Disputed Territory: Feminist Studies in Germany and Its Queer Discontents
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Disputed Territory:
Feminist Studies in Germany and Its Queer Discontents

SABINE HARK

ABSTRACT

When Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble* appeared in German translation in 1991, the book launched a heated debate among German academic feminists about the status of gender as a category of analysis, and about the future of feminist theory. The anxieties were quite fundamental. Is "gender" a category of "nature" or "culture"? And if its "nature" is entirely cultural, a social construction, how can we then speak and act in the name of a gender, i.e., in the name of women? Much of this debate was coded as a conflict between different feminist generations. This trope of "generation" served as a strategy of displacement: "queer issues" figured as a kind of absent/present threat haunting the coherence of Gender Studies as a legitimate field of knowledge, but they were hardly made an explicit subject of discussion. This essay will look at the conscious and unconscious levels of discourse: What is the "positive unconscious" of the so-called "Butler debate"? Who gets to say what and how? What defines an "intelligible" object of study? Who gets to define it? In short, what is the "order of things" that frames discourse? Even if queer theory has had no manifest impact on the definition of Women's and Gender Studies, how did the specter of "queer" structure feminist theory on an unconscious level? And above all, what does all this mean for the future of German academic feminism(s)?

In 1991, Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble* (1990) appeared in German translation under the title *Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter (Gender and Its Discontents)*. The German title refers to Sigmund Freud's famous essay *Das Unbehagen der Kultur (Civilization and Its Discontents)*. The English subtitle *Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* is elided. It is not quoted once in the book. Titles often say as much about the publishing strategy, the presumed audience, and the *Zeitgeist* as about the content of a book. The German title *Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter* is telling in many regards. It not only captures Western civilizations' *Zeitgeist* with regard to gender, i.e., its often unconscious uneasiness with gender, but also many feminist scholars' discontent with feminist theory in terms of the coherence of gender as an intellectually viable category of analysis, the development of sexuality theory, and feminism's potential to reflect on its own premises and exclusions.

The book launched a heated debate, which lasted for almost a decade, among German academic feminists about the status of gender as a category of analysis, and

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1 This essay was originally prepared for presentation at the Conference "Fifty Years of the Federal Republic of Germany through a Gendered Lens" at the Center for European Studies at UNC, Chapel Hill, September 1999, and at Cornell University, September 1999. I would like to thank Angelika von Wahl (UNC), Anna Maree Parkinson, and Anna Marie Smith (both of Cornell University) for inviting me. For crucial comments I'd like to thank Catrin Gersdorf and the members of my study group, "Berliner Sieben": Astrid Deusser-Mankowsky, Gabriele Dietze, Dorothea Dornhof, Karin Esders, Linde Lemke, and Klaus Milich.
about the future of feminist theory. The anxieties were quite fundamental. Is “gender” a category of “nature” or “culture”? And if its “nature” is entirely cultural, a social construction, how can we then speak and act in the name of a gender, i.e., in the name of women? Moreover, if Butler’s theory proves right that “woman” is a regulatory fantasy whose deployment inadvertently reproduces the normative relations between sex, gender, and desire that naturalize heterosexuality, how can “woman” then serve as the founding object of study? If neither “gender” nor “woman” can be taken as privileged categories, on what grounds does Women’s Studies insist on its right to be?1

Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter signaled the emergence of initially subtle, yet in the long run decisive, faultlines in the landscape of German academic feminism. Butler’s critique of feminism’s claim to represent “all” women and her questioning of the political necessity to develop a language that adequately represents women2 produced different, indeed opposing, reactions. While some feminists raged over Butler’s supposed postmodern relativism, for others she pointed to mechanisms of exclusion many women had experienced in the history of feminist activism and theory. Following this line of argument in Butler’s work, the latter camp demanded a critical revision not only of the subject of feminism, but of the mechanisms of in- and exclusion inherent in its production. For the notion of a resisting subject, the argument went, can only be useful politically when it is understood as a regulating concept that acquires meaning through what it excludes as well as what it includes. At stake, thus, was not only the “proper object” (Butler) of Gender Studies; at stake was also its “proper subject.” Consequently, in what follows, I will argue that the so-called “Butler debate” in Germany became an important arena to restructure the institutional terrain of Women’s Studies. In the course of this struggle, the legitimacy of the “old inhabitants” to define the objects of study was questioned, new claims on the territory were simultaneously made and warded off, old border lines were defended, and new ones drawn. In short, the debate functioned as a struggle over symbolic power, that is, to borrow Pierre Bourdieu’s words, “the power of imposing a vision of the divisions of the social world through principles of di-vision” (Bourdieu, Language 221).

