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Women's Internalization of Sexism: Predictors and Antidotes

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Introduction

Sexism is defined as „individuals' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, and organizational, institutional, and cultural practices that either reflect negative assessments of individuals based upon their gender or support unequal status of women and men" (Swim & Hyers, 2007, p.2) and is mostly directed against women. In many ways it can be argued that sexism is not particularly prevalent and that complete gender equality is on the cusp of being achieved at least in industrialized countries (e.g., Jackson, 1998). Starting with the cultural, political and social movements of the 1960s and 70s, gender relations in Europe and North America seem to have shifted from considerable gender inequality to emerging egalitarianism. Egalitarian values have become more and more important (e.g., Helmreich, Spence, & Gibson, 1982; Twenge, 1997; Wells & Twenge, 2005) and laws were changed in terms of gender equity.

However, these egalitarian norms did not result in real gender equality (for a review see Rudman & Glick, in press). Sexism and discrimination against women are still widespread all over the world (Glick et al., 2000; Swim, Becker, Pruitt, & Lee, in press). This can be seen on the societal level, for instance, regarding the ongoing gender-specific division of labor (Cornelißen, 2005; U.S. Department of Labor, 2006) as well as in everyday discrimination. Regarding the labor market, men, as compared to women, earn more money (e.g., Ostroff & Atwater, 2003; Cornelißen, 2005; European Commission, 2006a; U.S. Department of Labor, 2006), have more authority (e.g., McGuire & Reskin, 1993), receive more promotions (e.g., Brass, 1984) and are overrepresented in decision-making positions (European Commission, 2006b).

Regarding everyday life, women report to experience about one to two sexist incidents per week (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). These refer to

traditional gender stereotypes (e.g., expectations about women's and men's behaviors, and expressions of traditional gender stereotypes) and unwanted sexual attention (e.g., staring at body parts or unwanted sexual touching). Sexual or bodily objectification can also be experienced through media portrayals of women (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), for instance through the use of female bodies in advertisement to sell everything from toothbrushes to cars (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Furthermore, violence against women continues to be widespread in intimate relationships (e.g., Carlson, Worden, VanRyn, & Bachman, 2003; Cornelißen, 2005).

A final example of common sexism is sexist language. Language teaches and reinforces gender role expectations and helps to maintain gender inequality (Swim, Mallet, & Stangor, 2004), for instance by using the generic masculine (Stahlberg & Sczesny, 2001), by interrupting women in conversations (Brooks, 1982), or by demonstrating inadequate behaviors when a woman is talking, e.g., by engaging in side conversations, checking the time, leaving the room to make phone calls, or turning away from the speaker (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Tannen, 1990).

This evidence let scholars to conclude that sexism continues to reproduce gender inequality and to protect male privilege by a new language and new strategies (e.g., Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986; Glick et al., 2000; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). Thus, open endorsement of sexist beliefs is not in line with social norms any longer, which is why it changed into covert and subtle manifestations of sexism (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Swim & Cohen, 1997).

In response to these societal changes from blatant to subtle sexism, researchers developed new concepts to mirror contemporary forms of sexism. The most important developments during the past 15 years have been the concepts of Modern Sexism/Neosexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; Tougas, Brown,

Beaton, & Joly, 1995) and the concept of Ambivalent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), which will be outlined below.

Interestingly, although belonging to the target group of gender discrimination, a substantial share of women reinforces subtle sexism (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). The present research has aimed at explaining individual differences in women's endorsement of sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action on the one hand and has investigated ways of reducing endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs on the other.

Throughout the research I refer to the newly developed concepts of subtle sexism. Therefore, before focusing on the role of women in the proliferation of gender inequality, the seminal concepts of contemporary sexism will have to be reviewed.

1. Measures of Contemporary Sexism

First, I review the concepts of Modern and Neosexism and afterwards focus on the concept of Ambivalent Sexism (ambivalence toward women and ambivalence toward men).

1.1. Modern Sexism and Neosexism

The concepts of Modern Sexism (Swim et al., 1995) and Neosexism (Tougas et al., 1995) have been developed independent from one another in order to assess "hidden" prejudice against women. Both concepts derive from research that was done on modern and symbolic racism (McConahay, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981, Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, Sears, 1988).

Modern Sexism manifests itself in a denial of discrimination against women, resentment of complaints about sexism and resentment against special favors for women (e.g., affirmative actions; Swim et al., 1995). Neosexism is defined as "manifestation of a conflict between egalitarian values and residual negative feelings

toward women" (p. 843, Tougas et al., 1995) and is perceived as a socially acceptable way of expressing prejudice. Both of these beliefs represent resistance to efforts made in the direction of addressing the problem of sexism and imply an inclination to maintaining current gender relations: If there is no discrimination, then special efforts and policies directed at changing the gender system are unnecessary and complaints about sexism are overreactions which can be worth ignored.

Critics could argue that in an absolutely egalitarian society, denial of gender discrimination is not indicative of sexism. Likewise, Swim et al. (1995) argued that it is an indispensable assumption of the concept of Modern Sexism, at least at the level of its operationalization, that sexism still exists. However, inasmuch as our society is far from being egalitarian, such objections are not indicated in present societies (e.g., Cornelißen, 2005; U.S. Department of Labor, 2006). Research has demonstrated divergent and convergent validity of both scales. Modern and Neosexism are distinct from endorsement of traditional gender roles and stereotypes (Swim et al., 1995; Swim & Cohen, 1997; Tougas et al., 1995), but correlate with several similar characteristics, such as lesser likelihood of judging particular incidents as sexual harassment (Swim & Cohen, 1997), overestimation of the number of women in masculine domains (Swim et al., 1995), negative attitudes toward Affirmative Action (Tougas et al., 1995), religious service attendance (Frieze et al., 2003), negative evaluations of feminists and feminism (Campbell, Schellenberg, & Senn, 1997), and greater use of sexist language (Cralley & Ruscher, 2005; Swim et al., 2004; for a review see Swim & Hyers, 2007).

In spite of several similarities between Modern and Neosexism, there are some distinctions between the two measures. Researchers have argued that Modern and Neosexism scales appeared to measure different facets of the same construct (Campbell et al., 1997; Parks & Roberton, 2004): Both scales assess the three

dimensions of Modern Sexism as outlined by Swim et al. (1995): 1) denial of continued discrimination, 2) resentment of complaints about sexism and 3) resentment of special favors to women. Yet, the Modern Sexism scale primarily measures perceptions of discrimination whereas the Neosexism scale focuses mostly on the second and third subcomponent. An empirical test supported that both scales have different emphases. Swim, Becker, and DeCoster (2007) found that Modern and Neosexism items load on two different factors, indicating one factor with items assessing perceptions of the prevalence of sexism (which are mostly from the Modern Sexism scale) and a second factor with items measuring lack of support for efforts toward improvement of women's status and a few items that could be considered as relatively blatant sexist beliefs (e.g., "It is difficult to work for a female boss"; which are mostly from the Neosexism scale).

1.2. Ambivalent Sexism

1.2.1 Ambivalence toward Women

Glick and Fiske (1996) started their research with the question how women can be oppressed and loved at the same time. They referred to the concept of structural power (control over economic, legal and political institutions) and dyadic power (power that stems from dependencies in relationships, Guttentag & Secord, 1983) and took into account that sexism emerges within the context of patriarchal structures which also include interdependencies between women and men developing in heterosexual relationships (Jackman, 1994). The interplay of structural and dyadic power elicits ambivalent sexist attitudes, which are composed of hostile and benevolent sexist beliefs.

Hostile Sexism is clearly negative and fits Allport's (1954) antipathy model of prejudice, but it is also counterbalanced by a subjectively benevolent view of women.

This benevolence is a result of men's dependence on women for sexual reproduction and fulfilling domestic roles, hence lending women power in intimate relationships (Guttentag & Secord, 1983).

Patriarchy, gender differentiation and sexual reproduction create both hostile and benevolent sexist beliefs: Hostile Sexism addresses dominative paternalism (i.e., the belief that men ought to have more power than women, which is accompanied by the corresponding fear that women seek to gain power by getting control over men), competitive gender differentiation (the belief that women are inferior to men on competence related dimensions, e.g., that in conditions of fair competition women were unable to win high-status roles) and hostile heterosexuality (the belief that the sexuality of women is dangerous for men, that women are "sexual teases" or "femme fatales" who seek control over men in their relationships). In sum, hostile sexists perceive women as seeking control over men, be it through sexuality or though feminist ideology.

Hostile sexist beliefs are tempered by their benevolent counterparts: Benevolent Sexism includes protective paternalism (the belief that women should be protected and taken care of by men), complementary gender differentiation (the belief that women are the "better" sex, and have special qualities that few men possess, but only in ways suiting lower status and conventional gender roles, such as "other-profitable" traits (Peeter & Czapinski, 1990), in contrast to "self-profitable" traits which include the competence dimension which high-status groups excel on), and heterosexual intimacy (the belief that heterosexual romantic relationships are essential for true happiness in life and that women fulfill men's romantic needs).

Individuals scoring high on Hostile and Benevolent Sexism are the ambivalent sexists. They seem to reconcile their hostile and benevolent attitudes by classifying women into good (e.g., housewives) and bad subtypes (e.g., career women).

The Problem of Benevolent Sexism

Benevolent Sexism seems subjectively positive, characterizes women as wonderful, pure creatures and may flatter women, but reinforces patriarchy by portraying women as childlike, incompetent, needing men to protect them and therefore as best suited for low status roles. Only those women who behave in line with sexist prescriptions for maintaining traditional gender role behavior are "rewarded" with affection, those who challenge men's power (e.g., feminists, career women) and those who are perceived as using their sexual allure to gain power over men (e.g., temptresses) are punished with hostility (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner & Zhu, 1997).

Benevolent Sexism can also undermine the aspirations of women toward autonomy and socioeconomic progress. Benevolent Sexism is negatively associated with values of self-direction (e.g., freedom, independence, curiousness, choosing own goals, cf. Feather, 2004). It has been shown that women's implicit (but not explicit) idealization of men as chivalric rescuers (e.g., Prince Charming), negatively predicts their interest in personal power (Rudman & Heppen, 2003). Further, women who endorse benevolent sexist beliefs assigned more importance to the characteristic "good earning potential" when choosing a mate, which presumably reflects a desire for a male provider (Johannesen-Schmidt & Eagly, 2003). Instead, women who endorse benevolent sexist beliefs conform to current beauty ideals and practices, as seen, e.g., in the use of cosmetics (Forbes, Collinsworth, Jobe, Braun, & Wise, 2007; Forbes, Jung, & Haas, 2006; Franzio, 2001) and in body dissatisfaction (Forbes et al., 2005). Taken together, benevolent sexist ideology increases women's tolerance for acts of discrimination and promotes women's individual advancement by pairing themselves with a powerful man who functions like

a social and economic elevator for women. Thus, many women do not perceive benevolence as discriminatory for their own lives and do not realize the harm it causes for women as a category. As a consequence, Benevolent Sexism deflates collective resistance of women against it by offering them a way of coming to terms with a sexist system individually without having to challenge the structure of the system as a whole (e.g., Wright, 2001; Ellemers, 2001). Therefore, whereas Hostile Sexism is likely to elicit women's rebellion, Benevolent Sexism often obtains acquiescence and therefore works effectively and invisibly to promote gender inequality.

In sum, the positive nature of benevolent sexist beliefs (e.g., chivalrous offers of help to "damsels in distress") is particularly problematic since it may benefit individual women on a micro level, but is harmful for women in general on a macro level by representing an effective tool of oppression which exemplifies the ways in which women can be co-opted.

The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory

In order to measure Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, Glick and Fiske (1996) developed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI). Confirmatory factor analyses of the ASI with samples in the United States suggest that sexism encompasses separable hostile and benevolent components, which are moderately correlated. Although Glick and Fiske (1996) have suggested three subcomponents both for the hostile and for the benevolent scale, subfactors were only confirmed for the Benevolent Sexism scale. This factor structure was also found in 16 of 19 different countries from all over the world (Glick et al., 2000). Correlations between Hostile and Benevolent Sexism were higher for women (average r = .37) than for men (average r = .23). Furthermore they were higher in low sexist nations than in high

sexist nations and higher in low sexist individuals than in high sexist individuals. On a societal level, Hostile and Benevolent Sexism are strongly correlated (r = .89), supporting the argument that Benevolent and Hostile Sexism form complementary ideologies, like the stick and the carrot, motivating the acceptance of the system as a whole (Jackman, 1994).

Variation in national Hostile and Benevolent Sexism scores are associated with a variation in gender inequality across nations: Men's Hostile Sexism related significantly and men's Benevolent Sexism related marginally significantly to United Nations indices of gender inequality (as measured with the Gender-related Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure), indicating that higher gender inequality is accompanied with men's Hostile and Benevolent Sexism (Glick et al., 2000).

Consistent with an antipathy characterization of most measures of sexist beliefs, Hostile Sexism was moderately to strongly correlated with measures of blatant sexism such as the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS, Spence & Helmreich, 1972), the Rape Myth Acceptance scale (Burt, 1980), and also with the Modern and the Neosexism scale (Masser & Abrams, 1999). In contrast, Benevolent Sexism was only weakly correlated with these measures. These correlations even vanished, once the relation with Hostile Sexism was controlled for. Instead, Benevolent Sexism, but not Hostile Sexism, correlated with a measure of paternalistic chivalry (Viki, Abrams, & Hutchison, 2003). Moreover, Hostile and Benevolent Sexism predicted opposing valences in attitudes toward women: Hostile Sexism predicted negative and Benevolent Sexism positive attitudes toward women (Eckes, 2002; Glick et al., 1997; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Sibley & Wilson, 2004).

Ambivalent sexists produced the highest degree of polarization in their judgments of subtypes of women (career woman vs. housewife) as well as men

(manager vs. softy; Eckes, 2001). Glick et al. (2000) interpreted these results as supporting the notion that Hostile Sexism and Benevolent Sexism generally target different types of women.

Other researchers also found supporting evidence for the predicted validity of both scales: Benevolent Sexism is positively related to traditional values (Feather, 2004). Individuals high on Benevolent Sexism positively evaluate those women who conform to traditional gender roles (Glick et al., 1997) and negatively evaluate those who violate traditional role expectations (Viki & Abrams, 2002; Viki, Massey, & Masser, 2005). For instance, benevolent sexists have more favorable impressions of the breastfeeding woman than those with low scores on the Benevolent Sexism scale (Forbes, Adams-Curtis, Hamm, & White, 2003). In contrast, Hostile Sexism is positively related to power values (Feather, 2004) and to negative evaluations of women who pose a threat to men's status in the workplace (Masser & Abrams, 2004). Consistent with these findings, Abrams, Viki, Masser, and Bohner (2003) found, that Hostile Sexism, but not Benevolent Sexism is associated with acquaintance-rape proclivity, whereas Benevolent, but not Hostile Sexism is correlated with blaming the acquaintance-rape victim for having behaved in inappropriate ways (see also Viki, Chiroro, & Abrams, 2006; Yamawaki, 2007).

Social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, &Malle, 1994) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) are well established predictors of Ambivalent Sexism. Social dominance orientation is defined as the degree to which people favor group-based inequality and hierarchically structured relationships among social groups in society.

Social dominance orientation causes negative attitudes toward competitive groups and is therefore a well established predictor of Hostile Sexism. Contrary, right-wing authoritarianism causes negative attitudes toward groups threatening

security, control and order and is hence more closely related to Benevolent Sexism (e.g., Christopher & Mull, 2006; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007; Whitley, 1999). Moreover, Benevolent Sexism can be predicted by catholic religiosity (e.g., Glick, Lameiras, Castro, 2002), while Hostile Sexism can be predicted by a protestant work ethic (Christopher & Mull, 2006).

1.2.2 Ambivalence toward Men

Although it is not central for the present work, it is worth noting that members of lower status groups are also affected by power and status differences and are likely to both resent and admire the powerful (Glick & Fiske, 1999). To catch women's attitudes toward men, Glick and Fiske (1999) developed the concept of benevolent and hostile attitudes toward men and measured it with the "Ambivalence Toward Men Inventory" (AMI). Similarly to the ASI, the structure of the AMI is composed of a benevolent and a hostile superordinate factor, each of them having three subfactors related to paternalism, gender differentiation, and heterosexual relations.

Hostility against men is characterized by resentment of paternalism (women resent the power and higher status associated with men), compensatory gender differentiation (women differentiate themselves positively from men by attributing negative stereotypes to men, e.g., being arrogant or being whining when they are sick) and heterosexual hostility (resentment of male sexual aggressiveness and of the threat of sexual violence). In contrast, benevolence toward men is composed of maternalism (belief that men are weak and need protection and nurturing, e.g., that a woman must take care of her man at home because he is incapable of doing so himself), complementary gender differentiation (admiration of men for their higher status) and heterosexual attraction (belief that the most important thing for happiness in life is a romantic relationship with a man). Altogether, hostility and benevolence

toward men reflect and support gender inequality by characterizing men as being designed for dominance.

The hypothesized structure of the AMI was confirmed not only in the United States (Glick & Fiske, 1999), but also in 16 geographically and culturally diverse nations (Glick et al., 2004). Hostile and benevolent beliefs toward men were moderately positively related to each other and to Hostile and Benevolent Sexism (as measured by the ASI). Women, as compared to men, scored persistently higher on hostility toward men and lower on benevolence toward men. Therefore, some women simultaneously hold beliefs which actively support and justify male dominance at the same time that they resent the consequences of this dominance.

2. Women's Role in Maintenance of Gender Hegemony: Doing Gender

2.1 Prevalence of Doing Gender

According to the "doing gender" perspective (West & Zimmerman, 1987), gender per se and therefore all gender differences are socially constructed and constituted by interaction. "Doing gender means creating differences between girls and boys and women and men, differences that are not natural, essential, or biological" (West & Zimmerman, 1987, p.24).

Thus, women and men have internalized gender stereotypes and gender-specific behavior: Men are "doing" more dominance and women are "doing" more deference, which reinforces and legitimizes hierarchical arrangements. For instance, women are taken less seriously than men because they express themselves in less powerful ways: Women speak more tentatively than men, use more tag questions ("It's a nice day, isn't it?"), unfinished sentences, disclaimers ("I could be wrong, but…") and hedges ("hum, ah"). They ask more questions than they make statements and rather "support" than guide conversations (e.g., Carli, 1990; Lakoff, 1975; Reid, Keerie, & Palomares, 2003). When men are talking, many women respond with smile, attentive listening and nodding (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995).

Furthermore, many women have internalized different self-silencing beliefs, which are composed of relationship maintenance and self presentation beliefs (Jack & Dill, 1992; Swim, Eysell, Quinlivan, & Ferguson, 2007). These represent the tendency to restrain one's own thoughts and feelings in relationships in order to preserve harmony and to put other's needs before one's own. Therefore, they derive from gender related beliefs about appropriate behavior for women. These beliefs are related to self-silencing to sexism (Swim, Eysell et al., 2007).

Generally speaking, although women belong to the target group of gender discrimination, many of them typically agree with sexist beliefs: In a recent representative survey of the German adult population (Heitmeyer, 2007), 29.2% of the female respondents disagreed (“rather disagree” or “fully disagree” on a four-point rating scale) with the (recoded) modern sexist statement that discrimination is a problem in Germany. And 31.2% of female respondents demand (“rather agree” or “fully agree”) that women should concentrate on their roles as wives and mothers, hence approving an item measuring traditional sexism. However, women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs is not only confined to Germany. Glick et al. (2000) have analyzed people’s benevolent and hostile sexist attitudes in 19 different countries all over the world. In all countries, men scored higher on Hostile Sexism than women, but this gender gap was smaller for Benevolent Sexism in four countries, non-significant in nine countries and even reversed in four countries. In these four countries, where women had significantly higher scores on Benevolent Sexism than men, men had the highest Hostile Sexism scores, as compared to the other 15 countries. This suggests that women in these countries may feel a particularly high level of threat due to men’s endorsement of hostile sexist beliefs and, in turn, endorse benevolent sexist beliefs because it implies the need for protection from this threat (Glick et al., 2000; Fischer, 2006). Altogether, these results imply that belonging to the target group of discrimination does not automatically protect from endorsement and active maintenance of the current gender hegemony (see e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994). This phenomenon is not only observable for women, but for disadvantaged individuals and groups in general: Almost all societies involve social inequality and unequal distributions of resources and power, some individuals and groups are socially devalued, materially disadvantaged and have a lower status compared to other individuals and groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However, there

is typically little protest by members of these groups against social inequality. Thus, it seems as if disadvantaged individuals tolerate their situation and feel reluctant to challenge the system that oppresses them (Major & Schmader, 2001; Wright, 2001). Surprisingly, despite being discriminated against, disadvantaged individuals report, in comparison to members of socially advantaged groups, equal or greater levels of personal and collective self-esteem (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989).

The present research therefore is an attempt to understand this paradoxical reaction of members of disadvantaged groups, exemplified by women as one of the disadvantaged groups. More specifically, the present research focuses on explanations for the phenomenon that many women endorse sexist beliefs and legitimize gender inequality, whereas others do not. Based on these considerations, possibilities to reduce endorsement of sexist beliefs are derived and empirically tested.

2.2. Reasons for Women's Endorsement of Sexist Beliefs

In the following, different possible explanation for endorsement of sexist beliefs will be delivered. These are legitimizing ideologies, individual advantages of sexism and lack of awareness of the prevalence and harm of sexism. Based on this review, the major shortcomings of previous research on explanation of women's endorsement of sexist beliefs are pointed out and the connection to the present research is presented.

Legitimizing ideologies work not only for women but for all disadvantaged groups. Therefore, I start with a broad focus on disadvantaged groups in general to underline the universal mechanism by which long-term social inequality is upheld. I then regard the disadvantaged group of women in depth.

2.2.1 Legitimizing Ideologies

The classic position established by the most influential conflict model (Marx & Engels, 1888/1959) posits that force, violence and hostility are primary features of expropriate regimes to control subordinates. Such regimes engender resentment and resistance among disadvantaged groups, which inevitably leads to intergroup conflict and to attempts to subvert the legitimate rule (Marx & Engels, 1888/1959).

However, a scan through history impressively shows that most expropriate or oppressive social relations have survived for centuries without any evidence of political resistance (Jackman, 1994, 2005). Such stable social relations point to the assumption that there is more than just openly practiced violence and dominance at play securing the maintenance of expropriative or oppressive relationships. Therefore, other theorists have postulated that pure power is impotent and instead groups use more subtle means of managing oppressive relations and thereby win the voluntary acceptance (Machiavelli, 1517/1940) and consent of the vast majority of the population (Gramsci, 1971). Theoretical advances made in classic conflict theory have suggested that dominant groups achieve legitimacy[1] by using ideological means to induce a “false consciousness” among subordinates (Gramsci, 1971; Marx & Engels, 1846/1970). Marx and Engels argued that the primary function of ideology is to legitimize ideas and actions that might otherwise be objectionable. Dominant ideologies mask the real interests of the privileged groups and serve to rationalize, legitimize and justify social and economic forms of inequality. Therefore, ideologies are a prerequisite of the stability of any social order. Within society, legitimizing ideologies are held consensually and get their power through this collective

[1] I use a broad definition of legitimacy adopted from Zelditch (2001). For Zelditch, “something is legitimate if it is in accordance with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a group” (p. 33).

endorsement (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Gramsci, 1971; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Major, 1994; Marx & Engels, 1846/1970; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Legitimizing ideologies are, for instance, system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980), belief in meritocracy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and in a protestant work ethic (Mirels & Garrett, 1971). Sidanius and Pratto (1999) distinguish between hierarchy-enhancing "legitimizing myths", which justify and support group-based social inequality from hierarchy-attenuating "legitimizing myths", which support social equality.

