The Future of Female Employment: A Gendered Gap in Political Discourse
Nickel, Hildegard Maria
2003
https://doi.org/10.25595/290

Veröffentlichungsversion / published version
Sammelbandbeitrag / collection article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY 4.0 Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu dieser Lizenz finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de

Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY 4.0 License (Attribution). For more information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
REINVENTING GENDER

Women in Eastern Germany since Unification

edited by
Eva Kolinsky
and
Hildegard Maria Nickel

FRANK CASS
LONDON • PORTLAND, OR
# Contents

List of Tables and Figures .......................... vii
List of Contributors ............................... ix
Preface ........................................ xi

Introduction: Reinventing Gender after the GDR
*Eva Kolinsky and Hildegard Maria Nickel* ........................... 1

## Part I. Employment and Education in a Reinvented Gender Regime

Chapter One
The Future of Female Employment: A Gendered Gap in Political Discourse
*Hildegard Maria Nickel* .......................................................... 31

Chapter Two
Employment Opportunities and Labour Market Exclusion: Towards a New Pattern of Gender Stratification?
*Sabine Schenk* ................................................................. 53

Chapter Three
Gender and Education in East Germany after Unification
*Rosalind M. O. Pritchard* ......................................................... 78

Chapter Four
Gender and the Limits of Equality in East Germany
*Eva Kolinsky* .................................................................. 100

## Part II. Gender and Families in the New Risk Environment

Chapter Five
Women and Poverty in the German Welfare State
*Mechthild M. Matheja-Theaker* .................................................. 131
Chapter Six
Single Mothers in East Germany 151
*Beate Schuster and Angelika Traub*

Chapter Seven
Female Unemployment in the East: Or, How to Stay in the Labour Market 172
*Vanessa Beck*

Chapter Eight
Beyond Typical Life-Plans: Young Women's Themes of Life in East and West Germany 190
*Barbara Keddi, Patricia Pfeil, Petra Strehmel and Svendy Wittmann*

Chapter Nine
Family and Family Orientation in East Germany 209
*Harald Uhlendorff*

PART III. GENDER IN THE REINVENTED POLITICS OF EAST GERMANY

Chapter Ten
Women in Politics in Post-Communist East Germany 231
*Marilyn Rueschemeyer*

Chapter Eleven
Young Women in Right-Wing Groups and Organisations in East Germany 250
*Karin Weiss and Katrin Isermann*

Index 277
The Future of Female Employment: 
A Gendered Gap in Political Discourse

HILDEGARD MARIA NICKEL

TWO INTERWOVEN PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION

Germany is undergoing a dual social transformation. On the one hand, there are the economic, social and cultural processes associated with the country's political unification, which have primarily been taking place in the east, in the new federal states (Nickel 2001: 106ff.). On the other hand, general processes of modernisation and the advent of risk society and post-industrial structures are transforming the west and are also impacting on the east. Transformation, therefore, consists of two distinct, yet interwoven, developments.

The situation in the eastern job market is dramatic, and not only for women. More than ten years after unification, this can hardly be described as a temporary phase of adjustment. Rather, the east–west divide in the labour market seems to be assuming manifest features of permanence as the east became 'unhooked from the economic cycle' (Thierse 2001). The lack of job opportunities in the east exacerbates not only east–west polarisation, but also social differentiation in the east.

Eastern Germany is marked by a 'two-thirds society' which is the very mirror of its western counterpart. Only the upper third have been successfully integrated, corresponding to the centre ground of western society. The middle third, still resolutely in the running but with a sense that their life and employment prospects are still at risk in the east, constitute the 'centre ground' of eastern society. Set apart from this is a lower third, not – be it in the short or long term – actively integrated into society, a preliminary stage of the classical underclass. (Thierse 2001)

This undoubtedly crude stratification model has a gender grammar and a generation overlay: the growing number of women in long-term
unemployment and extremely high youth unemployment make it easy to predict who the candidates for this classical underclass are likely to be.

It is often forgotten that the transformation of eastern Germany is set within a process of social transformation in the west, the old federal states, which began long before German unification (Nickel 2001: 106). This more general process relates to the constellation of post-war growth, and is evidently undergoing a crisis: the process is no longer smooth, and has not yet entered a new phase of prosperity leading to a noticeable decrease in high basic unemployment.

From the outset, West Germany’s post-war prosperity went hand in hand with reforms achieved after conflicts over the distribution of wealth. The results were high levels of employment, prolonged economic growth, cushions for social inequality, a broad expansion and individualisation of educational and career opportunity, a diversification of freely chosen forms of cohabitation, and broad democratisation. The basic social consensus of the post-war period was founded on a social contract which was not legally enshrined but was nonetheless observed in practice, which aimed to achieve compromise on the distribution question and which was inspired by the idea that all members of society were ‘social partners’ with a more or less equal right to benefit from economic growth. During those years, federal government policy did not merely trail along in linear fashion behind the (upward) development in GNP. Social spending actually grew faster than GNP, as in all western European countries; it also played a proactive part in shaping social structure by compensating and regulating, and this in turn brought gains for the emancipatory interests of the individual. This was intentional and entailed rights that proved enforceable in practice, providing the narrow material basis for a whole series of emancipatory steps forward for women in the Federal Republic of Germany from the mid- or late 1960s onwards.