Much of this debate was coded as a conflict between different feminist generations, i.e., between “old feminists” and “young feminists” (Stoehr 104). This trope of “generation,” I will argue, served at least partially as a strategy of displacement. Framing the debate as a conflict between “feminist generations” made it possible to neglect what was Butler’s most important contribution to gender theory, namely the concept of a heterosexual matrix as the constitutive apparatus of gender.3 Despite the fact that some younger and less established scholars adapted queer theory concepts such as “heteronormativity,” mainstream feminist theory ignored Butler’s positioning within US queer theory.4 Hence, instead of critically engaging with the role sexuality plays in the construction of all sociosymbolic forms, especially in the construction of gender, Feminist Studies continued to neglect the inherent heterosexism of its theories. While in the US queer theory became a prominent field from which to challenge feminism’s core assumptions regarding gender and sexuality, in Germany it did not take a center stage position. Quite to the contrary, queer theory was hardly recognized as an equal intellectual counterpart to Gender Studies. “Queer” rather figured on the level of a collective unconscious as an absent/present threat haunting Women’s Studies as a coherent and legitimate field of knowledge. “Queer” became the unnamed place to ban the fears of dissolution and trespassing, of de-politicization and loss of agency. Indeed, it seemed that the privileged access to the academy via the hard-won entrance of Women’s Studies stood in question.

In what follows, I will look at what I want to call the conscious and unconscious levels of discourse: What, in Foucault’s terms, is the “positive unconscious” of the so-called “Butler debate”? Who gets to say what and how? What defines an “intelligible” object of study? Who gets to define it? In short, what is the “order of things” (Foucault) that organizes discourse? Even if queer theory has had no manifest impact on the definition of Women’s and Gender Studies, how did the specter of “queer” structure feminist theory on an unconscious level? In addressing these questions, I will proceed from the assumption that the contemporary neglect of queer issues is the legacy of the history of a specific desirational in feminist theory. From the very beginning in the early seventies, feminist theory constructed the figure of the lesbian and lesbian difference as its “constitutive outside” (Jacques Derrida), the “illegitimate cousin” of Women’s Studies. Lesbian difference then was not entirely neglected, but positioned in opposition to “woman,” thus serving as woman’s “other.” It served as a means to demarcate the borders of the object of knowledge “woman,” and as a means to purify this very object. To explore how feminism situated lesbian difference in relation to feminism, I will present an experimental reflection on, first, a text and, second, a conference set-up. The point I wish to make here is that feminist theory had to deal with the paradox to claim “woman” as its coherent object of study. It nevertheless had to address among other differences lesbian difference. Feminist theory “resolved” this paradox by accommodating difference in a manner that would not upset the foundational premises of Women’s Studies.

Queer theory, however, is not innocent in this game. While feminism established its intellectual space by relegating differences between women to the margins, in the US queer theory often carved out its space against feminism by reducing it to a narrow and limited theory of gender difference. Moreover, while feminist theory in part rests on unexamined foundations such as an unquestioned heteronormativity, queer theory often privileges an abstract hetero/homo divide, thereby dismissing issues of gender

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1 Many scholars in Germany speak of “Gender Studies” only. However, the terms “Women’s Studies” and “Feminist Studies” are still widely used. Institutionally, though, in recent years the coupling of both terms as “Women’s and Gender Studies” has become the most common denomination. In this essay, I will use all of these versions interchangeably.

2 Butler writes: “[The] feminist ‘we’ is always and only a phantasmatic construction, one that has its purposes, but which denies the internal complexity and indeterminacy of the term and constitutes itself only through the exclusion of some part of the constituency that it simultaneously seeks to represent” (Butler, Gender Trouble 142).

3 This is also true for the reception of Teresa de Lauretis’s work, especially her book The Practice of Love: Lesbian Identity and Perverse Desire (1994) which was published in German as

4 Die andere Szene: Psychoanalyse und lesbische Sexualität (1996). That The Practice of Love is a theory of lesbian sexuality was hardly mentioned.

