concepts.

6 This quotation is part of the answer to the question of how my informants perceived the fact that they were studying in a “male domain”. Translated from German into English by the author.
credibly important because [...] electrical engineers [...] shut themselves away at home and tinker on projects [...] the only social interaction is the university. I've noticed it with myself as well.” (JM479)

Here, electrical engineering is presented as an almost entirely “male” world closed off from the rest of society. In summary, two problems are formulated, which result from the men's lack of contact with women. First, the informant depicts these men as socially incompetent in their behavior toward women. Second, the men described are presented as having no opportunities for meeting women in order to form heterosexual couples. The quotation proposes two solutions.

The first suggestion is that “maybe it wouldn't be so bad if you put a few more women in among these people, so that it would become normal”. The “few more” women who are granted access to the field in the narrative are linked by the “more” to the women already in the field and thus identified as belonging, i.e., as (potential) “exceptional women”. They are, qua gender, attributed the ability to normalize men's social behavior solely through their presence. This corresponds with the finding that women are attributed with and reduced to the ability to contribute “social warmth”. This way, they lose their status as “exceptional women” and are, therefore, no longer intelligible as engineers.

The “male” electrical engineers are implicitly attributed social incompetence in dealing with women. This is characterized as a problem that, as we will see later, at first glance, seems to be irrelevant to being intelligible as an engineer. Since men who do not “even have a sister” are particularly subject to this social incompetence, the first suggestion of putting a few more women in among the men does not explicitly aim at admitting them as (potential) wives or as engineers. Rather, they are given access as “de-sexualized” sisters to enable men to function as subjects of an economy of heterosexual desire. This interpretation corresponds with the findings from the analysis of interviews in which male informants who refer to their heterosexual partners do not even perceive that there are only few women in the field, so they do not characterize it as a problem, as they are already in relationships and thus intelligible as subjects of heterosexual desire.

The second suggestion is introduced with the words “on the other hand” and its implementation is considered “incredibly important”. By referring to degree programs without men, the informant constructs a women's world outside the “male”-gendered world of engineering. Specifically, he proposes that the two worlds be brought together. Heterosexual couples would then form on their own. It seems the mere appearance of a woman within the field causes ambivalence and insecurity.
2. Interdependence of the Key Concepts

2.1. Two Classes of Gendered Professional Habitus in the Mathematics Hurdle, the Marriage Market, and the Exceptional Woman

The mathematics hurdle and the marriage market produce two classes of gendered professional habitus that are both diametrically opposed to one another and reproduced in a hierarchical relationship. In the following discussion, I demonstrate the way in which these two classes relate and refer to one another by combining the key concepts that I have thus far developed separately. As in Butler’s (1991) heterosexual matrix, one can see the circular interrelatedness of sex, gender and heterosexual desire.

One can picture an internally coherent “male”-gendered interreferential structure within the field of engineering and an equivalent “female”-gendered structure within the field of care. The boundary between the fields is symbolized by the mathematics hurdle. In the field of engineering, sex (man), gender (social incompetence and interest in mathematics, as well as the associated field-defining professional subject and subject of desire) and heterosexual desire (directed at women) are linked in a circular way. In the field of care, sex (woman), gender (providing “social warmth” and lack of interest in mathematics as well as the associated responsibility for care and object of desire) and heterosexual desire (directed at men) are linked in a circular and interreferential way.

On the one hand, the mathematics hurdle allows women into the field of engineering as professional subjects thanks to the expertise in mathematics attributed to them which identifies them as “exceptional women”, gendering them as “male”. At the same time, however, the marriage market makes them objects of desire and therefore positions them – without exception – outside the field. Symbolically, even as a “male”-gendered exceptional woman, a woman in the field disrupts the heteronormative order that forms the basis of intelligibility for engineers and men’s intelligibility as subjects of heterosexual desire. This explains why the subject of “men’s fears” comes up again and again in the interviews.

The mathematics hurdle, like the marriage market, produces two categories of women: the “typical woman” as socially predisposed and her masculinized
deviation, the “exceptional woman”. The marriage market produces the “typical woman” as an object of desire and the “sister” as a desexualized deviation. The latter gains access to the social field of engineering, albeit not as a professional subject but as part of the economy of heterosexual desire to enable the men in the field to become subjects of heterosexual desire. The “typical woman” is produced in the social field of care by the mathematics hurdle as well as by the marriage market. Both key concepts taken together produce a reality in which women must pay the price of “masculinization” and “desexualization” in order to become intelligible as engineers.

2.2. Two Classes of Gendered Social Fields Produced by the Mathematics Hurdle, the Marriage Market, and the Exceptional Woman

Just as there are two classes of gendered habitus, two classes of social field are (re)produced as internally coherent interreferential structures.

On the one hand, there is the social field of engineering sciences with “mathematized” technology and the professional subject – the engineer skilled in mathematics – in a relationship of co-constitution and mutual reconstitution. On the other hand, there is the social field of care, with its social aspect and the person who contributes “social warmth”. Each of these agents – as well as the fields themselves and the mathematical or social aspects associated with them – appear to be gender-neutral at first. It is the marriage market with its heterosexual organization of the relationship economy that positions agents, and through them the social fields, in a binary-gendered and hierarchical relationship. The reconstitutive interrelatedness of sex, gender, and desire explains why the field adheres so steadfastly to its focus on mathematics and technology. The intelligibility of the field as engineering depends on this focus. And because, with Bourdieu (1992), professional habitus and field (re)constitute one another, the intelligibility of field agents as engineers depends on this focus. This, in turn, is the basis for the intelligibility of their gender identity. Finally, in Butler (1991), one can see that gender identity is a condition for becoming a subject – in this case, a professional subject. The asymmetric gender relationship, which is only changing very gradually, can thus be interpreted as an effect of the powerful but largely invisible imposed heterosexuality that constitutes the field. This imposition ensures that engineers, as women who contribute “social warmth” and men who are interested in mathematics, are repeatedly placed in a binary, identity-forming, and naturalized hierarchical gender relationship and thus (re)produce the heteronormative field order.
3. Conclusion

Through the analytical combination of gender knowledge, gendered habitus, professional habitus, and the heterosexual matrix, I have developed the three concepts of the “mathematics hurdle”, the “exceptional woman”, and the “marriage market”. With the help of these concepts, I have shown how the heterosexual matrix exercises its power in a co-constitutional and mutually reconstitutorial relationship with the gendered and hierarchized professional habitus and social field of engineering.

The informants in my research explicitly perceive the mathematics hurdle as a problem, because they see it as the reason for the perpetuation of the engineering sciences as a “male domain”. However, this concept is informed by hegemonic everyday gender knowledge about – on the one hand – a naturalized “female”-gendered lack of interest in mathematics and a “male”-gendered interest in the subject and – on the other hand – a counterpole “female”-gendered predisposition to contributing “social warmth” and a “male”-gendered social incompetence. This knowledge usually forms a pre-reflective backdrop to the informants’ perceptions. This ensures that even “female” colleagues who are recognized as qualified and competent have to continually prove their mathematized expertise in order to be recognized as engineers. The economy of heterosexual desire organized via the marriage market, however, is not addressed as such at all by my informants. This mechanism of constitution and reconstitution together with the mathematics hurdle and the exceptional woman demonstrate how the field of engineering is shaped by the norm of heterosexuality. The gender difference can thus be interpreted as an effect of the powerful – yet still tacit and invisible – imposed heterosexuality that constitutes the field. Perpetuating the concept of the exceptional woman is essential to maintaining this order, which, in turn, is the basis for the intelligibility of the field’s agents as engineers. For men, their intelligibility as subjects of heterosexual desire also depends on this. Women who want to be engineers, on the other hand, face the dilemma that they will always either be intelligible as desexualized and “male”-gendered engineers or as heterosexually desirable women. The mathematics hurdle, the exceptional woman, and the marriage market are interwoven in a mutually referential interdependent structure that exercises its power as an invisible backdrop. This enables the perpetuation of the social field of engineering as a math-focused “male domain”, which has a dichotomous hierarchical gender relationship with the social field of care – despite the ideal of gender equality to which the agents in the research group were also committed, and despite the critique of math-focused education, also formulated in my research material.
Here, I have shown that for critics of heteronormativity in engineering, a good place to start is the professional cultures of the engineering sciences themselves, with the aim of breaking down this powerful link between engineering and heteronormative hierarchical binary gender identity. Action is needed on at least two levels. On the one hand, there is still a need for research in feminist gender and heteronormativity studies in the field of engineering sciences. Heteronormativity as a relevant analytical category should find its way into research on professional cultures and technology for examinations of the processes of “doing engineering” in engineering practices and technical artifacts. Furthermore, there is a need for research into the intersectional relationship between heteronormativity and other categories of inequality, such as age, disability, class, and ethnic origin. Closely linked with this, the findings from this and further research should flow directly into the field of engineering and all its associated disciplines. One way of doing this would be to integrate findings into education and to classify research-based gender competence as specialist knowledge (Greusing/Meißner 2017) in the respective disciplines.

4. References


In Greusing (2020), I suggest a definition of intersectionality in the field of feminist academic culture research in engineering.

The “GENDER PRO MINT” study program at TU Berlin is leading the way on this. See http://www.genderpromint-zifg.tu-berlin.de (last accessed on 18 December 2016). See also Lucht/Mauß/Stein/Okrafka et al. (2015).

In Greusing/Meißner (2017), we take this approach using the example of our introductory seminar that explores how gender hides in natural and technical sciences (Wie versteckt sich Gender in Naturwissenschaften und Technik? Eine praxisorientierte Einführung in den Zusammenhang von Wissenschaft(en) und Geschlecht).


Subjektivierung unter Bedingungen des antimuslimischen Rassismus
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Schlagwörter: Antimuslimischer Rassismus, Subjektivierung, Gender, Intersektionalität
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Subjektivierung unter Bedingungen des antimuslimischen Rassismus

Einleitung


Wie sich diese diskursiven Formationen im Leben von Muslim*innen artikulieren, wird im letzten Abschnitt des Textes anhand von Beispielen aus einer empirischen Studie skizziert. Hierbei werden zunächst die Bereiche Kindheit, Bildung und Arbeitswelt beleuchtet. Schließlich wird anhand eines Fallbeispiels nachgezeichnet, wie das Kopftuch als Signifikant für die Unterdrückung von Frauen* in westlichen Diskursen zum Signifikant von Widerstand und Handlungsmacht für Muslim*innen im Kontext des antimuslimischen Rassismus 1

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**Okzidentalistische Politiken und ihre Repräsentationen von Muslim*innen**


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walttätigkeit und Frauenunterdrückung“ (Müller-Uri 2014, 15) ist und der „Okzident‘ als die „westlich/europäische Kultur‘ als Verkörperung der Aufklärung“ (ebd.). Mit dem neuen Orientalismus in Form von antimuslimischem Rassismus entsteht auch ein neuer Okzidentialismus.


Das Dispositiv Köln – Intersektionen von Rassismus, Gender und Sexualität


**Subjektivierung unter Bedingungen des antimuslimischen Rassismus**


Viele unserer Interviewpartner*innen mussten erleben, dass sie durch die österreichische Gesellschaft, deren kulturelles Symbolisches eine jahrhundertealte Sedimentierung orientalisch-rassistischen ’Wissens’ beinhaltet, von Migrant*innen zu Muslim*innen gemacht wurden. Viele betonten in den Interviews, dass sie generell seit ihrem Aufenthalt in Österreich oder Deutschland die Erfahrung machten, nicht mehr als Individuum wahrgenommen zu werden, sondern durch einen kulturalisierten Filter, der von rassistischem ’Wissen’ über Muslim*innen geformt ist. Auch die Bedeutung dessen, was eine*n Muslim*in ausmacht, liegt nicht in ihrer Definitionsmacht, sondern wird von der Dominanzkultur bestimmt. Wir analysierten die Daten auch deshalb mithilfe der Intersekt-

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3 Mit Transmigration ist hier die Form der Migration gemeint, in der Menschen nicht von einem Land aufbrechen, um ein Zielland zu erreichen, in dem sie sich niederlassen, sondern in der sie in ihrer Lebensspanne in verschiedenen Ländern leben; wenn Menschen in ihrer Migrationsbewegung also mehrfach nationale Grenzen passieren oder auch gleichzeitig in verschiedenen nationalen Räumen leben.
nationalen Mehrebenenanalyse (Winker/Degele 2009), die erlaubt, gleichermaßen identitäre Zuordnungen, Sozialstrukturen und symbolische Repräsentationen in ihren Wechselwirkungen zu analysieren. Aus diesen Wechselwirkungen muss der in diesem Text verwendete Begriff Subjektivierung verstanden werden. Anders als sozialpsychologische Begriffe wie Identität oder Persönlichkeit, die letztendlich von einer Wesenhaftigkeit und Ontologie des Menschen ausgehen, verdeutlichen poststrukturalistische Subjekttheorien im Anschluss an Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Pierre Bourdieu und die Postkoloniale Theorie, dass Menschen nicht nur in ihrer Kindheit und Jugend, sondern über ihre gesamte Lebensspanne davon beeinflusst werden, wie sie gesellschaftlich repräsentiert und symbolisiert werden, wo sie sozialstrukturell verortet werden, welche Möglichkeitsräume sich ihnen eröffnen und wie schließlich auf der individuellen Ebene mit ihnen umgegangen wird. Was Menschen sind, wird also von Diskursen und Machtstrukturen bestimmt. Wie Butler im Anschluss an Foucault verdeutlicht, bezeichnet das Ontische, also das, was als „Identität“ oder „Persönlichkeit“ verstanden wird, bereits „eine bestimmte Wirkung der Macht oder ist vielmehr Macht in ihren formativen oder konstituierenden Effekten“ (1997, 62). Indem die Macht (des Diskurses) einen Objektbereich als ein Feld der Intellibilität errichtet, das für selbstverständliche Ontologie gehalten wird, „werden ihre materiellen Effekte als Datenmaterial oder als primäre Gegebenheiten aufgefasst“ (ebd.). Der von antimuslimischem Rassismus geprägte Diskurs (in deutschsprachigen Ländern) produziert beispielsweise eine Intellibilität, die Kopftuch tragende Musliminnen* nicht als Individuen erscheinen lässt, sondern als unterdrückte und ungebildete Frauen*

Die Konstruktion von Muslim*innen als konstitutives Außen einer aufgeklärten, emanzipierten, demokratischen europäischen Gesellschaft manifestiert sich in Österreich in sämtlichen Lebensbereichen. In den folgenden beiden Abschnitten werden die Erfahrungen, die unsere Interviewpartner*innen in diesen Lebensbereichen mach(t)en, skizziert. Die Beispiele zeigen, wie sehr der antimuslimische Rassismus sein Objekt selbst hervorbringt und dadurch die Subjektivierungserfahrungen der Menschen bestimmt.

**Kindheit, Bildung und Arbeitswelt**

Mehrere unserer Interviewpartner*innen berichteten, dass sie als Kinder automatisch in den muslimischen Religionsunterricht geschickt wurden, auch wenn sie Atheist*innen oder Alevit*innen waren. Es ist also nicht die Religion der Migrant*innen, sondern die stark vom Katholizismus und Traditionalismus geprägte österreichische Kultur mit ihrem Bildungssystem, die migrantische Kinder zwingt,


Offiziell fordert die österreichische (aber auch die deutsche und die europäische) Gesellschaft Migrant*innen also dazu auf, sich zu integrieren, erfolgreich eine Bildungslaufbahn abzuschließen und zu qualifizierten Arbeitskräften.