Following structural crisis in the mid-1970s, this overall social construct grew unstable; mass unemployment nibbled insidiously at the financial foundations of social state mechanisms for secondary distribution. The coalition government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl launched a conservative political reform and after 1982 a policy took effect of gradually modifying established relations of distribution in the name of deregulation, labour market flexibility and the ‘restructuring’ of the welfare state, its aim evidently being to discard the social compromise. It was not entirely unsuccessful. The fulfilment of individual social and cultural needs is flung back to the level of primary income distribution, ignoring the fact that societies today are stratified in terms of status, power and access to resources along the lines of class, gender, age and ethnic origin.

The process of dual transformation does not affect all men and women in Germany at the same time and in the same way. The differentiations between the sexes, and also between women, are considerable. Struggles
over the distribution of resources, above all employment, are exacerbated. In the same breath, the old bourgeois order of gender, which had long since been abolished in the GDR anyway, has finally vanished in the Federal Republic, or to put it another way, the gender order associated with the industrial era of capitalism is becoming obsolete, with both parties, women and men, increasingly challenging it. The old gender order centred on the 'normal family' and the ideal of a male bread-winner family income was founded on the division and bipolar gender allocation of gainful employment and domestic labour. Even if the bread-winner marriage has been eroding in West Germany since the late 1960s at the latest, and in spite of the fact that many families did not fit that industrial model before, it is ultimately the foundation on which the German social state, modifications apart, is built. It is certainly one reason why there are structural limits to integrating women into the world of paid employment. East German women are feeling this particularly at present, but they may be the ones who bring to a head the conflict over who gets the jobs, which is the very core of the equal rights issue, and who show up the need for renewal in employment policy and the social state. At least, they illustrate problems which affect women generally in Germany.

This chapter will examine how the more general process of 'dual transformation' has affected gender relations. Against the backcloth of developments in eastern Germany, it will illuminate the complex nature of dual transformation. For all their interdependence, the components in this process are not of equal status, but asymmetrical and hierarchical. It is taking place within the framework of the institutional structure of the old Federal Republic, enlarged eastwards in 1990. After more than ten years of German unity one must ask whether and how the societal agenda is structured around female employment, and whether and how East German experiences are taken into account.

In recent decades a multifarious system of academic policy input has evolved in the Federal Republic of Germany. It focuses on a variety of societal themes and has in part a political advisory function and in part a strong influence on public debate. We already have, for example, the 10th Report on Children and Youth and the 6th Family Report, while reports are regularly published on the condition of women in Germany, the latest in 1998. Apart from these reports, which are commissioned by the federal government, there is a less formalised reports system commissioned by individual states, parties and organisations. My comments here are confined to reports about the future of work produced at the latter level (by 'Future Commissions'), and will investigate whether they address gender relations, and if so, how they go about it. These reports are of immense importance as political advisory documents, influencing political decision-makers as well as public opinion. They have a significant part to play in shaping the social framework and hence the future of Germany.
REINVENTING GENDER

The demise of the Kohl administration in 1998 coincided with a conspicuous ‘backlog’ of reform agendas in Germany. This was the social context for a plethora of ‘Future Commissions’ which, depending on their political complexion, championed one or another of the reform strategies which were being proposed in order to ‘modernise’ the country. In all, this political debate about Germany’s ability to confront future challenges, gender and the gender gap issue played a noticeably marginal role. In the concluding section, I will argue that this gender-blind perspective has catastrophic results for women because it threatens to prolong the structural gender inequality of industrial society into the future.

The central proposition of what follows is that women’s integration into paid employment is a yardstick of society’s modernisation. This issue will demonstrate whether Germany can manage the transition to a service and ‘knowledge’ society, which builds on the creativity and commitment of as many people as possible and in so doing furthers social integration and cohesion. A gender-sensitive perspective will be an essential prerequisite here in order to overcome the structural inequality between men and women which developed in industrial society and was perpetuated by the (West) ‘German Model’. In a process of societal transformation perceived in these terms, East German experience provides a ‘head start’ towards modernisation (see sections below). The final section of this chapter will ask how political frameworks can neutralise the gender gap.

LABOUR AND GENDER RELATIONS IN FLUX

The industrial nations of the west are immersed in a process of restructuring, a societal transformation which affects every sphere of life: work, politics, the family and the gender order. In Germany this societal transformation is not only proceeding sluggishly, but has long been either ignored or else assumed to concern only the area which once constituted East Germany, which is perceived as ‘lagging behind’ the modern world. There are some, indeed, who blame the east’s need to ‘close the modernisation gap’ for any ‘anti-modernisation blockades’ in the west of the country.

If we focus our assessment on gender relations, we soon note that there had already been a severe need for modernisation in the Federal Republic prior to unification, and that since 1990 this has exerted an impact on both the east and the west of the country. Certainly, one problem of major significance to society – the compatibility of work and life or, to put it in more traditional terms, the ability of both genders to reconcile family and career – is still far from being adequately resolved. The core of societal restructuring lies in the transition from an industrial to a service society. This transformation process places an old problem – one which gender
research has been addressing for more than twenty years – in an even harsher light. It also delineates new contours for its solution, and in fact hugely intensifies the pressure for that solution. This is especially clear from women's shaky integration into the employment market. The sociologist Martin Baethge (1999) observes correctly that opinion in (western) Germany finds it difficult to grasp that women's participation in the labour market is creating jobs rather than devouring them, given that higher levels of female employment usually go hand in hand with a greater volume of labour hitherto performed privately acquiring market forms, and with increased demand for services, not only those of a domestic nature. He actually goes further and argues that a higher rate of female employment is a crucial condition for reducing unemployment in Germany. I would go a step beyond that. My fundamental proposition is that the integration of women into the employment market is a yardstick for Germany's ability to make the transition to a service society, a post-industrial ('knowledge') society built on the creativity and commitment of as many people as possible and fostering social cohesion, participation and integration instead of exclusion and social polarisation (see also Thierse 2001).