5 None of the works of other queer theorists in the USA, such as Michael Warner, Eve Sedgwick, Lauren Berlant, Robyn Wiegman, and Sue-Ellen Case have been translated so far.
hierarchy. In the second part of the chapter, I will propose a version of a ‘queer’ epistemological strategy. This epistemology takes as its point of departure the constant necessity to reflect on the relation between the spoken and the unspoken. This epistemology draws on the etymology of “queer” in the sense of crossing and transversing (as in Quergänge). It aims at developing a critical practice of knowledge production that constantly moves across and between the domain of intelligibility and that which has been rendered unintelligible. For if the goal still is to transform existing hierarchies according to gender and sexuality as well as race and class, we need epistemologies that resist easy victories in the struggle for institutional terrain won through gestures of exclusion and abjection.

Constructing Dichotomies 1

In 1987, one of the two German feminist theory journals, *beiträge zur feministischen theorie und praxis*, published an issue (No. 20) on “sexuality (and health).” In the initial “Call for Papers,” the editors asked for contributions on the following topic: “What happened to lesbian sexuality as the radical avant-garde practice of feminism?” It was the only question in the Call related to lesbianism and/or lesbians. None of the nineteen previous numbers of the journal, on topics such as ‘violence against women,’ ‘gender and work,’ ‘politics’ ‘Women’s Studies,’ ‘women and the state,’ ‘women and war,’ had considered lesbians and/or lesbian difference. Yet, after having neglected it for more than a decade of feminist theory production, feminism remembered its “illegitimate” relative “lesbian” in the very specific context of feminist conceptualizations of sexuality as a revolutionary force.

A closer reading of the text shows that its rhetoric produces a well-known— and tiresome—dichotomy: woman vs. lesbian. It is a dichotomy in which one term, “woman,” represents the universal, and the other term, “lesbian,” the particular. The text positions “woman” as the indiscriminate category, unmarked by sexuality, race, class, generation, or geopolitical position. “We women” regardless of our gender, sexuality, race or class are all affected in the exact same way by, e.g., male appropriation of female sexuality, sexual violence, AIDS, artificial insemination, population politics, birth control methods, etc.

Towards the very end of the text, however, the text marks the universal category “we women” by a new trope: “lesbian sexuality.” Without explicitly saying so, the text establishes a border between “us” and “them.” There is “woman” on one side and some other unknown species called “lesbian” on the other. Paradoxically, however, instead of de-centering the pretended universality of “woman,” introducing the trope “lesbian sexuality” further strengthens it. Addressing lesbianism as a separate (but equal?) category, a distant relation of feminism whose significance remains tied to this special interest group, reaffirms that “woman” continues to appear as an unmarked and universal category. This claiming of women’s universality was of central strategic importance for feminism since feminists had based their claim on grounds of speaking on behalf of the neglected half of humankind. Here feminism was on what appeared to be its most uncontestable ground. If the academy had ignored half the world, the legitimacy of feminism’s claim to correct this omission seemed beyond dispute. Consequently, differences between women, that is the difference between lesbian and heterosexual women, could only be embraced on the basis that these differences would not upset the fundamental basis of feminism. Much in the way that dominant culture allows minorities to participate, providing they have no designs on the hegemonic arrangements, the feminist project incorporates lesbians, providing they do not upset the foundational premises of feminist theory.

On that score, it is noteworthy that introducing “lesbian sexuality” does not lead to an inquiry of heterosexuality. Heterosexuality, let alone the question how normative heterosexuality structures all of the above-mentioned issues, is not considered once. Thus, a feminist journal’s “Call for Papers” constructs lesbian sexuality implicitly as a matter of private sexual orientation and not as a social structure, the very matrix that produces and organizes gender hierarchy.

Thus, to invoke “lesbian” in this text as a figure, a trope, serves primarily to mark the parameters of feminist theory and practice. She stands at once as the feminist par excellence, being at the same time oppressed and vividly resisting this oppression and as not a woman at all, being the only one explicitly excluded from the category “woman.” Lesbianism both glows at the horizon as the ultimate feminist liberation and yet is to be singled out, hence figuring in this text as the apotheosis and as the scandal of feminism. I will now move on to the second example of my minihistory of feminism’s positioning of lesbianism.