System justification theory has integrated several concepts and was developed to explain societal groups' agreement with social stereotypes as well as with the prevalence of outgroup favoritism among members of disadvantaged groups. System justification means that people are motivated to not only positively evaluate their own self and the groups they belong to (see Social Identity Theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Social Dominance Theory, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), but also the superordinate societal system. Based on the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980), Jost and colleagues argue that people want to believe that social outcomes and arrangements are fair, legitimate and deserved. Believing otherwise would imply that people might be treated unfairly, are not able to cause (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), and control their own outcomes (Langer, 1977) and that the world is not a predictable place (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). Individuals avoid these beliefs, because perceptions of undeserved suffering raise discomfort (Lerner, 1980; van den Bos & Lind, 2002; see also theory of cognitive dissonance, Festinger, 1957).

Therefore, by legitimizing social distributions, system justification reduces anxiety, guilt, dissonance and uncertainty both for those who are advantaged *and* for those who are disadvantaged (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Moreover, it justifies inaction of subordinates against social injustice (Taylor & Dube, 1986), because those who

are most disadvantaged have the most to explain, to justify and to rationalize (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). However, for members of privileged groups, motives of ego, group and system justification are consistent and complementary, whereas for members of disadvantaged groups they are often in conflict. As a consequence, members of disadvantaged groups show a tendency to justify existing status hierarchies, even when those hierarchies are to the disadvantage of them or their own group.

Assumptions of system justification as well as the belief in a just world have been empirically supported. Jost and colleagues found that the belief that every group in society possesses some advantages as well as some disadvantages, thus perceiving discrimination as being balanced, increased system justification. For example, women's system justification scores were increased by the complementary representation of gender stereotypes of women as communal and men as agentic or of Benevolent and Hostile Sexism (Jost & Kay, 2005). Belief in a just world is associated with derogating innocent victims (see Furnham & Procter, 1989), acceptance of inequalities in society (e.g., Smith, 1985) and justification of personal deprivation (Hafer & Olson, 1989).

Endorsement of legitimizing ideologies has also implications for self-esteem. On the one hand, appraisals of illegitimacy which pertain to specific situations of prejudice can buffer self-esteem: Researchers have demonstrated that attributing negative outcomes to discrimination is an effective strategy to protect personal self-esteem when prejudice appears to be blatant and unambiguously sexist (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003). On the other hand, the development of chronic perceptions of discrimination can have negative psychological consequences, because it can threaten important beliefs that sustain one's sense of self-worth and the perception that one is valued by others (Major &

Schmader, 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 1997). Therefore, blaming poor outcomes to discrimination in contexts where prejudice cues are weak or nonexistent, is not a protection but rather a threat to self-esteem (Brown & Siegel, 1988; Major et al., 2003). This is consistent with the finding that the belief in personal control and the belief in a just world are positively associated with self-esteem and well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Thus, one reason why individuals deny personal experiences with discrimination might be that it buffers their self-esteem.

An effective strategy to legitimize the gender system, to reduce chances of real change in power relations and to keep women in their "place" is tokenism.

Tokenism is defined as restricted intergroup context where only a few members of the disadvantaged groups gain access to advantaged positions, while the vast majority of the group remains in a disadvantaged position (Kanter, 1977; Wright & Taylor, 1999). Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998) commented that while "women and minorities have made inroads into the power elite, the overwhelming majority at the top continues to be white, wealthy, Christian and male."

Considering successful tokens, Wright (2001) answered the interesting question, as to whether those tokens support their disadvantaged group. He manipulated the opportunity of social mobility in a higher status group and analyzed responses from three perspectives: the perspective of the disadvantaged, of the advantaged and of the successful tokens who gained access to the higher status group. He contrasted responses to tokenism with responses to completely closed and completely open contexts in terms of social mobility. Wright (2001) found that successful tokens do not support their disadvantaged group, but in contrast, are sufficient to undermine the interest of collective action of members of disadvantaged groups who are denied access to higher status groups. This is consistent with findings of Ellemers (for an overview see Ellemers, 2001) that individual upward

mobility of women can help to perpetuate existing differences between women and men. Ellemers found that women who have been successful in male-dominated organizations (she labeled those women as “queen bees”) hold stereotypical images of other women: Compared to male faculty members, female faculty members rated female Ph.D. students as significantly less committed to the organization and to their career than the male students (Ellemers, van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 2004). She argued that the unwillingness to support the disadvantaged may result from their rapid shift in identification from the low to the high status group.

Moreover, Wright found that under conditions of tokenism, the disadvantaged themselves are also unwilling to support collective action on behalf of their group. Therefore, tokenism can serve as an effective tool by which dominants can maintain their position of power.

2.2.2 Possible Advantages of Sexism

As mentioned above, women who conform to traditional gender roles are rewarded with benevolence, whereas those who disconfirm to these roles are punished with hostility. Therefore, the former can individually profit from subtle sexism and hence do not perceive it as prejudicial. Especially chivalry refers to superficially courteous behavior that can be perceived as protective, paternalistic and positive (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Some women may feel flattered by offers of protection, adoration and enjoy being part of “the better sex” (Glick & Fiske, 1999). They reinforce gender stereotypes to get affection and potential rewards from dominant group members. This is consistent with Jackman’s (1994) argument that long-term inequality is maintained by paternalistic systems that accompany expropriation with affection toward disadvantaged groups. An extreme form of paternalistic prejudice is slavery which is couched by the dominant group as benevolent (e.g., White man’s burden).

Jackman (1994) argued in her velvet-glove theory that members of dominant as well as of subordinate groups have self-interested reasons for avoiding hostility and conflict. From her point of view, the small share of resources subordinates receive from dominants provide a potent incentive for subordinates and a sufficient motivation to cooperate and comply. Thus, dominants provide subordinates to a sufficient degree with a stake in the system, thereby encouraging them to fulfill the dominants' needs without social conflict. As mentioned above, pairing with a powerful man can serve a woman as a social and economic elevator. Therefore, women would have something to loose, at least short-term, if they started to challenge men's social privileges.

Besides the fear of losing rewards, self-stereotyping has the function of increasing personal and collective self-esteem. Many women can get self-esteem by favorably distinguishing themselves from men and by seeing themselves as superior in some – typically status irrelevant – areas, e.g., by being proud of superior domestic abilities, by attributing negative traits to men (e.g., arrogance) or by characterizing men as not being as capable as they might appear, when taking a "behind the scenes" point of view (e.g., men are like children, cf. Glick & Fiske, 1999).

Since conformity is rewarded and deviation punished, not confronting sexism can have the additional advantage to be accepted by a (male) group. For instance, women report to complicit in sexist humor, to be "one of the guys" (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Further, many women want to avoid rejection and reprisal. Studies have shown that, in general, people constantly try to shape other people's impressions of themselves. They desire to appear nice, and try to get others to like them. Complaining about discrimination can often produce undesirable consequences, such as creating the impression of incompetence, selfishness, or

being a whiner. Researchers have demonstrated, that the pressure to be polite (Swim & Hyers, 1999), and the fear to be labeled a feminist (Swim, Pearson, Chau, & Stangor, 2003) can inhibit women's tendency to confront sexism. In addition, women (as well as men) can directly benefit from being sexist: In a study of Watkins et al. (2006) it has been found that women (as well as men) who endorse modern sexist beliefs rely on men's (versus women's) work-related advice and, in turn, obtain more promotions than their less modern sexist counterparts.

The opposite effect, that is, experiences of individual disadvantages lead to a stronger rejection of sexist beliefs has also been shown: Tougas, Brown, Beaton and St.-Pierre (1999) found that women's endorsement of neosexist beliefs is negatively related to social mobility attempts. When women perceived that barriers in a non-traditional female field of work prevented their upward mobility, they felt collective relative deprivation, which in turn was associated with lesser endorsement of neosexist beliefs.

2.2.3 Lacking Awareness of Gender Inequality and its Harm

Subtle sexism is integrated into cultural and societal norms and therefore built into people's everyday routines. As described above, many women get used to sexism and internalize it as customary and normal behavior (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). In comparison to blatant sexism, subtle sexism is difficult to discover, because subtle forms of sexism do not match the mental prototype of sexist perpetrators. As a consequence, individuals are not aware of subtle manifestations of sexism or they do not perceive them as anything serious and harmful (Swim et al., 2003; Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Several researchers found empirical support for this phenomenon: Women were disinclined to recognize expressions of Modern Sexism as prejudicial (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a), and people endorsing benevolent sexist statements are less likely to be perceived as sexist than those endorsing

hostile sexist views (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b). Women prefer egalitarian men over benevolent men, but nevertheless evaluate a benevolent sexist men profile slightly positively (Kilianski & Rudman, 1998). The lacking awareness of manifestations of sexism in language was demonstrated by Swim et al. (2004). They showed that Modern Sexism is associated with the use and non-detection of sexist language. People improved their ability to detect sexist language when it was defined for them. Moreover, modern sexist beliefs are associated with a lack of awareness of the extent to which the work force is segregated along gender lines and people who endorse these beliefs overestimate the percentage of women in male-dominated jobs (Swim et al., 1995). In addition, beliefs about the prevalence of discrimination are the central element of modern sexist beliefs, thus it is assumable that people may endorse Modern Sexism because they do not perceive discrimination in their personal lives and are not aware of the prevalence of sexism in society.

In contrast, people may be likely to think that benevolent sexist men's statements are less sexist than those of hostile sexist men, because the positive nature of the former hides the harm they can cause (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Swim et al., 2005). Therefore, people may endorse benevolent sexist beliefs because they do not perceive benevolence as discriminatory in their personal lives and are not aware that these beliefs can promote harm especially for women as a category.

Hence, it is likely that informing people about the prevalence, respectively harm of sexism can reduce modern sexist, respectively benevolent sexist beliefs. These assumptions have not yet been tested and become central in the second part of the present dissertation.

3. Present Research

The present dissertation is based on two manuscripts. In Manuscript #1, the Gender Identity Model was developed to predict individual differences in women's endorsement of sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action. In Manuscript #2 the impact of heightened sensitivity for the prevalence of sexism and its harm on the reduction of benevolent, modern and neosexist beliefs was analyzed.

3.1 Predictors of Women's Endorsement of Sexist Beliefs: Shortcomings in Research

As described above, several correlates and predictors of sexism have been identified. These predictors are primarily relatively stable personality traits and attitudes (e.g., authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, religiosity, protestant work ethic). Yet, researchers analyzed predictors of endorsement of sexist beliefs for women and men at the same time. They did not focus on women's endorsement of sexist beliefs in particular. Therefore, the contradiction between being a member of the target group of gender discrimination and simultaneously reinforcing sexist beliefs is still insufficiently considered (for an exception see, Cameron & Lalonde, 2001). However, the objective group membership (e.g., being a woman) is accompanied by a more or less subjective sense of belonging to that certain group (i.e., strength of social identification with women as a group, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, it should be taken into account that the endorsement of sexist beliefs might depend on the strength of women's gender identification. It is likely that women who are strongly identified as compared to those who are low identified with their gender in-group are more sensitive to gender-related information and motivated to evaluate their gender in-group favorably to maintain positive self esteem. Equally, negative evaluations of women in general should be more self-relevant for highly identified women than for low identified women. Therefore, highly identified women should reject sexist beliefs

stronger than low identified women, since negative evaluations are self-relevant and harmful to them. Research on support for feminism is in line with this argument (Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; Harquail, 2007).

However, a further important distinction which needs to be made is the one between the strength of identification and identity content (cf. Condor, 1984): Women who are highly identified can associate either more progressive or more traditional values with the gender category. These different in-group connections result in different perceived group norms and as a consequence in different ways of thinking and acting. It is likely that women who associate traditional values with women as a group as compared to those with progressive associations adhere more strongly to sexist beliefs, because they understand differences in social behavior between women and men as genetically determined and value traditional relations between women and men.

Identity content is specified for instance, by the concept of gender roles derived from Social Role Theory (SRT; Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Wood, 1999). Gender roles cover a broad range of associations women and men connect with their gender category and determine prototypical in-group norms. According to SRT, gender differences in social behavior are based on contrasting social roles of women and men (Eagly & Wood, 1999). In most Western societies, women are more likely responsible for home and family, while men are more often employed outside their home (e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, 2006). Both women and men adapt their social behavior to fulfil role requirements and therefore tend to act in ways that are appropriate for their roles. As a consequence, gender-specific role expectations become internalized as part of individuals' self-concepts and personalities (Feingold, 1994; Wood, Christensen, Hebl, & Rothberger, 1997). On an individual level, however, not all society members do accommodate to traditional gender roles in the

same way. As a result of the feminist movement of the 1970's, many individuals disconfirm with traditional gender role expectations such as career women, female leaders, feminists, house husbands or homosexual couples (Jagose, 2001). For this reason, we expect that women have internalized different gender roles. Whereas some women internalize a traditional gender role, others prefer a more "progressive" or "modern" gender role. Therefore, the connection between strength of gender identification and endorsement of sexist beliefs is not straightforward, but depends on identity content. This is the starting point of the first part of the present dissertation. Built on the distinction between strength of gender identification and content of gender identity in explaining individual differences in women's endorsement of sexist beliefs, we developed the Gender Identity Model. Combining these two orthogonal dimensions results in four general types of gender identity: traditional identifiers, progressive identifiers, traditional non-identifiers, and progressive non-identifiers (for a comparable model see Condor, 1984).

In Manuscript #1, it was tested whether differences in women's endorsement of benevolent, hostile and modern sexist beliefs can be explained with this model. In order to not only consider differences in attitudes toward sexism but also differences in actual behavior, we also focused on participation in collective political actions aiming to improve women's social status in society (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). We predicted that women with a traditional gender role orientation adhere more strongly to sexist attitudes and reject collective action more strongly than women with a progressive gender role orientation, on condition that they are highly identified with their gender category. We did not predict these effects for low identified women.

To test this hypothesis, we started with a correlational study and analyzed the data with moderated regression analyses. In two following experiments, we

examined the causal relation between different gender identities and endorsement of sexist beliefs as well as participation in collective action by manipulating the salience of gender role preference. We analyzed the interaction effect of the gender role manipulation and strength of gender identification on endorsement of sexist beliefs and intention to engage in collective action.

3.2 Antidotes - Reduction of Sexist Beliefs

As a consequence of advancing knowledge about predictors to explain endorsement of sexist beliefs, ways are focused to reduce endorsement of these beliefs. Reduction of ethnic prejudice is well explored (e.g., Oskamp, 2000; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Stephan & Vogt, 2004). However, although sexism is prevalent and widespread all over the world and has negative consequences for women at least on a macro level, there exists almost no research on the reduction of sexist beliefs. Therefore, the second part of the present dissertation addresses this shortcoming and expands previous research on predictors of subtle sexism by investigating options to reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs.

Considering the reasons for endorsement of sexist beliefs as listed above, individuals adopt ideological belief systems partly because of the psychological needs and motives they satisfy (like the reduction of guilt, uncertainty and cognitive dissonance; Jost et al., 2003). Moreover, endorsement of such ideologies can help to secure self-esteem. For women who conform to Benevolent and Modern Sexism, possible individual advantages which can result are, for example, being rewarded with benevolence and affection, or being flattered by offers of protection (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Taken together, it appears difficult to change legitimizing ideologies as well as to simply withhold women their individual advantages of sexism because they serve different motivational functions (see e.g., Jost et al., 2003).

Therefore, instead of trying to change motivational factors, we focused on cognitive causes of endorsement of sexist beliefs, such as a lack of awareness of prevailing sexism and of the harm experienced by the targets of discrimination. Results of Swim et al. (2004) suggest that people use sexist language because they do not define it as sexist. Equally, denial of discrimination might implicate that people do not define various types of sexism as sexist. Therefore, a lack of awareness of prevailing sexism might be responsible for endorsement of modern sexist beliefs. It is likely that information about the prevalence of sexism changes endorsement of modern sexist beliefs, because perception of gender discrimination is the core element of the Modern Sexism scale. Due to conceptual overlaps between Modern and Neosexism, changes in Neosexism are also likely.

In contrast, it was posited that Benevolent Sexism appears to be positive on the first glance and that many women do not realize the harm it can cause, e.g., by characterizing women as childlike and best suited for conventional gender roles. Therefore, a lack of awareness of the harm experienced by the targets of discrimination might cause endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs.

Consequently, in the second part of the present research it was investigated whether a heightened awareness of the prevalence of sexism can reduce modern and neosexist beliefs and whether a heightened awareness of harm experienced by the targets of sexism can reduce benevolent sexist beliefs. We tested these assumptions with three experiments.

In the first experiment we tested whether a heightened sensitivity toward sexism in people's everyday life can change endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs. To heighten the awareness for sexism, participants were asked to write in a daily diary. They were either instructed to pay attention to sexism or they were instructed to focus on stress in their lives and to complete several sexism scales afterwards. We

analyzed the data by comparing the sexism scores of people who completed the sexism diary with those who completed the stress diary.

Next, we tested in a second experiment, whether information about the prevalence of sexism reduces endorsement of modern and neosexist beliefs, whereas information about the harm and negative consequences of seemingly positive behaviors like paternalism reduces endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs. For this purpose, we created three different information texts, a) about the prevalence of sexism, b) about the harm caused by sexism and c) about stress in students' lives (control condition). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three text conditions. Again, data was analyzed by comparing the three groups in their endorsement of benevolent, modern and neosexist beliefs.

Whereas the first two experiments were conducted with American students, the third experiment aimed to replicate and extend findings of Experiment 2 in a European context.

In all three experiments, we analyzed the role of gender identification in the process of changing sexist beliefs separately for women and for men. We predicted that women who are highly identified with their gender in-group would be influenced more strongly by information about sexism. Therefore, we assumed that for highly identified women the prejudice-reducing effect would be stronger than for low identified women.

In contrast, men highly identified with their gender in-group are likely to perceive such information as a threat to their gender identity and react with reactance. Thus, we assumed that information about the prevalence and the harm of subtle sexism reduces endorsement of sexist beliefs more strongly in low identified than in highly identified men.

We also aimed at testing the interplay of the strength of gender identification and identity content (i.e., the gender role preference) on changing women's endorsement of sexist beliefs. We expected that the prejudice reducing effects would be stronger for traditional identifiers than for progressive identifiers, because progressive identifiers might be less prejudiced anyway.

To control for changes in legitimizing ideologies we also included a measure of system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994). We tested in each of the three experiments whether a heightened sensitivity for the prevalence of sexism results not only in changes concerning modern sexist beliefs but also in a stronger rejection of system justification beliefs. Plus, we investigated whether this relation would be mediated by changes in modern sexist beliefs.

In sum, the present dissertation is composed of two manuscripts and aims at explaining the role of different gender identities in explaining women's endorsement of sexist beliefs and based on this, it explores possibilities to reduce the acceptance of subtle sexist beliefs. Whereas the first part of the dissertation explicitly focuses on women, the second part includes research on both women and men, because reduction of sexist beliefs is meaningful not only for women but also for men. Manuscript #1 (Becker & Wagner, 2007) was meant to investigate the explanatory impact of the Gender Identity Model on endorsement of benevolent, hostile and modern sexist beliefs as well as of participation in collective action. In Manuscript #2 (Becker & Swim, 2007), we investigated whether endorsement of modern and neosexist beliefs can be reduced via heightened sensitivity toward the prevalence of sexism and whether endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs can be reduced via heightened sensitivity to the harm experienced by the targets of gender discrimination.

The present dissertation ends with a conclusion including a brief summary and discussion of both manuscripts' results, as well as suggestions for future research and a final outlook.

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Manuscript #1:

Doing gender differently –

The interplay of strength of gender identification and content of gender identity in predicting women's endorsement of sexist beliefs

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Abstract

To explain differences in women's endorsement of sexist beliefs, we introduce the Gender Identity Model. Based on Social Identity Theory and Social Role Theory, we combine strength of gender identification and identity content and propose that different types of gender identity can be distinguished, which are predicted to relate to different levels of women's endorsement of sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action. Results of a correlational study and two experiments support the assumptions of the model: Women reject Benevolent, Hostile and Modern Sexism and participate in collective action in particular when they are highly identified with the category women and have, at the same time, internalized progressive identity contents. In contrast, gender role preference has weaker or no effects on sexist beliefs and collective action when women are low identified with their gender in-group.

Although women belong to the target group of gender discrimination it does not automatically protect them from endorsement and active maintenance of the unequal gender status quo (see e.g., Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Research shows that not only men but also women endorse sexist beliefs, namely Benevolent, Hostile and Modern Sexism (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b; Glick et al., 2000; Jackman, 1994; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Benevolent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) takes the form of seemingly positive but in fact condescending beliefs about women. Benevolent Sexism includes protective paternalism (e.g., the belief that women should be protected and cared for by men), complementary gender differentiation (e.g., the belief that women have – typically domestic – qualities that few men possess), and heterosexual intimacy (e.g., the belief that heterosexual romantic relationships are essential for true happiness in life and that women fulfill men's romantic needs). The counter part to Benevolent Sexism is Hostile Sexism. Hostile Sexism is clearly negative and fits Allport's (1954) classic definition of prejudice as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization" (p. 9). Hostile sexists perceive women as seeking control over men, be it through sexuality or through feminist ideology. Modern Sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) is characterized by doubts about the current prevalence of sexism, unfavourable attitudes toward people who complain about sexism and rejection of support for programs and legislation designed to reduce gender inequality.

Endorsement of sexist beliefs can take different forms, which range from blatant expressions of sexism like endorsement of old-fashioned and hostile sexist beliefs to subtle forms like denial of continuing gender discrimination and paternalism (Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Research has shown that blatant forms of sexism are increasingly less accepted, whereas subtle forms of sexism

receive a markedly stronger support (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b; Swim et al., 2005).Yet there is also variation between women in their tendency to reject sexism: Whereas a substantial part of women endorse sexist beliefs and deny or legitimate gender inequality, others reject every manifestation of sexism and engage in collective action to change unequal gender relations (e.g., Foster & Matheson, 1998; Liss, Crawford, & Popp, 2004). To explain differences in endorsement of sexist beliefs among women, we introduce the Gender Identity Model. Based on Social Identity Theory (SIT; e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Social Role Theory (SRT, e.g., Eagly & Wood, 1999), we argue that, firstly, different types of gender identity can be distinguished and, secondly, that these types explain for different levels of women's endorsement of sexist beliefs.

In order to not only consider differences in attitudes toward sexism but also differences in actual behavior, in the present paper we focus on differences in endorsement of sexist beliefs as well as on participation in collective political actions aiming to improve women's social status in society (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

Women's Endorsement of Sexist Beliefs: The Role of Strength of Gender Identification

To explain endorsement of sexist beliefs, previous research has focused primarily on interindividual differences in relatively stable personality variables. For instance, it has been shown that right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation (e.g., Christopher & Mull, 2006; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson 2006), adherence to a protestant work ethic (Christopher & Mull, 2006) and religiosity (e.g., Glick, Lameiras, Castro, 2002; Frieze et al., 2003) are predictors of the endorsement of sexist beliefs. However, most of

this research did not consider women as proponents of sexist attitudes and therefore ignored the contradiction between individual endorsement of sexist beliefs on the one hand and actually belonging to the target group of discrimination on the other hand.

We argue that it is central to consider interindividual differences in the importance of belonging to the category women to understand women's endorsement of sexist beliefs. According to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), it is necessary to differentiate between the objective category membership and the subjective sense of belonging to that category. That is, all women are part of the group of women, but not all women have the same subjective feeling towards belonging to this group: They vary in how strongly they identify themselves with their gender category. Social identification derives from the subjective importance of the group to the self (e.g., Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) and from "the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63; for a recent approach see Cameron, 2004). Therefore, according to SIT, women's interest in issues which concern the social category of women, as well as women's sensitivity to the evaluations and treatment of women should increase as a function of women's identification with their gender in-group. Deduced from SIT, it is reasonable to assume that highly identified women reject sexist views because, especially for them, negative evaluations of their gender group are self-relevant and therefore harmful. Indeed, among those women who identify strongly with their female in-group, researchers report stronger support for feminist demands (Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000) and a stronger engagement to advocacy on behalf of the female in-group (Harquail, 2007).