The debates currently under way in various 'Future Commissions' echo a dispute over the question that has polarised (West) German social scientists since the 1980s: is the employment society (Arbeitsgesellschaft) in crisis? What has emerged is a political controversy about the future of employment, culminating in recommendations for labour market policies. These recommendations impact on gender relations, without openly acknowledging that they do (Nickel 1999, 2000).

For example, the Future Commission of the Free States of Bavaria and Saxony, politically close to the CDU/CSU, argued that individual attitudes and behaviour patterns and above all collective principles in the field of employment will have to change fundamentally because the institutional demands of an 'employee-centred industrial society' are jeopardising Germany's future. In this view, the great majority of the working population expects 'third parties (employers) to organise and market their labour power and thereby provide them with a source of income, while the state ensures their standard of living during unemployment, sickness, periods in which they require care and old age' (Kommission für Zukunftsfragen 1997: 3, 7). Given the enduring changes occurring in the economy and in society – with occupations apparently being replaced by knowledge and capital – the employers and the state are hardly able to fulfil these expectations nowadays. 'For this reason, as many working individuals as possible must accept greater responsibility for their employment and their livelihood ... the model for the future is man as the entrepreneur for his own labour power' (ibid.: 7). Action recommended to achieve this future scenario included: the transition to an entrepreneurial
knowledge society, implemented by creative, business-minded people who are only likely to succeed if they are properly skilled; the accumulation of personal wealth on the part of broad sections of the population, rather than welfare benefits meted out by the government; business start-ups to replace risk evasion by paid labour; competition and the privatisation of state-owned companies and of public services, rather than leaving responsibility in the hands of local authorities.

By contrast, the Future Commission of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (allied to the SPD) identified (paid) labour as a fundamental value, explicitly emphasising the state’s responsibility to guarantee it: ‘The desire to participate in socially useful labour and in gainful employment can be formulated as a basic democratic right in a market economy founded on a democratic society’ (Zukunftskommission 1998: 229). Perpetual mass unemployment, therefore, must be regarded as a serious threat to the democratic community, and for the sake of democracy eliminating mass unemployment is a crucial task for the future. The recommendations included: reform and renewal of the (West) ‘German Model’, which was founded on a dynamic economy, a corporate political system, a social state providing broad security and ‘full employment’, which in fact – and this demonstrates the need for reform – is structured around gender hierarchy. The regular male working week was predicated on female family and household labour, the ‘single bread-winner marriage’. Hopes of reforming this model, which has been preserved over a considerable period, focus on two employment strategies: one exploits the openings created by upgrading human resources and enhancing innovation potential, above all in the field of high tech; the other looks to the low-pay sector for salvation.

The concept of the employment society (Arbeitsgesellschaft), which some social scientists had already abandoned when the debate about its crisis first arose, is linked to a recognition that in industrial society a person’s ‘occupation’ is the touchstone which determines opportunities (Zukunftskommission 1998). Material status and social prestige depend on it, but so do social entitlements as well as civil and political rights.

Just as women reach for this magic wand – and the Future Report produced for Bavaria and Saxony (Kommission für Zukunftsfragen 1997) illustrated this – the value and significance of regular skilled employment start to be dismantled. Or else, in a different variation on the theme, women’s employment is functionalised and instrumentalised to promote a particular interest. Thus there are those who, in the current political debate, project woman as the new working prototype: the lifestyle entrepreneur of the future is female because women are in every respect better equipped for the post-industrial era; they have learned better than
men to combine various social functions and to manage their ‘activity portfolios’. Others, meanwhile, regard female employment, if not as the cause of the crisis which has hit the occupational society, then at least as a reinforcing factor.

Most Future Commissions, with greater or lesser eloquence, reiterate the demand for a society in which women enjoy equality. However, when it comes to specific blueprints women are frequently not mentioned at all. Worse than that, they usually stand to lose from the policy recommendations which follow.

The effects of this gender blindness on the one hand and male-centred policy on the other have been explored on various occasions by feminist and social science research (Sauer 1999; Offe 2001). Pfarr and Linne (1998: 10) completed a study for the Boeckler Foundation (allied to the German Trade Union Federation DGB) on these issues and formulated a number of recommendations:

• Before ‘labour’ is rashly abandoned or transformed, attention should be given to how it meets a need for social integration, not only for men but also for women.

• Labour needs to be debated in terms of the theory of democracy, as economic and social inequality have a political dimension. ‘Those who are content to claim that insecure employment automatically accompanies any drive towards modernisation, and that as a consequence it must be accepted and borne by the private individual, will be obliged to demonstrate what opportunities this grants for a democratic participation in life and in society.’