**Das Kopftuch als Dispositiv**

Theoretisch gab es bis vor Kurzem in Österreich kein Kopftuchverbot, praktisch wird dieses jedoch seit Langem angewandt, wie wir aus den Interviews erfahren konnten. Am Kopftuchstreit wird deutlich, wie sich der Widerspruch von Eman-


4 Die Namen der Interviewpartner*innen wurden im Sinne der Anonymisierung geändert.

Abschluss

Statt Subjekte der Migrationsgesellschaft Deutschland oder Österreich zu werden, werden Migrant*innen zu Ausländer*innen und Fremden gemacht. Der strukturelle (antimuslimische) Rassismus, der auf der symbolischen, institutionellen, sozialen und personalen Ebene operiert, beeinflusst nicht nur massiv die Subjektivierungsprozesse von Migrant*innen, sondern entlarvt auch den Widerspruch zwischen dem Selbstverständnis von Deutschland oder Österreich als Menschenrechtsnationen und ihrer Realität als rassistische Gesellschaften.


**Literatur**


Feminist Security Studies and the Negotiation of Masculinity and Migration
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Abstract: This paper addresses the theoretical approach of feminist security studies, a branch of the interdisciplinary field of security studies. Feminist security studies is part of a broader conceptualization of security. It includes – but is not limited to – questions such as how womanhood and gender are relevant for understanding security, why the assumption of a link between women and peace, as well as between men and war, exists, and how militarized language is inherently gendered. This paper engages with the question of how male gender roles and masculinity within an (in) security setting and connected issues are negotiated. It outlines different categories that emerge within the existing literature. To illustrate, the case of displacement and migration is explored in the second part of the paper. By doing so, the paper elaborates the ways in which established categories are applicable to newer fields of security. It does not neglect or belittle the experiences of women or LGBTQ* individuals and communities but rather argues for an all-encompassing approach within the field of feminist security studies.

Keywords: Feminist Security Studies, Masculinity, Victimhood, Migration, Displacement
Cita Wetterich

Feminist Security Studies and the Negotiation of Masculinity and Migration

Introduction¹

Laura Sjoberg (2016) reacts to debates within and around feminist security studies (FSS) with the request “that we remain attentive to the question of who gets to be part of the conversation, and ask whose contestations are seen as legitimate challenges to dominant ways of knowing both within and outside of FSS” (Sjoberg 2016, 143pp.). The discussion was originally focused on inclusion/exclusion of researchers with different (methodological and theoretical) backgrounds as well as on intersectionality² (Sjoberg 2016). In this paper, I want to make an argument to engage with Sjoberg's statement by explicitly including research on men and masculinity in FSS and expanding the focus of research on migration and displacement. It might seem controversial to give space to men as subjects of research after fighting to shift the focus to long-time underrepresented and underresearched groups (a list that includes but is not limited to women and LGBQTIA+ people). Still, I make the argument for an all-encompassing gendered analysis of security and securitized topics. Only by also doing research on men and masculinity can phenomena such as victimhood, conflict, and experiences of violence be understood holistically.

Hence, the guiding question of this paper is how male gender roles and masculinity within an (in)security setting and connected issues are negotiated in academia. To do so, I engage with the case of displacement and migration. I explore the ways in which, with the help of the first research question, established categories are applicable to newer areas of security studies.

I start with a brief overview of the broader theoretical frame – namely security studies – and continue with a more detailed elaboration of feminist security studies as a field of research. I outline three main categories within feminist research on men and insecurity: literature on sexualized violence and rape, literature on the LGBQTIA+ community and intersectionality, and literature on the connection between military security and violence, masculinity, and the state. Subsequently, I illustrate this line of thought using the case of male victimhood during displacement.³ I explore how categories reemerge in all stages of displa-

¹ I would like to thank Anna Starkmann and Julia Gurol for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
² Intersectionality, here, is understood as focusing on the intersections of gender, race, nationality, and class in global politics.
³ The case studies contain descriptions of violent and upsetting events that might be disturbing to some.
cement: before, during, and after the journey. I conclude that it is worthwhile to explore men as individuals and a group not only in the role of perpetrators or soldiers, but to also include situations of male insecurity and victimhood in FSS. Additionally, a lot of academic work on male victimhood linked to conflict and military security can be transferred to newer fields in security studies, such as displacement and migration. Hence, it is important to employ feminist approaches and methodologies to displacement as a field of security studies. Furthermore, having an all-encompassing approach within the field and researching experiences, processes and insecurities specifically linked to men will help build a holistic understanding of today's migratory processes and mechanisms.

Theoretical Frame – (Feminist) Security Studies

Security is one of the most important and controversial phenomena, terms, and concepts in international politics. It is omnipresent in today’s societies – be it in regard to the war in Syria, in poverty ridden parts of Eastern Europe, or as a feeling of (in)security when talking about issues such as climate change or migration. Within the social and political sciences, security is often referred to as being an “essentially contested concept” (Gallie 1956) – meaning that there is no commonly shared definition of it. While this might be true, scholars from different strands of thought still strive for an all-encompassing definition. Security studies is understood as an area of inquiry loosely focused around a set of basic but fundamental questions, the answers to which change with time. In this research area, several strands of thought have emerged (Williams 2012, 2). Security studies can oftentimes be seen as one of the most important subfields of academic international relations (Williams 2012). Over time, different subfields and developments in security studies have been distinguished. Therefore, it is crucial to take into account who is in the position to define security and which topics should be put on the security agenda (Williams 2012, 2). Initially, security studies were mostly limited to nation states and the interactions between them. Part of this complex of research were realist (e.g., Walt 19914) and liberalist approaches (e.g., Fearon/Wendt 20025).

Things changed with the publication of Barry Buzan's work “People, States and Fear” (1987). Under the terminology of “broadening and deepening”, new categories were introduced to security studies and with them, new topics – such as environmental security, political security, economic security, and societal security – in addition to the traditional topic of military security (Williams 2012, 4).

4 For a more detailed description of realist security studies, see Walt (2017).
5 For a more detailed description, see Owen (2017).
These new approaches loosely follow Buzan’s (1998) definition of security as a social construct that is highly impacted by social norms and identities and is brought into being through social interaction within specific social and/or historical contexts or environments (cf., Wetterich 2018). Part of this development was the emergence of constructivist (e.g., Farrell 2002) and critical security studies (e.g., Booth 2005; Vaughan-Williams/Peoples 2014) as well as feminist security studies (e.g., Tickner 1992; Wibben 2011), which draw on both previously mentioned approaches. What all those subfields have in common is a specific interest in the individual (and meso) level and the subjective experiences and perceptions of (in)security.

Negotiation of Male Gender Roles and Masculinity within Feminist Security Studies

Feminist security studies (FSS) is a branch of security studies. The field investigates topics such as the specific roles assigned to men and women during war and conflict or the connotations of feminine or masculine attributes to certain behaviors within a security setting. More generally, researchers engage with gender and gender relations in a security context. According to Judith Ann Tickner (2006, 386pp.), the heterogenic field of FSS contains some commonalities regarding research questions and general approaches to research puzzles: 1) researchers ask feminist research questions, 2) the research is mostly based on the experiences of women or the LGBQTIA+ community, 3) and the research recognizes the necessity of self-reflection and 4) an emancipatory cognitive interest⁶.

FSS research usually focuses on women or other (highly) discriminated groups⁷ and, for example, covers studies on gendered security language in military contexts (Cohn 1987), on the role of prostitutes during the Vietnam war (Moon 1997), or on gendered (in)security in conflict and military interventions (Sjoberg/Via 2010). Most of the time, the gendered lenses researchers use are

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⁶ I follow the constructivist conceptualization of gender within FSS forwarded by Shepherd (2013) (see also Gentry/Sjoberg 2011). Constructivist FSS makes a distinction between sex, which is defined based on the body, and gender, which is defined based on socially constructed behavior. Following this line of thought, the connotations of feminine and masculine play an important role because a person assigned to a certain sex/gender (e.g., male or female) does not necessarily behave the way that is commonly expected of that designation (e.g., masculine or feminine) (Shepherd 2013, 15).

⁷ Iddo Landau already highlighted the phenomenon of talking about “good women” and “bad men” in 1997. This links back to Pierre Bourdieu’s (2001) understanding of the sexualized topology of the socialized body that influences the perception of social interactions and portrayals of persons. Even though most researchers follow a constructivist understanding of gender, oftentimes, a more nuanced understanding of whom to include in categories such as women or men is difficult, as in many instances, no differentiation is made between gender and sex in interviews, news, and reports.
specifically directed towards “women and security” (instead of “women in need of security”) (Lobasz 2014; Detraz 2013) to unravel the notion of women as passive bystanders or victims.

Still, FSS offers a great diversity of research on men and masculinity connected to security with which I want to engage in more detail. To get a better approach to the diverse literature within FSS, I clustered the research, based on the results of a systematic literature review8 (Wetterich/Plänitz 2021), into three main categories that are not exclusive. I inductively established the categories after the selection and the search for (re)appearing commonalities and intersections, added important literature that was not shown as part of the systematic search based on snowball sampling, and took into account the topic of migration and displacement, as well as the productivity of the established categories for said field of research. The categories are: 1) literature on sexualized violence and rape, 2) literature on the LGBQTIA+ community and intersectionality, and 3) literature on the connections between military security, violence, masculinity, and the state.

Before engaging more with the different categories, it is crucial to understand with which concepts FSS researchers work when they talk about masculinity and male gender roles. Research usually approaches masculinity not as a monolithic concept but rather as constantly changing and influenced by political, historical, social, cultural, and institutional settings and processes. Hence, a multitude of different, sometimes overlapping, masculinities within the security realm exists in all of the three above-mentioned categories, such as the “good soldier”, the “rational economic man”, or the “breadwinner” (Blanchard 2014). The concept of hegemonic masculinity is especially important in FSS and can be defined as a dominant form of masculinity that legitimizes and shapes men’s domination in the political, social, and cultural world order and thereby enforces discrimination against other genders and forms of masculinity (Connell 2016). Furthermore, the concept of “militarized masculinities” is of outmost importance when talking about masculinity in FSS. This again links back to the ideal

8 Systematic literature reviews are gaining more acceptance in the social sciences (Petticrew/Roberts 2006). They create the possibility of avoiding the “bias trap” in literature reviews that is often inherent to traditional literature analysis because of a lack of clarity regarding the literature selection criteria of authors (Plänitz 2019). Hence, there is a risk of reproducing the original authors’ biases when relying on existing literature analyses. This can be avoided by systematically searching for existing literature. For the purpose of this paper, a Boolean search was conducted with the “Web of Science Core Collection”. The literature search was conducted in 2019 and included English-language peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters – which is a distinct limitation to the search. In an additional step, all articles from the natural sciences, engineering, medicine, and psychology were excluded. Then, search results were sorted by relevance. A time period of 2008–2019 was set. Articles that were still in the set but obviously not part of the research interest (e.g., articles on biodiversity) were manually excluded. I used the following Boolean search string: “violen! OR securit! OR threat! OR victim! AND male! OR men! OR mascul! AND feminist! OR gender!”
soldier’s being portrayed as a masculine warrior and the imposition of this type of masculinity within the military. This constructed link between masculinity and war helps to upvalue and make use of stereotypical masculine traits acquired though military service and combat (Eichler 2014). Hence, there exists a specific understanding of how men should behave according to their gender. The different forms of masculinities and the images they conjure also influence the way in which male gender roles are understood.

One aspect that becomes apparent in the literature is that the majority of research on (in)security and men is centered around sexual abuse and sexualized violence. Within this category of literature, a strong focus is placed upon perpetrators (Williams/Bierie 2015), often male ones (e.g., Fleming et al. 2015 and Flood/Pease 2009). For example, several authors (Baaz/Stern 2009; Steiner et al. 2009) investigate how male soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) distinguish between different forms of rape and how these forms are linked to masculinity and lead to different coping strategies. In another piece, they engage with how male soldiers in the DRC negotiate a (perceived) feminization of the military and how this might pose a threat to the gendered status quo (Baaz/Stern 2011). There are also articles about the sexual assault of minors – both male and female (Gagnier/Collin-Vézina 2016) – and the focus of said articles is often on service provision and support systems (Chynoweth/Freccero/Touquet 2017). Additionally, some articles explore the link between sexism and rape (myths) (e.g., Suarez/Gadalla 2010 and Chapleau/Oswald/Russell 2008). Additionally, although most research engages with men as perpetrators, there is also research on male survivors of rape (Weiss 2010) as well as on the similarities and differences that exist between these events and the sexual assault of women, such as in reporting behavior or the specific “masculine” ways in which male survivors frame their experiences. Additionally, loss of face and of “masculine identity” form a significant part of this body of research (cf. Cheung/Leung/Tsui 2009 and Chynoweth 2017b).

A second category is formed of the experiences of the LGBQTIA+ community and the negotiation of masculinity within this context. This category includes research that engages with violence against trans people (Schilt/Westbrook 2009; Walker 2015) or with intimate partner violence in gay relationships (Nowinski/Bowen 2012; Craft/Serovich 2005) and with how this violence is linked to (a lack of) masculinity and manliness. An additional aspect that is mentioned within this category is the impact of intersectional categories of violence (Bowleg 2013). Intersectionality is a concept that also emerges in other articles from time to time (e.g., Shields 2008, Holvino 2010, and Turner 2017). Most of the research engages with multiple dimensions of insecurity and violence for peo-
ple who experience oppression at the intersections of race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, class, etc. Here, postcolonial and decolonial understandings overlap with feminist thought on security and masculinity and play an important role (Achilleos-Sarll 2018; Chisholm 2014; Soldatic 2015).

When moving onto more state-and/or military-centered research, a third category becomes apparent. This includes research on connections between the remasculinization of the state and military security (Stachowitsch 2013b). Saskia Stachowitsch also engages with the connotations and role attributions relating to men and women within the military (Stachowitsch 2013a). Others explore the ways heteronormative masculinities (re)create combat or protector masculinity within the military (Kronsell 2016). Additionally, outside of military security, researchers investigate which prevalent ideals of masculinity within peace-building or the justice system exist. They explore how the international system tries to deal with “violent masculinity” or “militarized masculinities” in conflict and how this translates to everyday life (Hamber 2016; Duriesmith/Ismail 2019; Blackburn 2018).

As this literature review shows, there exists a multitude of different approaches to men, masculinity and insecurity in FSS when connected to fields of research that have a longer history within international relations and security studies. Hence, it substantiates this paper’s claim to the value of work explicitly on male subjects, masculinity, and male gender roles and attributes. This holistic understanding of feminist research and gender studies also needs to translate to new areas of security research (Buzan 1987) and find a reflection in empirical (case) studies.