However, strength of identification is not consistently related to in-group bias (Brown & Zagefka, 2005). For instance, Hinkle and Brown (1990) found in their review that the overall correlation between identification and in-group-bias was close

to zero. Therefore, although a positive relation between identification with the group of women and rejection of sexist beliefs seems straightforward, the consideration of the strength of women's gender identification is not enough to understand women's endorsement of sexist beliefs. We argue for an important qualification.

The Role of Identity Content

Identification per se motivates to act on behalf of one's in-group. The direction of group behavior is, however, contingent on in-group norms (Turner, 1991). Thus, thinking and acting of in-group members depend on what they perceive as the prototypical in-group norm. For instance, Pehrson, Brown & Zagefka (2007) pointed out, that social identity processes should not be treated as independent from identity content. They delivered evidence showing that the relation between national identification and prejudice was moderated by identity content. We argue in a similar way that the relation between gender identification and endorsement of sexist beliefs is moderated by identity content. Women can associate progressive values with their gender in-group (i.e., women are independent, make own careers, interfere in politics, share household tasks and child care equally with men, reject traditional gender-related values) or traditional values and norms of femininity (i.e., women stay at home, do the household, take care of the children, valuing gender-specific behaviors and treatment of women, support the gender-specific division of labor). These different in-group attributes result in different perceived group norms and as a consequence in different ways of thinking and acting. Thus, as Pehrson et al. (2007) suggested, beside the strength of identification, it is important to take *identity content* into account. Whereas strength of identification energizes the behavior, identity content directs this behavior.

In previous research on the endorsement of sexist beliefs the distinction between strength of identification and identity content was almost neglected by either focusing solely on one of both constructs, or mixing them together in a single indicator (e.g., Foster, 1999). For instance, research on feminist identity (e.g., Downing & Rush, 1985; O'Neill, Egan, Owen, & Murry, 1993) confounds strength of identification and identity content, by ignoring that a woman might be identified with her gender group without favoring feminist attitudes.

To the best of our knowledge, only Cameron and Lalonde (2001) and Condor (1984) considered strength of gender identification, and identity content, separately. However, both approaches did not analyze the interplay of strength of identification and identity content in explaining women's endorsement of sexist beliefs.

We propose that gender role preference (derived from Social Role Theory, Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Wood, 1999) is the most important source of identity content. We expect that women have internalized different gender roles. Whereas some women internalize a traditional gender role, others prefer a more "progressive" or "modern" gender role. Moreover, depending on the strength of identification, women tend to apply their internalized gender role to the whole gender category which is the core assumption of the Gender Identity Model.

The Gender Identity Model

The Gender Identity Model (GIM) explicitly differentiates between strength of identification and content of identity (preference for a traditional vs. progressive gender role) which pose, at the same time, the core dimensions of the model. Theoretically, four types of gender identity can be separated (see Figure 1): traditional identifiers, progressive identifiers, traditional non-identifiers, and

progressive non-identifiers. Since Condor's (1984) conceptualization served as a model for the GIM we will retain her terminology.

Highly identified women do not only set their own behavior in relation to the gender role, but also the behavior of other in-group members (i.e., other women). When gender identification comes into play, women project their view about what is right and wrong for women (i.e., their internalized gender role) to the whole category and therefore demand role-conform thinking and behavior from other women, too. For low identified women, gender role is more neutral and less of a reference point for the evaluation of their own and other women's behavior.

Therefore, within the GIM, strength of identification captures the motivation of a woman to act on behalf of her gender in-group, whereas gender role preference specifies the prototypical in-group position and thus the direction of behavior. *Progressive identifiers* are highly identified and prefer a progressive gender role. They reject traditional definitions of femininity regarding these attributes as artificial and serving to maintain women's subordination. Condor (1984) assumed that progressively identified women want to redefine their gender in their own terms. These women perceive their gender group to be of lower societal status than the male gender group and claim for changes in status relations. Therefore, feminists as a female subtype would fit into the category of progressively identified women.

Women who are highly identified and prefer a traditional gender role for their personal lives are the *traditional identifiers*. For them, being a woman is important and moreover, they prefer to stay at home instead of pursuing a career, take care of the family and value traditional relations between women and men. Therefore, they associate traditional contents with women as a social category. Condor (1984) found that traditional women do not perceive their gender to be of lower status in comparison to men. In contrast, they regard women as positively distinct from men.

Hence, they are motivated to justify the current gender system (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Traditional identifiers do not challenge “their place” in society. With their attitudes and behaviors, traditional identifiers support the gender status quo and thus contribute to the maintenance of the unequal social order. We assume that the subtype of housewives and anti-feminists would fit into this category of the traditional identifiers.

An analog distinction can be made for low or non-identifiers: Women for whom being a woman is not essential, but who internalized a progressive gender role are the *progressively non-identified* women. According to Condor (1984), they regard themselves as different from other women and accept masculine but not feminine characteristics as self-applicable. Since masculine traits were associated with achievement and academic success, progressively non-identified women were most highly represented among professional women and students in Condor’s (1984) sample. They also could be queen bees (Ellemers, van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 2004) and disidentify with their gender in order to identify with male-dominated professions and use men rather than women as their reference group. Therefore, it is possible that these women view other women, who are not of high achievement, as less worthy.

The *traditional non-identifiers* evaluate being a woman as not self-relevant and simultaneously adopt a traditional gender role. Condor (1984) reported that these women support the gender status quo, but rate themselves neither as ‘not particularly’ feminine, nor as ‘not particularly’ masculine. Condor argued that these women might identify more with their husband than with other members of their own gender in-group (see de Beauvoir, 1949). It is assumable that these women are housewives for whom being a woman does not play a role.

The GIM allows for formulating specific hypotheses about the extent of endorsement of sexist beliefs depending on different types of identity. We

hypothesize that women's endorsement of sexist beliefs and participation in collective action to change the current gender system depends on the interplay between strength of identification and identity content (i.e., gender role preference). According to the GIM, women who are highly identified with their gender in-group should differ in their endorsement of sexist beliefs and participation in collective action depending on the identity content (i.e., their gender role preference). In contrast, for low identified women, identity content should not affect endorsement of sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action. Therefore, the relation between gender role preference on the one hand and endorsement of sexist beliefs and participation in collective action on the other should be moderated by women's identification with their gender in-group: We expect that highly identified women who prefer a rather traditional gender role show a stronger endorsement of sexist beliefs and a stronger rejection of collective action as compared to highly identified women who have internalized a rather progressive gender role. We do not predict these effects for low identified women.

To test the predictions derived from the GIM, we conducted a correlational survey (Study 1) and two experimental studies (Study 2 and Study 3).

STUDY 1

Method

Participants

Participants were a convenience sample of N = 250 non-student women, who participated voluntarily and were obtained via student assistants. They were between the ages of 20 and 65, with a mean of 42 years. 22% had a high school diploma and a further 31% a university degree. Three percent indicated that they were homo- or bisexuals.

Measures

All items could be answered on a six point rating scale (1 = “disagree strongly” to 6 = “agree strongly”).

Gender role preference was assessed with a newly developed scale measuring individual role preferences and actually lived gender roles. Most of the previous gender-related instruments captured either general gender-related attitudes (e.g., attitudes toward women, Spence & Helmreich, 1972; modern and ambivalent sexism) or they failed to hold sufficient construct validity like the Sex Role Behavior Scale (Orlofsky & O'Heron, 1987; McCreary, Rhodes, & Saucier, 2002). Thus, none of the existing scales were appropriate for our approach and we therefore developed and tested a new scale in a pretest. Items were phrased in a way that they measured individual approval and living of gender roles (e.g., “For me, it is important…” or “I am….”). Such phrases should implicate that women think about their own gender role, which is rather neutral and descriptive in comparison to general prescriptive statements, as for instance sexist beliefs, i.e., “For women, it is important…” or “We should be…” Partially adopting items from former scales, e.g., from the ALLBUS (a yearly representative German survey, see EA, 2002), we developed a pool of 33 items for the pretest (e.g., “It is more important for me to support the career of my partner than to go ahead by myself”, “When I date a man, I would feel unpleasant if I had to pay”). The items covered different areas of women’s everyday life, such as, job (e.g., preference for a career, vs. household), politics (e.g., preference to engage in politics), dealing with children (e.g., preference for child care), partner relationship (e.g., preference for traditional treatment, like to be proposed to instead of proposing marriage oneself), social norms (e.g., preference for keeping maiden-name).

A pretest sample of 70 non-student women (age range 20-68 years; mean age of 40 years) was recruited via friends and acquaintances. Respondents answered the

33 gender role items, and, in addition, the Benevolent, Hostile and Modern Sexism scales and eight gender role behavior items. The exploratory factor analysis for the gender role items yielded a one factor solution (eigen values: 5.34, 2.09, 2.07, 1.85, 1.69, 1.39, 1.34, 1.16, .97, etc.). From the pool of 33 items those eight items that showed highest factor loadings and item-total correlations in reliability analysis were chosen to form a gender role preference measure (see appendix). High scores indicate preference for a traditional gender role, low scores indicate preference for a progressive gender role. In the pretest, the composite measure showed a sufficient internal consistency (α = .75).[1]

Internal consistency for the gender role preference scale was α = .73 in Study 1. The following scale descriptions are also based on the sample of Study 1.

Identification. Identification with the gender in-group was measured with 4 items developed by Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams (1986; "I identify with the group of women"), Cameron (2004; "I feel strong ties to other women"; "Overall, being a woman is an important part of my self-image") and Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner (1999; "Being a woman is important for me"). Internal consistency was satisfactory (α = .82).

Sexism. Contemporary conceptualizations of sexist beliefs are the Benevolent Sexism, the Hostile Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and the Modern Sexism scale (Swim et al. 1995). To cover a broad range of contemporary sexist attitudes, we used all three scales as dependent variables. *Benevolent and Hostile Sexism* were

[1] We used the pretest data (*N* = 70) to test the construct validity of the scale by comparing the gender role preference scale with Benevolent, Hostile and Modern Sexism measures in their ability to predict gender role behavior: Gender role behavior was measured by eight items comparing the participants' and the reported partners' behavior in different household tasks (e.g., doing laundry, dishes, taking care of sick family members, cleaning the flat, α = .78). A regression analysis with gender role behavior as the dependent variable and the gender role preference scale and Benevolent, Hostile and Modern Sexism as independent predictors showed that the gender role preference scale was the strongest predictor for gender role behavior (*B* = -.25, *SE* = .07, *p* < .01) in comparison to Benevolent (*B* = -.03, *SE* = .06, *ns*), Hostile (*B* = -.14, *SE* = .07, *p* < .10) and Modern Sexism (*B* = .16, *SE* = .07, *p* < .05). That is, higher preference for a traditional gender role relates to a stronger gender specific division of labor at home.

measured using items of the German translation of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1999) and two self-developed items. Nine items measured Benevolent Sexism (BS, α = .82; e.g., "Women should be cherished and protected by men"), and five items Hostile Sexism (HS, α = .76; e.g., "When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against"). *Modern Sexism* (MS) was measured with nine items (e.g., "Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in Germany") chosen from a German version of the Modern Sexism Scale (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1998) and one additional self-developed item. Internal consistency of the scale was sufficient (α = .84). Items of BS, HS and MS were given in a mixed order.

Collective action. We included items measuring women's engagement in actions directed at improving the conditions of the entire group of women (CA; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). The five-item scale (α = .83), for instance, assessed the item "I have signed a petition advocating women's issues (e.g., affirmative action)" or "I participated in protests regarding women's issues" (items were chosen from Foster & Matheson, 1995).

We imputed all missing values using the expectation maximization algorithm (Little & Rubin, 1987). Missing values did not exceed 3% in any of the variables.

Results

Descriptives and intercorrelations of all measures are provided in Table 1.

Preliminary analyses

To test whether the measures of gender role preference, BS, HS and MS can be separated, we computed Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using Mplus 4.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 2006) and compared a model with four correlated latent factors (all construct indicators form separate but correlated latent factors) with a model with

only one latent factor (all construct indicators load on one latent factor). We used parcels as indicators (three parcels for BS, MS and gender role preference, and two parcels for HS) in order to reduce the number of parameters (cf. Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). Results of the CFA (robust maximum likelihood estimates) clearly showed that the four correlated factors model (χ^2 (55) = 49.17, p = .11; comparative fit index (CFI) = .99; root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .03, standardized-root-mean-square-residual (SRMR) = .03) represents the data significantly better ($\Delta\chi^2_{corrected}$ (11) = 45.63, p < .001; Satorra & Bentler, 2001) than the one factor model (χ^2 (44) = 465.26, p < .001; CFI = .56; RMSEA = .20; SRMR = .12). Moreover, a further CFA upheld the proposition that gender identification and gender role preference should be regarded as separate dimensions (r = .08, see Table 1): Model comparison revealed a comparable model fit of a two uncorrelated factors model (χ^2 (13) = 37.22, p < .001; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .09; SRMR = .06) and the correlated two factors model (χ^2 (14) = 37.70, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .06; $\Delta\chi^2_{corrected}$ (1) = .36, *ns*) showing that gender identification and gender role preference are almost orthogonal. Comparing the two uncorrelated factors model with the one factor model (χ^2 (14) = 201.37, p < .01; CFI = .57; RMSEA = .231; SRMR = .15) using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) showed that the uncorrelated two factors model (BIC = 5515.52) was better than the one factor model (BIC = 5685.57).

Test of GIM predictions

To test our main hypothesis, we conducted four separate hierarchical moderated regression analyses in order to be able to keep gender identification as a continuous measure (c.f. Aiken & West, 1991). BS, HS, MS and CA were dependent variables. Predictor variables in all regression analyses were centered, as recommended by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003). In a first step, we entered

gender identification and gender role preference in the regression and received significant regression models for all four dependent variables (results are provided in Table 2). Gender role preference and identification were significant predictors for all three sexism measures and CA. A higher preference for a progressive gender role (*B* = .40, *SE* = .07 *p* < .01 for BS; *B* = .16, *SE* = .06, *p* < .05 for HS; *B* = .27 *SE* = .06, *p* < .01 for MS and *B* = -.17, *SE* = .07, *p* < .05 for CA) and a higher gender identification (*B* = -.12, *SE* = .05 *p* < .05 for BS; *B* = -.11, *SE* = .05, *p* < .05 for HS; *B* = -.12 *SE* = .05, *p* < .05 for MS and *B* = .34, *SE* = .06, *p* < .01 for CA) are related to lower scores on BS, HS, MS and higher scores on participation in CA.

Including the interaction term in the second step resulted in a significant improvement of each of the four regression models and significant interactions (*B* = .12, *SE* = .06 *p* < .05 for BS; *B* = .23, *SE* = .05, *p* < .001 for HS; *B* = .11 *SE* = .05, *p* < .05 for MS and *B* = -.15, *SE* = .06, *p* < .05 for CA).

Figure 2 (a-d) shows simple slopes of the regressions of each of the three sexism scales and CA on gender role preference for highly identified (one *SD* above the mean) and low identified respondents (one *SD* below the mean). In accordance with our predictions, simple slopes were positive and significant for respondents who are highly identified with their gender for each of the three sexism scales (*B* = .53, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001 for BS; *B* = .40, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001 for HS and *B* = .38, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001 for MS) and negative for CA (*B* = -.35, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001). This implies that progressive identifiers reject sexist statements and engage in CA more than traditional identifiers. The simple slope for low identified women is positive and significant for BS (*B* = .27, SE = .08, *p* < .01, but weaker than the simple slope for high identifiers), and not significant for HS, MS and CA (*B* = .09, SE = .08, *ns; B* = .15, SE = .08, *ns; B* = .00, SE = .08, *ns*, respectively). That is, for low identifiers,

there is no difference between women with different gender role preferences in their endorsement of HS and MS and participation in CA.

We also performed all four moderated regression analyses controlling for age and education in the first step, because young age and high education could be features of progressively identified women. Age had an impact on BS, HS, MS and CA (B = -.01, SE = .01, p < .05; B = -.01, SE = .01, p < .05; B = -.02, SE = .01, p < .001 and B = .03, SE = .01, p < .001, respectively). Older women showed a higher rejection of all forms of sexism and a stronger participation in CA. Education had an impact on HS (B = -.33, SE = .13, p < .05) which implies the higher the education, the higher the rejection of hostile sexist beliefs. The interaction effects on BS, HS, MS and CA (B = .12, SE = .06, p < .05; B = .18, SE = .06, p < .01; B = .09, SE = .05, p = .065; B = -.12, SE = .06, p = .058, respectively) remained at least marginally significant.

Discussion

Altogether, the results support the assumptions of the GIM. For each of the three forms of sexism, namely BS, HS, MS, and for the behavioral indicator CA, the interaction between strength of identification and content of identity was significant and in the expected direction. Consistent with predictions of the GIM, gender role preference has an impact on sexist beliefs and engagement in CA only when women are highly identified with their gender in-group: Highly identified women with rather traditional identity contents endorse every form of sexist beliefs stronger and reject to participate in related CA more than highly identified women who connect progressive values with their gender in-group. In contrast, for low identified women, identity content had less impact on women's endorsement of sexist beliefs and their engagement in CA. Therefore, the results demonstrate the importance of

differentiating between strength of gender identification and content of gender identity for a better understanding of women's endorsement of sexist beliefs.

Results of Study 1 were correlational and hence the causal predictions proposed by the GIM cannot be tested critically. We proposed an influence from types of gender identity on sexism and CA. Nevertheless, the data would also fit to a model according to which sexist beliefs determine the type of gender identity. Study 2 was designed to address this issue by experimentally manipulating the salience of the content of identity (i.e., gender role) and using identification with the gender in-group as a quasi-experimental factor.

STUDY 2

Aim of the manipulation of the gender role was to increase the short-term cognitive accessibility of either a progressive or a traditional gender role. Although gender roles are internalized and thus relatively stable, research shows that it is possible to separate individuals from their social roles that regulate their behavior (e.g., Lightdale & Prentice, 1994). According to the GIM, we predict that women primed with a progressive gender role adhere less strongly to sexist attitudes and more strongly to CA than non-primed women, whereas women primed with a traditional gender role adhere more strongly to sexist attitudes and reject CA more strongly than non-primed women do. This should only be true for women highly identified with their gender.

Method

Procedure

Participants were recruited via internet. Some participants got the link from thematic web pages (e.g., web pages of women's magazines), others received the link via a snow balling system. Participants were debriefed 1 month later. Participants were 222 women, ages ranged from 16 to 66 years, with a mean of 26 years. 97% of the participants classified themselves as Germans, 3% as "other". 57% of the participants were students, 75% had a high school diploma and 11% a university degree. Participants were randomly assigned to three experimental conditions (progressive gender role condition, N = 73; traditional gender role condition, N = 77; control condition, N = 72).

Gender identification was measured before the experimental manipulation with the same four items as in Study 1 (α = .76) and served as quasi-experimental factor.

To manipulate gender role salience, participants in the two experimental conditions read a short text about women's gender roles to make either a progressive or a traditional gender role salient. Participants in the control condition received no text. The texts about the progressive gender role/ traditional gender role explained that the feminist movement seems to boom/ to decline in recent years, that women do not live/ do live in accordance to the classic female gender role (anymore) and that they do the same / more domestic work than men do. Moreover they are told that more and more women get self realization in the job domain/ family domain and have the same/ less interest in powerful positions in economy and politics as men have, and that many young women use typical feminine attributes (e.g., being nice) but also typical masculine attributes (e.g., being assertive)/ respectively typical feminine attributes to describe themselves.

Study Measures

Two items were used as a *manipulation check* to assess whether participants processed the information in the short text correctly. They were asked to rate whether “For the majority of women, the maintenance of the classical role assignment is important” and whether “Most women feel comfortable with the traditional gender role”. Both items were highly correlated (r =.84), and composite to one measure.

We used shortened measures of MS (4 items), BS (6 items), HS (2 items) and CA (5 items) as dependent variables, based on the scales used in Study 1 (see appendix). In order to have a measure which is sensitive for changes, items for CA were changed from measuring actual behavior into a measure to assess the intention to engage in CA, e.g., “I would participate in protests regarding women’s issues”. All items were answered on Likert scales from 1 = “disagree strongly” to 6 = “agree strongly”. Items were given in a mixed order. Internal consistency of the BS scale (α = .81), the MS scale (α = .77) and the CA scale (α = .83) were satisfactory. The two HS items (r = .58, p < .001) were highly correlated and thus averaged to form a single indicator of HS.

Results

Manipulation Check

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the manipulation check as dependent variable and experimental condition as between subject-factor revealed a main effect, $F(2,219) = 92.81$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .46$. Planned comparisons between the progressive condition versus the control condition and between the traditional condition versus the control condition support effectiveness of the manipulation. Participants in the progressive condition (M = 4.49, SD = .96) had significantly higher

scores on the manipulation check than participants in the control condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.38; $F(1,219) = 52.30$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .19$), whereas participants in the traditional condition (M = 2.05, SD = .88) had lower scores than participants in the control condition, $F(1,219) = 39.98$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .15$. Gender identification did not interact with experimental conditions.

Test of GIM predictions

In Table 3 descriptives and intercorrelations of all measures are summarized. To test our hypotheses, we conducted four separate hierarchical moderated regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) using the three sexism scales and CA as dependent variables. The experimental factors were recoded into two dummy variables. For the first variable (progressive role), participants in the progressive priming condition were assigned a one, participants in the other two conditions were assigned a zero. In the second variable (traditional role), participants in the traditional priming condition were assigned a one, whereas all other participants were assigned a zero. In regression analyses, in the first step, the two dummy variables and identification were entered. When both dummy variables are simultaneously included in the analyses, the progressive role compares only the progressive versus the control group and the traditional role compares only the traditional versus control condition. In the second step, the two interaction terms (progressive role x identification; traditional role x identification) were entered. The models predicting all four dependent measures are displayed in Table 4.

Entering the two dummy variables and gender identification in the first step resulted in significant effects of the progressive role on BS and HS (B = -.37, SE = .19, $p < .05$; B = -.54, SE = .21, $p < .05$, respectively). Entering the interaction terms in the second step into the regression equation resulted in a significant improvement in each of the regression models except for MS. As expected, the interaction term

progressive role x identification was negative and significant for BS and HS and positive and significant for CA (B = -.40, SE = .17, p < .05; B = -.48, SE = .20, p < .05 and B = .46, SE = .18, p < .05, respectively). The interaction term traditional role x identification was positive for all sexism variables, however, significant and negative only for CA (B = -.61, SE = .18, p < .01). Therefore, none of the sexism scales were influenced by this interaction.

As predicted, simple slope analyses for high identifiers in the progressive gender role condition revealed significant negative slopes for BS and HS (B = -.73, SE = .26, p <.01; B = -.98, SE = .29, p <.01; respectively) and a significant positive slope for CA (B = .69, SE = .28, p <.01), whereas slopes for the low identifiers were not significant for BS, HS, CA (B = .08, SE = .26, *ns*; B = -.03, SE = .29, *ns* and B = -.22, SE = .28, *ns*, respectively). Therefore, only for high identifiers, but not for low identifiers, scores on BS and HS were significantly lower and for CA significantly higher when a progressive gender role was made salient. Also and accordant to our assumptions, in the traditional gender role condition we found a significantly negative slope for CA (B = -.96, SE = .28, p <.01). In contrast, for low identifiers the manipulation had no impact on CA (B = .28, SE = .28, *ns*; see Figure 3). Therefore, a salient traditional gender role leads only to a decreased intention to engage in CA when women are highly identified with their gender in-group. Contrary to our hypotheses, a salient traditional gender role did not affect women's endorsement of sexist beliefs.

