Berliner Gender Studies herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Christina von Braun (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) Band3 LIT Ulrike Auga, Christina von Braun (Eds.) GENDER IN CONFLICTS Palestine - Israel - Germany LIT Cover Picture: Ulrike Auga, Gay Pride March in Jerusalem, Christopher Street Day 2004 We thank the offices of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Israel andin the Palestinian Territories for supporting the publication of this book. Bibliographie information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de. ISBN 3-8258-9281-6 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library © LIT VERLAG Berlin 2006 AuslieferungNerlagskontakt: Fresnostr. 2 48159 Münster Tel. +49 (0)251-62 03 20 Fax +49 (0)251-23 19 72 e-Mail: lit@lit-verlag.de http://www.lit-verlag.de Distributed in the UK by: Global Book Marketing, 99B Wallis Rd, London, E9 5LN Phone: +44 (0) 20 8533 5800 - Fax: +44 (0) 1600 775 663 http://www.centralbooks.eo.uk/acatalog/search.html Distributed in North America by: • Transaction Publishers New Brunswlck (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.) Transaction Publishers Rutgers University 35 Berrue Circle Piscataway, NJ 08854 Phone: + 1 (732) 445 - 2280 Fax: + 1 (732) 445 - 3138 for orders (U. S. only): toll free (888) 999 - 6778 e-mail: orders@transactionspub.com Contents Beyond Boundaries: Introduction Christina von Braun and Ulrike Auga Gender and Knowledge 1 The Critique of Representation and the Second Commandment 15 Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky Hegemonie Discourse on Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers and the Logic of Gender 23 Claudia Brunner Undoing Gender: Nationalisms, Emerging Communities and Gender in View of Globalization. Also a Gender Based Reading of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence and the Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 37 Ulrike Auga Gender, Memory, and Scripture Scripture and Community Christina von Braun 63 Hannah Arendt and fhe State of Israel: A Tale of Separation and Loss 75 Idith Zertal Gender, Remembrance, and Writing: Literary Memory Before and After Auschwitz 91 Inge Stephan Women, Memory, and Narrative: The Case ofMorrison's Beloved 101 Smadar Shiffman ii CONTENTS Gender, Arts, and Representation Visual Politics, Memory, and Gender 113 Silke Wenk Beyond the Limits: Gender in Contemporary Art 135 Adrienne Goehler Motherhood as an Oppositional Standpoint: On Michal Aviad's "For My Children" 143 Yael Munk Selected Poems 149 Liat Kaplan Selected Poems 157 Rose Shomali Musleh The Knowledge of Land 161 Efrat Mishori Gender and Political Transition Processes The Effects of the Globalization Process on Gender Orders Claudia von Braunmühl Violence against Women: The Analogy of Occupation and Rape-"The 171 Case of the Palestinian People" 183 Rana Nashashibi Gender Transformation in Conftict? 191 Hadeel Rizq-Qazzaz The "Women and Development" Discourse and Donor Intervention in Palestine 199 Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar Gender and Lif e Sciences The Concept of the Organism in Current Biology. Beyond Gender Binarities? Kerstin Palm Reflections on Reproductive Choice Cannel Shalev Contributors and Editors 235 247 259 The Concept of the Organism in Current Biology. Beyond Gender Binarities? Kerstin Palm Whoever wants to leam about European scientific concepts of the body in rela­ tion to the gender order will generally turn to the renowned study by American historian Thomas Laqueur on the history of the body in Western culture from antiquity to the early twentieth century. In Making Sex. Body and Gender from the Creeks to Freud, Laqueur shows how a fundamental reinterpretation of sexed bodies took place when the natural sciences emerged in the eighteenth century. He interprets this change as a shift from a one-sex model to a two-sex model. According to Laqueur, until the eighteenth century the female body was regarded as an inferior version of the male body on the basis of the prevailing cosmological humoral system. Accordingly, the female body was unable to produce life-giving semen and to expel the reproductive organs from the in­ ner space of the body to its surface because of a lesser vital heat. This model from the ancient world assumed the existence of only one sex, which appeared, according to the extent of perfection, in different modes, which were isomor­ phic to each other. The different body characteristics were merely places of resonance of a reality from outside the body; they only showed metaphysical hierarchies between the genders, but were not the basis for gender difference. The two-sex model introduced in the eighteenth century turned round this structure of arguments and explained, on the basis of the repositioning of na­ ture as the source of all knowledge, that the reproductive organs themselves were fundamental to the profound difference between the genders. Female and male bodies were now no langer arranged on a vertical axis of a hierarchy of perfection, but on a horizontal axis at opposite poles in radical difference to each other. From these different bodies, as Laqueur describes it, physicians and anthropologists read references to the characters of the genders and the associated gender-specific