Male Victimhood during Displacement and Migration

To illustrate how research on men and masculinity can be conducted in newer fields of security as well as to highlight in more detail how this negotiation of male gender roles and masculinity within a security setting can be done, this article engages with one of the most prominent issues to have been securitized in recent years – displacement and migration. Specifically, I explore displacement, situations of insecurity, and the victimhood of male refugees before, after, and on the move. The example discussed explores the negotiation of male insecurity within the very specific security settings of migration and displace-

9 Another possible category within the literature could be research centered around family, violence, and conflict. Accounts of violent behavior and neglect (cf. Asscher/van der Put/Stams 2015) are part of this category, as is work on the evolution of gender roles within a family context over time (cf. Goldscheider/Bernhardt/Lappegård 2015 and Pedulla/Thébaud 2015).
I establish that situations of insecurity exist in all stages of migration and displacement and manifest themselves in specific ways in relation to – or are even solely reserved for – male refugees. Hence, feminist approaches and methodology have the potential to allow an all-encompassing approach to displacement as a field of security and, within this field, allow research on experiences, processes, and insecurities specifically linked to men.

Migration and displacement is a highly gendered field, often focusing on the experiences of female refugees, LGBTQIA+ people, and/or children. There exists a growing (but not sufficient) body of (feminist) research on experiences of insecurity and its implications for women and LGBTQIA+ people during migration (cf. Freedman/Kivlicim/Özgür 2017). Jane Freedman (2016) outlines, for example, the experiences of female refugees and the ways in which gendered forms of violence, gendered divisions of space, and relations of power create specific insecurities for these women. Others, such as Jennifer Lobasz (2009) and Jef Huysmans (2006), engage with different aspects of gendered migration phenomena in the Mediterranean. In this context, male refugees as a group of interest are not specifically accentuated. Hence, victimhood is once again reserved mostly to women and children. The ordeals of male refugees are seldom specifically emphasized as being potentially vulnerable to infringement and assault. If the experiences of male refugees are highlighted, it is more often in the context of reports by international (non-)governmental organizations (Chynoweth 2019) than by authors in FSS. It is important to state that female refugees and migrants are indeed victims of violence and subject to very specific gendered experiences of insecurity. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to explore what happens to male refugees during this journey of insecurity. I therefore want to help with what Jane Freedman (2016) calls overcoming the dichotomous representation of the genders in conflict and extend her statement to the context of displacement and migration: “Just as men’s vulnerability in some circumstances should be acknowledged, so too should women’s active role and their agency in protecting and providing for families and communities” (Freedman/Kivlicim/Özgür 2017, 6). Periods of displacement are especially marked by situations of insecurity for all people. Refugees face common obstacles. This entails (but is not restrained to) threats, violence, torture, extortion, a limitation of resources, and being forced to live and travel illegally (UNHCR 2018). It is important to note that these aspects of insecurity, while being relevant for all groups of people, unfold in different ways, often connected to gender, and

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10 I acknowledge that this case study might replicate some of the conflation of gender and sex, as it does not explicitly include trans and other non-cis men. This is a limitation of this paper and should be explored in future research. Still, the aim of this paper is to make a claim for more inclusiveness towards male individuals as subjects of interest within FSS.
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However, different stages of mobility (before, during, and after the move) can be linked back to the categories that have been established during the discussion of different streams within FSS: 1) literature on the connections between military security and violence, masculinity, and the state; 2) literature on sexualized violence and rape; and 3) literature on the LGBQTIA+ community and intersectionality. Building a bridge between FSS and research on displacement and migration allows the demonstration of the great potential of FSS approaches to newer fields of security and the establishment of an all-encompassing approach when researching at the intersection of migration, displacement, security, and gender.

Male victimhood and forced migration do not start during displacement but are already in place before. Here, the category “engaging with militarized and violent masculinities” is especially important. This entails another dimension of violence, namely, the vulnerability of young men to forced recruitment and the difficulties that these young men may face in fleeing forced recruitment both in conflict and during their journey (cf. Davis/Taylor/Murphy 2014). This poses a variety of insecurities for forcibly recruited men. For example, in the Syrian case, young men, especially when they are not accompanied by family, are often not considered refugees because governments reproduce Islamophobic portrayals of Muslim Arab men as potential terrorists and hence as security risks (Turner 2017, 29). “This discrimination against men travelling alone derives from the premise that single men and boys visibly detached from a family unit pose a threat to security, whereas men who function as fathers, sons, brothers and/or husbands do not.” (Davis/Taylor/Murphy 2014) This type of gendered perception increases the vulnerability of these single men, who may be considered as less in need or less worthy of support such as housing in refugee camps, access to resources, or resettlement schemes, both during the journey and after arriving in so-called “host” countries (Turner 2017). Forced recruitment and the predicament it poses for male refugees is not limited to the Syrian case. Eritrea is another example where young people face the threat of being involuntarily drafted to the military – which often resembles a modern form of slavery. But as a peace treaty with Ethiopia was achieved, public perception in the Global North shifted to the view that things are improving in Eritrea and with that, Eritreans’ prospects for humanitarian protection declined. “In Europe, they’re using every excuse to deny entry, deny asylum applications”, an informant told the Guardian (Maclean 2018, 1). These examples of real insecurities for male refugees and the way governments react to them can be linked back to the literature category on the “violent masculinity” that is enforced within military structures (and has
been critically elaborated on by Kronsell 2016). This assumed masculine behaviour that is internalized during a (forced) stay with the military diminishes the chances for humanitarian support and aid tremendously and is linked back to perceived threats to security for countries in the Global North. The assumptions about a militarized refugee “other” are at times combined with racialized descriptions criticized by postcolonial and decolonial scholars who describe male refugees and migrants both as hypermasculinized and feminized in comparison to a hegemonic masculinity of the Global North (Soldatic 2015; Bilgic 2015).

A drastic example speaking to the category on “sexualized violence and rape”, demonstrating that sexualized violence against men has specific gendered implications, is the case of the systematic rape of male refugees in Libya. Here, situations of violence and insecurity before moving and on the move have been explored. Reports and newspaper articles have uncovered accounts of men being raped with objects and male refugees being forced to rape and humiliate other male prisoners within (illegal) prisons and reception centers while being filmed and afterwards being extorted with said films (Allegra 2017). Rape and sexualized violence are always linked to gendered power relations and male rape has specific gendered characteristics and implications. The motivation is often described as “castrating the other”, making him less, or destroying whole communities by making them “female” via rape (similar accounts have been made in relation to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where rape as a weapon of war was used also against men; see Apperley 2015). The experience of rape and the implications of forced migration often pose a situation of multiple insecurities and powerlessness for male refugees. Simultaneously, male refugees try to maintain their role as bread winner and head of the family. To keep their role and status within their family and/or community intact, most victims decide to stay quiet. In an interview, an informant told the UNHCR, “With men on men, they first rape and then blackmail them. They threaten, ‘I will tell or show this to the community if you tell anyone that we did this together.’ They blackmail them into continued rape. I think many cases are like this but no one wants to talk about it […] It’s not rare” (Chynoweth 2017b, 35). The reports and accounts in newspapers intriguingly show that there exist in fact specific situations and experiences of insecurity and violence for men during displacement. When linking this back to existing feminist literature on male victimhood in conflict and the specific implications this has on individuals and communities (Baaz/Stern 2013), it illustrates the importance of all-gender inclusive research on displacement and migration as newer fields of security.

Insecurity and violence are inherent in the last part of the journey of male refugees as well. Refugees and migrants also become victims after they have
arrived in an allegedly safe country. Here, intersectional aspects play a major role. In Italy in particular, the situation has become more intense, due to the new “migration and security” decree – also called the “Salvini law”, after Italy’s far-right interior minister – that was written into law in November 2018. It restricts humanitarian protection mostly to minors, victims of human trafficking, families, and people with mental or physical disabilities (Gostoli 2018). This often excludes male refugees that were traveling alone. Male minors that turn 18 in Italy may suddenly lose humanitarian protection and as a result become classified irregular. Similar to the Syrian case, there is also the fear playing out in European countries in the Mediterranean that the increase in refugee population leads to an augmented risk of terrorist attacks (for the Italian case, see Dixon et al. 2018, 10). Again, this reproduces the gendered description of male Muslim Arab refugees as security threats and speaks to different discriminatory descriptions based on religion, gender, race, and nationality. Additionally, male refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa are subject to racialized and gendered discourses and actions that have been enforced by the speeches of Salvini and other Lega representatives and even lead newspapers to title their news reports on the “Salvini law” as “Xenophobia Meets Reality in Italy” (Robertson 2018).

Usually, being male is an advantage in the gendered categorization of intersectionality. In the case of male refugees, most of the time, it poses a disadvantage because men are not perceived as vulnerable but rather as threatening, which means that their chances of humanitarian protection are significantly worse than those of female refugees. This increases their insecurity tremendously. To link these discourses back to the theoretical discourse, I want to refer to Charli Carpenter (2006, 2005), who points out the danger of a false dichotomy in research on conflict between men as “combatants” or “security risks” and women as “civilians” or “vulnerable” that reinforces gender inequalities and can lead to an augmentation of insecurities for all genders. This statement also holds true for the context of displacement. Additionally, the situation after displacement links back to the literature category that partly engages with intersectionality (cf. Shields 2008 and Holvino 2010). Quotes from Italian and other European officials show that impressions of male refugees are not only deeply gendered but also that race and religion pose a problem for these politicians. This makes an intersectional approach even more important (cf. Dixon et al. 2018 and Turner 2017).

In summary, situations of insecurity exist in all stages of migration and displacement and manifest themselves in specific ways in relation to (or even

11 La Lega or Lega Nord is an important Italian political party that, under current leader Matteo Salvini, has shifted increasingly to the right on issues such as crime and migration.
solely reserved for) male refugees. Hence, it is important to employ feminist approaches and methodology to displacement as a field of security and, within this field, to have an all-encompassing approach – meaning research must be undertaken on the experiences, processes, and insecurities of men specifically.

**Concluding Thoughts**

This article engaged with the theoretical field of feminist security studies. In this last part, I want to underline that giving men further attention within FSS is worthwhile. This paper supports the claim that it is necessary to deconstruct common pathways of pre-assigning stereotypical gender roles (“good women” and “bad men”) and oppose statements that feminist research on men in passive roles or as victims undermines feminist activism and serves a logic of excuse.

The guiding question of this paper was how male gender roles and masculinity within an (in)security setting and around these issues are negotiated. To answer this question, I engaged with the case of displacement and migration to explore the ways in which with the help of the first research question newly established categories are applicable to newer fields of security.

In the first part of the paper, I outlined three main categories linked to masculinity and insecurity within feminist research on security: 1) literature on sexualized violence and rape, 2) literature on the LGBQTIA+ community and intersectionality, and 3) literature on the connection between military security and violence, masculinity, and the state. In the second part of the paper, I showed how these categories find their reflection in research on displacement and migration. I investigated how the categories reemerge in all stages of displacement: before, during, and after the journey. This lets me conclude that it is worthwhile to explore men as individuals and groups, especially at the intersection with newer fields of security. Situations of male insecurity and victimhood are a fruitful area of research within FSS. Additionally, much academic work that has already been done on male victimhood linked to conflict and military security can be transferred to these newer fields of security, such as displacement and migration. Hence, this paper gives a good overview of what common lines of discussion miss out on in terms of information and experiences (which is surely not limited to the experiences of men in situations of insecurity but extends also to other – minority – groups). The intention of this article was in no way to contribute to a logic of excuse using research about male experiences of (sexualized) violence within and outside of feminist security studies or to diminish the ordeals of women and LGBQTIA+ people. I rather advocate for an all-encompassing perspective that takes into account intersectional factors.
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From Fiction to Reality back to Fiction: Culture as a Potential Change Maker
Gay-Art and Super Putin. Subversive Affirmation in Contemporary Russian Art
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Abstract: This article explores art projects created as a reaction to the “anti-gay propaganda law” passed in Russia in 2013. It focuses on artistic strategies used to oppose the homo-discriminatory rhetoric within Russian society, which has been emboldened by the law. As numerous activists and artists have created a number of projects in the seven years since the law’s creation, this article focuses on a specific group of artworks that have made use of subversive affirmation as a strategy for confronting the oppressive narratives imposed from above. Subversive affirmation is a term coined by theorists Inke Arns and Sylvia Sasse (2006) to describe artistic and political tactics that allows artists and activists to appropriate, consume, and affirm certain political discourses with the goal of undermining them from within. This article argues that for Russian artists Konstantin Altunin (b.1967), Oleg Ustinov (b.1984), Alexander Donskoy (b.1970) and Hagra (b.1992) subversive affirmation has been a useful tool in the process of undermining Putin’s oppressive politics.

Keywords: Anti-Gay Propaganda Law, Russian Art, Russian Activism, Homosexuality, Subversive Affirmation
Gay-Art and Super Putin. Subversive Affirmation in Contemporary Russian Art

Introduction

In 2013, Putin passed a law that banned “the propaganda of ‘non-traditional sexual relations’ among minors”. Under the law, pecuniary penalty or administrative arrest is imposed for any reference in public or the media that attaches a positive connotation to “non-traditional sexual relations” (for more information on the law, see Wilkinson 2014; Polsdofer 2014). As a reaction to this oppressive measure, Russian activists and artists have created projects opposing the state’s take on homosexuality as something that is against “tradition and Russian national identity” (Putin 2013). This article seeks to take a closer look at some of these projects and will discuss paintings by Konstantin Altunin (b.1967), performances by Oleg Ustinov (b.1984) and Alexander Donskoy (b.1970), and a series of illustrations by Hagra (b.1992). Since these artists live and work in Russia, I use the term Russian art to describe their projects that were either a direct reaction to the “anti-gay propaganda law” or to broader discriminatory moods in Russian society. Hence, this article’s main question is: What strategies have these artists used to oppose the homo-discriminatory rhetoric within Russian society that was enhanced by the anti-gay propaganda law?

The first artwork that is of interest to this study is a performance and art installation entitled “Administration” (2013) by artist Oleg Ustinov that commented directly on the anti-gay propaganda law. “Administration” was a prank performance that Ustinov staged in his home town, Rostov-on-Don, and then presented as an installation at the 4th Moscow International Biennale of Young Art in 2014. The first part of this article deals with Ustinov’s “Administration” in detail and compares it with his other project, his musical alter-ego Alexander Zalupin, who subverts “Russian chanson” music by queering it. I review his creative approach and compare it with illustrations created by Hagra entitled “Love is...“ (ongoing since 2013) where Russian гопники (street hooligans) are depicted in homosexual contexts.

In the second part, I discuss Vladimir Putin’s hypermasculinity, which historian Elizabeth A. Wood marks as his “personal scenario of power” (2016, 342) and which I interpret as an anchor for his anti-gay politics. Putin’s hypermasculinity found its reflection in the exhibition “Super Putin” (2017) created by ex-
politician and controversial figure Alexander Donskoy, who over the years has targeted Putin's homo-discriminatory politics. Donskoy created the concepts for a scandalous series of paintings that thematized the anti-gay propaganda law and commissioned the artist Konstantin Altunin to produce them. Shortly after displaying his series, Altunin fled the country in fear of political repression. Altunin's paintings will be also discussed in the second part of the article.

I argue that some aspects of these art projects appeal to subversive affirmation as a strategy for confronting oppressive narratives imposed from above. The methodological framework of subversive affirmation allows for a better understanding of the oppressive Russian state and the artistic practices that seek to subvert established narratives on homosexuality. As a term, subversive affirmation was coined in connection with Moscow Conceptualism and was used by theorists Inke Arns and Sylvia Sasse (2006) to describe artistic practices present in Soviet Russia and the Eastern Bloc throughout the 1960s and up to the 1990s as well as the influence of these practices on Western European and American art. According to Arns and Sasse (2006), subversive affirmation is “an artistic/political tactic that allows artists/activists to take part in certain social, political, or economic discourses and to affirm, appropriate, or consume them while simultaneously undermining them” (444).