Discussion

As proposed by the GIM, highly identified women showed a stronger rejection of BS and HS and an increased intention to engage in CA when a progressive gender role was salient. In contrast, when a traditional gender role was salient, highly identified women were less willing to participate in CA. Also accordant with the GIM, the priming manipulation had no influence on the endorsement of sexist beliefs and the interest in CA among low identified women.

However, evidence for the GIM was not unequivocal. Against our expectations, the traditional gender role manipulation had no significant effect on endorsement of BS and HS in highly identified women. In addition, endorsement of MS was neither affected by the progressive nor by the traditional role priming in highly identified women. One reason for the lack of effect of the traditional gender role manipulation among high identifiers on endorsement of sexist beliefs might be that - especially in a highly educated sample - it is considerably easier to make a progressive gender role salient than a traditional gender role: Priming of a traditional gender role can elicit reactance effects, especially among progressive women (which are probably overrepresented in more highly educated samples). However, we found an effect of the traditional gender role priming for high identifiers on CA: This dependent variable aims at improving the status of the entire group. When participants are told that most other women feel comfortable with their traditional gender role, they might have been less motivated to act against the majority of their in-group (i.e., act against sexism), but might focus on individual strategies to improve their own status instead (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

The lack of effects for endorsement of MS might also be due to the manipulation: The text about the progressive gender role claimed, for instance, that most women prefer progressive gender roles and men do 50% of the domestic work.

Such claims can lead to the idea that gender equality has already been realized in Germany. Beliefs about the prevalence of gender equality are the core element of the MS scale, hence it is not surprising that this kind of manipulation did not affect women's MS scores.

To overcome the described limitations, we conducted a further experimental study using a new gender role priming. We considered two points. First, in order to avoid reactance against the manipulation, we chose a more subtle manipulation for the traditional gender role priming. Second, in order to increase the likelihood to influence modern sexist beliefs, we tried to avoid that the priming of the progressive role could lead to the assumption that gender equality has been realized in Germany.

STUDY 3

Method

Procedure

Study 3 was again an online-experiment. Design and procedure did not differ from Study 2. We only changed the manipulation and did not retest effects for CA, because the predictions of the GIM were fully supported for CA in Study 2. Participants were 106 women, ages ranged from 16 to 61 years, with a mean of 27 years. 98% of the participants classified themselves as Germans, 2% as "other". About half of the participants were students, 63% had a high school diploma and 17% a university degree.

Manipulation

In order to induce a deeper elaboration of the content of the manipulation and therefore have a more effective priming, we asked participants to actively think about a progressive, respectively about a traditional gender role (instead of passively

reading a text as in Study 2). In a brief instruction, participants of the two experimental conditions were told that women and men have different social roles and that this role assignment has advantages and disadvantages for women. In the traditional gender role condition, participants were asked to focus only on advantages and to neglect the disadvantages of being a woman. In order to help focussing on the advantages, participants received eight examples of possible advantages of the traditional role assignment for women like having lower career pressure, a better possibility to build up a close relationship with children or to be financially secured by men. To avoid reactance, participants had the opportunity to disagree with the examples by asking them to rate these items on a six point rating scale ranging from "disagree strongly" to "agree strongly". In contrast, in the progressive gender role condition, participants were asked to think about the disadvantages of the traditional gender role assignment for women. They got eight items indicating several possible disadvantages like the financial dependency of women on men, the amplification of gender inequality or not being taken seriously by men, and were also asked to rate these items. With this kind of manipulation, we avoided that participants might get the idea that gender equality has been realized. In the control condition, participants conducted no such rating and started directly with the manipulation check.

Study Measures

Manipulation Check. To check for the effectiveness of the gender role manipulation, all participants were asked to estimate whether the different social roles for women and men rather have advantages or disadvantages for women. The seven-point scale was ranging from (1) "exclusively disadvantages", to (4) "neither disadvantages nor advantages" to (7) "exclusively advantages".

Gender identification and the sexism items were the same as in Study 2. Items were given in a mixed order. Internal consistency of the identification scale ($\alpha = .76$),

BS scale (α = .79) and the MS scale (α = .78) were satisfactory. The two HS items were highly correlated (r = .68, p < .001).

Results

Descriptives and intercorrelations of all measures are provided in Table 5. To test the hypotheses, we used the same procedure and the same dummy coding as in Study 2.

Manipulation Check

We first checked whether women in the three conditions differed in their evaluation of the existence of different gender roles. As expected, women in the progressive condition had significantly higher scores than women in the control and in the traditional role condition (B = -.83, SE = .27, p <.01). Similarly, women in the traditional role condition had lower scores than women in the control condition and in the progressive condition (M = 3.22, SE = 1.02; M = 3.65, SE = 1.10; M = 4.81, SE = 1.80, respectively B = -.55, SE = .27, p <.05). Both effects were moderated by gender identification: The effect for the traditional (B = -.68, SE = .26, p <.05) and the progressive role condition (B = 1.07, SE = .43, p <.01) were strongest for women highly identified with their gender in-group (F (5,100) = 17.07, p < .01). That is, especially highly identified women in the progressive role condition rated that the role assignment has disadvantages for women, whereas especially highly identified women in the traditional gender role condition responded that the traditional role assignment has advantages for women.

Test of GIM predictions

Consistent with the hypotheses, the progressive role priming decreased endorsement of BS, HS and MS (*B* = -.74, *SE* = .27, *p* <.01; *B* = -.79, *SE* = .29, *p* <.05; *B* = -.52, *SE* = .23, *p* <.05, respectively). Neither the traditional role priming nor identification had an effect on endorsement of sexist beliefs (results are provided in Table 6).

Entering the interaction terms progressive role x identification and traditional role x identification resulted in a significant improvement in each of the three regression models. As expected, both interaction terms were significant for all three dependent variables: The interaction term for the progressive role x identification was negative and significant (all *p*s < .05) for BS, HS and MS (*B* = -.55, *SE* = .24; *B* = -.54, *SE* = .26; *B* = -.49, *SE* = .21, respectively), whereas the interaction between the traditional role and identification was positive and significant (all *p*s < .05) for BS, HS and MS (*B* = .50, *SE* = .25; *B* = .58, *SE* = .27; *B* = .43, *SE* = .21, respectively). Therefore, the impact of both types of gender role priming depended on women's identification with their gender-in-group.

In accordance with our predictions, simple slope analyses for BS, HS and MS yielded significant negative slopes for highly identified women in the progressive role condition (*B* = -1.15, *SE* = .33, *p* <.001; *B* = -1.08, *SE* =.35, *p* <.01 and *B* = -.89, *SE* = .28, *p* <.01, respectively), whereas slopes for low identified women were not significant for each of the three sexism measures (*B* = -.05, *SE* = .33, *ns*; *B* = -.01, *SE* =.35, *ns* and *B* = .09, *SE* = .28, *ns,* respectively). Thus, a salient progressive gender role leads to greater rejection of BS, HS and MS, only for women who are highly identified with their gender in-group (see Figure 4a-c).

Also supporting our predictions, simple slopes for BS, HS and MS revealed a significant slope for highly identified women in the traditional role condition (*B* = .81,

SE = .37, *p* <.01; *B* = .88, *SE* = .40, *p* <.01 and *B* = .67, *SE* = .32, *p* <.01, respectively). In contrast, for low identified women the manipulation had no impact on BS, HS and MS (*B* = -.14, *SE* = .37, *ns*; *B* = -.01, *SE* = .40, *ns*; and *B* = -.01, *SE* = .32, *ns*, respectively). Therefore, a salient traditional gender role leads to a higher endorsement BS, HS and MS, again, only when women are highly identified with their gender in-group. For low identified women, the manipulation did not influence their endorsement of different forms of sexism (see Figure 4a-c).

Discussion

The results of Study 3 replicated and extended the findings of Study 2. Highly identified women showed not only a stronger rejection of BS, HS, but also of MS, when a progressive gender role had been made salient. Therefore, we achieved to improve the manipulation successfully in the way that it also affected endorsement of MS. Moreover, in accordance with the predictions of the GIM, highly identified women showed a higher endorsement of BS, HS and MS when a traditional gender role had been made salient, whereas the priming did not influence endorsement of sexist beliefs in low identified women. This finding offers evidence that the priming of the traditional gender role was more subtle and did not elicit reactance in women.

The causal assumption of the GIM was fully supported: Increased or decreased endorsement of sexist beliefs was due to the salient type of gender role in highly identified women.

General Discussion

The Gender Identity Model was developed to explain different levels of endorsement of sexist beliefs among women. Based on SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and SRT (Eagly & Wood, 1999), we separated different forms of gender identity by distinguishing the strength of identification from the content of identity. We hypothesized that among women who are highly identified with their gender in-group endorsement of sexist beliefs and sympathy for CA depends on the gender role preference: Whereas progressive identifiers were expected to reject sexist beliefs and engage in CA, traditional identifiers were assumed to endorse sexist beliefs and to reject CA. For low identified women, we did not expect this effect.

Three studies supported these propositions and provided empirical evidence for the GIM. In Study 1, we demonstrated that highly identified women who prefer a more traditional gender role showed a stronger endorsement of BS, HS and MS and a stronger rejection of CA compared to those highly identified women who prefer a more progressive gender role. For low identified women gender role preference had almost no influence on the endorsement of sexist beliefs and CA. In Study 2, we found partial experimental causal evidence for the predictions of the GIM for BS and HS and full experimental causal evidence for the prediction concerning CA: A primed progressive gender role resulted in stronger rejection of BS and HS and a stronger engagement in CA when women were highly identified, whereas a primed traditional gender role resulted in stronger rejection of CA, again, only for highly identified women. Based on a critical review of our manipulation used in Study 2, we improved the priming of gender roles and tested the new manipulation in a further experimental study. Results of Study 3 fully supported the predictions of the GIM. Only for highly identified women, a primed progressive gender role led to rejection of BS, HS and MS and the intention to engage in CA, whereas a primed traditional gender role led

to a stronger endorsement of all three types of sexist beliefs and a stronger rejection of CA. For low identifiers, manipulation had, as expected, no effect. Taken together, the GIM enables to explain why some women support the gender status quo, although they are members of the target group of gender discrimination and why others reject the unequal gender system. Moreover, identification motivates to think and act on behalf of the in-group, whereas identity content directs thinking and behavior. It is a strength of the present research, that the GIM was not only validated for attitudinal variables (sexist beliefs) but also for actual behavior (CA in Study 1) and behavioral intentions (intention to engage in CA, Study 2). Overall, the GIM closes an important gap in previous research by offering a theory-driven and parsimonious way to consider both the strength of identification and the content of identity and to distinguish different types of gender identity.

Our results have important implications for social interventions (see also Becker & Swim, 2007). In terms of changing sexist attitudes, heightening solely women's identification with their gender in-group is not sufficient and might be even contraindicated: Without considering identity content, simply increasing gender identification could result in a higher acceptance of sexist beliefs. In contrast, we would recommend to heighten women's identification with their gender in-group and to change identity content simultaneously: The probability for rejection of sexist beliefs is increased when identification is heightened and the content of identity is associated with progressive values (e.g., when the traditional gender-specific way of living is reflected and changed to a "gender equal" life style).

We presented both correlational as well as experimental support for the main prediction derived from the GIM. However, in the last two studies we manipulated salience of a traditional vs. a progressive gender role, but not gender identification. Our results are therefore not unequivocal with regard to the causal status of gender

identification. Thus, we encourage future research to manipulate, in addition to identity content, levels of identification with the gender category.

A further limitation of the present research might be our operationalization of identity content through gender role preference. Although the behavioral indicator CA was only weakly correlated to gender role preference, measures of sexism were moderately correlated and have therefore something in common. However, results of a confirmatory factor analysis supported the expectation that the gender role preference scale was separable from the three sexism scales. Moreover, we predicted that the correlation between gender role preference and sexist beliefs depends on the strength of identification. Additionally, identity content represents what individuals associate with their gender in-group, hence it might be difficult to find any operationalization which is not related to sexism. Therefore, it might be easier for future research to test predictions of the GIM for other behavioral indicators than just collective action. For instance, it is assumable that the different types of gender identity differ in the likelihood of confronting sexist incidents in everyday life (Stangor et al., 2003).

In conclusion, we presented and provided first evidence for the GIM. We therefore extended previous research on gender identity and offer a parsimonious model to explain different levels of endorsement of sexist beliefs among women. In addition, the GIM has important implications for social interventions aiming to reduce endorsement of sexist beliefs. Both strength of identification and content of gender identity have to be considered.

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Table 1

Descriptives and intercorrelations for the relevant measures of Study 1 (N = 250; 1 = "disagree strongly", 6 = "agree strongly")

	M	*SD*	2	3	4	5	6
1 Benevolent Sexism (BS)	3.64	1.07	.43(**)	.42(**)	-.18(*)	.37(**)	-.15(*)
2 Hostile Sexism (HS)	2.90	.97	-	.31(**)	-.29(**)	.19(**)	-.13(*)
3 Modern Sexism (MS)	2.85	.90		-	-.40(**)	.30(**)	-.18(**)
4 Collective action (CA)	2.85	.90			-	-.19(**)	.36(**)
5 Gender role	2.31	.92				-	-.08
6 Identification	3.87	1.19					-

NOTE * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

Table 2

Beta-coefficients of the four regression analyses on Benevolent, Hostile, Modern Sexism and Collective action, Study 1

	Benevolent Sexism (BS)		Hostile Sexism (HS)		Modern Sexism (MS)		Collective action (CA)	
	B (SE)		*B (SE)*		*B (SE)*		*B (SE)*	
Step 1								
Gender role	.40** (.07)	*F* (2,247) = 22.24**	.16* (.06)	*F* (2,247) = 6.46**	.27** (.06)	*F* (2,247) = 15.86**	-.17* (.07)	*F* (2,247) = 15.86**
Identification	-.12* (.05)	R^2adj =.15	-.11* (.05)	R^2adj =.04	-.12** (.05)	R^2adj =.11	.34** (.06)	R^2adj =.11
Step 2								
Identification x Gender role	.12* (.06)	$F\Delta$ (3, 246) = 4.67* R^2adj = .16	.23** (.05)	$F\Delta$ (3, 246) = 17.44** R^2adj = .10	.11* (.05)	$F\Delta$ (3, 246) = .4.57* R^2adj = .12	-.15* (.06)	$F\Delta$ (3, 246) = .4.57* R^2adj = .12

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

Table 3

Descriptives and intercorrelations for the relevant measures of Study 2 (N = 222; 1 = "disagree strongly", 6 = "agree strongly")

	M	*SD*	2	3	4	5
1 Benevolent Sexism (BS)	3.69	1.11	.49(**)	.25(**)	-.15(*)	-.02
2 Hostile Sexism (HS)	3.36	1.28	-	.28 (**)	-.18(**)	-.09
3 Modern Sexism (MS)	3.15	1.02		-	.01	-.07
4 Collective action (CA)	3.55	1.28			-	.12
5 Identification	4.26	1.05				-

NOTE. ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

Table 4

Beta-coefficients of the four regression analyses on Benevolent, Hostile, Modern Sexism and Collective action, Study 2

	Benevolent Sexism (BS)		Hostile Sexism (HS)		Modern Sexism (MS)		Collective action (CA)	
	B (SE)		*B (SE)*		*B (SE)*		*B (SE)*	
Step 1								
Progressive role (Dummy 1)	-.37* (.19)	*F* (3,218) = 2.35$^{(*)}$ R^2adj.=.02	-.54* (.21)	*F* (3,218) = 3.74* R^2adj.=.04	.06 (.17)	*F* (3,218) = .35 R^2adj.= -.01	.33 (.21)	*F* (3,218) = 5.42* R^2adj.=.06
Traditional role (Dummy 2)	.09 (.18)		.01 (.21)		.03 (.17)		-.39$^{(*)}$ (.21)	
Identification	-.01 (.07)		-.09 (.08)		-.07 (.07)		.14$^{(*)}$ (.08)	
Step 2								
Identification x progressive role	-.40* (.17)	*F*Δ (2,216) = 5.02** R^2adj.= .05	-.48* (.20)	*F*Δ (2,216) = 4.53* R^2adj.= .07	-.26 (.16)	*F*Δ (2,216) = 1.45 R^2adj.= -.01	.46* (.18)	*F*Δ (2,216) = 15.77** R^2adj.= .17
Identification x traditional role	.15 (.17)		.10 (.19)		.02 (.16)		-.61** (.18)	

NOTE. $^{(*)}p < .10$, * $p < .05$,** $p < .01$ two-tailed.

Table 5

Descriptives and intercorrelations for the relevant measures of Study 3 (N = 106; 1 = "disagree strongly", 6 = "agree strongly")

	M	*SD*	2	3	4
1 Benevolent Sexism (BS)	3.63	1.19	.57(**)	.47(**)	-.04
2 Hostile Sexism (HS)	3.44	1.29	-	.40 (**)	-.01
3 Modern Sexism (MS)	3.17	1.01		-	-.14
4 Identification	4.48	1.04			-

NOTE. ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

Table 6

Beta-coefficients of the four regression analyses on Benevolent, Hostile, and Modern Sexism, Study 3

	Benevolent Sexism (BS)		Hostile Sexism (HS)		Modern Sexism (MS)	
	B (SE)		*B (SE)*		*B (SE)*	
Step 1						
Progressive role (Dummy 1)	-.74** (.27)	F (3,102) = 4.91** R^2adj.=.10	-.69* (.29)	F (3,102) = 5.4** R^2adj.=.11	-.52* (.23)	F (3,102) = 4.32** R^2adj.=.09
Traditional role (Dummy 2)	.26 (.27)		.47 (.29)		.22 (.23)	
Identification	.04 (.11)		.09 (.12)		-.08 (.09)	
Step 2						
Identification x progressive role	-.55* (.24)	$F\Delta$ (2,100) = 8.88** R^2adj.= .22	-.54* (.26)	$F\Delta$ (2,100) = 8.68** R^2adj.= .23	-.49* (.21)	$F\Delta$ (2,100) = 9.38** R^2adj.= .22
Identification x traditional role	.50* (.25)		.58* (.27)		.43* (.21)	

NOTE. $^{(*)}p < .10$, * $p < .05$, two-tailed.



Figure 1. Gender Identity Model (see also Condor, 1984)



Figure 2a-d. Simple slopes of Benevolent Sexism (BS), Hostile Sexism (HS), Modern Sexism (MS), and collective action (CA) as a function of identification and gender role preference in Study 1.



Figure 3. Simple slopes of collective action(CA) as a function of identification and salient gender role preference in Study 2.







Figure 4a-c. Simple slopes of Benevolent Sexism (BS), Hostile Sexism (HS), and Modern Sexism (MS) as a function of identification and salient gender role preference in Study 3.

APPENDIX

Items measuring gender role preference

1. I prefer to stay at home instead of getting ahead.
2. I would feel foolish keeping my maiden-name after marriage.
3. I would go to work even though I do not have to for financial reasons. (-)
4. I would not interfere in politics since it is a men's business.
5. If possible, I would not work as long as my kids go to school.
6. When I date a man, I feel unpleasant if I had to pay.
7. It is more important for me to support the career of my partner than to get ahead by myself.
8. I would not propose marriage to a man since it is a men's business.

Note: (-) items were recoded. The German Scale can be obtained by the first author.

Items measuring Benevolent Sexism, Study 1

1. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he has the love of a woman.*
2. Women should be cherished and protected by men.*
3. It is more appropriate that a man helps a woman to put a coat on than the other way around.*
4. It is important that men are chivalrous towards women, for instance by holding the door open for a woman.*
5. Men are incomplete without women.*
6. Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility.*
7. People are not truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a member of the other sex.

8. Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good taste.
9. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.*

Note: In Study 2 and Study 3 only items with an asterisk were used.

Items measuring Hostile Sexism, Study 1

1. Most women interpret innocent remarks of acts as being sexist.
2. Women exaggerate problems they have at work.
3. Many women get a kick out of teasing men by seeming sexually available and then refusing male advances.
4. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality”.*
5. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against.*

Note: In Study 2 and Study 3 only items with an asterisk were used.

Items measuring Modern Sexism, Study 1

1. I consider the present employment system to be unfair to women. (-)
2. Discrimination against women is still a problem in Germany. (-)*
3. Us probably getting a female chancellor is a clear sign for women in Germany of not being discriminated against any longer.
4. Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination.
5. Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievement.*
6. I consider the present employment system to be fair to women.*
7. It is often to see women treated in a sexist manner on television. (-)

8. In Western countries, gender equality has been realized a long time ago.*
9. Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in Germany.

Note: In Study 2 and Study 3 only items with an asterisk were used, (-) items were recoded.

Items measuring collective action, Study 1, Study 2

1. I make a conscious attempt to use non-sexist language.
2. I have signed a petition advocating women's issues (e.g., affirmative action).
3. I participated in protests regarding women's issues.
4. I have gone out of my way to collect information on women's issues.
5. I got together with others in order to do something against the discrimination of women.

Manuscript #2:

Legi, intellexi, condemnavi (I have read, comprehended, and condemned):

Differential effects of attending to sexism and its harm on reducing modern and benevolent sexist beliefs

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and

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Submission date: November 15, 2007, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Abstract

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs can be reduced via heightening people's sensitivity towards its prevalence and harm. In the first experiment (*N* = 120) using a daily diary-method, we demonstrated that attending to sexism in everyday life leads to rejection of modern, neo-, and benevolent sexist beliefs in women. In the second experiment (*N* = 240), we showed that a heightened sensitivity towards the prevalence of sexism resulted in rejection of modern sexist beliefs, whereas a heightened sensitivity towards harm experienced by the targets of discrimination resulted in rejection of benevolent sexist beliefs. Findings of the third experiment (*N* = 189) demonstrated that the prejudice reducing effects of the information were consistently stronger for women who are more identified and men who are less identified with their gender in-group. Across all studies, we found that rejection of sexist beliefs generalized to rejection of system justification beliefs. Results point to reasons why individuals endorse subtle sexist beliefs.

Although gender relations have become more egalitarian since the feminist movement (e.g., Twenge, 1997; Mason, Czajka, & Arber, 1976; Spence & Hahn, 1997; Thornton, Alwin, & Camburn, 1983; for a discussion see Rudman & Glick, in press), sexism and discrimination against women are still widespread all over the world (e.g., Glick, Fiske, Mladinic, Saiz, Abrams, Masser et al., 2000; Swim, Becker, Pruitt, & Lee, in press). For instance, researchers have documented the continued presence of endorsement of sexist beliefs by examining more subtle indicators of sexist beliefs, which are accepted by significant proportions of men *and* women (e.g., Glick et al. 2000; Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Endorsement of sexist beliefs is harmful to women, yet the negative consequences caused by subtle sexism are widely unrealized (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Jackman, 1994). Despite these consequences and perhaps at least in part because of the unrecognized harm, women and men do not label certain types of sexism as sexism (e.g., Baretto & Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Swim et al., 2005). Thus, lack of recognition of several types of sexism and presumably endorsement of sexist beliefs is at least partly due to a lack of information about sexism (e.g., Swim, Mallet, & Stangor, 2004).

The present research aims to reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs via heightening people's sensitivity towards the prevalence of sexist behaviors and their harm. Relative to research on reduction of endorsement of racist beliefs (e.g., Oskamp, 2000; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Stephan & Vogt, 2004), little is known about reduction of endorsement of sexist beliefs. Additionally, knowing what types of information reduce endorsement of these beliefs points to reasons why women and men endorse the beliefs.