• A dearth of visions must be countered by formulating theoretical blueprints for society which teach ‘the gender-blind eye’ to see. ‘Some of the visions currently mooted as “the future of labour” do not merely suffer from not being able to provide a full answer to the question: “What does this blueprint do for women and their wish to work?” The picture is worse. The right questions are not even asked.’

For its employment policy projects, the Future Commission set up by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation confined itself to a narrow selection of reform models. On the one hand, there was a focus on enhancing the innovation potential of the high-tech sector, and in particular on upgrading human resources. While not compensating for mass unemployment, this at least injects some momentum into the labour market. On the other hand, ideas
were advanced for employing the poorly skilled, who make up the bulk of the (long-term) unemployed. No consideration at all was given to the gender dimension. If we factor this into an analysis of the models proposed for reforming labour market integration, it emerges that the opportunities and risks are still distributed asymmetrically for men and women. Moreover, it emerges that a gender-sensitive approach to policy-making is indispensable if we truly wish to break open the vicious circle of uneven employment distribution between men and women with all the social consequences this entails, and to generate greater gender democracy.

*Sectoral economic change and upgrading*

Economic structures in the industrial nations are shifting increasingly towards the service sector. The same applies to Germany, which has been able to maintain the pace of sectoral transformation. Service companies with a high knowledge component are taking the lead. More than one-third of the employed population – primarily men – are already working in this field. The knowledge component of employment is intensifying. The skilled work-force is growing faster than employment as a whole. Jobs that demand high skills are less likely to disappear. The introduction of new technologies primarily reduces the demand for poorly skilled workers. These are the major victims of the structural transformation induced by technology (Zukunftskommission 1998: 166).

As average skilling levels rise and knowledge-based labour spreads, however, there is a danger that the labour market will undergo a deeper segmentation: on the one hand, groups who find employment in centres of highly qualified activity, and on the other, those who perform unskilled or low-skill labour. As knowledge itself becomes more quickly outdated, anyone who leaves employment for a lengthy period runs the risk of being isolated from developments, especially as skill requirements which go beyond the standard qualification are usually fostered in conjunction with a person’s present job.

It is easy to foresee what this means for women if the process is not supported by appropriate framework conditions. It is true that women have narrowed the education gap considerably; in 1997 women began to outnumber men among the university student intake in Germany. Nevertheless, the education indicator does not offer firm protection against the disadvantages which confront women when it comes to employment policy. Not only are women in general more frequent victims of unemployment than men, but so are qualified and highly qualified women, and they are encountered more frequently than men in unstable jobs or jobs below their skill level (Trautwein-Kalms 1999: 45). In career terms,
women have a ‘lop-sided orientation’ (ibid.) towards social occupations, education, the arts and humanities, not only for subjective reasons, but above all due to social patterns of determination. In terms of employment, they have not so far benefited from the future technologies to which the reform proposals attach such weight, and at present the proportion of women training for these is actually decreasing again, not increasing. Let us take the case of information technology as a university degree subject. Initially this seemed to offer women an opportunity to advance. In 1979, 19 per cent of students on these courses in West Germany were female, but women’s interest had stagnated by the mid-1980s. In the early 1990s the proportion had fallen to 15 per cent. Ten years on, universities reported that only 5 per cent of their first-semester information technology students were female (Trautwein-Kalms 1999: 46). One challenge remaining for the future, therefore, is to combat the social disadvantages women encounter in the field of employment, which are still perpetuated in part at least by horizontally unequal qualifications.

The hidden yardstick for the development of human resources in the high-tech sector is the total availability of the working individual, free of family and domestic responsibilities, who can certainly be female but is usually – at least in the blueprints for the future – conceived as male. In terms of gender policy, this reform agenda can already be said to ignore the actual needs and interests of both women and men, and we are bound to doubt whether this is a viable prospect for the future at all, especially when we consider that in the international arena – at least this appears to be increasingly the case in the United States – the creativity and potential which derive from employing women in the high-tech sector have long been regarded as an innovative and economical resource. In high-tech companies – Hewlett-Packard, for example – part-time work, job-sharing and sabbaticals are not merely concessions to problems women have in combining their functions, but positive approaches to designing work patterns which satisfy changing lifestyles, including those of men.

@Service gap’ and gender polarisation

On two points the recommendations from the Future Commissions set up by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Free States of Bavaria and Saxony appeared to concur: first, in the belief that jobs can be generated in Germany by closing a perceived ‘service gap’; and second, in the importance attached to regulating labour by means of its cost. The recommendation here was to reduce labour costs in the ‘simple services’ in order to stimulate the demand for these services and thereby create jobs for the poorly skilled. This recommendation has been subjected to
several critical appraisals, all of which advise taking a sceptical view of
the real impacts of such an employment policy (Bäcker 1998; Krämer
1998; Offe and Fuchs 1998; Wendl 1998; Bosch 1999). This is not the
place to analyse those critiques in detail, but they do draw attention to
the bias implicit in these gender-blind recommendations. Both Future
Commissions passed over one essential aspect in silence, and that was the
fact that this measure would essentially expand female employment in the
low-pay (and part-time) sector. After all, which services are expected to
generate this employment? These are no doubt ‘internal market-oriented
services’ in the retail and hospitality trades and in public administration,
and also services of a social or personal care nature, jobs which are
already the domain of women, such as looking after small children in
nurseries and crèches, looking after the elderly and those in need of care,
services in hospitals and in nursing homes, and so forth. These are ‘low-
productivity’ occupations because they are labour intensive. In most cases,
however, they are not ‘low-skill’ occupations, but qualified activities that
are frequently undervalued and underpaid.