Constructing Dichotomies 2

In 1997, US sociologist Judith Lorber held the “International Marie Jahoda Chair for Women’s Studies” at the Ruhr University of Bochum. During her tenure, a conference took place entitled “Feminism and Social Change.” Keynote speaker was Judith Lorber herself, talking on “Feminism’s Future.” A second keynote address by the German feminist sociologist Ulrike Teubner was entitled “Breaking Up Binary Thinking.” In addition, the organizers had scheduled a number of panels under the general title “Feminism and Its Coalitions with Other Social Groups.” The social groups in question were class, race/ethnicity, and lesbian/gay/bisexual.

This conference set-up and its particular “order of things” provoke a series of questions. What is feminism, if class, race/ethnicity, and lesbianism/bisexuality are to be considered only after ‘real’ feminism has been discussed? What is the conceptual idea of a feminism that is free of issues of class, race, and sexuality? What and whom does feminism address if these issues/groups are labeled “other”? Moreover, what are the consequences on a theoretical level to define the issues of race, class, and sexuality as issues concerning presumably clearly demarcated social groups instead of issues concerning power hierarchies and relations? Again, we find the same dichotomy as in the

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6 For an in-depth analysis of this conference see also Hänsch, “Ein erotisches Verhältnis?”
first example. Woman/feminist represents the universal, that is unmarked by sexuality, race, and class, whereas lesbian difference (as much as race/ethnicity and class differences) is first reified as a group difference, which then can be separated off at will.

The organizers of the conference did not have these kinds of separation in mind. Rather, the conference program shows how Women and Gender Studies in Germany did indeed respond to the critique of lesbians, women of color, and migrant women articulated throughout the late eighties and nineties. For the most part, however, the response came predominantly in the form of tokenism and the “friendly” gesture of adding the “other” on. Instead of rigorously searching for the “tools” that would dismantle the master’s house (Lorde 98) Women’s Studies often settled for a cubbyhole in the master’s house. Hence, a critical and reflexive reappraisal of research categories and paradigms did hardly take place. This led German feminist theorist Birgit Rommelspacher to the conclusion that Women’s Studies’ privileging of gender as the main category of analysis produced a new center-periphery relation, thereby dismissing other research perspectives such as race and sexuality. What has been diagnosed as the self-ghettoization of Women’s Studies, she continued, might well be one of the outcomes of this narrow fixation on gender.

If, however, as Wendy Brown has argued, “various marked subjects are created through very different kinds of powers—not just different powers,” that is, if “subject construction does not take place along discrete lines of nationality, race, sexuality, gender, caste, class and so forth, these powers of subject formation are not separable in the subject itself” (Brown 86). Consequently, the practice of listing differences and adding the “other” on (if remembering the “other” at all) cannot do the work of grasping these complex workings of power, as it is impossible to extract race from gender, or gender from sexuality. Contrary to the intention of analyzing the various modes of production of power, the “additive approach” might end up affirming socially produced and enforced hierarchical differences instead of critically challenging and transforming them. A critical practice of representing differences thus requires analyzing processes of differentiation and discrimination in our own analytical constructions.

Disputed Territory 1

As both these examples clearly show, the question of the relation and/or intersection between Women/Gender Studies and lesbian difference in Germany, their shifting configurations, the limits, limitations, boundaries, and constraints of their alliance, indeed, the question of alliance itself, marks a complicated and complex area of contestation. Although politically lesbianism functioned throughout the late seventies and eighties as feminism’s “magical sign” (King 124), as the symbol of revolutionary change, Women’s Studies in Germany has been reluctant to address lesbian difference in its theory and research practice. Neither normative heterosexuality nor lesbian difference was critically addressed in mainstream feminist research and Women’s Studies. This led, among others, the German lesbian-feminist sociologist Lising Pagenstecher to the conclusion that lesbianism marks the “blind spot” of Women’s Studies in Germany (127).

This unquestioned assumption of normative (female) heterosexuality informs until today most of Germany’s Women’s Studies research and teaching. Despite the fact that lesbian scholars have continuously raised what the pioneering Austrian lesbian sociologist and historian Hanna Hacker has called the “lesbian accusation” (49), hegemonic feminist discourse still constructs “woman” predominantly as self-evidently heterosexual, thereby mythologizing not only the category “woman,” but also naturalizing heterosexuality. What is concealed in the first place, however, is that a construction is taking place at all, which regulates what and who counts and what and who does not, what is talked about and what is rendered unthinkable. For the “woman” in Women’s and/or Gender Studies does not exist in a social or political vacuum; its meanings are constructed and shaped by those who have the power to manipulate discourse and the process of naming. Moreover, “woman” is, like most terms, a deceptive term insofar as it presupposes and conveys a monolithic collective experience and a unified, uncomplicated, static category in which differences based on gender, sexuality, national identity, etc., are overridden by the commonality of femaleness.