Subtle Sexist Beliefs

Subtle sexist beliefs include modern sexist (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), neosexist (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995) and benevolent sexist beliefs (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Modern Sexism and Neosexism are indicated by denial of discrimination against women, antagonism towards women's demands and resentment against special favors for women (e.g., affirmative actions). These beliefs are considered sexist because they can lead to the maintenance of the status quo. For instance, the belief that gender discrimination is a thing of the past, which represents the core element of Modern Sexism, implicates non-support for actions to change the gender system. Lack of support for change would result in women remaining in lower status. Support for these assumptions comes from data showing that believing that sexism is not prevalent is associated with endorsing gender system justification beliefs (Swim, Becker, & DeCoster, 2007). Benevolent Sexism is one component of Ambivalent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and consists of endorsement of complementary gender differentiation, heterosexual intimacy and paternalism. Benevolent Sexism encompasses protective, affectionate but patronizing beliefs about women who conform to their expected roles. Endorsement of these beliefs is associated with stronger gender inequality in a country (as measured with United Nations indices, Glick et al., 2000). Supporting the argument that these beliefs are subtle, women and men are less likely to identify endorsement of modern and benevolent sexist beliefs as sexist than they are to identify endorsement of traditional gender roles, Hostile Sexism, and gender stereotypes as sexist (Swim et al., 2005).

Endorsement of modern sexist, neosexist and benevolent sexist beliefs by men *and* women has been demonstrated cross-culturally (Glick et al., 2000; Swim et al., in press). Although women and men often differ in their support of gender

inequality with men having higher scores in measures of sexism, evidence indicates that a significant number of women also endorse subtle sexist beliefs (e.g., Baretto & Ellemers, 2005b; Glick et al., 2000; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & St-Pierre, 1999), sometimes even more than men (Glick et al., 2000).

Prevalence of Subtle Sexism

In many regards it can be argued that sexism is not particular prevalent in industrialized countries. For instance, relative to many non-western countries, United Nations data on gender equality indicates that there is much greater equality in countries such as the United States and many European countries (Swim et al., in press). Yet, despite this relative equality, other data indicate that sexist behaviors are still prevalent in these countries, but the behaviors are subtle.

Subtle sexist behaviors refer to unequal and harmful treatment of women that is typically less visible than blatant sexist behaviors (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Swim & Cohen, 1997). Reports about experiences with sexism reveal the prevalence of subtle sexist behaviors. Subtle sexist behaviors can come in the form of everyday sexism (Klonoff & Landrine, 1995; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001), sexual and gender harassment (Fitzgerald et al., 1988), and incivility in the work force (e.g., Sandy & Cortina, 2005). Qualitative data reveals several other forms of subtle sexist behaviors such as paternalism and tokenism (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). The existence of subtle sexist behavior is also supported by laboratory research, for instance, on paternalism (Rudman & Heppen, 2003; Vescio, Gervais, Snyder, & Hoover, 2005), tokenism (Ellemers, 2001; Wright, 2001), and backlash (Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 2001).

Harm from Subtle Sexism

There is ample evidence that being a target of sexist behaviors is associated with reduced well-being and lower self-esteem among women (see Berg, 2006; Kaiser, Major, & McCoy, 2004; Landrine, Klonoff, Gibbs, & Manning, 1995; Major et al., 2002; McCoy & Major, 2003; Moradi & Risco, 2006; Moradi & Subich, 2004; Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002). Other research demonstrates that endorsement of modern and benevolent sexist beliefs by women and men is harmful to women.

Modern sexist beliefs can be harmful because they serve to maintaining the status quo and blame women rather than sexism for inequality. Endorsement of modern sexist beliefs is associated with being less likely to acknowledge sexism as a source of gender segregation in the workforce and with higher ratings of biological differences as a likely reason for job segregation (Swim et al., 1995). Moreover, when people think that gender equality has been achieved, they claim that lack in career success of women can be primarily a result of their inability and lacking effort compared to men (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). This implies that women bear the blame for their low status. This is harmful for women, because it portrays them as being inferior and less ambitious compared to men.

Benevolent sexist beliefs can be harmful to women because Benevolent Sexism legitimates and maintains inequality by valuing traditional feminine attributes in women and offering the promise of protection that is enacted only when women behave in line with sexist prescriptions for maintaining traditional gender role behavior. Hostile Sexism comes into play when women violate prescriptive roles. For instance, Benevolent Sexism is associated with favorable feelings toward women in a traditional role (homemakers), whereas Hostile Sexism is associated with unfavorable evaluations of women in a non-traditional role (career women; Glick,

Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997). In a direct test of the implication of endorsement of benevolent and hostile sexist beliefs for maintaining the status quo, Jost and Kay (2005) found that the conjoint activation of benevolent and hostile sexist beliefs increased endorsement of gender system justification in women. Moreover, Jackman (1994) argued that benevolent prejudice can be more effective at maintaining oppression of women as a group than hostile prejudice because of the resistance that the former causes. Thus, “sweet benevolence” pacifies women’s resistance against discrimination and increases their satisfaction with the status quo.

Benevolent Sexism can also hurt women in other ways. It can create lack of sympathy for those who have been raped by an acquaintance. For instance, Benevolent Sexism is associated with blaming women for having behaved inappropriately in this situation (Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003). Benevolent Sexism can also have negative consequences when women internalize sexist ideology: They have been socialized to be passive, modest, and dependent and might feel incompetent in several male dominated areas. This can result in the belief that they need male help and protection (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Consistent with this argument, women’s implicit romantic idealization of men as chivalric rescuers (e.g., “Prince Charming”) negatively predicted their interest in projected income, education goal, interest in high-status jobs and group leadership appeal (Rudman & Heppen, 2003). Moreover, women’s endorsement of Benevolent Sexism is associated with valuing “good earning potential” as an important characteristic in a mate (Johannesen-Schmidt & Eagly, 2003), probably reflecting a desire for a male provider.

Why do People Endorse Subtle Sexism?

Many people may get used to several manifestations of sexism in their everyday lives, because sexism is integrated into cultural and societal norms and individuals have internalized it as customary and normal behavior (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). For instance, individuals are unlikely to detect sexist language unless it is explicitly defined for them (Swim et al., 2004). Further, many do not consider expressions of subtle sexism as offensive (e.g., Baretto & Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b; Jackman, 1994, 2005; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998). Blatant sexism is more likely to be perceived as sexist than Modern or Benevolent Sexism suggesting that the latter will not be noticed when it occurs and the harm it can cause may not be realized (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b; Kilianski and Rudman, 1998; Swim et al., 2005). Related to lack of awareness of sexism is "gender apathy", which can also explain endorsement of sexist beliefs. Forman (2004) developed the concept of racial apathy and defined it as „indifference toward societal racial and ethnic inequality and lack of engagement with race-related social issues" (Forman, 2004, p.44). Applying this construct to gender discrimination, gender apathy would be a) "not knowing" about gender inequality, b) ignorance about the persistent nature of gender inequality as a strategic evasion of responsibility, c) an indifference about and avoidance of gender issues generally or a lack of interest and care in addressing such inequalities. Thus, we propose that lack of attention to or awareness of sexism in individuals' everyday lives is a reason why individuals endorse subtle sexist beliefs.

We also propose that lack of awareness of the *prevalence* of sexism helps specifically explain endorsement of modern sexist beliefs and possibly neosexist beliefs given the conceptual overlaps in the two constructs. Most of the items in the Modern Sexism scale measure beliefs about the prevalence of sexism (Swim, Becker, & DeCoster, 2007). Plus, modern sexist beliefs are associated with a lack of

awareness of the extent to which the work force is gender segregated and furthermore demonstrate a lack of understanding how this affects women's occupational, economic, political and social status negatively (Swim et al., 1995). For instance, higher scores on the Modern Sexism scale are associated with greater overestimations of the percentage of women in several male-dominated jobs. The connection between modern sexist beliefs and lack of awareness of sexism is also illustrated by associations between endorsement of modern sexist beliefs and being less likely to detect sexist language (Swim et al., 2004).

Similarly, endorsement of modern sexist beliefs can be explained as an expression of system justification. Jost and Banaji (1994) have argued that individuals are motivated to maintain the perception that the world is just and individuals get what they deserve. Therefore, individuals show the tendency to justify existing status hierarchies, even if those hierarchies disadvantage their own group. Eagly and Mladinic (1994) have shown that women are described with more positive adjectives than men. Based on this finding, Jost and Kay (2005) argue that as long as people believe that every group in society possesses some advantages as well as some disadvantages, the system as a whole is regarded as fair, balanced, and legitimate. Thus, women may see positive aspects of their own gender role and negative aspects of the male gender role which can result in the overall impression that both women and men are discriminated against in some way. If discrimination is perceived to be balanced, then individuals may deny that sexism is a particular problem for women, a central tenet of modern sexist beliefs.

While we anticipate that awareness of the prevalence of sexism is particularly tied to endorsement of modern sexist beliefs, we propose that awareness of the harm associated with sexism is particularly tied to endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs. When considering endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs, it is important to

take into account that an individual women might profit from Benevolent Sexism. For example, women may feel flattered by offers of protection and positive attributions or may enjoy being cherished by men. Further, women gain personal and collective self-esteem by seeing themselves as superior on status irrelevant dimensions, such as taking pride in their superior domestic abilities (Glick & Fiske, 1999). Women may be particularly likely to endorse benevolent sexist beliefs in contexts where they feel most vulnerable. For example, the countries where women are more likely to endorse Benevolent Sexism are those where men tend to be most likely to endorse Hostile Sexism (Glick et al., 2000). The argument given for women's endorsement of Benevolent Sexism in these countries is that it reflects the benefits it gives them through protection from men's hostility (e.g., Glick, Sakalli-Ugurlu, Ferreira, & Souza, 2002; Fischer, 2006). These types of benefits may make women less attuned to the costs associated with them. Moya, Glick, Expósito, De Lemus, and Hart (in press) have also demonstrated that women are more likely to accept Benevolent Sexism from intimate partners than strangers. They may do this because they are less attuned to the possible harm that Benevolent Sexism can cause in these relationships. Further, women and men may be likely to think benevolent sexist people and statements are less sexist than hostile sexist men, because the positive nature of the former hides the harm that they can cause (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Swim et al., 2005). Thus, women and men may endorse Benevolent Sexism because they are not aware of the harm that these beliefs can promote.

Changing Endorsement of Sexist Beliefs

Research on reduction of sexism is scarce. Most of the existing research on reduction of prejudice focuses on ethnic prejudice (see e.g., Oskamp, 2000; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Stephan & Vogt, 2004). Existing studies on changing gender-related concepts involve long-term projects like participation in women's classes, consciousness raising groups and gender courses: Most of this research provides evidence that such interventions reduce traditional sexist attitudes toward women (Jones & Jacklin, 1988), heighten the awareness of sexism (Stake & Hoffmann, 2001), help develop more egalitarian attitudes (Katz, Swindell, & Farrow, 2004; Malkin & Stake, 2004; Thomsen, Basu, & Reinitz, 1995), heighten feminist consciousness (Henderson-King & Stewart, 1999), and heighten feminist activism (Stake, Roades, Rose, Ellis, & West, 1994). Taken together, these studies provide evidence that gender related attitudes can be changed by continuous information and/or heightened sensitivity towards sexism over a period of time. Nevertheless, previous research did not identify what aspects of these interventions lead to changes in gender related concepts. Plus, these studies did not focus on reduction of subtle sexist beliefs.

We argue that lack of awareness of sexist behavior in one's personal life, awareness of the prevalence of sexism, and the harm caused by sexism are central reasons for endorsement of modern, neo-, and benevolent sexist beliefs. Hence, we propose that increasing awareness of sexism can reduce endorsement of these beliefs. If individuals are encouraged to attend to sexist behaviors, they are likely to become more aware of sexism. This can be seen in a study of Swim et al. (2001): After women were asked to report experiences with sexism on a daily basis for two weeks, they reported a greater awareness of sexism. We therefore predict that if women's and men's attention is drawn to sexism in their own lives they may become

less likely to endorse modern sexist beliefs, which largely accesses perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination. They also may be less likely to endorse neosexist beliefs when attending to everyday sexist behaviors because beliefs about the prevalence of discrimination are also part of this measure and they are related to other components of Modern Sexism that are represented in the Neosexism scale. Attention to everyday sexist behaviors could also include drawing attention to benevolent forms of sexism and the possibility that they could be considered sexist. This type of attention could result in reduction in endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs as well. Thus, we hypothesize that attending to sexist behaviors in one's everyday life will decrease endorsement of modern, neo-, and benevolent sexist beliefs.

We propose, however, that different types of information will be more effective at addressing modern and neosexist beliefs on the one hand versus benevolent sexist beliefs on the other. Because beliefs about the *prevalence* of discrimination are more central to modern sexist beliefs, we propose that information that specifically targets this aspect of current manifestations of sexism will most potently influence endorsement of modern sexist beliefs, and potentially, by association, neosexist beliefs as well. In contrast, because Benevolent Sexism is hidden by its surface positive characterization, we propose being aware of negative consequences of seemingly positive behavior like paternalism, gender differentiation that favors women or heterosexual intimacy might result in rejection of benevolent sexist beliefs. This is in line with a recent assumption of Rudman and Glick (in press) that increasing awareness of why paternalism is problematic might help to resist its seductive appeal. Hence, we hypothesize that attending to the prevalence of sexism will decrease endorsement of modern and neosexist beliefs and attending to the harm of sexism will decrease endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs.

The Role of Gender Identification in Changing Sexist Beliefs

Information about sexism may be more effective in changing attitudes for some individuals than others, because endorsement of sexist ideologies has been argued to be motivated by desires to legitimate and maintain the unequal gender status quo (Jackman, 1994, Jost & Banaji, 1994). Thus, individuals who are more motivated to maintain gender inequality may be less receptive to such information. For instance, racial apathy, and by extension gender apathy, is motivated such that "not-knowing" about gender inequality and gender issues is not innocent, but driven by the will to maintain dominance structures (Forman & Lewis, 2006). Information about prevalence and harm of sexism can be taken as a form of information about injustice which implies a need for changing unequal gender relations.

When dealing with sexism, subjective feelings of belongingness to one's gender group may influence women's and men's reactions to drawing their attention to everyday sexism and their receptivity to information about sexism. From Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) we know that it is important to differentiate between objective group membership and a subjective sense of belonging to this group: Individuals differ in their identification with their gender in-group. This identification derives from the subjective importance of the group to the self (e.g., Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). With higher identification, an individual's thinking and acting is oriented towards in-group norms (Turner et al., 1987; see also Becker & Wagner, 2007; Burn, Aboud & Moyles, 2000). Therefore, for people with different social identities, the same information can elicit different responses (van Knippenberg, 1999). Applied to this study, the importance and impact of a message about sexism should vary as a function of gender identification. For highly identified men, changing hierarchies is accompanied with loss of male privilege and might threaten male identity. Therefore, men who are highly identified with their male in-

group should respond with more reactance than men for whom being male is less important. In contrast, it is likely that higher gender identification in women is accompanied with stronger sensitivity for gender-related information, because highly identified women are motivated to evaluate their gender in-group favorably. Women for whom their gender is very important may be more attuned to information that indicates that their group status is threatened, such as that sexism is prevalent and harmful, in comparison to women less identified with their gender. Therefore, women who are more identified with their gender group may be particularly receptive to such information and respond with a stronger rejection of sexist beliefs.

The Present Research

The present research is designed to extend previous findings on reduction of prejudice by examining the impact of awareness of everyday sexist behaviors on endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs and the differential impact of heightened sensitivity towards prevalence of sexism versus harm of sexism on endorsement of modern, neo-, and benevolent sexist beliefs. In our first study we examine the impact of attending to everyday sexism on endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs. In the second and third study we examine the differential impact of information about prevalence of sexism and harm of sexism on endorsement of different types of sexist beliefs. In each study we also examine the role of receptivity to information, determined by identification with one's gender group, as a possible moderator of the extent to which women and men are influenced by awareness of and information about sexism.

In each of the studies, we also examine whether attention to prevalence and harm of sexist behaviors influences system justification beliefs as well. We consider endorsement of modern sexist beliefs to be a specific expression of system

justification (Swim et al., 2007). Thus, we expect that people who get information that leads one to attend to the prevalence of sexism will also decrease general system justification. Becoming aware of and comprehending that gender inequality exists provides evidence that the general system can not be just. Therefore, general system justification beliefs are expected to decrease as a consequence of changes in modern sexist beliefs. That is, Modern Sexism is predicted to mediate the relation between attention to the prevalence of sexism and system justification.

STUDY 1

In Study 1, we investigated whether attending to sexism in people's everyday lives results in rejection of sexist beliefs. In order to test the impact of attending to real life experiences on sexist attitudes, we chose to have participants complete daily diaries asking them to focus on whether or not they experienced or observed multiple forms of everyday sexism (see, e.g., Swim et al. 2001; Hyers, Swim, & Mallet, 2006). For comparison, other participants completed diaries asking them to focus on everyday stressors, a task, which is less likely to lead to attention to sexist behaviors. We hypothesize that paying attention to everyday sexism that includes attending to subtle manifestations of sexism will result in decreases in endorsement of modern, neo-, and benevolent sexist beliefs.

Method

Participants

160 students of the Pennsylvania State University participated in group testing sessions and received course credit in exchange for completing the measures. Of the 160 participants, 40 participants failed to complete the diaries correctly[3]. For example, they did not complete all seven diaries or they completed several diaries at one day. Analyses were conducted using the remaining 120 participants, 82 of them were female and 38 male students. The sample consisted of 81% White/European Americans, 14% Asian Americans, 3% Black/African Americans and 2% Arab and Latino/a Americans. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 26 years, with a mean age of 19 years.

Design

The design was a 2 (diary condition: sexism, stress) x 2 (gender of participant: female, male) between-subject design with identification with the gender category as a measured continuous variable. Participants were randomly assigned to diary conditions (sexism diary condition, N = 58; stress diary condition, N = 62).

Procedure

Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to investigate how many and what kind of daily hassles students experience in their everyday life. The diary study was an online-experiment and it was divided into three parts. First, participants completed pre-diary measures. We told them that these were about

[3] After half of the participants completed the study we observed that many completed several diaries at one time which lead us to question the validity of their responding. As a result, we altered the requirements for the study such that participants would not receive credit if they completed more than one diary on a single day. This resulted in decreasing the unusable data from 33% to 16% confirming our assumption that those who provided unusable data differed from those who did not because they were less involved in the study. As noted below, participants completed pretest measures prior to completing diary measures. Participants included vs. excluded from the study did not differ on these measures. Further, when we included whether participants were from the first vs. the second wave of data collection as a covariate in the analyses, all findings remained the same.

some demographic information, personal preferences, and interests. Then they were randomly assigned to either a sexism diary or a stress diary and were asked to complete the diary materials online for seven days. In the sexism diary condition, participants were asked to keep track of different types of sexism in their everyday lives, in the stress diary condition they were asked to keep a daily record of different types of stressors they experience on campus. After the week, participants answered postdiary measures, including questions about awareness of sexism, stress and racism, their feelings during the week and their endorsement of system justification beliefs and several other beliefs, including modern sexist, neosexist, and benevolent sexist beliefs.

Prediary measures

Prediary measures assessed demographic variables and student's identification with several groups (e.g., age identity, gender identity, ethnic identity) and distracter questions asking about general preferences (e.g., "I don't buy Christmas chocolate until it is December") and their gender role preference. The latter did not form a reliable scale, so we did not include them in our analyses. Identification with one's gender group was measured with four items developed by Cameron (2004; e.g., "I feel strong ties to other women/men"; "Overall, being a woman/man is an important part of my self-image"). We excluded the recoded item because of a low corrected item total correlation. Internal consistency was satisfactory for a three item scale ($\alpha = .75$ for women; $\alpha = .76$ for men).

Diaries

Participants either completed sexism or stress diaries for one week. For the structured *sexism diary*, participants were asked to indicate whether they observed 24 incidents which represented various types of sexism. We stressed that they should focus on interpersonal relationships and ignore incidents found in the media.

Diaries were adapted and modified from diary forms used by Swim et al. (2001). An examination of the types of incidents typically reported in diary studies assessing everyday sexism revealed that participants do not frequently report subtle forms of sexism, especially Benevolent Sexism (e.g., paternalistic behavior), when asked to report their observations of sexism in an open ended format (e.g., Swim et al., 2001; Hyers, 2007). However, a purpose of the present study was to heighten the awareness of multiple forms of sexism. For this reason, our structured diaries included incidents representing a broad range of incidents, for instance traditional, hostile and paternalistic stereotypes, traditional, hostile and paternalistic treatment based on gender, situations in which women's complaints of sexism were not taken seriously, feminists were devalued, unwanted sexual attention, use of sexist language or sexist jokes. These diaries did not specifically focus on incidents directed at women. However, previous diary studies indicated that the target of most of the incidents women and men reported were women (Swim et al., 2001). Thus, we assume that the target of most of the incidents in the present diary were women.

For the structured *stress diary*, we specified 19 stress incidents which represented typical stress situations among students (e.g., too much homework, failing exams, unfair grades, problems with group work, roommate problems). This represents a modification of previous diary studies that asked participants to attend to non-discriminatory stressors (e.g., Swim et al., 2001; Swim, Eysell, Quinlivan, & Ferguson, 2007). We altered the diaries such that we included more incidents to make it more comparable in work load to the sexism diaries.

Participants of both diary conditions were asked to indicate if they personally experienced or witnessed each of the specified incidents in their interpersonal relationships and to enter how often the corresponding incidents occurred during the day. After indicating an incident, students in the sexism diary condition were asked to

estimate how sexist they perceived the reported incident to be on a rating scale ranging from “definitely not sexist”, “might be sexist”, “probably sexist” to “definitely sexist” (“sexism rating”). Comparably, students in the stress diary condition were asked to rate how stressful they perceived the reported incident on a rating scale ranging from “definitely not stressful”, “might be stressful”, “probably stressful” to “definitely stressful”.

Manipulation checks

The first question in the post measure was to indicate a general number of stressful and sexist incidents participants had experienced during the week. Afterwards, they were asked to rate the degree to which the study made them more aware of stress and sexism in their life on a six-point scale ranging from “disagree strongly” to “agree strongly”.

Dependent measures

All dependent variables were measured on six-point rating scales (1 = “disagree strongly” to 6 = “agree strongly”). After completing the manipulation checks, participants completed measures in the order presented below.[4]

System justification. Participants completed Jost and Banaji’s (1994) eight item measure to assess system justification beliefs (α = .84; e.g., “Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness”).

Modern Sexism and Neosexism.[5] Modern Sexism (MS) and Neosexism (NS) were assessed using the eight items of the MS scale (e.g., “Discrimination against

[4] We also asked participants about the number of racist incidents, whether the study made them more aware of racism in their lives and to complete the Modern Racism scale (McConahay, 1986). We included these ratings to make it less obvious that we were particularly interested in sexism.

[5] To ensure that Benevolent, Modern and Neosexism represent different constructs, as was found in previous research (Swim, Becker, & DeCoster, 2007), we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis with data of all three studies (N = 548). Results indicated that a correlated factors model representing each scale (χ^2 (24) = 35.92, p = .06; comparative fit index (CFI) = .99; root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .03, standardized-root-mean-square-residual (SRMR) = .03) represented the data significantly better than the one factor model (χ^2 (27) = 567.96, p < .001; CFI = .52; RMSEA = .19, SRMR = .17, $\Delta\chi^2_{\text{corrected}}$ (3) = 258.27, p < .001, Satorra & Bentler, 2001).

women is no longer a problem in the United States") and the 11 items of the NS scale (e.g., "Due to social pressures, firms frequently have to hire under qualified women"). Researchers have argued that MS and NS do not measure the same construct, but two separate factors (Campbell, Schellenberg, & Senn, 1997; Parks & Roberton, 2004). Previous factor analyses indicated that one factor measured denial of discrimination (mostly MS items) and the second factor measured negative attitudes toward policies designed to promote gender equality (only items of the NS scale; Swim, Becker, & DeCoster, 2007). Our exploratory factor analysis supported previous findings (Campbell et al., 1997). Two NS items and five MS items constituted the MS factor (which measured only denial of discrimination, α = .82) and the remaining nine NS items loaded on the NS factor (α =.84). Although results were the same if we did not create scales based upon the factor analysis, we created scales based upon this factor analysis rather than the original scales, because the reliabilities were improved, they represent a more pure conceptualization of the constructs assessed in the two scales, and they provide a greater distinction between the two scales.