If the future agenda is not merely to perpetuate cheap remuneration
in these fields but to expand the system by means of a ‘citizen’s wage’
(Bürgergeld) and multiple mini-wages (state-supported Kombi-Löhne),
that is not simply gender-blind but – in plain language – misogynist. This
kind of model for the future attempts to salvage the asymmetrical gender
order of industrial society for a new age. In the long term, however, it is
hardly likely to survive.

To do so, it would need to withstand another feature of this new era,
which should not be underestimated in terms of gender policy. As the
tertiary sector expands, society’s time structures are changing (more time
outside the work sphere, erosion of the standard working week with
its monolithic norms, a time switch for service provision and produc-
tion into non-working hours, etc.). The way a society shapes its time
patterns becomes less and less dependent on the relatively rigid rhythm
of industrial manufacturing and increasingly influenced by the more
flexible rhythm of service supply and demand. On the one hand, society’s
use of time is geared to the flexible requirements of service providers as
they seek optimum organisation of their commercial value-added chains,
but on the other, service providers must adapt their hours of operation
to the diversity and complexity of lifestyles which result from increasingly
flexible individual rhythms. Standard working hours must adjust to
growing calls for flexibilisation, and already policy-makers are required
to display considerable creativity and to assert their weight as moder-
antors. If women are seen merely as the grease to lubricate these changes,
the ‘German Model’ underlying these reforms will pay the price of
inbuilt obsolescence and the restructuring of industrial society will run
aground.
THE FUTURE OF FEMALE EMPLOYMENT

THE (WEST) 'GERMAN MODEL' AND THE GENDER BATTLE FOR JOBS

The (West) 'German Model' which the Future Commission of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation took as a positive point of departure and which the Future Commission of the Free States of Bavaria and Saxony seeks to change fundamentally is associated historically with West Germany's 'economic miracle'. This permitted the development of a welfare system in the Federal Republic, evolving from reforms which were themselves the outcome of tough collective bargaining around conflicting distributive interests. These resulted in a high rate of (male) employment, long-lasting economic growth, cushions for social inequality, broad education and career opportunities and a more diverse basis for individual self-determination from which women increasingly also benefited. Politics regulated the social structure, not eliminating social inequality but offering compensations, and to a certain degree emancipatory interests gained ground. This was the narrow material platform that enabled women in West Germany to take a whole range of emancipatory steps from the mid- to late 1960s onwards.

The framework provided by this welfare state meant that the family lost its importance as a unit of economic redistribution. To a modest degree, imbalances and discrimination in the distribution of primary income (wages and company profits) were overcome. Since the early 1980s, by contrast, the neo-liberal policy underlying modernisation of the production apparatus has permitted more blatant discrepancies in primary distribution to re-emerge.²

It would be too simplistic to claim that a backward-looking, conservative women's policy and family ideology dominated the former West Germany and now the reunited Germany in the last 20 years. Ever since the Kohl years the federal government has nurtured the illusion that the way career and family are reconciled is a matter of 'free choice'. The motto of this policy was: let every woman choose how to live her life. However, in terms of social legislation, the normative model was the classical family consisting of a single bread-winner with a wife to care for him and children. Looking after children and the elderly was regarded as an essentially unremunerated duty; mothers, daughters and daughters-in-law figure within this model as dependent on financial transfers which take place within a pattern of marital maintenance (Koch 2000: 591), while gainful employment on the part of women is described as 'additional earned income'.

At the same time, the last 20 years witnessed a process of flexibilisation and deregulation of the work field and work hours that had to be synchronised privately in the family context. Although this encouraged a (precarious) integration of women into the labour market, it also
reinforced their 'buffer function' in the private, family sphere. From 1982 onwards, women's Janus-headed 'freedom of choice' was adapted to fit deregulation and the erosion of social distribution mechanisms: if a woman did not establish a foothold in the labour market with her own career and/or hitch herself to the 'right' male partner, her rights (and those of her children) to redistribution and solidarity were 'leaner' than they had been in the past. The deregulation of social conditions was backed by a call to individuals to step up their personal efforts. The unfettered citizen, free of 'social ballast' and battling on in solitude, albeit with every right to be female, was now in demand.

On the one hand, then, the growing number of precarious jobs – for men, too – was a springboard for the increasing employment of women in West Germany seeking to boost household income; but on the other, women were seeking more employment not solely for economic reasons, but also because they were changing their ideas about how to run their lives.

Drawing critically on sociological approaches which reflected this development, Angelika Diezinger, writing in the early 1990s, referred to the specific form in which women were being confronted with the structures of societal requirements as 'controlled individualisation' (Diezinger 1991: 26). By contrast to the dominant 'labour market individualisation' which took its cue from the standard male biography, this was a typically female pattern of individualisation which, given the segregation and simultaneous hierarchical relationship between gainful employment and private reproduction, opened up contradictory options for women:

on the one hand autonomy in the sense of independence and personal responsibility, and on the other hand a life built on personal dependence and personal responsibility for other people. Each of these two principles was applied in its own sphere. Employment thereby appears to be the sphere where personal realisation is more easily achieved. Priority is attached, however, to the responsibility for private, everyday labour. (ibid.)