Furthermore, I analyze the “Super Putin” exhibition through the prism of metamodernism, a term coined by cultural theorists Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker (2010) that describes a new kind of sensibility composed of an informed naivety and pragmatic idealism (ibid., 5). A metamodernistic framework allows for a better understanding of the performative nature of Donskoy’s controversial exhibition. The art historical approach to the analysis of the above-mentioned group of artworks puts them in the context of artistic practices that emerged after the anti-gay propaganda law and add to the discourse of what was marked by previous researchers as Russian “gay-art”.

Journalist Alexander Yastrebov was the first to write about art projects created by Russian artists that he identified as “gay-art”, which for him are works that “unambiguously put the same-sex relationships in a positive context” (Yastrebov 2011, paragraph 1). In a short article for Artguide Magazine, he writes about artists of the late Soviet period such as Timur Novikov and his New Academy of Fine Arts, Slava Mogutin, and Gennady Ustiyan. Sociologist Alek D. Epstein borrows the term “gay-art” and its connotation from Yastrebov but undertakes more comprehensive research on the history of Russian “gay-art” by starting with the 1930s and ending with 2013, when his article was published (Epstein 2013). Throughout the article, he mentions several artworks that were created as a reaction to the anti-gay propaganda law: an eye-catching social
satire by caricaturists Alex Hots and Vasya Lozhkin, a scandalous video installation – “Propaganda of Homosexuality” (2012) – by David Ter-Oganyan, a photo project – “We are proud of our people” (2013) – by Roman Gauz, and posters by Wanja Kilber (ibid.).

While the political, social, and economic problems of the gender order and homophobia in Russia are well explored by scholars (see, for example, Rjabova/Rjabov 2013; Baer 2013; Kondakov 2014; Stella/Nartova 2015; Healey 2018; Suchland 2018), research concerning contemporary Russian visual art dealing with the topic of homosexuality is rare. Research on pop culture (Baer 2005), music (Wiedlack/Neufeld 2018; Amico 2014), media (Wiedlack 2017), as well as film and literature (Baer 2011) has been published, but only the two articles by Yastrebov and Epstein engage with the topic of homosexuality in Russian contemporary visual and performance art. This article continues the exploration of Russian “gay-art” and puts the analyzed art projects in the broader context of artistic practices that use different approaches to questioning established oppressive narratives imposed from above.

**Subversive Affirmation in “Gay-Art”**

In 2013, Oleg Ustinov performed a prank entitled “Administration” by putting announcements at the entrances of apartment buildings in his hometown, Rostov-on-Don, that were written under the pretense of being on behalf of the housing administration and contained the following text, mimicking bureaucratic vernacular:

> While your apartment building was under observation during the first and second quarters of 2013, [number in handwriting:] 3 people of non-traditional sexual orientation (gays, lesbians, etc.) were found in your apartment building. Police investigation into this matter is currently ongoing. We ask that you display special vigilance against persons suspected of propagating homosexuality. Please note that a person of non-traditional sexual orientation can promote homosexuality not just directly by describing the benefits of homosexual life or by offering you or your loved ones opportunities to engage in sexual intercourse with bright clothes or unusual behaviour but also, gradually, subtly, by working on promoting homosexuality in the house for many years. Remember that a homosexual can have an unremarkable style of dress, look like you, and be pleasant in communication – and be familiar to you! Do not forget that homosexuality knows no age and the propagandist for homosexuality can be both yesterday’s schoolboy or an older man. Be
vigilant when dealing with neighbours, especially in your own or in a neighbour's apartment and in the area of mailboxes and lifts. It is very easy to become a target of homosexual propaganda and there is a thin line between an ordinary homosexual and a homosexual propagandist corrupting decent people. If you suspect one of your neighbours of disseminating homosexual propaganda, urgently report them to the Department of Internal Affairs or call 2406030 or 02. Administration (Fig. 1).¹

What does this announcement convey? It starts by telling the reader that people of non-traditional sexual orientation have already been found in their apartment building and the fact that the amount of those individuals is handwritten, hence could not be pre-printed and is specific to each building, emphasizes the authenticity of the statement. The announcement then suggests that these individuals are trying to propagate their lifestyle and that the matter is in need of investigative work by the authorities. The text plays on the ambiguity of the terms that are used within the anti-gay propaganda law. For instance, “propaganda” can easily be applied to any information regarding sexual orientation that does not fit into the category of “traditional” and this can be done in any form, be it “offering you or your loved ones opportunities to engage in sexual intercourse”, “bright clothes”, or “unusual behaviour”. Furthermore, places in the private sphere, such as post boxes and lifts, are no longer safe from the pernicious influence of homosexuals, because their “work” can be done gradually and subtly. The visibility and simultaneous invisibility of “homosexual propagandists” is framed as the biggest threat in the announcement.

This is exactly how scholar Brian James Baer argues homosexuality is being construed in Russia, as a “threat to established values and identities both because it is too visible and because it is potentially invisible” (Baer 2013, 42). Baer conjugates this visibility with homosexual invisibility, i.e., the ability of homosexuals to pass as straight and spread the disease of homosexuality from within. The unidentifiable nature of homosexual invisibility becomes a “threat that is clearly imbued with paranoia” (ibid.). This paranoia requires self-policing, control, and vigilance towards one another in an attempt to expose homosexuality, make it visible, and finally erase it. With “Administration”, Ustinov invited Russian citizens to trust their paranoia, be aware at all times, and act on their feelings in the battle against “the homosexual propaganda”.

After its performance aspect, “Administration” entered the space of the governmental art institution, the Museum of Moscow, and was shown there as an

¹ Translation from the Russian is mine. The text is taken from the installation.
installation during the 4th Biennale of Young Art in 2014 (Fig. 2). Ustinov used colors and shapes that are typical of communal entrances of apartment buildings in Russia: Two green wallboards shape a corner with a grey hallway beam in the middle that serves as a notice board, with the single white announcement from the “administration” on it. However, these pristine artificial walls, situated in the middle of an exhibition space, did not resemble the reality of the mediocre, dirty, and well-worn walls of communal halls, which are usually covered with graffiti and dust. On the outer walls of the entrance corner, Ustinov put the essential part of the prank – printouts with documentation of the aftermath of the prank collected from different online and media sources.

Indeed, the prank caused massive public discussions: People took pictures of the announcements and posted them online, several newspapers wrote about them, and one of the central channels, NTV, produced two news reports about the announcements (Makarenko 2013; NTV 30.08.2013, 29.08.2013). Some citizens took the prank announcements seriously and since phone numbers written at the end of the announcements were real phone numbers of the city administration and the police, people called them asking if the announcement was real (Rizoma 2015). It is not clear if citizens of Rostov-on-Don were actually ready to report on alleged homosexuals, since the city administration denied its involvement in the story, but what is more interesting is the reaction in official media that the work provoked. NTV used this event to expose not the recent controversy around the passing of the anti-gay propaganda law but the nature of the Western (in this instance, German) inclination to “snitch” that was set against a Russian loyalty to one's neighbors and the historical distaste for denunciations of all kinds among Russian citizens (NTV 2013). Of course, this is a myth; there are numerous examples throughout Russian history when denunciations were used as a political and private tool (Kozlov 1996; Bergemann 2019). Even in the news piece on the artwork that supposedly criticizes the state's discourse on homosexuality, the government channel managed to propagate the story of the soulless West by substituting facts and shifting the focus away from Russia.

As the installation shows, the spread of information on the artwork in media and social networks was thought by Ustinov to be an essential part of “Administration”; therefore, it can be seen as a media performance. The media coverage is described as one of the most important parts of the art of the protest, which curator Julia Aksenova uses as an umbrella term for the Russian actionism of 2010s, when happenings, interventions, and street art started being used by activists to address political issues (Aksenova 2014, 24). As an example, Aksenova lists performances by the art group Voina and labels them as media performances, since their main purpose was to create viral videos and promote them online.
For example, the group had public sex in Moscow's Timiryazev State Museum of Biology, made an intervention in a Moscow police station, robbed supermarkets wearing the robes of a Russian Orthodox priest and the hats of police officers, staged a mock hanging of two homosexual men and three Central Asian guest workers in a department store in Moscow, etc. (ibid., 25). The media-performances by Voina influenced the next wave of artists – Pussy Riot (created by ex-members of Voina) and Petr Pavlensky. Pussy Riot gained global notoriety when its members staged a performance inside Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in 2012 and were sentenced to two years imprisonment (Wiedlack 2016). Pavlensky, whose first performance was a protest against the incarceration of Pussy Riot members, became famous because of his viral actions, in which the reaction of the media and governmental institutions played a crucial role in the process of performance (Kombarov 2018). Can we put Oleg Ustinov's name on this list of new-wave performance artists and attribute his prank performance to the art of the protest?

It is not clear if “Administration” actually protested against the anti-gay propaganda law, since the rhetoric used in the announcement copies the state’s, and as a result, the aftermath of the prank turned out to be contradictory. On the one hand, it brought into focus the nonsensical nature of the law and the paranoia that is cultivated in the heads of Russian citizens by the distorted narratives produced by pro-Kremlin TV channels. On the other hand, it reproduced the tactics of governmental oppression and pointed out that the anti-gay propaganda law can be used as a tool that channels the aggression of one part of Russian society and directs it against another part – the part that is already vulnerable and consists of people who might look unconventional or not fit in the limits of heteronormativity. Ustinov's prank might have put those people in further danger by encouraging aggression in their private spheres. Was the usage of the anti-gay propaganda law as a tool in “Administration” an alliance with government politics or an act of mockery?

In an interview with the curators of the 4th Biennale of Young Art, Ustinov defined his prank performance as an act of subversive affirmation, which suggests that he was in fact mocking the law and pointing to its absurdity when imagined in action (Moskva24 2014). Arns and Sasse (2006) define subversive affirmation as an artistic strategy of copying the political or social practices of the state in order to undermine those practices. This undermining is achieved through a surplus that “destabilizes affirmation and turns it into its opposite” (Arns/Sasse 2006, 445). The surplus that destabilized the affirmation

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2 You can read more on Voina performances on their official website: [http://en.free-voina.org](http://en.free-voina.org)
in “Administration” was revealed during its installation in the contemporary art space, which was supportive of openly gay artists and artworks on different topics around gender and sexuality.³

Ustinov erased the distance between Russian citizens and the anti-gay propaganda law by putting them into direct confrontation with each other. The presence of an audience to the situation of subversive affirmation is seen as crucial by Arns and Sasse, because only through their physicality can each audience member “understand her or his involvement afterwards and reflect upon it” (ibid., 447). Arns and Sasse see the tactic of over-identification as the ultimate form of subversive affirmation, which they borrow from Slavoj Žižek's seminal essay on Slovenian artistic groups Laibach and NSK (Žižek 1993). Arns and Sasse write that

“overtly criticizing the ideology of a system misses the point because today every ideological discourse is marked by cynicism. This means that the ideological discourse has become internalized, and thus anticipates its own critique. Consequently, vis-à-vis a cynical ideology, according to Žižek, irony becomes something that ‘plays into the hands of power’. In such a situation what is most feared by the ruling ideology is ‘excessive identification…: the enemy is the “fanatic” who “over-identifies” instead of keeping an adequate distance.’” (448)

Oleg Ustinov’s strategy did not involve openly criticizing the discourse of the state and its ideology on homosexuality, nor did the rhetoric of “Administration” distance itself from the discriminatory discourse through irony or ironic negation. Quite the opposite, the artwork performed an over-identification with the ruling ideology through an appropriation of its components and a repetition of existing codes with the aim of undermining the state's position.

This was not the first project in which Ustinov undermined homo-discriminatory structures from within by means of over-identification. In 2010, he created an alter-ego, a singer named Alexander Zalupin, who according to legend spent 16 years in jail before he became the first singer in his genre, which Ustinov called gay chanson (Ishenko 2012, paragraph 1).⁴ Typically, Russian chanson is a neologism used to refer to a range of songs that include city romance songs and блатняк (criminal) songs based on themes of the urban underclass and criminal underworld. Romanticizing military, patriotic, and criminal themes, Russian chanson acts as one of the most homophobic directions in modern Russian music. In his songs, written in the best traditions of Russian chanson, Zalupin poetically thematizes same-sex love, his prison experience, and, for the

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³ See the homepage of the 4th Biennale of Young Art: http://archive.youngart.ru/
⁴ The official YouTube Channel of Alexander Zalupin: https://www.youtube.com/user/zzzalpolon/
first time in the history of the genre, gives voice to all опущенные (turned out) inmates (ibid.). Zalupin discredits and attacks Russian chanson from the inside. The tactic of over-identification even allowed him (according to Ustinov) to sneak into places where Russian chanson is popular – taxis, маршрутки (shuttle buses), and шашлычные (shashlik houses) (ibid.). As of 2020, Zalupin has produced three albums and given numerous concerts around Russia, during which he is forced to cover his face with masks to avoid being recognized and attacked (Shamanov 2012).

A similar approach to queering a subculture that appears homo-discriminatory in the mainstream is used by artist and illustrator Hagra, who is based in Kazan (Tatarstan, Russia). In numerous series of pictures and comic strips, Hagra depicts members of the Russian urban underclass – the main audience for the блатняк (criminal) songs of Russian chanson and Russian rap culture – engaging in homosexual sex. For example, in the ongoing series “Love is...”, the characters (predominantly young men) engage in small criminal activities as well as alcohol and drug consumption but always end up having sexual intercourse with each other (Fig. 3). The heroes see themselves as чёткие пацаны (true bros) and distinguish their intimate relationships from those of пидоров (fags). Examples include the comics entitled “Evening with bros” (2017) (Fig. 4).5

During an unstructured interview with me, Hagra elaborated on this dichotomy:

“When I realized that I was transgender, my ideas about the LGBT+ community and public expectations of what a person from the queer community should aspire to came into conflict with my experience as a person from a poor district of Kazan. After all, many people believe that гопники (street hooligans) and queerness are fundamentally incompatible. However, it is not that simple. Over time, I began to realize that some parts of this subculture are queerer than people might think. It turned out that it is not uncommon for the гопник community to be not only homosocial, but also homosexual. Often, гопники, who for many people serve as a stereotype of ‘true masculinity’ and are therefore less likely to be suspected of homosexuality, allow themselves to show much more affection toward each other than men from seemingly less homophobic communities. I often found myself being much more comfortable among гопники, because suddenly, their ideas on who to consider a ‘man’ were much more flexible than in some LGBT+

5 “Love is...” (since 2013) and “Evening with bros” (2017) are published on the official website of Hagra: http://hagra.ru/
communities. Gradually, this relationship between the гопник culture and the queer became one of the main themes of my creative work.”