Benevolent Sexism (BS) was measured using 11 items of the ambivalent sexism inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999, α = .90; e.g., "Women should be cherished and protected by men").

Results

Manipulation checks

We expected that participants who completed the sexism diary would report in the post-measure that they had experienced more sexist incidents during the week and report a heightened awareness of sexism than those who completed the stress diary. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with number of sexist incidents as dependent

variable and condition and gender as between subject-factors revealed a main effect of diary condition, $F(1,109) = 36.87$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .25$. Estimated number of sexist incidents was higher in the sexism diary condition ($M = 6.30$, $SD = 6.34$) than in the stress diary condition ($M = 0.41$, $SD = 0.89$). Women and men did not differ in the estimated number of sexist incidents. The same ANOVA with awareness of sexism as dependent variable indicated that the study made participants in the sexism diary condition more aware of sexism in their lives ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.19$) than participants in the stress diary condition ($M = 2.16$, $SD = 1.09$), $F(1,116) = 78.00$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .40$. A main effect of gender, $F(1,116) = 4.35$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .04$, was qualified by a significant diary condition by gender interaction, $F(1,116) = 11.08$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .09$, indicating that differences between sexism and stress diary condition were stronger for women (sexism diary: $M = 4.68$, $SD = .85$; stress diary: $M = 2.09$, $SD = .97$) than for men (sexism diary: $M = 3.52$, $SD = 1.36$; stress diary: $M = 2.35$, $SD = 1.37$). Importantly, however, the difference for men was still significant, $F(1,36) = 6.91$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .16$.[6]

Endorsement of sexist beliefs

We predicted that the sexism diary experience would result in lower endorsement of sexist beliefs than the stress diary experience. To test this prediction, we conducted a 2 (diary condition: sexism diary, stress diary) x 2 (gender of participant: female, male) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with MS, NS,

[6] We also tested whether diary condition affected perceptions of how stressful the previous week had been. In a further ANOVA for number of estimated stressful incidents, a marginal significant main effect occurred, $F(1, 113) = 2.82$, $p < .10$, $\eta^2 = .02$. Means indicate that perceived number of stressful incidents was higher for participants in the stress diary condition ($M = 11.67$, $SD = 14.63$) than in the sexism diary condition ($M = 7.21$, $SD = 9.49$). An ANOVA with awareness of stress as dependent variable revealed a significant condition by gender interaction, $F(1, 116) = 8.43$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$. There was no difference between sexism ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 1.03$) and stress diary condition ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.13$) in awareness of stress for women, $F(1,80) = 2.35$, $p < .10$, $\eta^2 = .03$, suggesting that women perceived the sexist incidents and stressful incidents as similar stressful. Paying attention to stress ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 1.25$) made men more aware of stress in their lives than paying attention to sexism ($M = 2.57$, $SD = 1.21$), $F(1,36) = 17.28$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .32$.

and BS as dependent variables. A significant two-way interaction of diary condition by gender, $F(3,113) = 5.25$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .12$, revealed different effects of the sexism diary for women and men. Therefore, we computed separate analyses for women and men.

For women, a MANOVA revealed a main effect of diary condition, $F(3,77) = 8.44$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .25$. At the univariate level, the main effect of diary condition was significant for all sexism scales, $F(1,79) = 14.66$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .16$ for MS; $F(1,79) = 7.53$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .09$ for NS and $F(1,79) = 16.14$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .17$ for BS. As expected, participants in the sexism diary condition had lower scores on MS ($M = 2.67$, $SD = .57$), NS ($M = 2.05$, $SD = .52$) and BS ($M = 2.77$, $SD = .82$) than participants in the stress diary condition ($M = 3.19$, $SD = .65$ for MS; $M = 2.45$, $SD = .75$ for NS and $M = 3.50$, $SD = .80$ for BS).

A MANOVA indicated that type of diary was not significant for men, $F(3,34) = 0.69$, $p = .56$, $\eta^2 = .06$. Participants in the sexism diary and stress diary condition had similar scores on MS ($M = 3.69$, $SD = .90$ vs. $M = 3.31$, $SD = .79$), NS ($M = 2.90$, $SD = .61$ vs. $M = 2.85$, $SD = .60$), and BS ($M = 3.55$, $SD = .73$ vs. $M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.1$). Hence, contrary to our expectations, sexism diary did not have prejudice-reducing effects for male participants.

We tested two possible reasons for the lack of effect of condition for men. First, we tested whether men reported fewer sexist incidents in their diaries than women. We added all reported incidents of the seven dairies completed during one week to a sum score of “amount of incidents” for each participant. A t-test on amount of incidents reported overall during the week did not reveal significant variation between female and male participants, $t(56) = 0.85$, $p = .40$. Thus, women ($M = 62.49$, $SD = 41.17$) and men ($M = 52.81$, $SD = 42.59$) reported the same amount of experiences during the week. Second, we tested whether men evaluated observed

incidents as less sexist than women did. We averaged the "sexism ratings" participants gave for each incident they reported in their diary ratings. A t-test revealed that women (M = 2.48, SD = .48) perceived their observed experiences as more sexist than men did (M = 1.93, SD = .55), $t(56) = 4.03$, $p < .01$.

Next we tested whether differences in sexism ratings could account for the different effects of diary condition on women and men. We did not have sexism ratings in the stress diary condition, so we could not test this directly. Instead, we tested whether sexism ratings accounted for an effect of gender on endorsement of sexist beliefs within the sexism diary condition. ANOVAs revealed that women and men differ significantly on sexism measures with men having higher scores on MS, $F(1,56) = 33.32$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .37$, NS, $F(1,56) = 32.35$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .37$, and BS, $F(1,56) = 13.04$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .19$. We tested whether sexism ratings mediated the relation between gender and endorsement of sexist beliefs using procedures established by Baron and Kenny (1986). The independent variable (gender) significantly predicted both the proposed mediator sexism rating, (B = -.55, SE = .14, p < .01) and the dependent variables MS (B = 1.02, SE = .18, p < .01), NS (B = .85, SE = .15, p < .01) and BS (B = .78, SE = .22, p < .01). Women perceived more sexism than men and had lower scores on MS, NS and BS. Furthermore, the proposed mediator (sexism rating) significantly predicted the dependent variables MS (B = -.38, SE = .17, p < .05) and BS (B = -.46, SE = .20, p < .05) but not NS (B = .11, SE = .15, *ns*), controlling for gender. That is, those who perceived incidents as more sexist tended to reject modern sexist and benevolent sexist beliefs stronger than those who perceived incidents as less sexist.[7] When including the mediator, the relation between gender and MS (B = .81, SE = .19, p < .01) and between gender and BS dropped (B = .52, SE = .24, p < .01). A Sobel test confirmed the significance

[7] Perceptions of stressful incidents as stressful were not correlated with MS (r = -.16, *ns*), NS (r = -.08, *ns*) and BS (r = .11, *ns*).

of both mediations (z = 2.07, p < .05 for MS and z = 2.00, p < .05 for BS). That is, the gender difference in MS and BS scores was partially mediated by sexism ratings suggesting that diaries had less impact on men compared to women because men perceived the daily sexist incidents differently.

Endorsement of system justification

An ANOVA revealed a significant diary condition by gender effect. Follow up analyses with female participants revealed a main effect of diary condition, $F(1,80)$ = 5.5, p < .05, η^2 = .06, indicating that women in the sexism diary condition were more likely to reject system justification beliefs (M = 3.30, SD = .76) than women in the stress diary condition (M = 3.67, SD = .69). In contrast, for men, diary condition had no effect on system justification beliefs, $F(1,36)$ = .035, p = .85, η^2 = .00. Using a mediation analysis we further tested whether lower scores in system justification for women in the sexism diary condition were due to their reduced scores in MS. We already know that diary condition is significantly related to the dependent variable (system justification: B = .38, SE = .25, p < .05) and to the mediator (MS: B = .52, SE = .14, p < .001). Additionally MS is related to system justification controlling for condition (B = .50, SE = .12, p < .001).[8] After inclusion of the mediator, the effect between diary condition and system justification decreased to non significance (B = .12, SE = .16, *ns*). A Sobel (1982) test was significant (z = -2.82, p < .01). Hence, the relation between condition and system justification was fully mediated by modern sexist beliefs. We tested the reverse mediation that information about the prevalence of sexism leads to changes in system justification that in turn lead to changes in MS. System justification decreased the relation between condition and MS significantly (z

[8] Modern Sexism and system justification are highly correlated. We used confirmatory factor analyses, with data of all three studies, to test whether the scales represent two different constructs. We found that the two correlated factor model (χ^2 (8) = 25.38, p < .001; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .063, SRMR = .03) represented the data significantly better than the one factor model (χ^2 (9) = 290.04, p < .001; CFI = .77; RMSEA = .24, SRMR = .11, $\Delta\chi^2_{corrected}$ (1) = 145.49, p < .001).

= -2.04, $p < .05$). However, the relation between condition and MS remained significant ($B = .39$, $SE = .13$, $p < .01$). We did not find support for BS and NS as mediators.

Gender identification

We tested whether gender identification moderated any of the above effects. We used regression in order to be able to keep gender identification as a continuous measure (c.f. Aiken & West, 1991). We did not find any significant interactions with gender identification suggesting that identification did not moderate the findings.

Discussion

As expected, results of Study 1 show that keeping track of sexist incidents in everyday life decreased endorsement of sexist beliefs. However, the expected impact of the sexism diary on sexist attitudes was only validated for female participants: Women who completed the sexism diary had significantly lower scores on Modern, Neo-, and Benevolent Sexism scales than women who completed the stress diary. Furthermore, results for women show that keeping track of sexist incidents did not only decrease endorsement of sexist beliefs, but also system justification beliefs. A Mediation analysis revealed that reduced scores on system justification in the sexism diary condition were fully mediated by Modern Sexism and not by other types of sexist beliefs. This suggests that the tendency to downplay sexism (as assessed by the items included in the version of the Modern Sexism scale in this research), more so than endorsement of other types of sexist beliefs, is the reason why individuals endorse system justification beliefs.

In contrast, attending to sexism, relative to attending to other stressors, did not influence men's endorsement of sexist beliefs. We found that men's perceptions of the degree to which incidents were sexist partially explained gender differences in

endorsement of modern and benevolent sexist beliefs within the sexism diary condition. We also found that, although men reported the same number of observed sexist incidents as women, the sexism diary had no effects on men's sexist attitudes. This indicates that attending to sexism alone is not sufficient to reduce men's endorsement of sexist beliefs. The gender difference in rating of incidents as sexist suggests that it is important to change men's perception of everyday discrimination as sexist and not just change their attention to the occurrence of sexism.

There are a couple of limitations to Study 1 that could be addressed by a more controlled study. In the diary study, experiences of prevalence and harm of sexism are conflated together. Hence, we could not test our hypotheses that attending to prevalence of sexism reduces endorsement of modern sexist beliefs and attending to harm of sexism reduces acceptance of benevolent sexist beliefs. In the next study we provided participants with information about the prevalence of sexism rather than asking them to keep track of the prevalence of sexism in their daily lives. Other participants were given information about the harm caused by sexism. The remaining participants were given information about college stressors. We reasoned that directly providing information about prevalence and harm might be a more effective manipulation for male participants because this kind of information is less ambiguous and might reduce their tendency, for instance, to attribute sexist incidents to other causes. In addition, separately manipulating information about prevalence and harm allowed us to test whether different types of information triggered changes in different types of sexism.

Finally, contrary to expectations, we did not find that gender identification moderated our effects. Given that experiences with discrimination have been associated with increases in gender identification (Schmitt et al., 2002), perhaps women's gender identity was primed by attending to their experiences with sexism in

their lives thereby decreasing differences between more and less gender identified women. Moreover, given the lack of effect of attending to discrimination in men, it is possible that men's gender identity was situationally increased by attending to sexism. Perhaps some of the incidents men reported were directed at men rather than women or, even if most of the sexist incidents were directed at women as we have found in other studies (Swim et al., 2001), thinking about and attending to gender related events may have increased men's gender identification. We retested the role of gender identification in Study 2.

STUDY 2

Study 1 provided support for the hypothesis that attending to sexism leads to a stronger rejection of sexist attitudes in women. In Study 2 we examined the mechanisms of how participants were affected by attending to sexism. We disentangled differential effects of awareness that sexism is prevalent and awareness that sexism is harmful on different types of sexist beliefs: We hypothesized that knowledge about the prevalence of sexism works as a mechanism to decrease endorsement of modern and neosexist beliefs, but not of benevolent sexist beliefs. In contrast, information about negative consequences and harm for targets of ostensibly positive discrimination, such as paternalism, would work as a mechanism to decrease endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs in particular and affects modern and neosexist beliefs less or not at all. We also included gender identification again in Study 2 to test whether more identified women and less identified men were particularly receptive to information about prevalence and harm.

Method

Participants

A sample of 240 Pennsylvania State University undergraduate students (168 women, 72 men) participated in group testing sessions with up to 50 persons per session. They received course credit in exchange for completing the measures. Their ages ranged from 18 to 44 with a mean age of 19 years. 89% identified as European-American, 4% as Asian American, 3% as Black or African American and 4% as Hispanic or Latino/a.

Design

The design was a 3 (information condition: prevalence, harm, stress) x 2 (gender of participant: female, male) between-subject design with identification with the gender category as a measured continuous moderator. Participants were randomly assigned to three experimental information conditions (prevalence condition, N = 86; harm condition, N = 77; stress condition, N = 77). The last group served as control group.

Procedure

Participants arrived at the laboratory room and were told that the study was about text evaluation. The first author served as the experimenter in the study and she spoke with a German accent. They were told that she was a PhD-student from Germany and wrote an English newspaper article to be published in an American student magazine. Participants were told that the author desired comments to improve the article for an U.S. audience. In addition, participants were told that researchers were interested in how their personal interests and attitudes would influence their evaluation of the article and they would therefore complete measures before and after they read and evaluated the text. To be consistent with the cover story, after reading the text, participants were asked to evaluate the text on several

dimensions (e.g., about the comprehensibility of the text and how interesting and new the topic was for the reader). Afterwards, participants completed a questionnaire assessing system justification, Neosexism, Modern, and Benevolent Sexism, in that order.[9]

Manipulation. The newspaper article about the *prevalence* of sexism explained that discrimination has become more subtle but is still prevalent. Information included percentages of women in decision making positions, government and traditional male dominated fields. It was explained how often women experienced different kinds of sexist behaviors in their everyday lives. The newspaper article about the *harm* of sexism explained that subtle discrimination is less visible but still harmful. The harm and negative consequences of ostensibly polite behaviors like paternalism and chivalry, and characterizations of women with positive stereotypes were described. The newspaper article about *stress* in student's lives described different sources of stress, such as too much homework, failing exams, unfair grades, problems with group work, roommate problems, and lack of time for friends. Negative consequences of stress for students were presented. To make the information more concrete and vivid, we included graphic stories in each of the three information texts. All three texts were of equivalent length. Pretesting both articles with 16 students indicated that the information about prevalence made participants focus more on the prevalence of sexism (M = 4.56, SD = .63) than on the harm of sexism (M = 3.75, SD = .93, $t(15) = -3.75$, $p < .01$) and the information about harm made participants focus more on harm (M = 4.56, SD = .51) than on prevalence of sexism (M = 4.13, SD = .50, $t(15) = 2.78$, $p < .05$).

[9] As was done in Study 1, participants also completed the Modern Racism scale at the end of the measures, again to make it less obvious that we were particularly interested in their endorsement of sexist beliefs.

Gender Identification. Identification with the gender in-group was again measured with items from Cameron's (2004) gender identification scale. Internal consistency was satisfactory (α = .80 for women; α = .70 for men).

Manipulation Check. Two items were used as a manipulation check to determine whether the newspaper article about harm focused more on harm than on prevalence of sexism and whether the article about prevalence stressed the prevalence more than harm of sexism. Participants in the harm and prevalence condition were asked: "Overall, how strong is the argument that sexism is prevalent in society?" and "Overall, how strong is the argument that sexism is harmful for women?"

Dependent variables. As dependent variables, we used the same measures as in Study 1. All items could be answered on six-point rating scales ranging from 1 = "disagree strongly" to 6 = "agree strongly". An exploratory factor analysis of MS and NS items validated the distinction between denial of discrimination (five items of the MS scale and two of the NS scale) and NS (nine items of the NS scale, but without the two NS-items which measured denial of discrimination). Internal consistencies of system justification scale (α = .78), the newly constructed MS scale (denial of discrimination, α = .77), the newly constructed NS scale (α = .80), and BS scale (α = .78) were satisfactory.

Results

Manipulation check

A 2 (information condition: prevalence, harm) x 2 (gender of participant: female, male) MANOVA was conducted with both manipulation check items as dependent variables. The condition by gender interaction was significant, $F(2,158) = 3.07$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .04$, indicating that women and men differed in ratings of manipulation check. Therefore, we did MANOVAs separately for women and men.

The MANOVA for women revealed a significant main effect for condition, $F(2,109) = 7.55$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .12$. Univariate analyses indicated that women in the prevalence condition rated that the text more strongly stressed the argument that sexism was prevalent than women in the harm condition ($M = 4.55$, $SD = 1.08$; $M = 4.07$, $SD = .60$, respectively), $F(1,110) = 8.15$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$. In contrast, women in the harm condition perceived that the text more strongly stressed that sexism was harmful than women in the prevalence condition ($M = 4.19$, $SD = .85$; $M = 3.76$, $SD = 1.1$, respectively), $F(1,110) = 5.31$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .05$. Hence, results suggest that manipulations were effective for women.

For men, a MANOVA revealed a main effect for condition, $F(2,48) = 5.90$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .20$. Univariate analyses showed that men in the prevalence condition rated that the text more strongly stressed the argument that sexism is prevalent ($M = 4.29$, $SD = .78$) than men in the harm condition ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 1.26$, $F(1,49) = 12.02$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .20$). However, there was no significant difference between conditions for the harm rating, $F(1,49) = 1.07$, $p = .31$, $\eta^2 = .02$ (harm condition: $M = 3.65$, $SD = 1.39$; prevalence condition: $M = 4.00$, $SD = 1.03$). Therefore, this suggests that the prevalence manipulation was effective for men whereas the harm manipulation was not. However, as noted below we found the predicted effects for the harm condition for men suggesting that the manipulation might have had the intended effects.

Endorsement of sexist beliefs

A 3 (condition: prevalence, harm, stress) x 2 (gender of participant: female, male) MANOVA on MS, NS, and BS revealed a significant main effect for condition, $F(6,464) = 7.49$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .08$, and gender, $F(3,232) = 28.91$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .27$. The interaction was not significant, $F(6,466) = 0.37$, $p = .90$, $\eta^2 = .01$. The gender effect indicated that men scored higher on the MS, NS and BS scales ($M = 3.12$, $SD = .71$; $M = 2.77$, $SD = .67$; and $M = 3.81$, $SD = .81$, respectively) than women ($M = 2.66$, $SD = .69$; $M = 2.01$, $SD = .61$; and $M = 3.49$, $SD = .86$, respectively). Univariate analyses revealed significant effects of condition for MS, $F(2,234) = 11.22$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .09$, and BS, $F(2,234) = 8.81$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$, but not for NS, $F(2,234) = 1.61$, *ns*, $\eta^2 = .01$.

Planned comparisons ($p < .05$) between the prevalence condition versus the harm and stress condition and between the harm condition versus the prevalence and stress condition support the predictions. Participants in the prevalence condition had lower MS scores than participants in the stress and in the harm condition ($M = 2.57$, $SD = .65$; $M = 3.04$, $SD = .75$; $M = 2.81$, $SD = .71$ respectively, $F(1,237) = 14.37$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .06$). Subsequently, a test was run for any remaining variance left to explain after the variance explained by the contrast had been removed (Niedenthal, Brauer, Robin, & Innes-Ker, 2002). This test for residual variance was not significant ($F < 1$), indicating that no additional significant contrasts are possible and the hypothesized contrast is a parsimonious and accurate description of the data.

As predicted, participants in harm condition had lower BS scores than those in the prevalence condition and stress condition ($M = 3.24$, $SD = .85$; $M = 3.80$, $SD = .82$; $M = 3.69$, $SD = .79$ respectively, $F(1,237) = 20.11$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .08$). Again, the test for residual variance was not significant ($F < 1$), indicating that there was no

additional significant contrast. Hence, consistent with the manipulation, participants in the prevalence condition had significantly lower scores on MS than participants in the harm and stress condition, whereas participants in the harm condition had significantly lower scores on BS than participants in the prevalence and in the stress condition. These effects were true for women and men and were found across all subcomponents of the BS scale.

Endorsement of system justification

A 3 (condition: prevalence, harm, stress) by 2 (gender of participant: female, male) ANOVA performed on system justification also revealed main effects for condition, $F(2,234) = 4.02$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .03$, and gender, $F(2,234) = 8.24$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .03$, and no interaction of condition by gender, $F(2,234) = .09$, $p = .91$, $\eta^2 = .00$. Planned comparisons indicated a significant difference between prevalence and stress condition, indicating greater rejection of system justification in the prevalence condition (women: $M = 3.24$, $SD = .78$; men: $M = 3.58$, $SD = .71$) than in the stress condition (women: $M = 3.59$, $SD = .78$; men: $M = 3.93$, $SD = .75$) but no differences between harm condition (women: $M = 3.49$, $SD = .78$; men: $M = 3.73$, $SD = .71$) and stress condition.

As in Study 1, we conducted a mediation analysis to test whether MS mediated the relation between prevalence vs. stress condition and system justification. We already know that prevalence vs. stress condition is significantly related to system justification ($B = -.30$, $SE = .12$, $p < .05$), and to the mediator MS ($B = -.44$, $SE = .11$, $p < .001$). Additionally MS is related to system justification controlling for prevalence versus control condition ($B = .57$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$). After inclusion of the mediator, the effect between prevalence vs. stress condition and system justification decreased to non significance ($B = -.05$, $SE = .11$, *ns*). A Sobel (1982) test indicated that this mediation was statistically significant ($z = -3.78$, $p <$

.001). Again, we tested the reverse mediation that information about the prevalence of sexism leads to changes in system justification which in turn lead to changes in MS. System justification decreased the relation between condition and MS significantly (z = -2.39, p < .05). As in Study 1, the relation between condition and MS remained significant (B = -.29, SE = .10, p < .01). Additional analyses also reveal that the other sexism scales were not significant mediators.

Gender identification

As in Study 1, we used regressions to test whether gender identification moderated any of the above effects. None of the interactions with gender identification were significant.

Discussion

The results of Study 2 provided important insights into the mechanisms that are responsible for endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs by investigating differential effects of selected information. As expected, information that sexism is still prevalent decreased endorsement of modern sexist, but not of benevolent sexist beliefs. That is, participants who were confronted with statistical information, which clearly attest to women's under-representation in decision making positions and prevalence of everyday sexism, changed their perceptions of gender discrimination in society. In contrast, information that subtle sexism is harmful led to a stronger rejection of benevolent sexist beliefs than of modern sexist beliefs. Hence, a heightened knowledge that ostensibly positive stereotypes and behaviors can have negative consequences reduced acceptance of benevolent sexist beliefs in particular. Importantly, these effects were not moderated by participants' gender indicating that when the information is less ambiguous, information about the prevalence of sexism and its harm can influence both women and men.