Since German unification, the restructuring of German society briefly outlined here can no longer be assessed without the East German reference, although the debates, theories and findings of West German gender research cannot be applied directly to the east (Nickel 1996), especially when considering women's employment.

Ostner (1995) shows that by international standards (West) Germany presents a 'strong bread-winner model', while Krüger (1995) analyses gendering from the angle of curriculum vitae research and singles out institutions which are used to frame adult status. Work (or rather employment) and family (as central social 'institutions') produce complementary gendered positions: the male bread-winner, market mediated and 'borne'
by his family, and the female home-maker whose life-course is interrupted by her family and the fact that the market does not take into account the reproductive needs of individuals (ibid.: 206). By comparison, East German researchers observe a heavy employment focus for both sexes (Nickel 1995; Dölling 1998) and concomitantly a different approach to organising 'private' reproduction by means of appropriate public facilities and contractual arrangements with employing companies. This did not eliminate the uneven gender division of labour in the family sphere, but the relationship between public responsibility and private duty was defined along different lines. Even today, while western Germany experiences a broader and broader spectrum of personal services, frequently organised on a market economy basis, eastern Germany still boasts a greater number of public providers in the field of child care. This has major consequences in defining the various ways in which employment and reproduction may be reconciled and hence for relations and arrangements between the genders.

We must also look precisely at how processes of change in western Germany, which tend to be sluggish, dovetail with 'matters of self-evidence' (Dölling 1998) to East Germans. Whereas in western Germany the younger generation of women at least is claimed to be resisting total confinement to the domestic sphere, and egalitarian arrangements are actually practised in some cases, the gender division of labour seems by and large stable among the older generation. Furthermore, a quantitative and qualitative study by Frerichs (1997) indicates that class and gender origins interact in influencing gender negotiations on how to run the household. The GDR, by contrast, is deemed on the whole to have had a 'flatter hierarchy' in its gender relations (Nickel 1998), due above all to the almost total integration of women into the employed work-force, with the result that they enjoyed substantial economic independence and had limited resources, notably time, to invest in private reproduction (Braun 1995: 6ff.). In other words, although housework was strongly defined along gender lines, East German men were obliged to do more of it (Frauenreport '90: 127ff.). We have two different but complementary findings which cast some light on how these gender arrangements concerning the division of domestic labour are (re-)shaping today. First, social differences seem to be growing with particular vigour in eastern Germany between women who can afford (and not only financially) to delegate domestic labour to others in return for payment and women who perform these often low-paid duties in other people's households (Diezinger and Rerrich 1998) and hence join the 'informal' service sector. Second, there is a third grouping, and these are women who, alongside their own jobs, carry out the 'traditional' work of private reproduction unilaterally day by day. Irene Dölling (1998), meanwhile, draws on qualitative case studies to identify contradictory trends whereby East
German households are either preserving or abandoning an egalitarian division of labour, and this choice seems closely linked to the position of the two partners concerned within the employment hierarchy.

One factor which remains relevant in explaining differences between eastern and western gender arrangements is the construction of motherhood and fatherhood and the way in which this influences conduct. Geissler’s research (1998) illustrates how caring for small children is predominantly linked in western Germany to the concept of motherhood. Even among young women she found almost unanimous rejection of male partners or public facilities assuming this task during the early years of a child’s life. As young women subject their lives to ‘dual planning’, they weight priorities differently according to the phase in which they find themselves, and when a child is born their attitude to employment changes radically, attaching priority to a period of exclusive family commitment. ‘Nevertheless, even during the family phase she perceives herself as a woman with a career and not as a housewife’ (123). In eastern Germany, by contrast, the care of even very young children is still strongly based on an interaction of public and private responsibility (Seidenspinner et al. 1996).

Given these value shifts, time lags and yet mutually dependent development processes, it has become customary to describe societal change in Germany as a ‘dual transformation’ (Nickel 1995). This means, among other things, that the East German transformation process is neither merely a simple adjustment to West German patterns, nor adequately understood without reference to the fundamental structural changes affecting the Federal Republic, which began long before German unification. One inherent part of this intertwined dual transformation is those cultural (habitual and symbolic) features of a society which unfold a power and dynamism all of their own, and which exert their own impact on doing gender (Nickel, Völker and Hüning 1999): in the former west the model of the male bread-winner and the female carer institutionally dominates life choices and specific gender arrangements, but it is currently undergoing erosion (Krüger 1995); meanwhile in the former east the model which enabled women to combine career and family is being undermined by the increasingly precarious reality of female employment and itself attributes family labour to women. Given income levels in the new German states, this model now confronts East German women with the individual challenge of reconciling a job with domestic duties.

**PROCESSES OF CHANGE IN EASTERN GERMANY**

The most common form of domestic household in eastern Germany is still a partnership in which both individuals are fully employed. Classical family policies which seek to promote the satisfaction of individual needs
by private gender arrangements, and to resolve the structural dilemma faced by women combining a job with a family by offering women opportunities to leave the labour market, are not very compatible with the actual needs of people in eastern Germany or the conditions which they currently face.

The employment rate for women is still higher in the east of the country than in the west; in 1995, 66 per cent of East German women were in a full-time job entailing social insurance contributions, while the figure for West German women was only 45 per cent.