(Hagra 2020, translation from Russian is mine)

On the surface, it seems that Hagra, similar to Ustinov, uses the tactic of subversive affirmation and aims to undermine the stereotype of homophobic гопники (street hooligans). However, a closer reading reveals that Hagra's work is actually the product of an affirmative gaze from within. The illustrations are rooted in Hagra's own experience as a trans masculine person surrounded by young trans and cis men from Kazan who wear the Adidas clothing typical of their subculture and follow the “bro code”. The characters' exploration of gender norms and sexuality in “Love is...” is, on the one hand, deeply rooted in patriarchal and homo-discriminatory attitudes; one the other, it denies the discourse on those norms suggested by Russian and Western LGBT+ communities. Hagra's works suggest the alternative possibility of breaking the dichotomy between homosexuality and the national traditional toxic masculinity that is imposed from above by Putin's powerbase. The next chapter deals in greater detail with this idea of Putin's hypermasculinity and contemporary art projects that reflect on it.

The Metamodernism of Super Putin

At the center of the anti-gay propaganda narrative stands the figure of Vladimir Putin, whose masculinity is constantly mythologized through the media to show his people that as long as Russia remains under his protection, threats from the outer world, especially from “the declining wicked West”, are of little concern (Rjabova/Rjabov 2013, 32). The Russian and non-Russian media are full of images of half-naked Putin riding a horse, fishing, shooting a tiger with a tranquilizer dart or winning judo matches (see Wiedlack 2020), which Wood interprets as Putin's “personal scenario of power” built on his hypermasculinity (2016, 342). This scenario of power allows the establishment of “the connection of the ruler with the ‘masses’” (ibid.) in order to soothe anxiety and paranoia (as discussed above) in the presence of a dominant heteronormative male. Wood notes that in the contexts in which Putin needs to emphasize his hypermasculinity, he often opts for an adolescent street language style (332) similar to the jargon of гопники (street hooligans), which allows him to become свой мужик (one of our men) in the eyes of the audience (Gorham 2005, 391–395) and support homo-discriminatory politics, which according to him lie in “tradition and the Russian national identity” (Putin 2013).

Putin's hypermasculinity became the topic of an entire exhibition entitled “Super Putin” that took place in December 2017 at the Ultra Modern Art Museum
in Moscow. Sixty anonymous artists made portraits of the president as, among others, a hockey player, judo master, Roman emperor, a superhero shooting a Putin-blaster, and even Santa Claus. They did not forget to show a softer side of him either, portraying him cuddling a бабушка (grandma) and different animals, such as a puppy, leopard, or horse (TRT-World 2017). These portraits were made in large formats as digital prints imitating the esthetics of pop art and comic book art. “Super Putin” also displayed small sculptures, including a statue of Putin wearing armor and sitting on the back of a bear, as well as three plaster busts in the Russian tricolor repeating the iconography behind Lenin’s busts of the Soviet era (ibid.).

The straightforward kitsch and shameless pathos of “Super Putin” might be perceived as irony or simple mockery but is more complicated than that. The idea of the exhibition stemmed from 23-year-old student and part-time model Yulia Djuzheva, who has stated that she is sincerely in love with Putin and praises him and his talents (Bennetts 2018). We cannot be certain of the sincerity of her public statements, since behind her stands Alexander Donskoy, co-creator and sponsor of the exhibition, a figure with less obvious motives.

Donskoy is a former mayor of the city Arkhangelsk and, in 2008, was convicted of having a false diploma and abusing his official powers. He called the accusations “an act of political prosecution” targeted against him because he had announced his intention to run for the presidency the same year (Lenta.ru 2008). In 2013, he changed careers and opened a gallery named The Museum of Power in Saint Petersburg (Levitina 2013). The first exhibition, entitled “The Rulers” (2013), displayed, among other artworks, paintings by artist Konstantin Altunin (b.1967). Four of them caused a huge scandal and led to the closing of the gallery. The first painting, entitled “Travesty” (2013), depicted Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev wearing women’s underwear. The second painting, “From the confessions” (2013), depicted the head of the Russian Orthodox Church with his torso covered in prison tattoos. The other two paintings, “The rainbow Milonov” (2013) and “The erotic dreams of deputy Mizulina” (2013), ridiculed the makers of the anti-gay propaganda law (EchoMSK 2013). Milonov was depicted dreaming with his eyes closed amidst rainbow streams. Mizulina was depicted in form of a diptych that showed highly erotic scenes of people engaged in intercourse. The gallery was quickly shut down by the authorities and the paintings were confiscated (ibid.). Altunin, fearing the the anti-gay propaganda law and laws against extremism, fled to France, where he asked for political refuge (Shepelin 2013).

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6 Information on the exhibition can be found on the homepage of Artplay: https://m.artplay.ru/events/vystavka-superputin.html
In fact, Altunin’s approach mimics the homo-discriminatory rhetoric of the state that frames homosexuality as a tool for the de-masculinization of the political opponent, which scholar Valerie Sperling defines as one of the main instruments used by both liberal and pro-Kremlin actors (Sperling 2015, 104). She states that homophobia is used with the intent to undermine the target’s legitimacy and “relies on the involuntary rescinding of someone’s masculinity, thereby ‘feminizing’ the man and reducing his societal authority” (ibid.). Altunin feminized Putin to undermine his political hypermasculinity and hinted at the alleged homosexual inclinations of Milonov and Mizulina. Donskoy, who had commissioned their portraits from Altunin, seemed to be supportive of this strategy at that time. However, his approach to the topic changed when, in October 2017, Donskoy came out as gay7 and, two months later, opened the “Super Putin” exhibition.

In an interview with Radio Svoboda, Donskoy explained his motives for opening an exhibition that sheds positive light on Putin as an “act of inner humility, stating that if he (Donskoy) “wants to stay in Russia he should surrender and stop fighting,” (Radio Svoboda 2017) because nothing can be done and “Putin is forever” (Radio Azattyk 2017). He chose Yulia Djuzheva as the main curator of the artworks submitted by artists because “only Djuzheva’s true love of Putin could become a suitable measure for the artworks”, hence any artwork that in her opinion would not be “liked by Putin himself” was banned from the display (ibid.). Objects, paintings, comics, and digital prints of “Super Putin” resemble obviously photoshopped pictures and internet memes and one can hardly consider them to be a serious part of the contemporary art market. Moreover, since the artists behind these creations remained anonymous, I consider “Super Putin” to be not an exhibition per se but a media performance orchestrated by Donskoy. This performance started with hiring a “true fan” of Putin’s as the main curator in order to avoid straightforward accusations of sarcasm and insincerity and ended with coverage across different media with catchy headlines.8 Even the opening of the exhibition was planned on the same day as Putin’s announcement of his presidential bid in 2018 (Bennetts 2018).

Donskoy changed his tactics from open criticism of the ruling ideology that he had used during “The Rulers” exhibition and instead, similar to Ustinov, made use of a strategy of “an excessive identification with the enemy”, becoming

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7 He came out on his official YouTube channel: https://youtu.be/O5Qy_zurzZ0
8 Some examples from coverage in English media: “Super Putin: Do Russians Really Love Their President?” in the Newsweek magazine, “As Putin Announces 2018 Presidential Bid, ‘SUPERPUTIN’ Exhibition Opens In Moscow” in Huffpost, “Putin Crowned SUPERPUTIN at New Art Exhibition in Moscow” in Moscow Times, “Exhibit portrays Putin as superhero” by CNN.
a “‘fanatic’ who ‘over-identifies’ instead of keeping an adequate distance” with the subject of his criticism (Arns/Sasse 2006, 448). Therefore, as a media performance, “Super Putin” can be seen as a classic example of subversive affirmation, where Yulia Djuzheva embodies the audience, the masses that support and whole-heartedly love Putin, while Alexander Donskoy embodies the surplus that subverts the affirmative act with his openly gay persona and the political controversy tied to it (Radio Azattyk 2017).

One can argue that Donskoy’s “act of inner humility” is sincere and he has in fact obeyed his fate and started his own pro-Putin propaganda. However, I would suggest that this does not make a difference on a wider scale. To support my argument, I apply a metamodernist set of thinking to the case, as suggested by cultural theorists Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker (2010). According to them, a metamodernist sensibility “can be conceived of as a kind of informed naivety, a pragmatic idealism” that ontologically oscillates between modern enthusiasm and belief in idealism on one side and a post-modern irony, deconstruction, and sarcasm on the other (ibid., 5). Epistemologically, metamodernism commits itself to an impossible possibility of as if, which is “intrinsically bound to desire, whereas postmodern irony is inherently tied to apathy” (ibid., 10). Vermeulen and van den Akker attribute the metamodernist sensibility to artistic practices that allows artists such as Tacita Dean, Didier Courbot, and Mona Hatoum to appeal to affective and often sentimental abstractions (ibid., 7). They cite art critic Jerry Saltz, who wrote about this new approach to artmaking:

“It’s an attitude that says, I know that the art I’m creating may seem silly, even stupid, or that it might have been done before, but that doesn’t mean this isn’t serious. At once knowingly self-conscious about art, unafraid, and unashamed, these young artists not only see the distinction between earnestness and detachment as artificial; they grasp that they can be ironic and sincere at the same time, and they are making art from this compound-complex state of mind.” (Saltz 2010; cited in Vermeulen/van Den Akker 2010, 7)

The media performance “Super Putin” can be seen as a metamodernist creation that unashamedly combines post-modern irony (through Donskoy) and the affective emotion of modern idealism (embodied by Djuzheva). “Super Putin” is sincere and ironic at the same time, since there is no detachment, no distance between the artwork and its creators, who embody the two approaches. The new metamodernist rules of the game allowed an openly gay ex-candidate for the presidency to manifest Putin’s hyper-masculinity using sarcastic and sincere approaches in one stroke.
Conclusion

The main focus of this article was a group of artworks created after the adoption of the anti-gay propaganda law in Russia. I argued that artists Konstantin Altunin, Oleg Ustinov, Alexander Donskoy, and Hagra used common tactics in their approach to criticize the homophobic state's politics and asked what those tactics might be and how exactly they were conveyed in each artwork. Closer analysis showed that all of the artists, to some extent, used irony, exaggeration, and reversion in their artistic approaches.

Konstantin Altunin, in several of his paintings, reversed the homophobic rhetoric of the state by “accusing” the authors of the anti-gay propaganda law of homosexuality – symbolically using the law against its own creators. In this case, homosexuality became a tool for the de-masculinization of figures of authority, including Putin, Medvedev, Milonov, and Mizulina, by appealing to scenarios and prejudices about homosexuality normally used in homophobic rhetoric. Altunin's approach was effective in terms of causing a scandal and controversy but necessitated the artist's leaving the country fearing oppression by the state.

The absurdity of the anti-gay propaganda law was revealed in the media performance “Administration” by Oleg Ustinov. The artist pointed to the aggression, frustration, and paranoia of some part of the Russian population towards non-heterosexual individuals and, by mimicking the bureaucratic language of Putin's apparatus, illustrated how one can act on the the anti-gay propaganda law. This illustration was possible thanks to the strategy of subversive affirmation, which allowed the artists, through the means of over-identification, to subvert and ridicule the state's homo-discriminatory practices. In his earlier project, the alter-ego and musical persona Alexander Zalupin, Ustinov also used subversive affirmation, which allowed him to undermine the homophobic and hyper-masculine culture of Russian chanson from within. Such a queering of a homophobic subculture is not a new approach in Russian “gay-art” and was also thematicized in the series of illustrations “Love is...” by Hagra. At first thought, Hagra appeals to the same strategy of subversive affirmation when depicting Russian гопник (street hooligans) culture in a homosexual context. Yet, a closer study reveals that Hagra reflects on personal life experience, hence an unequivocal opposition between the hyper-masculine гопник culture and homosexuality appears to be just a myth created by mainstream gender and sexual politics.

I described the “Super Putin” exhibition as a media performance by Alexander Donskoy, because the artworks displayed at it were secondary to the media coverage and persona behind the exhibition. Donskoy, like Ustinov, appealed to the strategy of subversive affirmation and exaggerated and over-identified with
the figure of Putin that stands at the center of the state's homo-discriminatory rhetoric. The sincerity and irony of metamodernism in “Super Putin” allowed for a bizarre and ambiguous manifestation of Putin's hyper-masculinity. Donskoy referred to a strategy of ambivalent mimicry by reproducing the rhetoric of the state and re-enacting its oppressive tactics, thereby subverting and destabilizing them.

This article scrutinized a group of artists that expressed their take on the discourse on homosexuality offered by Putin's powerbase through a literal re-enactment of measures suggested by the anti-gay propaganda law and its consequent subversion. It describes subversive affirmation as a tool that has allowed some artists to address the difficult topic of homosexuality under oppressive governmental politics and to add their artworks to the growing body of Russian “gay-art”.

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Hagra (2020): Personal communication via Facebook messenger, 30.05.2020.


Illustrations

Fig. 1, Fig. 2: Oleg Ustinov, *Administration*, installation, 2014. Exhibited at the 4th Biennale of Young Art in Moscow Museum of Modern Art, Moscow, Russia. Source: © Pavel Otdelnov
Fig. 3: Hagra, Love is..., 2013. Illustration series. Source: © Hagra
Caption: “Love is when you rob phones not to sell them to a pawn shop, but to give him.”
Fig. 4: Hagra, *Evening with bros*, 2017. Illustration series. Source: © Hagra
Deconstructing Masculinities in the Classroom with George Miller’s Film Adaptation of John Updike’s Novel “The Witches of Eastwick”

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Abstract: This paper aims to reflect on the contribution of popular culture to the deconstruction of hegemonic masculinities and on how popular culture can be used in the classroom context as a powerful tool for overcoming gender binarism outside of feminist academic circles. In particular, the paper will discuss the film adaptation of John Updike’s novel “The Witches of Eastwick” and the way it rewrites the novel, transforming the author’s rather misogynist message into one of empowerment for women. By subverting the traditional role of the “Prince Charming” as well as that of the witch in classic fairytales, the film exposes the harsh reality of male domination in 1980s Western society and its strong correlation with religious convictions and practices. Finally, the paper aims to prove that the non-essentialism of the film makes it a good object of study for present-day students and suggests ways to implement its use in the classroom.

Keywords: Masculinities; Popular Culture; Deconstruction; Adaptations; Education
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Popular Culture and the Film Industry

"Anyone who does not grasp the close juxtaposition of the vulgar and the scholarly has either too refined or too compartmentalized a view of life. Abstract and the visceral fascination are equally valid and not so far apart."

– Stephen Jay Gould, “Living with Connections: Are Siamese Twins One Person or Two?”

We start from the premise that all representations tell stories. The representations offered to us by popular culture are no exception. They help “readers” determine the values they choose to advocate and contest and, once these “readers” themselves become agents and producers of “texts”, their own representations are likely to reflect internalized values. Popular culture must be perceived as a political arena and one reason to study it is to be politically literate and understand what issues are at stake when political leaders (and others) condemn or praise its representations. As Carla Freccero argues, teaching popular culture to college students allows them to

“recognize and draw on their already existing literacies and the cultures they know in order to analyze and think critically [… T]he product may be students who may be able to intervene to produce meanings in the language of the medium itself, as well as politically when those representations are used to support particular agendas” (Freccero 1999, 4).