To make myself clear at this point: I am not saying that Women’s Studies in Germany is indifferent to differences. Nevertheless, it has yet to acknowledge that dealing with differences might mean to thoroughly deconstruct its categories of analysis as well as its founding assumptions, which have been left unquestioned. I would argue that we have to start with paying attention to the fact that our categories of analysis are very specific moments in time and space. They are products of social processes and actions in a particular field and not representations of given entities in “reality.” In short, we produce the things we know. The task then is to develop practices of evaluating our “semiotic technologies” (Donna Haraway), which produce meaningful realities. This will enable us to account for the difference between the thought and that which is rendered unthinkable.

How much that which is rendered unthinkable governs what we mean to think is demonstrated by the following. The first Masters degree-granting Gender Studies program in Germany at Humboldt University of Berlin, which started in 1997, arranges disciplines and their proper objects as follows:

Social sciences: Economic, social, and political aspects of the emergence, fixation, and transformation of gender relations; Medicine and Sexology: Biomedical and psychosocial developmental processes of gender identity, sexuality, relationship and reproduction in the medical context, changing sexual experiences and behavior.

The program not only assigns certain objects to clearly demarcated disciplines; it also defines the related objects. Gender is about economy, society, and politics; sexuality is about biology, medicine, private relationships, and sexual experiences. That sexuality itself is subject to not only social transformation, but also produces social relations, meanings and reality, is successfully erased in this “order of things.”
This arrangement of assigning gender to social sciences and sexuality to medicine, sexology, and biology has concrete meanings in terms of the legitimate locations for studying gender and sexuality. Gender is about public matters, and sex/sexuality about private ones, thus reproducing the sex/gender-dichotomy in its most problematic form as a nature/culture dichotomy. Moreover, gender belongs to the domain of social relations whereas the curriculum defines sexuality as a category of identity, thus again reifying it.

Feminist scholars designed the Humboldt Gender Studies curriculum at a moment in time when the meanings of gender and the usefulness of gender as a category of analysis had already been thoroughly put into question. But instead of making that their point of departure for the curriculum, the initiators of the Gender Studies program operated in the only language that is understood by the administration and the canonized academic powers: the language of disciplines and clear-cut objects. For, if the goal is to gain entry into the academy, one has to use the native language.

Moreover, the Humboldt Gender Studies curriculum operates as part of a powerful discourse that defines and legitimizes not only "proper objects," but organizes "visions of division." Although claiming to be a critical project aimed at the transformation of traditional disciplinary borders, Gender studies scholars at Humboldt University used strategies that affirm existing hierarchies and institutional structures. That is not to say that feminists in the institution intentionally act to support the establishment of borders and hierarchies. Since to embrace a paradigm critical of disciplinary borders is a problematic task for Women's Studies—still under siege to a certain extent and struggling to maintain the place of Gender Studies and the power of feminist critique. It is rather, as again Bourdieu (Vom Gebrauch der Wissenschaft) has shown, the ensemble of objective power structures that produce an institutional constraint enforced onto the "newcomers." This institutional constraint operates in the form of symbolic power. It brings about a form of consent that is not based on deliberate decision but on the immediate and prereflexive subordination of the subjects. This means that in order to gain entrance to and acceptance in the institution one has to play the game by the rules, that is, claims to truth must be formulated in the already established truth-speaking formulas. In order to establish an intelligible discourse one has to use already existing standards of plausibility, make recourse to already established disciplinary borders, proper objects, and proper methodologies. For the knowledge-game follows the logic of struggles over territories. After hoisting the flag, one has to demarcate and secure the borders, and after that to legitimate why this is the only flag that makes sense for the newly established "territory."