The gap is narrowing, however. The female employment rate is rising in the west and falling steadily in the east (see Chapter 2). Considerable social differences have also emerged among East German women, and these have a decisive impact on the social conditions in which families operate. Surprisingly, the family situation (child-rearing breaks, number and age of the children) in which East German women currently find themselves reveals a weak correlation with their labour market integration. It is not finding someone to care for the children which is the key criterion for women's position in the employment world, much as it damages their status (Zukunftskommission 1998: 325ff.). The boundary is strikingly drawn, instead, by women's skill potential. If, for example, we analyse the employment constellation of partnership-based households in eastern Germany, we see that the labour market integration of men is relatively uninfluenced by their vocational training, whereas women's integration depends very heavily on their qualifications. Women are being forced out of the labour market in eastern Germany by virtue of their specific skills, and in the main they are competing with other women (Nickel 2001). As a result, it is unskilled and semi-skilled women and also women with a basic skilled worker’s certificate who face the worst odds in the battle over the distribution of employment, while highly qualified women in white-collar positions overwhelmingly tend to live in households with a fully employed partner (Arbeitsmarkt 2000).

In the East German transformation process, therefore, the 'halving' of opportunity between genders is not at all balanced out by the internal structure of a domestic partnership, as the West German gender model implies. Rather, a dual mechanism is triggered which exacerbates social differentiation. Mediated by the employment odds of women with different qualification levels, women’s opportunities – and with them the situation of households and families – are polarising dramatically. In eastern Germany it is not primarily the income of a ‘male breadwinner’ which determines how well a family prospers, but whether the female partner is able to earn an income or not. Women’s labour market integration is the main criterion for socially stable families (Zukunftskommission 1998: 313ff.).
With comparatively low general levels of household income, the transformation process in eastern Germany has turned many women into the principal earners of family income (Weick 1995: 6ff.; Ziegler 2000: 231ff.). On average, women in eastern Germany account for almost 50 per cent of household income (compared with one-third in western Germany). The employment rate of married women with children under 18, in particular, is considerably higher in the new states of Germany (west 56 per cent; east 74 per cent). One reason for this is that women in the new states still have recourse to better child care provision: in 1994 places were available for 2.2 per cent of West German children under three and for 41.3 per cent of East German children in the same age group (Zehnter Kinder- und Jugendbericht 1998: 200; Datenreport 1999: 56).

Against this backdrop we observe a striking polarisation of opportunity within the primarily female single parent population, which is relatively large in eastern Germany. On the one hand, these women are disproportionately excluded from gainful employment. They and their families are heavily dependent on benefits, and it is not unusual for them to hover on the poverty line. However, this exclusion from the labour market does not affect the group as a whole. Even in 1995 most single mothers in skilled and highly skilled white-collar occupations still had jobs. Their family situation is founded on their own skilled labour and can hardly be regarded as fundamentally negative (Zukunftskommission 1998: 313ff.).

Gisela Erler (2000) identifies one aspect of the dual transformation process which hitherto has been difficult to pin down in statistical terms and yet might have significant consequences: a changing role for men. Among the younger generation of men, for example, there has been a huge increase in the number of single households. Some 56 per cent of men aged 34 or under live alone. In 1972 the figure for this age group was only 21 per cent. One effect of this is that growing numbers of men are caring for themselves over prolonged periods of time. In certain milieus men are now afforded much greater respect for looking after themselves, and designer kitchens have become a male status symbol. Civilian alternatives to military service and fathers’ involvement in looking after their children have significantly changed society’s image(s) of masculinity. Male biographies and career patterns are increasingly differentiated or ‘fraying’. The relative decline of stable employment and promotion opportunities in traditional male domains and occupations and the erosion of the standard male employment contract, including the male function of family maintenance, seem to be gradually altering the way men plan their lives, even if this is not automatically reflected in quantifiable statistics. Quite the contrary. If we take part-time work as a yardstick for lifestyle, we see that the proportion of men with such jobs is not increasing and remains below 5 per cent, whereas for women,
inevitably, the figure is rising again (40 per cent). Moreover, the hours of
e overtime performed by men are increasing rather than decreasing. In
other words, while some are condemned to sacrifice their lives to their
jobs, with leisure or family dwindling to become a residual phenomeno
of their working years (Simon 2000), others plunge straight into the world
of multiple activity with a ‘citizen’s wage’ (Bürgergeld) providing a modest
livelihood. The gender syntax of this distributive battle has become far
more complex than it used to be.

‘BRIDGING DISCOURSE’, A TASK FOR THE FUTURE

The issue in Germany today is no longer about how to share out increasing
prosperity, as it was when the new women’s movement emerged 30 years
ago. The discussion about distribution is now embeded within another
discussion about sharing the burden of cutbacks and constraints. With
unemployment increasing from one economic cycle to the next since the
early to mid-1970s, the relationship between the social accumulation of
wealth and redistribution through the welfare state has tilted off keel.
This is not the place to probe that issue more deeply, except to say that
this makes it all the more important to define a new social contract,
and with it new arrangements between the genders and between the
generations. Problems can only be surmounted if decisions are based on
‘producing consensus’. That is by no means easy and it challenges the
women’s movement to demonstrate its political credentials in a new way.
The redistribution of income and investment inevitably induced by
reorientation call for social negotiations, new methods for civil society to
seek compromise and a ‘bridging discourse’ (Fraser 1994) between the
genders. This is a major task, not only for democratic policy-making, but
also for gender research.