Film Adaptations as Rewritings

As pointed out by Julia Kristeva in “The Bounded Text” (1980) and “Word, Dialogue and Novel” (1986), all texts invoke and rework other texts, which references the phenomenon of intertextuality, which, in turn, has been considered one of the most striking characteristics of postmodern art. When discussing film adaptation, one is often talking about reinterpretations of established texts in
new generic contexts; therefore, adaptations must not be judged by their level of fidelity to the “original”. On the contrary, “it is usually at the very point of infidelity that the most creative acts of adaptation [...] take place” (Sanders 2007, 20). In some cases, the process of adaptation moves away towards comments on the politics of the source text. Undoubtedly, film adaptations have been offering valuable contributions to the deconstruction of hegemonic masculinities, namely that of the stereotype of the “macho man” and that of the witch. To better understand this phenomenon, we start by providing a general overview of the conceptualization and history of the myth of the “unruly” woman.

The Myth of the “Unruly Woman”

“The history of men’s opposition to women’s emancipation is more interesting perhaps than the story of that emancipation itself.”

– Virginia Woolf, “A Room of One’s Own”

“Who, surprised and horrified by the fantastic tumult of her drives (for she was to believe that a well-adjusted normal woman has a [...] divine composure), hasn’t accused herself of being a monster? Who, feeling a funny desire stirring inside her ([...] to bring out something new), hasn’t thought she was sick? Well, her shameful sickness is that she resists death, that she is trouble.”

– Hélène Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa”

Feminist critic Mary Daly, drawing on the scholarship of a number of leading mythographers, writes that mythologies around the world originated in the worship of the mother goddess as the source and destination of all life, i.e., she was considered to be the origin of the universe and all creation was perceived as being of her substance (Daly 1984, 47). Men could not conceive; therefore, women were seen as endowed with special powers, in particular the power of giving birth. Furthermore, metallurgy, when it first appeared (during the late Paleolithic period, ca. 40,000 BC), used light metals mostly shaped by women. However, according to Monica Sjöö and Barbara Mor (1987), substantial developments in the use of metals during the Bronze Age generated an interest in warfare. The winners of battles would eventually be labeled “heroes” and the idea of male gods became intelligible. The link between the body of the god and creation faded and a rigid class system of royal masters and slave laborers that
coalesced around a new patriarchal elite emerged. By the time European and Arabic slave traders and colonial invaders reached Africa (more than 2,000 years ago) “the matriarchal social patterns [...] were still intact and the people still worshiped Black Goddesses with bisexual powers, and still participated in the cyclic processes of Mother Earth as a sacred year-cycle ritual” (Sjöö/Mor 1987, 24), but the colonist invaders had to break such patterns in order to impose “imperialist domination” (ibid., 25). The same strategy was used by Imperial Rome on its colony, Europe, at the beginning of the Christian Era. Since then, structures of binary opposition have organized our thinking and decreed that woman operate as the negative of man. Such dualization implies that women are objectified and, therefore, dislocated from their selves. Consequently, they started appearing in myths and legends as only passive victims who need the helping hand of a male individual or as dangerously evil sirens against whom men should guard themselves (Sjöö/Mor 1987, 18).

Associations of the feminine with transgression and monstrosity in Western culture can be traced as far back as to the biblical story of Adam and Eve, written around 1,500 BC. Eve’s characterization symbolizes the essence of women as an inept and immoral group of human beings. The number of classical representations of “daughters of Eve” is countless, manifesting patriarchal concerns with the role of women in society, namely the threat they represent to men’s status quo as well as trying to assure traditional roles will remain intact. On this subject, Virginia Allen comments that “the original source of the femme fatale [...] is the dark half of the dualistic concept of the Eternal Feminine – the Mary/Eve dichotomy” (1983, ii). In her influential book “The Second Sex”, Simone de Beauvoir states, “All Christian literature endeavors to exacerbate man’s disgust for woman” (1949, 221). She further asserts that Christian ideology played a major role in women’s oppression. Looking at John Milton’s epic poem “Paradise Lost”, one finds a classical example of such representations. At one point, Adam asks why God created women. The rhetoric is blatantly misogynistic:

“O! why did God,
Creater wise, that peopl'd highest Heav'n
With Spirits Masculine, create at last
This novelty on Earth, this fair defect
Of Nature, and not fill the World at once
With Men, as Angels, without Feminine,
Or find some other way to generate
Mankind? This mischief had not then befall'n,
And more that shall befall, innumerable
Disturbances on Earth through Female snares,
And strait conjunction with this Sex”
(Milton 1968, X. 888–898)

Susan Bordo considers that “during periods when women are becoming independent and are asserting themselves politically and socially [...] there is a trend to represent the dark, dangerous, and evil female” (2003, 161).

In mythology, such as throughout history, the powers of a witch have both been admired and feared. As Barbara Creed (2007) points out, women used to have two very important roles in their communities: as mothers and as healers growing medicinal herbs. They were originally linked to magical powers because of giving birth and during pregnancy were seen as particularly gifted in the performing of magical ceremonies. The Roman law tried to repress such practices and when Christianity triumphed, a religious law banned any popular tolerance towards such “witchcraft”. In the 13th century, believing in witches or demons was considered a heresy and those who did so were subject to persecution and punishment. The witch became a symbol of disrespect for the established order and rejection of the moral values of the Christian community. Persecution during the Middle Ages and in particular the 16th and 17th centuries followed.

Against the background of this set of cultural expectations, gender roles were passed to the communities, among other sources, through classical fairy tales, in which the role of the witch was of particular significance. Creed considers the witch as a figure “represented within patriarchal discourses as an implacable enemy of the symbolic order” (2007, 76). Frequently deformed and displaying animalistic traits, she has become the most widely recognized symbol of female monstrosity and is defined as “irrational, scheming, and evil” and associated with “abject things” (Creed, 2007, 76). The “Dicionário da Crítica Feminista” (Amaral/Macedo 2005) points out that, taken to extremes, the concept of “deviance” is similar to Creed’s definition of the “monstrous feminine” (Amaral/Macedo 2005, 35), which implies that what lies behind the construction of a woman’s monstrosity is her sexuality.

Critical Literacy and Regimes of Truth

The origins of critical literacy lie in feminist post-structuralist theory (as a movement, post-structuralism emerged in France during the 1960s) and in postcolonial theory (considered to have its origins in cultural critic Edward Said’s 1987
work “Orientalism”). In both, there is “a strong move away from the automatic privileging of dominant colonizing discourses and a move towards multiple voices, perspectives, ways of seeing the world.” (Bronwyn 1997, 26). This way, the subject becomes aware of the qualities that give the subject a particular ethnic, sexual, and/or cultural identity and sees these identities/qualities as a rich set of possibilities. Speaking about gender, Davis Bronwyn explains how it is constructed through discourse, that is to say, how “we become gendered through the particular discursive patterns made available to us in our culture(s)” (1997, 9). Language constructs gender as two binary categories that are hierarchically positioned in relation to one another. This constructed truth then appears to be absolute, unconstructed. Michel Foucault named such a process a “regime of truth” (1980, 131), which is a historically constituted body of knowledge and practice, in a specific time and society, that shapes people and gives positions of power to some and not to others.

Since popular culture – namely, the film industry – works as an agent of socialization, it can be considered a vehicle towards critical literacy, allowing students and teachers to become reflexively aware of the possibilities of thinking, writing, and speaking in ways other than those dictated by regimes of truth.

A particular powerful regime of truth emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries, during the Enlightenment: a glorification of science with its domination of the rational (male) mind over (usually female) matter. Enlightenment thought encapsulates much of what is understood as “modernism” and is also fundamental to “humanism”.

Recently, postmodern and poststructuralist discourses have shown the discursively constructed nature of much that was taken in these discourses to be the fundamental unquestionable basis on which arguments could be built and “truth” established. By deconstructing those humanistic binaries (male/female and others, such as human/machine, human/animal, right/wrong, and pure/im-pure), the human body becomes capable of manifesting itself in various ways. These discourses tend to see identity as something fluid and ever-changing, a game that we play instead of a universal constant.

That is what Michael Cristofer did in his scriptwriting and George Miller in his directing for the film adaptation of “The Witches of Eastwick” – they deconstructed. One can argue that Updike’s novel is representative of the first mentioned regime of truth, while the film adopts a postmodernist point of view. Here, I will look at the way the film rewrites the novel by rewriting the myth of the “unruly” witch, thus contributing to the deconstruction of hegemonic masculinities.
The “Unruly” Witch: the Novel versus the Film Adaptation

“A free woman in an unfree society will be a monster.”
– Angela Carter, “The Sadeian Woman and the Ideology of Pornography”

Updike’s Story

In the beginning of the novel “The Witches of Eastwick”, Alexandra Spofford, Jane Smart, and Sukie Rougemont are introduced as three witches who are friends. They live in the fictional town of Eastwick on Rhode Island of the sixties. Alexandra is a widow and the other two are divorcees. All have in common the fact that they acquired their powers after their marriages ended. Alexandra is a sculptor, Jane a teacher, and Sukie works at a local newspaper. They have relationships with married men and the reader learns that they have previously been unfaithful to their husbands, namely by engaging in affairs with each other’s husbands. They are unscrupulous to the point of betraying their own friends. In the second part of the novel, Darryl Van Horne, an inventor working on an interface between solar and electrical energy, arrives in town in the company of his servant, Fidel, and buys a neglected mansion. He ends up seducing the three friends and encouraging their powers. As a consequence, a scandal grows in the village. The women commit atrocities throughout the first and second part of the story, such as causing a woman to fall and break a leg, killing a puppy simply because it is barking, and making Sukie’s boss and lover, Clyde Gabriel, kill his wife, Felicia, before hanging himself. Sukie, Alexandra, and Jane share Darryl without jealousy, but he ends up marrying a friend of theirs, Jenny, who is Clyde Gabriel’s daughter. At this point, the third part of the novel starts. The witches decide to give Jenny cancer and eventually, she dies. Darryl leaves town with Jenny’s brother, Chris, who, it is implied, has become his lover. Ultimately, the witches get married, lose their powers, and leave Eastwick.

According to Updike, women can either be good wives and mothers or think about themselves and their happiness – but not both. He characterizes the witches as less smart and with fewer powers than Darryl. They are presented as pathetic second-wave feminists who avoid a feminine look to feel empowered although they despise their appearance. About Alexandra, he writes, “One of the liberations of becoming a witch had been that she had ceased constantly weighing herself” (17). Alexandra is fat and her hair is a “muddy pallor now further dirtied by gray” (12). Towards the beginning of the second part
of the novel, the witches try to recall Darryl’s name but are unable to do so: “The three witches fell silent, realizing that, tongue-tied, they were themselves under a spell, of a greater” (Updike 1984b, 37). When Darryl talks about his job to them, they do not know anything about his field of work. Alexandra does not even acknowledge her lack of knowledge on the subject. Darryl talks about the concept of “big interface” and Sukie is not ashamed to ask about it but Alexandra “would just have nodded as if she knew; she had a lot still to learn about overcoming acculturated female recessiveness” (50). When discussing a painting, Sukie calls it “electrifying” and Darryl calls the comment a “flirtatious featherheaded thing” (51) and regrets having wasted his time talking about it to her.

Children are a burden to them: “God, don’t children get in the way? I keep having the most terrible fights with mine. They say I’m never home and I try to explain to the little shits that I’m earning a living” (Updike 1984b, 71), says Sukie to Alexandra.

Their flaws do not stop here, though. They are also racist, as the following quotations about Alexandra reveals. She “had brought with her from the West a regrettable trace of the regional prejudice against Indians and Chicanos, and to her eyes Darryl Van Horne didn’t look washed. You could almost see little specks of black in his skin, as if he were a halftone reproduction” (Updike 1984b, 39). They are also prejudiced against homosexuals: When they hear the news that Darryl has arrived, they proceed to comment, “No wife and family, evidently” – Jane, “Oh, one of those.” “Hearing Jane’s northern voice bring her this rumor of a homosexual come up from Manhattan to invade them, Alexandra [...]” (Updike 1984b, 1). Yet, they are sexually attracted to each other. Lesbian sexuality is, though, “forbidden” and they “weep” at “the curse of heterosexuality that held them apart” (Updike 1984b, 185). Updike found depictions of homosexuality not to his taste, which transpires in most of his work, particularly in “The Witches of Eastwick”. Jane’s “new” husband is described as follows: “He had heavy-lidded protruding eyes the pale questioning blue of a Siamese cat’s; he did not drop by so briefly as to fail to notice – he who had never married and who had been written off by those he might have courted as hopelessly prissy, too sexless even to be called gay” (Updike 1984b, 340). Gay writers, among them Tony Kushner, frequently expressed their annoyance with his remarks.

Updike’s “Intentions” Versus the Final Product

Updike has described his novel as an attempt to “make things right with my, what shall we call them, feminist detractors” (Rothstein 1988, C21), meaning
it was meant to be a reply to those who would argue that his women characters were systematically spouses, housewives, and sexual objects. He further explained that his objective was to link the liberated woman to the symbol of the witch. Yet, when discussing the reasons why he had chosen such a topic, he claimed, “I would not have begun this novel if I had not known, in my life, witchy women, and in my experience felt something of the sinister old myths to resonate with the modern female experiences of liberation and raised consciousness” (Updike 2012b, 855). Ultimately, using the symbolism of the witch, he represented women both as wicked and as the “second sex”.

On the back cover of the first Ballantine Books edition (Updike 1985a), one reads,

“Alexandra, Sukie, and Jane, who consider themselves a coven, meet each Thursday for food, drink, gossip and magic. At the opening meeting of the novel, the witches gossip about the new man in town, Darryl Van Horne. Soon this man becomes central to the witches’ lives, and the coven meetings are transformed into tennis and hot tub baths at Darryl’s house. The relationship between Darryl and the witches quickly becomes sexual, and the Thursday afternoon meetings become orgies. Later, Jenny, a much younger woman, joins the group, and Darryl marries her. The three witches, jealous of Darryl’s affection, cast a spell on Jenny, and eventually, she dies. At this point, the coven disintegrates, and each witch remarries and loses her powers.”

In accordance with Updike’s upper-class WASP (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) background, his novel warns women to stay away from feminism and urges them to adopt safe traditional roles. In parallel, Updike denounces homosexual conduct, yet gay love is worth a better ending than lesbian love: While Darryl leaves town with his brother-in-law and Fidel, the witches look forward to a relationship together but soon give up pursuing the idea.

Many reviews were not favorable toward Updike’s portrayal of the witches. Critic Peter S. Prescott found them “unsympathetic […] empty, vulgar, uninteresting, forlorn, and nasty” (1984, 92). Margaret Atwood commented that “Updike provides no blameless way of being female” (1984, 1) and, in turn, Katha Pollitt called the book “patronizing”, “mean-spirited”, and “sexist” (1984, 773). Finally, Paul Gray considered the book to be Updike’s answer to the women’s movement since Updike seems to think that women who renounce domesticity will turn to evil and that “[w]hat every liberated woman wants most of all is another husband” (Gray 1984, 113).

Updike reflects what David Glover and Cora Kaplan labeled the “sixties-in-the-eighties”. Glover and Kaplan use the term to refer to how in the 1980s, the
United States underwent a national rise in conservativism and a right-wing backlash against what was, then, perceived as excessive liberalism. They write, "Today the fate of the sixties-within-the-eighties is a notoriously important issue in the struggle for cultural and political meaning, an instance of the way the conflicting forces in every conjuncture attempt to write uncontestable histories for themselves. The hegemony of the New Right has involved a sustained critical attempt to monopolize the complex terrain of the popular, and in particular to drastically overhaul the social significance of the sixties" (Glover/Kaplan 1992, 222).