In addition, we replicated our ability to reduce system justification beliefs. We illustrated that changes in system justification are specifically a function of information about the prevalence of sexism. Thus, it is not just a heightened awareness of sexism (as found in Study 1) but knowledge about the prevalence of sexism that leads to decreases in endorsement of system justification beliefs. Plus, this effect of information about prevalence of sexism on system justification was mediated by endorsement of modern sexist beliefs. As in Study 1, a reverse analysis showed that system justification partially accounts for the relation between the prevalence versus the stress condition and Modern Sexism. Again, the reverse mediation was weaker than the first one.

Our manipulations, however, were not successful at reducing neosexist beliefs. A possible explanation for this is that the texts may not have directly addressed information relevant for this type of sexist beliefs. The text about prevalence stressed the prevalence of sexism in society, but did not focus on the other two subcomponents of Modern Sexism that are more strongly represented in the Neosexism scale, namely antagonism towards women's demands and resentment against special favors for women. The Neosexism scale includes fewer items that address prevalence of sexism and, based upon a factor analysis, we included these items from the Neosexism scale with the Modern Sexism scale. Thus, different information might need to be added to information about the prevalence of sexism to address these aspects of Neosexism. In addition, the Neosexism scale tends to measure hostility towards women more so than the Modern Sexism scale (see Swim, Becker & DeCoster, 2007), therefore it is understandable that the text about prevalence of sexism did not affect neosexist beliefs.

Also contrary to explications, we again did not find that gender identification moderates the effects. Perhaps the presence of a German experimenter and the

emphasis made about her ethnicity in the cover story made participant's identification as U.S. Americans more salient and decreased the role that gender identification played in this context. As a consequence, we decided that experimenters' and participant's nationality should be the same in the third study.

STUDY 3

We added a third study, conceptually similar to Study 2, but with some improvements: First, we improved the newspaper articles. We hypothesized that additional information that indicated that the advantages of policies designed to help women in work which would address the subtlety of everyday discrimination would lead to a stronger rejection of neosexist beliefs. Second, we ran the study in Germany with participants older than college students and did not mention ethnic identity in the cover story. In this case, experimenters' and participant's nationality were identical (German).

Third, we added Hostile Sexism (HS) as an additional dependent variable. We did this for two reasons. It is possible that the lack of effect on NS in the previous study occurred because of its association with hostile beliefs about women. For instance, an examination of the NS scale items revealed some items to measure a relatively blatant form of sexist beliefs (e.g., "It is difficult to work for a female boss"). Also, Swim, Becker, and DeCoster (2007) found indicators that NS is measuring a similar construct as HS. Thus, including the HS scale, we can test whether the effects or lack of effects for NS and HS are similar. The second reason, however, is to see whether information that affects endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs also decreases endorsement of hostile sexist beliefs. HS is defined as the flip side to Benevolent Sexism with individuals who are more likely to endorse benevolent sexist

beliefs also being more likely to endorse hostile sexist beliefs. Thus, because the two beliefs are linked, if we are able to decrease endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs, we may also be able to decrease endorsement of hostile sexist beliefs. Moreover, because information about harm is particularly potent for reducing benevolent sexist beliefs, information about harm may be potent for reducing hostile sexist beliefs as well.

Method

Participants

131 women and 58 men participated in an online-experiment and received the link of the study from friends and acquaintances and were asked to forward the link. Participants' ages ranged from 19 to 60 years, with a mean age of 28 years. 98% of the participants classified themselves as Germans, 2% as Austrians and Swiss. In exchange for completing the measure, they participated in a lottery. One third of participants were students. They were debriefed one month after their participation.

Design

The design was a 3 (information condition: prevalence, harm, stress) x 2 (gender of participant: female, male) between-subject design with identification with the gender category as a measured continuous moderator. Participants were randomly assigned to information condition (prevalence condition, N = 66; harm condition, N = 58; stress condition, N = 65). The stress condition served as a control group.

Procedure

The experiment was again described as a study about "evaluation of texts". Participants were told that an article was written about sexism or stressors, depending on condition, to be published in a local newspaper but it still needed to be

improved. Besides paying attention to mistakes, we asked participants to think about whether the text was too difficult because the local newspaper was read by people of different educational backgrounds. In addition, participants were told that researchers were interested in how their attitudes might influence text evaluation. Therefore, they were asked to complete some additional measures before and after they read and evaluated the text. Gender identification was measured before the manipulation. After reading the texts, participants were asked to evaluate the text on dimensions described in Study 2. In addition, an opportunity to comment on the article was given. Finally participants completed manipulation checks and dependent measures.

Manipulation

Each of the three newspaper articles used in Study 2 were translated into German language and adapted to German context. We added the following to the articles: To the prevalence article, we added a statement that indicated the advantages of policies designed to change the current gender status quo. Thus, nearly the entire article addressed prevalence but we did make an additional connection between prevalence and policies. Most of the text about harm of sexism that was used in Study 2 addressed paternalism. We therefore bolstered comments about the other two subcomponents of Benevolent Sexism, namely gender differentiation and heterosexuality. Again to make the information more vivid, we included graphic stories for each of the three subcomponents. To make each of the articles the same length, we also extended the stress text. Finally, to have a similar amount of personal stories in each of the articles, we added personal stories for the prevalence and stress articles. Results of a pretest (N = 21) confirmed that the information about prevalence focused participants on prevalence (M = 4.40, SD = .52) more than harm of sexism (M = 3.73, SD = .79; $t(19) = -2.29$, $p < .05$) and the

information about harm focused participants more on harm (M = 4.55, SD = .69) than on prevalence of sexism (M = 3.10, SD = .1.10; $t(19) = 3.75$, $p < .05$).

Gender Identification

Identification with the gender in-group was again measured with translated items of Cameron's (2004) scale. Internal consistency was satisfactory (α = .78 for women; α = .86 for men).

Manipulation Check

We used the same manipulation check as in Study 2.

Dependent variables

Items could be answered on six-point rating scales ranging from 1 = "disagree strongly" to 6 = "agree strongly". We used German translations of the scales applied in Study 1 and Study 2: German Modern Sexism scale (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1998) primarily measures denial of discrimination. For the sake of consistency, we used unpublished translations of the NS scale (T. Eckes, personal communication, February 13, 2007) to have a full measure for NS. A factor analysis of MS and NS items again confirmed the distinction between denial of discrimination (five items of the MS scale and two of the NS scale, α = .82) and NS (nine items of the NS scale, without the two items which loaded on the denial of discrimination-factor, α = .85). BS was measured with a German translation (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1999, α = .87). We added a measure of Hostile Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) using the 11 items of a translation of HS scale (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1999; α = .81; e.g., "When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against"). We translated the measure of system justification (α = .90) and put this measure at the end of the survey.[10]

[10] Instead of modern racism, our filler items this time were a reduced and slightly adapted measure of subtle and blatant prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).

Results

Manipulation check

A MANOVA with both manipulation check items was significant ($F(4,364) = 105.48$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = 54$). Participants in the prevalence condition perceived that their text provided a stronger argument for the prevalence of sexism than did participants in the harm and stress conditions $F(2,186) = 214.07$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .70$ (planned comparisons: both *p*s < .01; harm condition: $M = 3.28$, $SD = 1.17$; prevalence condition: $M = 4.45$, $SD = .64$; stress condition: $M = 1.34$, $SD = .76$). In contrast, participants in the harm condition perceived that their text provided a stronger argument for the harm of sexism than did participants in the prevalence and stress conditions, $F(2,186) = 123.34$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .57$ (planned comparisons: both *p*s < .01; harm condition: $M = 4.16$, $SD = 1.17$; prevalence condition: $M = 3.15$, $SD = .92$; stress condition: $M = 1.42$, $SD = .86$). No gender difference revealed, $F(2,182) = .23$, $p = .79$, $\eta^2 = .00$) or interaction with gender, $F(4,366) = .91$, $p = .91$, $\eta^2 = .01$.[11]

Endorsement of sexist beliefs

We found significant effects for gender identification in our analyses. Therefore, we conducted separate hierarchical moderated regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) using each of the four sexism scales as dependent variables. The experimental factors were recoded into two dummy variables. For the first variable (prevalence contrast), participants in the prevalence condition were assigned a one, participants in the other two conditions were assigned a zero. In the second variable (harm contrast), participants in the harm condition were assigned a one, whereas all other participants were assigned a zero. In regression analyses, in the

[11] Gender identity did not interact with the manipulation check. Thus, women and men who were more and less identified were similarly made aware of the content of the articles and, therefore, the manipulation was equally effective across groups. Because we found predicted moderating effects for identity on our dependent variables, this suggested that, while they both comprehended the information, they reacted differently to this information.

first step, the two dummy variables were entered. When both variables are simultaneously included in the analyses, the prevalence contrast compares only the prevalence versus the control (stress) group and the harm contrast compares only the harm versus control (stress) condition.[12] In the second step, identification with the gender in-group and two interaction terms (prevalence contrast by identification; harm contrast by identification) were entered.

First, regression analyses for each of the four dependent variables with the two contrasts testing the effects of prevalence and harm conditions relative to the stress condition, identification, gender, and two- and three-way interactions as predictors, revealed three-way-interactions for the contrasts by identification by gender. As expected, these interactions indicated different effects of the information texts on endorsement of sexist beliefs depending on gender and gender identification. Therefore, we computed separate regression analyses for female and male participants.

Female participants. MS, NS and HS were predicted to be lower in the prevalence condition in comparison to the stress condition. BS and HS were predicted to be lower in the harm condition than in the stress condition. Both effects should be especially true for women highly identified with their gender.

Consistent with hypotheses, the prevalence condition decreased endorsement of MS and NS (B = -.80, SE = .15, p < .001; B = -.46, SE = .17, p < .01, respectively), but not of BS. Similar to the effect for NS, information about prevalence of sexism also decreased endorsement of HS (B = -.39, SE = .16, p < .05). Also, consistent with our hypotheses, the harm condition decreased endorsement of BS and HS (B =

[12] To get a comparison between prevalence and harm condition, we calculated further regressions with either harm condition or prevalence condition as the comparison group. When prevalence had an effect on modern and Neosexism, the effect was the same using the stress condition or harm condition as comparison group. When harm had an effect on Benevolent Sexism, the effect was the same using stress condition or prevalence condition as comparison group.

-1.26, *SE* = .16, *p* < .001; *B* = .67, *SE* = .16, *p* < .001, respectively), but not MS and NS. As expected, the interaction term for the prevalence contrast by identification was negative and significant for MS, NS, and HS (*B* = -.47, *SE* = .19, *p* < .05; *B* = -.54, *SE* = .21; *p* < .05; *B* = -.76, *SE* = .20, *p* < .001, respectively) whereas the interaction between the harm contrast and identification was negative and significant for BS and HS (*B* = -.78, *SE* = .19, *p* < .001; *B* = -.69, *SE* = .19, *p* < .01, respectively). Hence, the impact of both types of information depended on women's identification with their gender in-group.

Figure 1 (a-d) shows simple slopes of the regressions of each of the four sexism scales on information condition for more identified (one *SD* above the mean) and less identified respondents (one *SD* below the mean). In accordance with our predictions, simple slope analyses for MS and NS yielded significant negative slopes for more identified women in the prevalence condition (*B* = -1.27, *SE* = .23, *p* < .001; *B* = -1.0, *SE* = .25, *p* < .001, respectively), whereas slopes for less identified women were not significant (*B* = -.34, *SE* = .23, *ns*; *B* = .09, *SE* = .25, *ns*, respectively). There was also a negative trend for high identifiers in the harm condition with greater rejection of NS when provided information about harm (*B* = -.50, *SE* = .28, *p* < .10). Thus, information about the prevalence of sexism leads to greater rejection of MS and NS, particularly for women who are highly identified with their gender in-group. Moreover, there was a trend suggesting that high identifiers who read that sexism is harmful also rejected neosexist beliefs. Also supporting our prediction, simple slopes for BS revealed a significant slope for more identified women in the harm condition (*B* = -2.04, *SE* = .27, *p* < .001). For less identified women a marginal significant slope was found (*B* = -.48, *SE* = .27, *p* < .10), but not nearly as strong as for high identifiers. Hence, the impact of information about harm depended also on gender

identification: For women who read that sexism is harmful, higher gender identification lead to greater rejection of benevolent sexist beliefs.

Consistent with the main effects, for those high in identification, simple slopes for both dummy variables were significant in case of HS for the harm contrast and for the prevalence contrast (*B* = -1.35, *SE* = .27, *p* < .001; *B* = -1.15, *SE* = .24, *p* < .001, respectively). Simple slopes for those low in identification were not significant. Thus, information that sexism is harmful as well as that sexism is prevalent leads to a stronger rejection of hostile sexist views only when women are highly identified with their gender in-group.

Male participants. We predicted the same effects of information on endorsement of sexist beliefs for men as for women, except for men we predicted that the effects would be strongest for those who were less identified with their gender in-group.

Consistent with hypotheses, the prevalence condition decreased endorsement of MS, NS, and HS (*B* = -.69, *SE* = .22, *p* < .01; *B* = -.43, *SE* = .26, *p* = .107; *B* = -.44, *SE* = .25, *p* < .10, respectively) but not BS. Also, consistent with hypotheses, the harm condition decreased endorsement of BS (*B* = -.83, *SE* = .27, *p* < .01), but not MS and NS. However, in contrast to predictions, the harm condition also did not decrease endorsement of HS (*B* = -.34, *SE* = .26, *ns*). Similar to results for women, men in the prevalence condition had significantly lower scores on MS, NS and HS, whereas men in the harm condition had significantly lower scores on BS.

Also as expected, the interaction between prevalence and identification was negative and significant for MS, NS, and HS (*B* = .41, *SE* = .17, *p* < .05; *B* = .72, *SE* = .21, *p* < .01; *B* = .63, *SE* = .20, *p* < .01, respectively) whereas the interaction between the harm contrast and identification was positive and significant for BS (*B* =

.98, *SE* = .23, *p* < .001). Hence, in line with our hypothesis, the impact of information on men's endorsement of sexist beliefs also depended upon gender identification.

We plotted the simple slopes for the regressions of each of the four sexism scales on information condition for more identified men (one *SD* above the mean) and for less identified men (one *SD* below the mean; see Figure 1e-h). As predicted, simple slope analyses for those less identified testing the prevalence contrast revealed significant slopes for MS, NS, and HS (*B* = -1.09, *SE* = .27, *p* < .001; *B* = -1.15, *SE* = .33, *p* < .01, and *B* = -1.07, *SE* = .31, *p* < .01, respectively), whereas simple slopes for those more identified were not significant (*B* = -.28, *SE* = .27, *ns*; *B* = .28, *SE* = .33, *ns,* and *B* = .19, *SE* = .31, *ns*, respectively). Simple slope analyses for BS revealed a significant slope for those low in identification with the harm contrast (*B* = -1.82, *SE* = .34, *p* < .01), but not for those high in identification (*B* = .15, *SE* = .34, *ns*). Surprisingly, there was a negative trend for the less identified in the harm condition toward greater rejection of neosexist beliefs (*B* = -.74, *SE* = .34, p < .05). Thus, information that sexism is still prevalent leads to greater rejection of modern sexist, neosexist and hostile sexist beliefs only for less identified men. Equally, information about harm leads to greater rejection of benevolent sexist beliefs only when men are less identified with their gender in-group.

Endorsement of system justification

Regression analyses with system justification as dependent variable revealed that the prevalence condition decreased endorsement of system justification in women (*B* = -.47, *SE* = .19, *p* < .05), but not the harm condition (*B* = -.27, *SE* = .19, *ns*). No interaction effect with gender identification occurred.

For men, the prevalence condition also decreased endorsement of system justification (*B* = -.64, *SE* = .27, *p* < .05) but not the harm condition (*B* = -.08, *SE* = .28, *ns*). In addition, the prevalence contrast by identification interaction was

significant (*B* = .75, *SE* = .22, *p* < .01), suggesting that less identified men in the prevalence condition had lowest scores on system justification.

Again, we conducted a mediation analysis, with prevalence versus stress condition as the predictor variable, system justification as dependent variable and MS as mediator together for women and men. Prevalence vs. stress condition was significantly related to system justification (*B* = -.53, *SE* = .16, *p* < .01), and to the mediator (MS: *B* = -.85, *SE* = .14, *p* < .001). Additionally MS was related to system justification controlling for the prevalence contrast (*B* = .60, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001). After inclusion of the mediator, the effect between condition and system justification decreased to non significance (*B* = -.02, *SE* = .16, *ns)*. Sobel (1982) test indicated that this mediation was statistically significant (*z* = -4.54, *p* < .001). Thus, for the third time, the relation between condition and system justification was fully mediated by effects of modern sexist beliefs. We tested again the reverse mediation. The relation between prevalence vs. stress condition and MS was partially mediated by system justification (*z* = -2.92, p < .01) but remained significant (*B* = -.62, *SE* = .13, *p* < .001). Support was also not found for the other sexist beliefs as mediators.

Discussion

The results of Study 3 replicated and extended findings of the two US studies in a European context. We not only replicated the effect of information about prevalence of sexism on endorsement of modern sexist beliefs and information about harm of sexism on endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs, but found new effects as well. Consistent with predictions, information about prevalence of sexism affected endorsement of neosexist beliefs. The pattern of findings for Hostile Sexism was very similar to those for Neosexism and is consistent with the argument that Hostile Sexism and Neosexism both tap into more negative beliefs about women. Moreover, we had predicted that information about harm would affect endorsement of hostile sexist beliefs and we found this to be the case for women but not for men.

Another significant finding of Study 3 concerns the moderating role of gender identification. Effects of both types of information on endorsement of sexist beliefs depended on gender identification. Consistent for all measures of sexism, the above effects were strongest for women who were more identified and men who were less identified with their gender and weaker or not significant for women who were less and men who were more identified.

General Discussion

The present research investigated whether women and men endorse sexist beliefs because they do not attend to its prevalence and harm. We investigated this by testing types of information that would reduce endorsement of these beliefs. Specifically, we analyzed the impact of attention to sexism in one's everyday live and heightened awareness that sexism is prevalent and harmful for women on reduction of subtle sexist attitudes. So far, research has mostly studied ways to reduce ethnic

prejudice (e.g., Oskamp, 2000; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and a few studies successfully tested that participating in gender classes change feminist consciousness (e.g., Henderson-King & Stewart, 1999). The unique contribution of the current research was to investigate the role of awareness of sexism in one's own life on endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs and the differential role that information about prevalence and harm has on endorsement of different types of subtle sexist beliefs. We hypothesized that heightened awareness about the prevalence of sexism would result in greater rejection of modern sexist and neosexist beliefs whereas heightened awareness that sexism is harmful would lead to greater rejection of benevolent sexist beliefs. Overall, we found strong support for our hypotheses.

In Study 1, we found that attending to sexism in everyday life resulted in stronger rejection of modern, neo- and benevolent sexist beliefs in women but not in men. A mediation analysis indicated that men scored higher on every sexism measure, not because they attended to fewer everyday sexist incidents but because they evaluated these incidents as less sexist than women did. Thus, in essence they observed a similar amount of incidents but, in their view, they observed fewer sexist incidents because they were less likely to label them as sexist. As a result, attending to specific behaviors in their lives that researchers have identified as sexist were not as effective at reducing endorsement of sexist beliefs in men as in women.

Our two controlled information studies, in which we carefully manipulated information that provided evidence for the prevalence of sexism versus for the harm of sexism, indicated that this kind of information decreased endorsement of sexist beliefs by women and men. This suggests that information about sexism can impact men's beliefs when the information is less ambiguous. It may have been easier for men to provide alternative explanations for the sexist incidents in their everyday lives than when provided with information about sexism. We also found that different types

of information can affect different types of sexism. The findings suggest that women and men endorse modern sexist, neosexist, and hostile sexist beliefs because they do not perceive sexism to be prevalent, whereas women and men endorse benevolent sexist beliefs because they do not perceive them to be harmful.

Across all three studies, we found that attending to everyday sexism and information about the prevalence of sexism decreased endorsement of system justification beliefs. Moreover, this effect can be accounted for by the effect of such information on endorsement of modern sexist beliefs. Across all studies, the reverse mediation with system justification as mediator and Modern Sexism as dependent variable revealed that system justification partially mediated the relation between experimental condition and Modern Sexism. Therefore, we conclude that Modern Sexism and system justification affect each other, but here we found stronger evidence that specific beliefs (Modern Sexism) influence diffuse beliefs (system justification) more so than the other way around.

In Study 3 we were able to find support for the predicted moderating role of gender identification. We found that attending to the prevalence of sexism and its harm lead to prejudice reducing effects for women more identified and men less identified with their gender. These results are a step further toward a better understanding of the impact of gender identification on women and men's reactions toward sexism. Because information was less effective at changing more identified men and less identified women's beliefs, they may endorse sexist beliefs for different reasons than less identified men and more identified women. Perhaps more identified men's motivation is maintenance of dominance hierarchies and less identified women's motivation is a general desire to perceive the world as just (Lerner, 1980). These motivations may result in resistance to accepting information about the prevalence and harm of sexism. Yet it is interesting to note from the pattern of

means, that the resistance did not result in reactance in the form of greater endorsement of sexist beliefs. That is, even though they may have reacted against the information, the information did not increase endorsement of sexist beliefs relative to the control condition.

This finding contrasts with results from the first two studies. We argued that the procedures in the first two studies may have affected the salience of gender identity. In the first study, attending to sexism for a whole week may have increased gender identification in both women and men, thereby explaining the effect on the diaries on women and not men. In the second study the German experimenter's emphasis on her nationality may have overpowered participant's thoughts about their gender identity. This might have made the U.S American identity more salient and thus overshadowed the role of gender identity in that context. A second possibility may have to do with characteristics of the samples used in the studies. A difference between the first two and the third study was participant's age. Participants in the first two studies were on average 19 years old (with a range of 18 to 44 and 1% being older than 22 years) whereas participants in the third study were on average 28 years old (with an age range from 19 to 60 and 84 % being older than 22 years). It is possible that young students are less adept at questioning the content of the article than older participants (e.g., Sears, 1986). Being less critical and more likely to accept information might have overshadowed the effects of gender identity.

Our results have important implications for interventions to reduce sexism. We demonstrated that sexist attitudes can be changed through selective information about the prevalence and harm of sexism. Therefore, we recommend programs to inform individuals about the prevalence and negative consequences of subtle sexism especially about the negativity of behaviors, such as paternalism, which seem to be positive and benevolent yet represent stereotypic characterizations and treatment of

women. This information may be more effective for less identified men and more identified women. For prejudice reduction programs, it would be interesting to determine whether situationally decreasing men's gender identification and increasing women's gender identification increases the effectiveness of the information for more individuals. Practically, increasing one group's gender identification while simultaneously decreasing another group's gender identification could be difficult. If motivational reasons do underpin more identified men and less identified women's resistance to information, prejudice reduction programs might want to target both motivational reasons for endorsing sexist beliefs and informational reasons to most effectively reduce endorsement of sexist beliefs.

There are some limitations to the present research. First, we did not find that gender identification moderated the prejudice-reducing effects in the first two studies but it did in the last study. Future research should further examine the role of gender identification in this context to determine, for instance, whether it was a function of differences in age or cultural understandings of gender or a consequence of methodological differences across the studies that affected the salience of gender.

Second, since we do not know how long lasting the effects are, it would be useful for future research to address long term effects. Plus, we were able to reduce sexist attitudes in a neutral situation where sexism did not have a function. However, sexism is often motivated and strategically used in situations where individuals seek to get advantages of being sexist or are rewarded for accepting sexism, whereby the use of Benevolent Sexism can be effective in situations where Modern Sexism would not be and the other way around. Hence, future research should focus on the functional relevance of Benevolent and Modern Sexism in different contexts, for example, to investigate when people use Modern or Benevolent Sexism to their advantage or when they think it is best to appear non-sexist, so that interventions can

be specifically developed for situations where sexism is most likely used to one's advantage.