Establishing a new field of knowledge within the university thus provokes a series of questions, namely: how do we account for the paradoxes that arise from the clash between a progressive and emancipatory project and a conservative institutional structure? In a political context in which we still need to fight basic struggles for recognition, we cannot easily dismiss these questions. Processes of institutionalization often follow rules that have become highly self-referential and immune against critique. Thus, one of the dangers inherent in struggles for inclusion is that we will reproduce instead of transform already established hierarchies. What we need instead is, as Butler has argued, that we "move beyond and against those methodological demands which force separations in the interests of canonization and provisional institutional legitimation." She continues that the "critique of the conservative force of institution-
that were at times relentless, feminist scholars argued over objects, research paradigms, and theoretical orientations as well as over the constituency of Women's Studies. Implicated in these debates was the question of borders. Consequently, the issue of who is a "native" and who is a "foreigner" seemed of utmost importance.

The most frequently used metaphor in the debate clearly indicates that. Images of dissolution, that is the dissolution of gender, women, the subject, the body, and political agency as the foundations of feminist theory, dominated the discourse. As if Butler—like a flood or tide—would sweep away these very foundations and enclosures. This is but one example of many in which such images were used to describe the threat that "Butler" represents. Moreover, in blending Butler's theory and the persona "Butler," it insinuates that it is not theory we are dealing with, but simply Butler's narcissistic self-portrayal. In the essay "The Woman without Womb: On Judith Butler's Disembodiment," feminist historian Barbara Duden comments on what she calls Butler's "cynical disembodiment."

We need a definition for this product of a voiceless discourse that apparently Ms. Butler represents herself: We could talk of this phantom-like product of a new subjectivity as the disembodied woman. (Duden 26; italics in the original, my translation)

A second interpretative framework to cope with the shift of paradigms and topics is the concept of "generation." Younger feminists, the almost stereotypical saying goes, are engaged in the debate more often than before, even becoming "followers" of Butler. The older generation, however, is—for good reason—unable or unwilling to follow and accept Butler's ideas. Again, Barbara Duden most clearly advocates this position:

I will not let any deconstructionist talk me out of my corporeality.... Since I started working on the history of the body, I have been determined not to let postmodern deconstructivism take away how I deal with the bodily sensations of the woman in the past.... I cannot trust [Butler's] text. I am, however, concerned about the attitude of a student I recently talked to. She tries to trust Butler's text as, so she says, it helps her to cope with her daily discomfort concerning her corporeality. (Duden 28, 29, 33; my translation)

The trope of generation serves at least partially as a displacement strategy. While focusing on different backgrounds and experiences according to generation, one could avoid to talk about differences between straight women and lesbians. In the editorial to the special issue of Feministische Studien, the editors Hilge Landweer and Mechthild Rumpf write:

The idealism of Butler's position has a substantial background. It consists of the different experiences and sociocultural conditions of various feminist generations. Accordingly, we expect that what in a broader sense Butler brought into the world cannot be pushed out of the world again merely by engaging with and analyzing her ideas. Rather, it is necessary to recognize and valorize the theoretical and political interests and orientations of the new feminist generation. (4; italics added, my translation)

This passage clearly reveals the anxieties that were associated with Butler's work as much as with her as a figure. It displays feminism's dramatic, symptomatic forms of ambivalence to lesbians. On the level of a collective unconscious, it can be interpreted as a defense against a threat coming from outside. "Butler" serves as a figure of strangeness. She represents a "new feminist generation" with substantially different experiences. This seems to threaten the coherence, unity, and homogeneity of the community of feminist scholars whose experiences were based more or less in the beginnings of the women's movement—and in the certainty that "woman" and "man" are stable categories. Butler is portrayed at once as incredibly powerful and as enormously dangerous: what came into the world through Butler "cannot be pushed out of the world" easily.

While on a manifest level Butler was, though hesitantly, perceived as a feminist, on a more subtle level she was not really considered "one of us." Rather, Butler became an outsider, a foreigner who threatened the coherence of the field, norms, rules of behavior—and visions of division. Moreover, many texts constructed her as seducing the "young ones." The figure "Butler" thus served at once as the figure of the manly lesbian/dyke haunting the coherence of feminism while seducing the (young) subjects of feminism. German feminist scholars therefore acted like warriors engaged in protecting the borders of Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung—and in safeguarding the young generation against this foreign seducer.