Updike refers to the 1960s in the novel as a time when “[f]emale yearning was in all the papers and magazines [and] the sexual equation had become reversed as girls of good family flung themselves toward brutish rock stars[, with] dark suns turning these children of sheltered upbringing into suicidal orgiasts” (Updike 1984b, 11). In every single situation that refers to betrayals, the narrator puts the blame on women. They are allegedly unfaithful to provide comfort to “poor souls” who are in relationships with controlling women but, in doing so, they are destructive because as they attain some independence, they make their husbands lose power.

“As Alexandra accepted first one and then several lovers, her cuckolded husband shrank to the dimensions and dryness of a doll, lying beside her in her great wide receptive bed at night like a painted log picked up at a roadside stand, or a stuffed baby alligator [...] By the time of their actual divorce her former lord and master had become mere dirt—matter in the wrong place, as her mother had briskly defined it long ago—some polychrome dust she swept up and kept in a jar as a souvenir” (Updike 1984b, 5–6).

In general, about Eastwick, he comments that where once a puritan family bloomed, the Lenoxes, “[b]y the time of Alexandra’s arrival in Eastwick there was not a Lenox left in South County save one old widow, Abigail, in the stagnant quaint village of Old Wick” (Updike 1984b, 9). Updike depicts the atmosphere of the 60s as pathetic and dangerous and compares it to the negative repercussions of the “witchy woman”. The Puritan inheritance slides into further despair with the arrival of Darryl van Horne. Updike alludes to songs such as “Satisfaction” by the Rolling Stones and “I Got You Babe” by Sonny and Cher as being from an “era of many proclaimed rights, and blatant public music [when] the spirit of Woodstock was proclaimed” (Updike 1984b, 21).

The fears about women from which psychoanalysis suggests men suffer, such as that of castration, surface in witchcraft mythology where the witches’ sexuality represents death for the men who are seduced by them.
The Film Adaptation. Meaningful Differences

While the novel is set in the 1960s, the plot of the film is set in the 1980s. In the film, which is divided into three parts like the book, the three witches are initially depicted as postmodern “damsels in distress” in search of an equally postmodern “Prince Charming”, a “Mr. Right”. In the second part of the story, they are involved with one such so-to-speak “Prince Charming”, Darryl, and they enjoy the relationship. Finally, in the third part, they find out about Darryl’s “dark side” and decide to eradicate him from their lives.

The first scenes of the film show a puritan, patriotic New England town where married, religious men are unfaithful to their wives, a behavior the witches condemn. At the elementary school where Jane is a teacher, the principal suggests he will increase her salary in return for sexual favors and pats her on the behind in front of students. The children are being educated in a traditional, boring educational system, which includes that at the opening ceremony of the new school year, “America, the Beautiful” is sung and the principal’s speech exalts the “good old days” as well as the Lenox family that founded the town and subdued the “Indians”. He laments the present disintegration of values and “lost mores” and thanks Jane for her contributions, commenting, “I can see we all have our work cut out for us” and winking at her. Jane seems bored, exhausted, annoyed and Sukie comments that he had made a pass at her a week before with his wife “ten feet away”. The viewer learns that Sukie’s husband has left her because the pair had “too many” children, that Jane’s husband has left her because she could not bear a child, and that Alexandra is a widow. Later in the novel, Jane feels such discomfort with the traditional educational system that she decides to subvert the norms and adopt an unconventional approach to teaching.

When, in one of their gatherings, they express their wish to find a smart man with whom they could talk, “somebody you could be yourself with”, they envision him as “foreign”. “A tall dark European, [...] a foreign prince riding a great black horse” – this suggests that they have no racial prejudice in the way it is present in the book. Such a man would be the perfect postmodern “Prince Charming” to these “damsels in distress”. Darryl arrives in town as a result of their wishes. They have the power to bring him into their lives only to learn the lesson of how cautious they need to be regarding what they, as witches who are unaware of themselves being witches, wish for. They have desired a “Prince Charming” to come into their lives and so, one did. The problem is that such “princes” may entrap women, which is why they must be cautious to avoid falling for an undercover male chauvinist who will treat women as porcelain dolls
to be maneuvered. The film indirectly calls the attention of women viewers to this reality and consequently helps them build self-confidence.

Cristofer seems to have chosen to transfer his reading of Updike's view of women to the character of Darryl. When Darryl – whose name is spelled “Daryl” in the film's script – first approaches Alexandra, he pretends to be a feminist to win her heart and brain.

“DARYL
[...]
Women are the source, the only power.
Nature. Birth. Rebirth. Cliché,

ALEX
Why are you telling me all this?

DARYL
Because you're an honest woman.
And I'm being honest with you. I like women. I respect them. If you want me to talk to you like you're a dumb twit, I will. But what's the point? You have brains, Alex. More than brains. You have power. And you don't even know it, do you? Well, most women don't.

ALEX
Were you ever married?

DARYL
Good question. You see? Brains. The answer is no. Don't believe in it. Good for the man. Lousy for the woman. She suffocates. She dies. I've seen it. And then the husband runs around complaining that he's fucking a dead person.
And he's the one that killed her.
Where's your husband?

ALEX
Dead.

DARYL
Well, sorry, but you're one of the lucky ones. When a woman unloads a husband – or when a husband unloads a woman – however it happens – death, desertion, divorce – the three ‘d’s’ – when it happens, a woman blossoms.
[...] That's the woman for me.”

Later, Darryl uses the same technique with Jane and Sukie. All three end up having sex with him and subsequently undergo a radical change in their appearance. This corresponds to the second part of the film, when the three women are under Darryl's spell. From then on, they all have pre-Raphaelite curls and become aggressively feminine, a characteristic of postmodern female performers, namely postmodern divas (such as Cher, who plays Alexandra). They defy the concept of immutable identities when they adopt the carnivalesque body as masquerade. By using excess femininity, they are, as Judith Butler puts it, appropriating the instruments culture offers and using them to work in the opposite direction (Butler 1999, 174). Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of the “carnivalesque” refers to a literary mode that subverts and liberates the assumptions of the dominant style or atmosphere through humor and chaos. Since the witches have crossed borders, the local community perceives them as “monsters”. In a scene where Jane goes to the supermarket, all the women at the store look at her with disdain. Creed states, “that which crosses or threatens to cross the ‘border’ is abject” (2007, 11); it displays inversion that can be compared to the carnivalesque.

In one of their grotesque gatherings, the witches inadvertently help Darryl perform tricks on people that lead to the death of Felicia, the wife of Sukie's boss (in the novel, her death is caused solely by the witches). When they realize what has happened, they decide to stop seeing Darryl. This marks the beginning of the third part of the film.

Darryl gets extremely upset and decides to punish the witches by making them undergo the situations they once told him they feared the most. Sukie
undergoes excruciating pain that puts her life in danger. Fearing for her life, Alexandra goes to Darryl's mansion and convinces him that she is willing to get back on friendly terms with him. At this point, the viewer is led to believe that the women are going to win this fight and that the initial hierarchy that placed Darryl above them has been reversed, that they will “uncrown” him as they undergo a process of rebirth. Sukie recovers and they eventually start playing tricks on him. During one scene, Darryl enters the local church and addresses the congregation, inquiring if women are a mistake of God.

“DARYL

[...]
Ungrateful little bitches
[...]
Let me ask you – do you think God knew what he was doing when he created women? [...]
Or do you think it was another of his little mistakes? Like earthquakes, and floods.
[...]
So what do you think? Women. A mistake? Or did he do it to us on purpose? I'd like to know. Because if it's a mistake, maybe we could do something about it. Find a cure.
[...]
And you'll never be afflicted with women again.”

Upon his return home, the fight continues. Jane falls from the top of the stairs. Alexandra and Sukie ask her to laugh and she starts levitating (the force of gravity does not apply to them if they do not want it to), i.e., “normal” rules are suspended. The women are presented as responsible for an “assault” on masculine authority. This way, the film extends Bakhtin's analysis of the social and literary traditions of the carnivalesque (applied to social strata) to gender (Bakhtin 1984). Eventually, Darryl's powers weaken as the women keep fighting him until finally, he literally vanishes into thin air. Nine months later, the witches give birth to a baby boy each, Darryl's children. One day, he shows up
on their television screens and tries to manipulate them by winning their affection but Sukie simply turns the TV off. The male stereotype can no longer “talk like a man”. It is the final laughter of the witches as they are left to raise a new generation at the mansion that once belonged to Darryl in the company of his former servant. Ironically, Fidel is now happily loyal to the women who defeated his former master. Given Fidel's presentation in the film, this could be argued to reference the idea that gay men usually empathize with strong empowered women because they look at them as role models to fight their own insecurities and the prejudice society exposes them to.

The film depicts the cynicism of men who proclaim Puritan principles and convictions yet do not put them into practice and also of women who encounter men who introduce themselves as feminists just to earn favor. The witches manage to stick together and not allow jealousy to ruin their friendship. They are still good, caring mothers, in spite of not being housewives and they are incapable of purposefully committing atrocities and harming others. Furthermore, they are feminine and behave as third-wave feminists; they are ahead of their time.

In this way, the film is a counter-representation of the book and shows that representations are made up of signs that are combined to tell a story, pointing beyond themselves. By doing so, the film also shows how hegemony works and teases out the way a “conservative message” can speak against itself. When reviewing Updike’s book, Margaret Atwood wrote, “What a culture has to say about witchcraft, whether in jest or in earnest, has a lot to do with its views of sexuality and power, and especially with the apportioning of powers between the sexes” (Atwood 1984, Section 7, p. 1).

**John Updike and George Miller in the Classroom**

The above comparative analysis can be used in a wide variety of academic courses, such as courses in Literary Studies, Film Adaptation, Screenwriting, Film Studies, Women and Gender Studies, Popular/Media Culture, Cultural Studies, and Mythology. It can also be used in courses in Pedagogy to make students aware of the need to address issues such as deconstructing hegemonic masculinities, overcoming gender binarism, and fighting male domination and the objectification of women.

Students could be guided into selecting aspects from theoretical models suggested at the beginning of this article and locate film scenes that can be

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1 In the book, Fidel is explicitly described as gay. In the film, his homosexual orientation is implied.
understood in theoretical terms. They could proceed to explain how they relate to the model and how they see the theory manifest itself in the specifics of the chosen scenes (in words, sentences, visuals).

We suggest using theoretical concepts around masculinities in the classroom before exploring Updike's novel and its film adaptation. These concepts will expose the masculinities embedded in a social theory of gender prior to the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s, which involve what men and women do, a fixed personality type resulting from socialization, and/or a mainly inherent or biological set of personality characteristics reflecting men's and women's roles in reproduction. In a second stage, we suggest moving on to the theoretical concepts that emerged following the women's movement, namely those that asserted that biological sex is distinct from gender and focused on masculinity and femininity as personality types and behavior embodied by an individual, exploring how they are not simply cultural but also political and reflect power relations that systematically benefit men.

Here, it could prove useful to work with authors such as Raewyn Connell and her groundbreaking books “Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics” (1987) and “Masculinities” (1995), in which she defines masculinity as a location or place in social relations, embodied practice, and an idealized set of valued characteristics, called “hegemonic masculinity”, which she defines as the characteristics and practices that, when embodied by men, secure their dominance and superiority over women. This can serve as a basis on which to develop strategies for a politics of gender equality that will eventually be embraced by students.

We propose the study of film adaptation for this purpose. The film industry is one of the major agents of socialization and our ideas about gender often originate in – and are reinforced by – the narratives it produces. The more counter-representations of dominant narratives we become exposed to, the more likely we are to understand and treat masculinity as a discursive construction and propose strategies for politics of gender equality in which men will have better chances of making choices from a broad repertoire of masculine behavior. For this reason, we advocate the study of popular culture in the classroom setting, in particular film adaptations, based on the premise that an adaptation is always a rewriting. That being said, the choice of such material also contributes to the implementation of a critical pedagogy since understanding an adaptation as a rewriting can help students separate themselves from unconditional acceptance of immutable identities. They learn to ascertain how the author of a text may position a reader and how meaning and power relationships may change if such positioning is resisted or altered.
When comparing Updike’s novel with Miller’s film, one can easily explore the social construction of femininity and masculinity since the characters illustrate some of the ways we construct and perform gender identities, namely by indirect references to the material of fairy tales. The students, as readers and viewers, learn how to resist certain visual texts and images and adopt others. “The Witches of Eastwick” is also a good example to make students understand film as a set of statements about cultural authority and historical (in)visibility. By unmasking masculinities, the film demeans undemocratic ways of being a man. When the myth of the witch is deconstructed, a new fairy tale is possible, one in which “talking like a man” and “dying like a man” are no longer stances worthy of applause.

References


Teaching Materials


Questions for Discussion

• Were you ever pressed to take up a dominant form of hegemonic masculinity/femininity?
• Does discourse work to shape us as beings within the two-sex model? If so, should it work to shape us out of both sides of any binary? Consider the following:
  • Jack Nicholson’s line “A woman is a hole, isn’t that what they say? All the futility of the world pouring into her” refers to the statement taken from Jean-Paul Sartre’s book “Being and Nothingness” (taken from IMDB’s Trivia page for the film - https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094332/trivia).
  • Do you think that “clothes make the man”?
  • In what ways has the film industry been framing/unframing roles and providing viewers with ways of creating gender norms?
    • Do they offer ideas for resisting gender-based inequities?
  • Can pop icons and film stars be catalysts of ruptures and social changes? Do entertainers have a place in the production/consumption dialectic of a media text, that is, its ideology? Take into account the following:
• Cher’s line “Big deal, it’s not like it’s gonna get us on David Letterman” (spoken in one of the first scenes of the movie when the women suspect they may have telepathy) was different in the script, where it referred to Johnny Carson instead. Cher decided to say “David Letterman”, because she personally disliked Carson. Years earlier, while watching the 1968 presidential election returns, an aggravated Carson had reprimanded Cher at a party for making rude jokes about Richard Nixon. After that, she refused to go on “The Tonight Show Starring Johnny Carson”, unless a guest was hosting (taken from IMDB’s Trivia page for the film – https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094332/trivia).

• While recording the scene with the snakes surrounding her bed, Cher famously commented, “Which one is Jon Peters (one of the film producers)?” (taken from IMDB’s Trivia page for the film – https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094332/trivia).

Fanfiction als utopische Praxis und (queere) Utopie?

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Fanfiction als utopische Praxis und (queere) Utopie?

Was wäre, wenn ... – Eine Einleitung

Fanfiction writers, more than most people, know how to tell a story that begins, ‘What if...?’ (Coppa 2013, 308)


1 Ich verwende an dieser Stelle den Unterstrich, um die Prozesshaftigkeit und die Uneindeutigkeit von Positionen zu benennen und gleichzeitig die unterschiedlichen und vielfältigen Bedeutungsebenen einzelner W_orte und Begriffe hervorzuheben und zu verdeutlichen (vgl. Bretz/Lantzsch 2013, 8).


2 Der Begriff Produsage geht zurück auf Axel Bruns (2008), der damit eine nutzer:innenbasierte kollektive Erschaffung von Inhalten in Form von z.B. Blogs, Social Media, Fanfiction etc. beschreibt.