Third, we do not know if the findings translate into changes in behaviors. Broadening this research of heightened awareness of sexism and its harm on changing intentions and actual behavior to confront sexism would be a promising extension. For instance, important first steps to publicly noting sexism is to notice and label it as sexist (Stangor et al., 2003).

Fourth, one could argue that demand characteristics might account for our findings. However, demand characteristics are not likely to fully account for our findings, otherwise we would not have found differential effects of information about harm and prevalence on different types of sexism. Plus, we also may not have found that the effects were stronger for women than men in the first study and for certain groups of women and men based on gender identification in the third study.

To conclude, the present findings point to core reasons why individuals endorse subtle sexist beliefs based upon the type of information that reduces endorsement of such beliefs. Moreover, the research points to ways to reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs. First, awareness of sexism in one's everyday live can reduce endorsement of sexist beliefs in women. Second, in order to reduce endorsement of modern sexist, neosexist, and hostile sexist beliefs it is specifically necessary to heighten awareness of the prevalence of sexism. In order to reduce endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs it is specifically necessary to attend to the harm experienced by targets of discrimination. In addition, although this type of information will effectively reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs in certain individuals, other individuals will be resistant to this information and it may be important to address gender identification when using this type of information to reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs.

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

Figure 1a-d: Simple slopes of Modern Sexism (MS), Neosexism (NS), Benevolent Sexism (BS) and Hostile Sexism (HS) as a function of condition and identification, women, Study 3.
Note: We have two dummy variables, therefore the slopes for high and low identifiers are composed of two different slopes. One compares the first dummy with the control (stress) condition, the second one compares the second dummy with the control (stress) condition.



Figure 1e-h: Simple slopes of Modern Sexism (MS), Neosexism (NS), Benevolent Sexism (BS) and Hostile Sexism (HS) as a function of condition and identification, men, Study 3.
Note: We have two dummy variables, therefore the slopes for high and low identifiers are composed of two different slopes. One compares the first dummy with the control (stress) condition, the second one compares the second dummy with the control (stress) condition.

Final discussion and outlook

As outlined in the introduction, sexism is still prevalent but has changed its appearance in the way that formerly blatant expressions of sexism have now become more subtle (Glick et al., 2000; Swim, Becker, Pruitt, & Lee, in press). The most important psychological concepts of subtle sexism are Modern Sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), Neosexism (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995) and Ambivalent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Subtle expressions of sexism are typically less visible and obvious than blatant sexism, as they are internalized as customary behavior (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995) and hence often remain unnoticed (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a, 2005b). Not only men, but also many women take an active part in maintaining the current gender system by "doing gender" (West & Zimmerman, 1987) and by endorsing sexist beliefs (e.g., Heitmeyer, 2007; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Recent research has identified several psychological factors as predictors of women's acceptance of sexist attitudes (e.g., Christopher & Mull, 2006; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson 2006), but a coherent parsimonious theoretical model was still missing. Accordingly, the first purpose of the present research (Manuscript #1) was to shed light on the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that, even though women belong to the target group of gender discrimination, many of them support the gender hegemony. Based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999), the Gender Identity Model (GIM) was introduced to explain this phenomenon. Three studies provided preliminary, but clear evidence for the usefulness of the GIM to explain differences in women's endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action.

As a direct consequence of advancing knowledge about predictors to explain endorsement of sexist beliefs, the second part of the present research focused on

ways to reduce endorsement of these beliefs (Manuscript #2). So far, no research work has yet investigated a method to reduce subtle sexist beliefs, and only little research has so far analyzed changes in other gender-related concepts which were caused by long-term teaching projects (e.g., Jones & Jacklin, 1988; Henderson-King & Steward, 1999). The second part of the present dissertation (Manuscript #2) therefore aimed at identifying factors which help to reduce subtle sexist beliefs. It was posited that many individuals lack awareness of the prevalence of sexism and the harm experienced by the targets of gender discrimination (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Swim, Mallet, & Stangor, 2004). A heightened knowledge about the prevalence of sexism was predicted to reduce endorsement of modern sexist beliefs, whereas a heightened sensitivity for the harm of sexism was predicted to result in decreased endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs. These effects were predicted to be moderated by gender identification. Results of three experimental studies provided strong support for the reduction of prejudice through heightened knowledge about the prevalence and harm of sexism and partial evidence for the moderating role of gender identification.

1. Predictors of women's endorsement of sexist beliefs: The GIM

Previous research catalogued many relatively stable personality factors as predictors of sexism (e.g., Christopher & Mull, 2006; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007; Whitley, 1999), but ignored the fact that many women endorse sexist beliefs although they belong to the target group of gender discrimination. Thus, group membership, i.e., strength of gender identification should play an important role in explaining the acceptance of sexist beliefs. However, only little research has so far considered the strength of gender identification as an important predictor for endorsement of sexist beliefs and engagement in collective action (for exceptions see Cameron & Lalonde,

2001; Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; Harquail, 2007). A further important, but almost neglected distinction, which needs to be made, is between the strength of gender identification and the identity content (see for example, Downing & Roush, 1985; Foster, 1999). To the best of our knowledge, only Condor (1984) combined strength of gender identification, and identity content. However, Condor did not analyze the strength of gender identification and content of identity in explaining women's endorsement of sexist beliefs. In the first Manuscript of the present dissertation (Manuscript #1), we therefore developed the GIM incorporating strength of identification and identity content as two orthogonal dimensions of gender identity. The GIM combines theoretical insights from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999) and is thus based on a strong theoretical background. According to the GIM, different gender identities can be separated which in turn are expected to be differently related to endorsement of sexist beliefs. Highly identified women who connect traditional contents with the gender category (i.e., have internalized a traditional gender role) were expected to endorse sexist beliefs and to reject collective action more strongly than highly identified women who associate progressive contents with their gender in-group (i.e., have internalized a progressive gender role). We did not predict this difference for low identified women. Three studies, one correlational survey and two experiments, confirmed our assumptions: Women indeed show a stronger endorsement of benevolent, hostile and modern sexist beliefs and a stronger rejection of collective action when they are highly identified with their gender in-group and connect traditional contents with the female gender category as compared to those women who associate progressive contents with women as a group. In contrast, the content of identity had almost no effect on the endorsement of sexist beliefs when women are low identified with their gender in-group. Hence, our research highlights the

importance of separating strength of gender identification and content of gender identity in explaining women's endorsement of sexist beliefs.

Overall, the GIM closes an important gap in previous research by offering an explanation for why some women support the gender status quo, although they are members of the target group of gender discrimination, whereas others not only reject sexist beliefs but also engage in collective action in order to change the unequal gender system. Moreover, we demonstrated that identification motivates to think and act on behalf of the in-group and that identity content directs thinking and behavior.

2. Antidotes

Although subtle sexist beliefs are still prevalent, there is a dearth of studies which have explicitly investigated psychological factors to reduce them (an exception are studies about the influence of long-term teaching projects on changing gender-related concepts, e.g., Jones & Jacklin, 1988; Henderson-King & Steward, 1999). Therefore, in Manuscript #2 this dissertation is based on, we proposed that a heightened awareness of the prevalence of sexism reduces modern and neosexist beliefs, whereas a heightened awareness of the harm experienced by the targets of gender discrimination reduces the endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs in particular. In three independent experimental studies we found strong support for these assumptions. Women who kept track of sexism in every day life for one week by completing a sexism diary showed reduced endorsement of benevolent, modern and neosexist beliefs. Moreover, information about the prevalence of sexism reduced endorsement of modern (and neosexist) beliefs whereas information about the harm of sexism reduced endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs in women and men. Hence, the second part of the dissertation extends findings from long-term teaching projects on changing gender-related concepts (e.g., Jones & Jacklin, 1988;

Henderson-King & Steward, 1999) by indicating that short-term interventions which heighten knowledge and awareness of the prevalence of sexism and its harm can change subtle sexist beliefs effectively.

Additionally, we demonstrated that the prejudice reducing effects of information about the prevalence of sexism as well as about the harm of sexism were consistently stronger for women highly *identified* and men highly *unidentified* with their gender in-group as compared to highly unidentified women and highly identified men (Study 3 in Manuscript #2). Therefore, the present research stresses the important role of gender identification in both explaining (cf. Manuscript #1) and reducing (cf. Manuscript #2) sexist beliefs.

In Manuscript #2, we also aimed at testing the impact of the interplay of the strength of gender identification and gender role preference on changing subtle sexist beliefs. Unfortunately, the gender role preference scale did not work in the North American context. Possible reasons are a) a lack of correspondence in the meaning of the items after translation from German into English language, b) that the participants in the US sample were considerably younger (on average 18/19 years) than the participants who were used to construct and validate the gender role preference scale (on average 40 years) and c) that the scale expressed behaviors which are an important issue in Germany but perhaps taken for granted in the US (e.g., being a working mother).

Therefore, future research investigating the reduction of subtle sexist beliefs should consider the role of the strength of gender identification *as well as* identity content. It is likely that interventions to reduce endorsement of sexist beliefs are irrelevant for highly identified women who associate progressive values with the gender category, because they are less prejudiced anyway. By contrast based on the

results of Manuscript #1, interventions might be especially important for those women who connect traditional values with the gender category.

3. General Discussion

In sum, the present research addressed aspects of sexism which has until now received only little empirical attention, for instance the separation of the strength of gender identification and identity content in order to predict sexist beliefs and the role of awareness of the prevalence of sexism versus the role of knowledge about the harm of sexism in regard to reducing sexist beliefs. This research has important implications in a number of ways, particularly for the domain of understanding and changing power relations between women and men.

First, the present dissertation clarifies mechanisms of how endorsement of sexist beliefs can be predicted in women as well as of how these beliefs can be changed, at least in a European and American context. It would be of benefit if future research investigates whether a lack of awareness and knowledge about sexism and its harm is also one of the reasons for endorsing subtle sexist beliefs in “non-Western”-countries. As demonstrated by Glick et al. (2000) stronger objective gender inequality in a country (as measured with United Nations indices of gender equality) is accompanied with more obvious forms of prejudice such as Hostile Sexism. Hence, it might be unnecessary to heighten the awareness of the prevalence of sexism in countries where gender discrimination is not subtle, but obvious. It is therefore likely that the concept of denial of discrimination is only of psychological relevance (or meaning) in societies in which gender equity is, at least on the surface, culturally valued. Likewise, resentment toward feminists emerges only in those countries where a substantial number of women have made efforts to obtain gender equality (Swim et al., in press). In addition, concepts developed in the United States,

for instance the concept of denial of the discrimination, can, but does not have to be the same in other cultures (Gibbons, Hamby & Dennis, 1997; Chia, Allred & Jerzak, 1997). Hence, although the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory has been successfully translated and administered in a variety of cultures (Glick et al., 2000), the suitability of the concepts of denial of discrimination, anti-feminism and gender identity need to be validated in cultures beyond North America and Europe.

A second important point of the present research concerns the three reasons for women's endorsement of sexist beliefs outlined before, which are a) legitimizing ideologies, b) individual advantages of sexism, and c) lack of awareness of the prevalence of sexism and its harm. As argued in the introduction of the dissertation it seems to be difficult to change legitimizing ideologies and to withdraw women's individual advantages of sexism, since both serve particular motivational functions (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Jost & Banaji, 1994). For this reason, in Manuscript #2, we focused on cognitive processes (lack of awareness and knowledge) in order to change sexist beliefs. However, we also included system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994) as a general measure of legitimizing ideologies in the questionnaire in order to be able to control whether these beliefs were also affected by information about sexism. Indeed, we obtained evidence that a heightened sensitivity for the prevalence of sexism changed more than only subtle sexist beliefs: A higher attention to sexism in one's everyday life and information about the prevalence of sexism also reduced the endorsement of system justification beliefs and therefore general legitimizing ideologies. Given the motivational functions of the endorsement of system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994), this finding is worth remarking.

Additionally, regarding benevolent sexism on the surface as expression of individual advantages for women, it can be argued that attitudes toward individual advantages of sexism were changed as well: The stronger rejection of benevolent

sexist beliefs in women who have read information about negative consequences of sexism might imply a changed attitude toward personal advantages of subtle sexism. In other words, realizing the harm of seemingly positive attitudes and behavior for women on a macro level might lead to rejections of promised personal benefits on a micro level. Realizing that Benevolent and Modern Sexism is harmful to women on a macro level, even though the individual woman does not perceive personal discrimination in her everyday life, is of particular importance, because that can be a first step to stop denial of discrimination and to stop reinforcement of gender stereotypes.

Altogether, our results show that at least in neutral situations, it seems to be possible to change subtle sexist beliefs, attitudes toward personal benefits of sexism and general legitimizing ideologies through heightening people's awareness of sexism and its harm.

A third contribution of the present research concerns possible implications for interventions to reduce sexist prejudice. Based on the findings of both manuscripts, programs that heighten people's awareness of and knowledge about the prevalence and harm of sexism are strongly recommended, especially for women who are highly identified with their gender and who connect traditional contents with this category. The present research is limited to reducing sexist beliefs in situations were sexism did not serve a particular function. Hence, interventions should take place in people's everyday life, where sexist behavior is strategically used and rewarded. Such interventions could already start in schools in order to establish an awareness of sexism in society and an anti-prejudice norm.

We argued that keeping track of sexism using a diary-method did not change men's sexist beliefs because the observed incidents might be too ambiguous. Accordingly, we found that unambiguous information either about the prevalence or

about the harm of sexism could actually reduce endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs in men. Hence, less ambiguous information may be better for men at the beginning of anti-sexism-interventions, because it might reduce their tendency to attribute sexism to other causes.

Additionally, as demonstrated in this research, the moderating role of gender identification should be considered in programs to reduce sexist prejudice by all means. Especially regarding interventions for men, it should be taken into account that information about the prevalence and harm of sexism implicates the necessity of changing the unequal gender system. For highly identified men, such information can present a threat to male privilege and elicit resistance. We provided preliminary evidence that indeed highly identified men did not decrease their sexist beliefs which might indicate that they perceived this information as a greater threat as compared to men for whom being male is not as important. However, information about sexism did not increase men's endorsement of sexist beliefs. Future research should therefore explore this process more carefully.

Finally, the present research is closely linked to research on confronting sexism (Hyers, 2007; Stangor et al., 2003). It is likely that individuals, who change their sexist beliefs, also change their related behavior. Hence, a further interesting avenue for future research would be to explore, by means of behavioral indices, whether a heightened awareness of sexism and its harm leads not only to a change in attitudes but also to more confronting behavior both in women and in men.

4. Outlook

Coming back to a more general level, expropriate and oppressive relationships work effectively without the use of force but with consensually shared legitimizing ideologies (Jackman, 1994). The use of ideologies conceals and justifies inequality and can result, for instance, in non-detection or even denial of subtle sexism (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Swim et al., 2005). As demonstrated in the first part of the present research (Manuscript #1), women to whom their gender in-group is important and who connect progressive contents with this group reject subtle sexist beliefs more strongly and show more approval of collective action in order to change the current gender status quo as compared to traditional women. It is likely that this goes back to the understanding that women have a lower status in society than men (cf. Condor, 1984). Hence, women who are aware of gender discrimination are more likely to reject sexist beliefs. This hypothesis was proofed in the second part of the present research (Manuscript #2): Paying attention toward sexism as well as increasing knowledge that sexism is prevalent and harmful can change endorsement of subtle sexist beliefs.

According to Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemony, consent is not automatic, yet is produced and transmitted by the civil society, e.g., political organizations, church, schools, the media, or family. To change society involves a period of negotiation carried out in all institutions of society and culture. Hence, from an idealistic point of view, the findings of the present dissertation indicate that a promising way to change gender hegemony in society would be to heighten the awareness of sexism and its harm in the civil society, to establish anti-discrimination norms and to engage in actions to change inequality (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990).

However, besides the discussed psychological mechanism of heighten sensitivity and attitude change, political equality can only be achieved by subtracting power from the advantaged group (cf. Jackman, 1994). It is self-evident that dominants will not give up their advantages voluntarily. This can be seen, for instance, in negative reactions toward feminism, such as the so called “backlash decade” (Faludi, 1991) of the 1980s that produced a new wave of sexism. Therefore, besides changes in individuals on a micro level, societal changes on macro level are necessary to reach actual gender equality.

The necessity of changes on the micro and macro level are not only confined to gender discrimination, but should certainly be applied to all kinds of expropriate and unequal relationships between groups, such as those caused by socioeconomic status and ethnicity.

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Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Internalisierung von Sexismus bei Frauen: Prädiktoren und Interventionsmöglichkeiten

Sexistische Inhalte werden nicht nur von Männern unterstützt, sondern auch von vielen Frauen befürwortet (Jackman, 1994; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick in press). In der vorliegenden Dissertation wurde dieses Phänomen aufgegriffen und zunächst der Frage nachgegangen, wie sowohl die unterschiedliche Zustimmung zu Sexismus als auch unterschiedliches Engagement gegen Sexismus von Frauen erklärt werden kann. Daran anschließend wurde untersucht, welche Möglichkeiten es gibt, die Zustimmung zu subtilem Sexismus bei Frauen und Männern zu reduzieren.

In der psychologischen Forschung wurden bislang Prädiktoren zur Vorhersage von Sexismus bei Menschen generell untersucht, ohne zu beachten, dass viele Frauen sexistischen Inhalten zustimmen, obwohl sie der Gruppe angehören, gegen die Sexismus gerichtet ist. An dieser Forschungslücke ansetzend wurde im ersten Teil der vorliegenden Dissertation berücksichtigt, dass zwar alle Frauen der Kategorie Frau angehören, sich aber darin unterscheiden, wie wichtig bzw. unwichtig ihnen diese Gruppenmitgliedschaft ist, d.h. wie stark sie sich mit der Geschlechtskategorie identifizieren (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Zusätzlich wurde beachtet, dass Frauen unterschiedliche Inhalte mit der Geschlechtskategorie verknüpfen können (progressive versus traditionelle Inhalte). Durch die Kombination der Dimensionen Stärke und Inhalt der Identifikation wurde das „Gender Identity Model“ entwickelt. Auf der Basis des „Gender Identity Model“ wurden folgende Hypothesen formuliert: Frauen, die sich stark mit der Kategorie Frau identifizieren und gleichzeitig traditionelle Inhalte mit dieser Kategorie verknüpfen, sollten im

Vergleich zu denjenigen, die ebenfalls stark identifiziert sind, aber progressive Inhalte mit der Kategorie verbinden, allen Formen von Sexismus eher zustimmen und sich nicht für eine Veränderung des Status quo einsetzen. Im Gegensatz dazu sollte sich bei niedrig identifizierten Frauen kein Unterschied zwischen denjenigen, die progressive und denjenigen, die traditionelle Inhalte mit der Kategorie Frau verknüpfen, in der Zustimmung zu Sexismus zeigen. Operationalisiert wurde der Inhalt der Identifikation mit der individuellen Geschlechtsrollenpräferenz einer Frau. In einem Pretest wurde eine Skala zur Messung der Geschlechtsrollenpräferenz entwickelt und in drei anschließenden Studien wurden die Vorhersagen des „Gender Identity Model“ überprüft. In einer ersten korrelativen Studie konnten die Hypothesen bestätigt werden. Zwei zusätzliche Experimente untersuchten die kausale Richtung des Zusammenhanges zwischen den Formen der Identifikation und der Zustimmung zu sexistischen Überzeugungen. Der Inhalt der Identifikation wurde durch ein Priming einer traditionellen oder einer progressiven Geschlechtsrolle experimentell manipuliert. Dagegen wurde die Stärke der Identifikation gemessen und als quasiexperimenteller Faktor behandelt. Es wurde getestet, ob eine saliente traditionelle Geschlechtsrolle bei starker Identifikation mit der Geschlechtskategorie die Zustimmung zu Sexismus erhöht (Hypothese 1) und ob eine saliente progressive Geschlechtsrolle bei starker Identifikation mit der Geschlechtskategorie die Zustimmung zu Sexismus reduziert (Hypothese 2). Während sich im ersten Experiment nur für collective action beide Hypothesen bestätigen ließen, sich für benevolenten und hostilen Sexismus jedoch nur Hypothese 2 empirisch bewährte, fanden im zweiten Experiment beide Hypothesen für benevolenten, modernen und hostilen Sexismus Bestätigung: Moderierte Regressionen ergaben, dass hoch mit der Geschlechtskategorie identifizierte Frauen, bei denen ein Priming einer progressiven Geschlechtsrolle erfolgt war, benevolenten, modernen und hostilen

Sexismus signifikant stärker ablehnten als hochidentifizierte Frauen in der Kontrollgruppe. Im Gegensatz dazu akzeptierten Frauen, die sich hoch mit der Geschlechtskategorie identifizierten und mit einer traditionellen Geschlechtsrolle geprimt wurden, benevolenten, modernen und hostilen Sexismus signifikant stärker, als Personen, die nicht geprimt wurden. Für Frauen, die sich wenig mit der Geschlechtskategorie identifizierten, zeigte sich kein Effekt des Priming auf die Zustimmung zu sexistischen Inhalten.

Im zweiten Teil der Dissertation wurden Möglichkeiten der Reduktion von Sexismus untersucht. In drei Experimenten wurden die beiden Hypothesen getestet, dass a) die Akzeptanz von modernem Sexismus durch ein erhöhtes Bewusstsein für die Prävalenz von Sexismus verringert werden kann und b) die Akzeptanz von benevolentem Sexismus durch erhöhtes Wissen über die negativen Konsequenzen des scheinbar „positiven“ Sexismus reduziert werden kann. In einem ersten Experiment wurde zunächst untersucht, ob eine erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit für Sexismus im Alltag zu veränderten Einstellungen führt. Um die Aufmerksamkeit für Sexismus im Alltag zu erhöhen, wurde US-amerikanische Studierende gebeten, eine Woche lang entweder ein strukturiertes Sexismustagebuch oder ein strukturiertes Stresstagebuch (Kontrollgruppe) auszufüllen. Es zeigte sich, dass eine erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit für Sexismus die Zustimmung zu benevolentem, modernem und Neosexismus bei Frauen abschwächen kann. In einem zweiten Experiment waren US-amerikanische Studierende aufgefordert einen von drei Informationstexten, a) über die Prävalenz von Sexismus oder b) über die negativen Konsequenzen des scheinbar „positiven“ Sexismus oder c) über Stress im Leben von Studierenden, zu bewerten. Gemessen wurde, ob die Texte die Zustimmung zu verschiedenen Formen von Sexismus unterschiedlich beeinflussten. Es zeigte sich, dass Information über die Prävalenz von Sexismus zu einer stärkeren Ablehnung von modernem

Sexismus führte, während sich Informationen über negative Konsequenzen des scheinbar „positiven“ Sexismus in einer stärkeren Ablehnung von benevolentem Sexismus niederschlugen. Ergebnisse eines dritten Experiments replizierten und erweiterten die Befunde der vorangegangen Studie in einem europäischen Kontext. Es zeigte sich, dass die vorurteilsreduzierenden Effekte bei stark mit der Geschlechtskategorie identifizierten Frauen und wenig identifizierten Männern besonders groß waren. In allen drei Studien zeigte sich außerdem, dass eine erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit für die Prävalenz von Sexismus nicht nur sexistische Einstellungen veränderte, sondern ebenfalls die Tendenz zur Systemrechtfertigung (Jost & Banaji, 1994) verringerte.

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Erklärung

Ich versichere, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation „Women's Internalization of Sexism: Predictors and Antidotes“ selbständig und ohne unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt habe. Dabei habe ich mich keiner anderen als der von mir ausdrücklich bezeichneten Quellen und Hilfen bedient.

Die Dissertation wurde weder in der jetzigen noch in einer ähnlichen Form bei einer anderen Hochschule eingereicht und hat noch keinen sonstigen Prüfungszwecken gedient.

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Julia Becker Ort und Datum