Just how influential and powerful this discourse continues to be can be demonstrated by a series of newspaper articles. On the occasion of Butler's first talk in Germany after the publication of Gender Trouble, journalist Christel Zahlmann wrote in the Frankfurter Rundschau: "She troubles the audience by being present in a double sense. That is through her speech as well as through her body which traditionalists would simply call male. As a pleasant, slim, energetic young man, presumably of Italian descent, with an accurate male haircut, and gesticulating wildly...." The author of the article goes on to quote a member of the audience who is afraid that the body will disappear in Butler's theory: "But what about the influence you have upon the young women you teach?" (19)

Zahlmann constructs Butler simultaneously as an "Italian male," influencing her female students, and as a somehow phantom-like creature which does not fit the categories of humankind, that is, female or male. The image of being not only male but also a seducing man reappears again in the left newspaper die tageszeitung. German feminist philosopher Beate Rössler wrote: "What are the sources of Butler's tremendous impact on (academic) women? Her personal performance could be considered impressive, though it is not that unusual in being manly and cavalierly...." (24)

Both images, that of seduction and that of Butler as a phantom that transgresses the boundaries of sex, keep coming up repeatedly. In 1997, after Butler's Berlin talk on "Antigone's Claim," journalist Mariam Niroumand wrote an article in die tageszeitung entitled "Wie im Phantomschmerz" ["As in Phantom Pain"]. Niroumand describes the event as a holy mass, and Butler—whom the journalist describes as "acting as in phantom pain"—as the priest of a "congregation of converts." This "converted congregation," Niroumand continues, only "came to have Butler philosophically legitimize their sexual preference" (16). This is, one could argue, the ultimate scenario of seduction. Butler is constructed as a priest preaching to the masses. Moreover, Niroumand denounces Butler's philosophy as a kind of revelation; hence, it is not philosophy at all.

On the occasion of the German edition of Butler's book Excitable Speech (Hass spricht [1998]), Niroumand plays out the same scenario: Presumably Butler's fame results from the fact that she tries to translate her sexual orientation as a lesbian into philosophy or anthropology, or even into a new dawn for (hu)mankind. ("Eigentor im Heimspiel" 26).
Jörg Lau wrote in the most influential German weekly paper, *Die Zeit*: “She [Butler] constructs a future feminism which in the end will manage to survive without women. . . . Out of the ruins of the battle between the sexes, a new species shall arise, freed from the burden of a sexualized body. . . . Both Gender Studies and genetic engineering represent phantasmagoric attempts to escape today’s gender and its discontents” (32).

To conclude this minihistory of the “Butler debate,” I want to argue that the participants did not critically engage with Butler’s theory. Rather, some of the scholarly and for sure the journalistic articles busied themselves with constructing a persona “Butler.” This persona consists of images of masculinity, of transgressing the border between the sexes, and, above all, of sexualized fantasies of seduction. In every text, the figure of the “lesbian” is present only as a threat, that is, in a powerful, yet dangerous and monstrous mode. “She” is able to influence students, convince masses to convert, and construct a new species. I will thus conclude with an argument made by Teresa de Lauretis concerning the position of lesbian difference in feminist theory.

Lesbianism, though hardly mentioned, figures prominently as a subtext and a fantasy of seduction . . . . in fact, lesbianism is not represented in . . . feminist theory, which has more often elided the actual sexual difference, the psychosocial and sociosexual difference, that lesbianism signifies as, while avoiding that signer, it has instead spoken it as a trope, a figure of discourse. (de Lauretis, “Fem/Les Scramble” 43)

I hope it has become clear that, on a “manifest” level, “queer” has hardly had an impact on the definition of Women’s Studies in Germany. This is especially true for the social sciences, whereas literary criticism and cultural studies were somewhat more receptive to queer thoughts. Queer theory is not perceived as an equal intellectual counterpart to feminist theory, and it is virtually non-existent as an autonomous field of knowledge in German academic institutions. On an “unconscious” level, however, the specter of “queer” is present in feminist theory. “Queer” functions as a simultaneously absent and present threat haunting Women’s Studies as a coherent and legitimate field of knowledge. It represents Women’s Studies “outside” necessary to constitute the latter’s identity. The so-called “Butler debate” in Germany served as an important arena for the struggle over the institutional terrain of Women’s Studies, over its resources, its visions, and its legitimate players. In the course of this struggle, the legitimacy of the “old inhabitants” to define the objects of study was questioned, and new players emerged. New claims on the territory were simultaneously made and warded off, old border lines defended and new ones drawn. The “Butler debate”—in spite of the attempts at containment—dramatically altered the map of Women’s and Gender Studies. I will now move on to the second part, the outline of a “que/e/r” epistemology—*Quergänge*—that takes as its point of departure this very nexus of the spoken and the shadow of the spoken.