Vampir:innen als Symbol für Wünsche und Ängste


Die Sehnsucht nach dem, was (noch) nicht ist

Der Begriff der Utopie wird wissenschaftlich vielfältig diskutiert und definiert: Utopien können literarisch und fiktional sein oder gesellschaftspolitische Entwürfe einer zu realisierenden besseren Welt darstellen. Sie können als Inspirationsquelle für soziologische Überlegungen nutzbar gemacht werden oder als individuelle Tagträume und Wünsche in Erscheinung treten.⁴


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Fanfiction als Raum für Wünsche und Träume

Diese Zurückweisung von dem, was ist, zeigt sich mit Blick auf Fanfictions insbesondere darin, dass diese weniger als Hommage an den Originaltext zu verstehen sind, sondern die Möglichkeit einer kritischen, perversen und grenzüber schreitenden Auseinandersetzung mit diesem beinhalten können. Dadurch lassen sie sich insofern als potentiell utopisch begreifen, als dass sie einen Raum für Sexualitäten, Begehrensformen und Geschlechter außerhalb einer Entweder-oder-Ordnung eröffnen. Insbesondere bei Slash Fiction werden er-


„This allows, to some extent, for fan utopias to enjoy the best of both worlds—they benefit from utopian storytelling’s ability to point toward a better future, which can motivate the desire for change, while not fore- closing the possibility for critique and revision, since no one utopia ever maintains authority.“ (2016, 8)

Diese Möglichkeiten zur Kritik, zur Revision und zum prozesshaften, offenen und auch kollektiven Schreiben sowie der Dialog und die Strukturen innerhalb von Fanfiction-Communitys sind es, die Fanfiction sowohl als literarische Utopie als auch als utopische Praxis so wertvoll machen. Denn zum einen können diese Texte als Teil einer sich ständig wandelnden Utopiedebatte verstanden werden und zum anderen sind sie selbst stetigen Transformationsprozessen ausgesetzt und können so Veränderungen zulassen (vgl. Bulk 2017, 257).

homoerotische Beziehungen im Vordergrund. Sheenagh Pugh (2005, 95) geht davon aus, dass sich eine Motivation im Schreiben von Slash Fiction durch den homoerotischen Subtext vieler Originalwerke erklären lässt. Anzumerken ist hierbei, dass die Bezeichnung Slash zu- meist für homosexuelle Inhalte zwischen männlichen Figuren steht, homosexuelle Inhalte zwischen weiblichen Figuren hingegen als Femslash bezeichnet werden. Auch hier findet sich die Norm also in der männlichen Form, wohingege die weibliche Form als Abwei- chung markiert wird.
Methodologische Überlegungen zur Analyse queerer Utopien


8 Wie bereits diskutiert bezeichnet Slash Fanfictions mit homoerotischen Inhalten, die auf Fanfiction-Plattformen zumeist als solche markiert werden müssen. Het-Fictions hingegen sind die unmarkierte Norm, da sie heterosexuelle Beziehungen zum Inhalt haben und so nicht gesondert ausgewiesen werden müssen. Die Bezeichnung „Het-Fictions“ stellt einen Versuch dar, diese unmarkierte Norm sichtbar zu machen.

9 Auf Fanfiction-Plattformen können Nutzer:innen Texte suchen und diese Suche über die Auswahl bestimmter Kriterien einschränken. Die gängigsten Kriterien dabei sind „Fandom“...

on wurden die Daten in MAXQDA eingepflegt und die Analyse begonnen. Die Online-Gruppendiskussion lieferte durch die Eröffnung von spezifischen Sinnprovinzen und Erfahrungswelten wichtige Hinweise auf das, was (noch) nicht im Blick ist. Dies erwies sich insbesondere für die Analyse der Fanfictions von großer Bedeutung. So konnte das induktiv entwickelte Kategoriensystem durch die deduktiv herausgearbeiteten Kategorien sowohl der Fanfictions als auch der Gruppendiskussion komplementiert werden.

**Die Zurückweisung von dem, was ist**

Im Folgenden lege ich anhand von Beispielen aus den analysierten Fanfictions und der Online-Gruppendiskussion dar, innerhalb welcher Themenkomplexe utopische Visionen und Wünsche via Fanfiction artikuliert werden und wie diese ‚Räume der Kritik‘ eröffnen und transformative Potentiale zum Ausdruck bringen. Wo findet sich das Träumen und Streben nach neuen und anderen/besseren Freuden, nach anderen/besseren Arten, in der Welt zu sein, und so letztlich nach ganz neuen Welten, wie José Esteban Muñoz (2009, 1) es formulier? Der Fokus der Suche nach diesen Träumen und Wünschen liegt dabei in diesem Artikel auf (alternativen) Formen von Familie, Verwandtschaft und Fortpflanzung. Die darin enthaltenen, teilweise ambivalenten Aus- und Verhandlungen von Normativität geben sowohl Aufschluss darüber, auf welche normativen Denkfiguren zurückgegriffen wird, als auch darüber, was an gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen verweigert und zurückgewiesen wird, sowie über die Sehnsüchte nach dem Anderen; über das, was ist, und das, was wäre, wenn ...

Sowohl im Fragebogen (FB), den die Teilnehmer:innen der Diskussion zu Beginn ausfüllten, als auch in der Gruppendiskussion (T) und in den Fanfiction-Texten selbst (F) werden Wünsche nach Veränderungen ausgedrückt. Diese können auf einer individuellen Ebene Wünsche nach weniger (Lohn-)Arbeit und einem erfüllten Leben sein. Sie finden sich auch in den Wünschen danach, „in meiner anderen Welt zu sein“ (Finn T10, 16), um zum Beispiel den Alltag, das Hier und Jetzt wenigstens kurz auszublenden. Das Träumen von einer besseren Welt kann zum anderen auch die gesellschaftliche Ebene betreffen, zum Beispiel indem Wünsche geäußert werden nach „mehr queere[n] Charakteren in Literatur und Film ohne das diese die Sicht von Heteros oder Cisses darstellen“ (Udai FB, 4ff.) oder nach einer herrschaftsarmen „freie[n] sozialistische[n] Gesellschaft“ (Anon FB, 4). Und auch in den Fanfictions findet die Sehnsucht nach dem, was (noch) nicht ist, nach Veränderung einen Ausdruck, wie Chris es treffend zusammenfasst:

„[Daraus] leitet sich für mich ab, dass ich mir in Zukunft, wie viele von euch auch, mehr queere Figuren und Liebesbeziehungen und auch
kreativ variierte Geschlechtermodelle von Held_innen wünsche, […] vielleicht kommt das dann da draußen irgendwann auch an, bis dahin machen wir das selber weiter, würde ich sagen.“ (Chris T2, 96ff.)

„Du gehörst zur Familie“ – Idealbilder und Alternativen

Familiendynamiken und -strukturen, Vorstellungen einer idealen Familie sowie dysfunktionale und alternative Formen von Familie spielen in allen analysierten Fanfictions eine zentrale Rolle. Hier lassen sich Transformationsprozesse und Zurückweisungen sowie eine Sehnsucht nach dem, was sein könnte, identifizieren. Das Ideal von Familie wird dabei besonders häufig über die vermeintliche Abweichung konstruiert. Diese Abweichungen bieten jedoch das Potential, Alternativen zu entwickeln und zu erproben. So finden sich in den Beispielen Wahlfamilien und erweiterte Familienstrukturen, die gerade aus dem Scheitern am Ideal, aus der Zurückweisung von dem, was ist, erwachsen.


„Wir waren nach Shreveport, Louisana gezogen, da mein Bruder hier einen vielversprechenden Job angeboten bekommen hatte [...] Wir hatten unser letztes Geld zusammengekratzt um uns die Kaution für diese kleine Wohnung zu bezahlen. [...] Wir glaubten an einen schönen Neuanfang. Ohne Eltern die uns nur noch ausbeuteten und ohne Drama.“ (F N, 7)

Deutlich werden an dieser Passage auch die Abhängigkeitsstrukturen und Hierarchien innerhalb von Familiendynamiken sowie die Interdependenzen mit der Kategorie Klasse. In dieser Ambivalenz zwischen bestehenden Hierarchien und Normen und dem Wunsch nach Veränderung liegt das emanzipatorische Potential. Der Neuanfang in einer neuen Stadt markiert die Sehnsucht nach einem Überwinden von dysfunktionalen Familiendynamiken und Klassenschranken und eröffnet zugleich einen Blick in eine potentielle Zukunft, ohne das Hier und Jetzt gänzlich zu verlassen.
Auch in der Vampire-Diaries-Fanfiction „You're my Savior“ nimmt die Abwesenheit der Eltern sowie die dysfunktionale Beziehung zu diesen in der Vergangenheit eine zentrale Rolle ein, aus der alternative familiäre Strukturen erwachsen. So findet die Hauptfigur Selina nach dem Tod ihrer Eltern in ihrem Ziehvater Alexander eine Alternative zu den Erfahrungen in ihrer Kindheit, die Selina wie folgt beschreibt:

„Zu meinen Eltern, Miranda und Greyson […]. Da war nie Anerkennung, da kam nie ein ‚Selina ich bin stolz auf dich’ […] Es hat sie einfach nicht interessiert was mit mir war. Ich hab echt alles getan um ihre Aufmerksamkeit zu bekommen doch alles was ich bekam war weitere Ablehnung […] Da war nur noch Hass. Hass auf meine Familie, Hass auf Elena … ich hab ihr das schlechteste gewünscht […] Wie sagt man so schön ‚Familie kann man sich nicht aussuchen‘ Ich wollte nur immer wissen warum. Warum sie mich nicht geliebt haben aber Elena schon …“ (F YmS, 100)

Selinas Familie scheiterte bereits vor dem Tod ihrer Eltern am Ideal. In Kontrast dazu wird die Beziehung zwischen Selina und Alexander beschrieben. Hier findet Selina eine Zuflucht und eine Alternative zu Missgunst und Konkurrenz, fehlender Anerkennung und Liebe. Denn obwohl Selina nicht Alexanders leibliches Kind ist, übernimmt dieser Verantwortung, zeigt offen seine Sorge und Zuneigung:

„Du sagst vieles Selin[a], ich möchte aber, dass du dich in der Zeit wo du hier bist wohl fühlst. […]‘ Dankbar sah ich ihn an. ‚Danke, ich wüsste nicht was ich ohne dich tun würde.‘ ‚Selbstverständlichkeit, mehr ist das hier nicht. Du gehörst zur Familie‘“ (ebd., 21)


**Alternative Formen von Verwandtschaft und Reproduktion**

Werden am Beispiel der Familie vor allem anhand der Abweichungen vom Ideal Alternativen entwickelt, so resultieren diese beim Thema Verwandtschaft vor allem aus der Normsetzung des Vampirischen und einer Abwertung des Mensch-
lichen. Dies wird vor allem auch durch die Einordnung der Fanfictions in das Vampiregenre begünstigt. Dennoch finden sich auch Verhandlungen von Normen, die einen Referenzrahmen angeben. In der Vampire-Diaries-Fanfiction „Große Worte, Wetten und andere Schwierigkeiten“ zeigen sich diese in der Auseinandersetzung der Protagonist:innen mit dem gesellschaftlichen (menschlichen) Inzesttabu. Hier finden sich Momente, in denen diese Normen dekonstruiert und hinterfragt werden und das Vampirische zur neuen, besseren Norm erhoben wird:


„Ich bin vor einigen Monaten Vater geworden“ – Reproduktion und Fortpflanzung


„Ich bin vor einigen Monaten Vater geworden.‘ Der Schock stand mir ins Gesicht geschrieben. „Aber du bist ein Hybrid … ihr könnt doch also ihr habt doch, du weißt schon …‘ ,Wir können uns nicht fortpflanzen das dachte ich auch, doch meine Werwolfseite ermöglicht es.“ (F YmS, 273).

Hier werden die Regeln und Grenzen des Vampirgenres durch Hybridisierung unterlaufen und durchbrochen. Der Hybrid wird zur Bedrohung für die biologische Kleinfamilie – plötzlich werden neue Zukünfte insofern denkbar, als dem
Verworfenen, dem Anderen die Möglichkeit zur Reproduktion nicht mehr verwehrt bleibt.\textsuperscript{10} Gleichzeitig bleiben die heteronormativen Reproduktionsvorstellungen unangetastet. Doch nicht nur in der Geschichte selbst ist Fortpflanzung ein zentrales Thema. In einem Review zu „Sunrise over Dallas“ äußert eine Produzent:in den Wunsch danach, dass die menschliche Stephanie und der vampirische Godric ein Kind bekommen. Wie genau dies möglich sein soll, sei jedoch unklar:

„Ich fände es schön wenn sie zusammen bleiben, ob sie ein gemeinsames Kind bekommen sollen weiß ich nicht aber es wäre bestimmt schön das zulesen, gerade weil Godric in einem Früheren Kapitel sagte das er gerne Kinder gehabt hätte.“ (F SoD-R, 5)


Diese deutliche Verweigerung und Zurückweisung von Reproduktion, von dieser Form der Verantwortung und so gleichzeitig auch die Zurückweisung der entsprechenden gesellschaftlichen Erwartungen lassen durchaus widerständige, emanzipatorische Potentiale erkennen. So findet sich hier die Forderung nach Recht auf körperliche Selbstbestimmung, die sich ohne Weiteres in aktuell-

\textsuperscript{10} Die Fortpflanzung des Hybrids Klaus in der Fanfiction findet sich in dieser Form auch im Originaltext der Serie.
le gesellschaftliche Debatten, zum Beispiel um das Werbeverbot für Schwangerschaftsabbrüche in Deutschland\(^{11}\), einreihen lässt und die durch die Figur der Vampirin die sich mit der (Un-)Möglichkeit einer Abtreibung gar nicht auseinandersetzen muss, neue utopische Dimensionen eröffnet.

„Ganz gerne wünsche ich mir auch mal in meiner anderen Welt zu sein“ – Fazit


Gerade durch diese Verbindung von dem:der Vampir:in als das Andere mit Fanfiction als Experiment und Raum für Erfahrung implizieren die darin ver- und entworfenen Möglichkeiten Wünsche und Sehnsüchte nach Alternativen und Transformationen in Form von – auch queeren – Utopien. Innerhalb eines nach wie vor wirksamcn binären Geschlechtsystems findet sich in Fanfictions für viele queere Produser:innen ein Ausweg: Fanfiction gibt ihnen Raum, zu schreiben, was sie selbst gern lesen würden, Stereotype zu hinterfragen, sich selbst auszuprobieren und zu experimentieren. Wie hier gezeigt werden konnte, hält die Figur des:r Vampir:in auf mehreren Ebenen queeres Potential bereit, das mögliche queere Zukünfte denkbar macht. Dabei ließen sich in den besprochenen Beispielen insbesondere alternativen Formen von Familie, Verwandtschaft und Reproduktion identifizieren, die immer eine Kritik an dem, was ist, beinhalten. Insgesamt finden sich in den besprochenen Beispielen der Fan-

\(^{11}\) Die Debatte um die Abschaffung des Paragrafen 218/219a StGB erhielt 2019 durch die Verurteilung einer Ärztin aus Gießen, die auf ihrer Homepage angegeben hatte, Abtreibungen durchzuführen, neuen Auftrieb und sorgte bundesweit für zahlreiche Proteste unter dem Motto „Information ist keine Werbung“ (vgl. z.B. Hecht 2019).


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