There can be no return to the old familiar pattern of full employment
founded on the regular (male) working week which evolved in a specific
post-war constellation. Women’s share in this was in any case limited.
Nevertheless, a modified form of modern full employment remains a core
strategic task for the future. All members of society must be able to earn
their own income in order to secure their own livelihood, and to earn
this income from useful, publicly acknowledged labour. Overcoming
mass unemployment, as the Future Commission of the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation rightly argued, is the key issue in determining future relations
between the genders and the generations in Europe and in Germany east
and west.

The decline in industrial jobs is a trend which cannot be reversed. Some
questions remain open, however, and these relate to the future pace of
structural transformation, its social costs and its impact on the creation
of employment. Further adverse effects are unavoidable if structural transformation is left to the mercy of radical market mechanisms. By comparison, an expansion of the service sector (especially its sociocultural dimensions) driven by economic and employment policies may not be the perfect solution, but at least it is one option alongside others (a shorter working week, sabbaticals, and so on) which would help to establish new economic foundations permitting women and men to take responsibility for their own lives rather than relying on support, and making it possible to redesign social insurance systems under overall conditions of high productivity. In other words, public resources must be used wisely for real investment in activities which cater for social and individual needs.

One long-established, though as yet unfulfilled, demand of the women’s movement is a ‘redefinition of private and public and thereby a redistribution of essential community tasks between the sexes’ (Schaeffer-Hegel and Leist 1996: 38). The aim today is not simply to recognise that care and child-rearing are socially essential work and to reward them adequately in material terms, but, given the changing choices which women make in their lives, to ensure that the portion of a woman’s life which has gone missing because it can no longer ‘be devoted to family duties is compensated by a similar increase in paternal care and time’ (ibid.). In addition there is still the demand for affordable public child care and care for the sick and elderly, which would generate jobs. As findings from the new German states reveal, it is vital to take an active initiative in constructing social justice and cohesion by means of a labour market policy which integrates women. If the evidence is there that women are being elbowed enduringly out of the employment process not for family reasons but primarily due to effects induced by the labour market (Zukunftskommission 1998: 309ff.), then political responses to this situation are required, and that does not mean measures that reinforce women’s unwilling exodus, but framework conditions that enable women and men to maintain both families and gainful employment.

Empirically, however, there are indications that the structural asymmetries of the German gender relationship tend to be ‘self-regulating’. Without an institutional framework, the individual resistance demonstrated by East German women and the partnerships arranged by men and women within private relationships will not bear fruit. The structural pressures exerted by conditions can only be effectively withstood by the counterweight of political framing and framework conditions which must be politically enforced (such as more all-day schools, rather than the morning-only timetable for German primary pupils). Increasingly, organisations devoted to the collective defence of interests must focus on ‘life as a whole’ (Pongratz and Voss 2000), or – to use Beck’s phrase – we need to pursue a path of neo-corporatism (Beck 1999). If we adopt this perspective on social transformation, we cannot limit social security in
THE FUTURE OF FEMALE EMPLOYMENT

East Germany to material security, but must embrace participatory security (Simon 2000; Thierse 2001). This includes opportunities for continuous vocational training and reorientation. It also includes being able to devote oneself to a family or to personal relationships during particular phases in life without being permanently dismissed. Not only is this the only way to take women on board as equals, but it is vital if society wishes to make the transition into a new phase of productivity ('knowledge society', 'service society').

Various authors (Goldmann 1998; Oberbeck 1998) have shown that the service society need not necessarily entail a crisis scenario for women. According to a recent study by the Federal Employment Institute, women are gaining from Germany’s structural transformation, although the same study points out that in the year 2010, merely in those states which used to constitute West Germany, there will be a shortfall of over 2 million jobs for women (Arbeitsmarkt 2000: 394).

If, however, the labour market increasingly excludes women once again, this will exacerbate the political conflict over distribution, as household income founded on male earnings will not provide an adequate livelihood, and nor will it be stable and reliable. There is a need here for political action, and not only for the sake of (gender) democracy and social justice, but because gender-sensitive policy-making is increasingly necessary to achieve what Anthony Giddens calls ‘positive welfare’.

NOTES

1. The main features: creation and expansion of a social security system (secondary distribution), public regulation of income redistribution (fiscal policy), creation and social regulation of a network of industrial relations ('tripartism') and creation of a system of intermediate institutions to defend particular interests and to perform public, non-governmental functions (associations, societies, etc.).

2. Incomes in the new states are still at the level of 73–80 per cent of West German equivalents, and as a rule women need to be gainfully employed. Incomes earned by men are usually not enough to support a family. On the contrary, women often earn the higher income in a household (Datenreport 1999: 338).

REFERENCES


Fraser, Nancy (1994), Widerspenstige Praktiken. Macht, Diskurs, Geschlecht (Frankfurt-on-Main: Suhrkamp).


Giddens, Anthony (1999), Der dritte Weg (Frankfurt-on-Main: Suhrkamp).


Seidenspinner, Gerlinde, Barbara Keddi, Svendy Wittmann, Michaela Gross, Karin Hildebrandt and Petra Strehmel (1996), Junge Frauen heute – Wie sie leben, was sie anders machen (Opladen: Leske and Budrich).