Mary Armstrong has rightly pointed out that “this utopian version of queer presents us with the question of whether queer, while it claims to overlook all boundaries including normality, must ultimately define itself against the normal—or some kind of other—in order to exist” (“The Lesbian as Political Subject” 116).
"Quergänge"

Against this backdrop, the question arises what future demands should be made. Under what conditions can we maintain the claim that feminist theory is a theory critical of hegemonic powers? What capabilities do feminist—as well as queer—scholars require in order to act as dissidents in the face of increasingly commodified forms of knowledge production based on the logic of identity? How can we interrupt an institutional economy that is based on the "circular proliferation" (Judith Lorber) of power, reputation, and resources? That is an economy which concentrates on the reproduction of hierarchies marked by gender, race, sexuality, and class, among others. If the goal still is, as Donna Haraway pointed out in 1996, to produce "better accounts of the world," what kind of epistemologies do we need then? How do we claim "objectivity" while holding on to the necessary process of critical interrogation of foundations and borders?

The guiding principle of such an epistemology, I would suggest, is the continuous examination of the artificially drawn and contingent boundaries, and their related exclusions. As German feminist sociologist Edit Kirsch-Auwärter has pointed out:

In remembering the premises as well as the effects of any decision, we can document the traces of that which has been excluded. This uncovers organizational limitations and enables processes of learning in institutions. The main criterion for evaluating transformative participation, however, is the potential to use one’s own power for the empowerment of others as well as to resist adhering to exclusionary regimes of power. (41-42; my translation)

This last point, especially, could be decisive as a future foundation for the production of a critical feminist theory. The past two decades have been characterized by vehement worldwide struggles over the epistemological and political "we" of feminism. This has led to the decentering and questioning of the representativeness of any one version of feminism. In the course of these struggles, it has become clear that while reference to an epistemological "we" is basic to the production of feminist knowledge, it must also be simultaneously relativized, displaced, and reformulated by the thematization and treatment of the differences and inequalities between women. This is in no way to be understood as a misfortune or the leaching troubles of a still-young scholarly practice. It can be regarded rather as a significant indicator of the direction both feminist and queer theory should take. For "[t]he need to reimagine difference," writes Helen Crowley, "is central to the projects of feminism. Feminism ... must be able to configure a world in which 'difference' is no longer a vehicle for inequality, racism, and subjugation" (147).

Thus, any critical theory must, again in Helen Crowley’s words “retain the commitment to interrogate critically the possibility that it need not always be thus” (147). Feminist as much as queer theory must reflect upon the contingency of their respective premises and constructions to maintain their awareness of the difference between the thought and the thinkable. This is less a matter of working out a subject core than of developing a range of instruments capable of analyzing the logic of power relations and power struggles. A scholarly practice that aims to analyze power and hegemony must be forthright about its own complicity in given relationships of power. That is, the unsaid must also appear in the said.

The challenge is to make speech transparent by thematizing the conditions of speech, and by constantly interrogating one’s own organizing principles. “In the ideal case, this transparency of conditions,” the German philosopher Wolfgang Welsch commented, leads “to an explicit delineation of the boundaries and exclusions of the respective conditional framework” (938; my translation). This would be a truly “que/e/red” practice of knowledge production based on epistemological strategies that constantly move across and between established disciplinary as well as object-centered territories.

Feminist theory has repeatedly resisted the procedures of exclusion inherent in the disciplinary organization of knowledge. In doing so, it has provoked reconsideration not only of the disciplinary structure itself but also what qualifies as “knowledge” in any discipline. This openness to self-reflection and subsequent changes has been largely a result of feminism’s attention to women’s contradictory social experiences. On its intricate path from margin to center, Women’s Studies now is in danger of giving up its dialogue with the other in favor of a dialogue with the canonized powers. It thus behooves us to bear in mind Paul Celan’s line that “who speaks shadow, speaks truth” (135; my translation). It could indeed serve to remind us that it is the unspoken which constitutes the intelligibility of that which is spoken.

Works Cited


11 Concerning queer theory, Suzanna Walters asks: “Is it possible that Queer theory’s unspoken Other is feminism, or even lesbianism, or lesbian-feminism?” (842)
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