division of labor. Laqueur emphasizes the ideological aspects of the two gender orders. The one-sex model was a means for the cultural dominance of the patriarchy, si.nce it provided arguments to counteract the obvious priority of the maternal contri­ bution to reproduction. This model not only made clear the essential role of the 236 KERSTIN PALM male in tbe procreative act because of tbe ability assigned to bim of animating material witb bis semen, but also sbowed tbe superiority of tbe invisible, male­ connoted principle, tbat is, tbe intellectual principle, over tbe female-connoted sensuous and material principle. Moreover, in tbe context of tbe egalitarian natural law of the Enligbtenment, tbe two-sex model provided a tbeory tbat arranged men and women on the same level side by side, but still stressed a radical difference, wbicb made it possible to justify and naturalize tbeir differ­ ent social positions. Laqueur gives a detailed and rieb description of tbe cbange in tbe inter­ pretation of tbe body witb its consequences for tbe gender order, but be fails to examine tbe concept of tbe organism wbicb underlies tbe sex model. In my view, bowever, tbis is crucial for understanding the relationsbip between sci­ ence and tbe gender order, not only ideologically, but also with regard to the gendered structure of tbe concept of tbe organism itself, as 1 will elaborate in the following. Anotber study covering similar ground as Laqueur's book (and wbicb to date bas only been publisbed in German) is Claudia Honegger's book Die< Ord­ nung der Geschlechter (Tbe Order of tbe Sexes). Honegger concentrates on bistorical developments since tbe eigbteentb century and explores tbe cbang­ ing concepts of organism in greater detail. Sbe describes bow a mecbanistic, Cartesian division of body and mind still prevailed in tbe eigbteentb century, wbicb understood tbe mind as being not inftuenced by tbe body and tberefore not sexed. But in tbe mid-eigbteentb an anti-Cartesian, Romantic movement emerged, wbicb rejected tbe mecbanistic model of tbe body and aimed at tbe overcom­ ing tbe dualism between body and mind. lt drew up a bolistic model with two essential cbaracteristics. First, tbe body was perceived as an independent liv­ ing unit wbicb was categorically differentiated from tbe inanimate spbere. Tbe body was now marked by a special teleological organization wbicb could no longer be explained by pbysical and cbemical laws, but required specific bio­ logical explanations. Second, mind and body were integrated in an analogical and coberent re­ lationsbip with eacb other. Tbis integrative connection was very important for tbe emergence of tbe bourgeois gender order, as Honegger convincingly sbows, because it laid the foundation for a resexualization of the mind. Witb this moral-pbysiological monism, and by means of analogical argumentation, it could now be "proved" that tbe wbole female organism was, pbysically and mentally, exclusively assigned to tbe duty of motberbood because of tbe promi­ nence of its reproductive organs and cbildbearing capability. At tbe same time this capability required a weaker pbysical and mental constitution and a greater degree of sensibility. Tbe male body was read as being not very involved in re­ productive duties due to the small proportion of tbe reproductive organs in THE CONCEPT OF THE ÜRGANISM 237 the body as a whole. Moreover, because these organs were largely external to the body, they were seen as a reference to a man's natural field of activity in the official sphere, in culture and politics. The inner reproductive organs of the women, however, were interpreted as a reference to the domestic svhere. In this way, modern individualization became the anatomical privilege of the man, while motherhood, associated with a particular kind of morality, was el­ evated to the position of a dominant ethical imperative, and at the same time to the essence of female nature. lt was, however, rather difficult to apply this monistic argumentation to the male, because it resulted in serious contradic­ tions to the notion of the modern autonomous, self-identical subject. Honegger shows that this dilemma was increasingly solved by using a dou­ ble argumentation: that is, on the one hand the generalization of the man as the rational human as such, and on the other hand the special treatment of the woman as the object of the social, psychological, physiological, and anatomi­ cal thinking of integrative gynecology. What Honegger does not follow up on is the further discussion of the organism in biology and medicine in the nine­ teenth century, which, in my view, also showed a process of generalization. I would like to deal with these concepts of organism in their relation to the gender order in more detail in the following. In conjunction with this I want to introduce another method for analyzing scientific visualizations from a gender perspective that goes beyond the contentive and ideological aspects of body descriptions by looking at the structural aspect of the organism models. In this way I wish to show that the living body in the European modern age represents an important place for discussing different aspects of the gender order, which do not appear very obvious at first sight. In the nineteenth century comparative zoology increasingly placed the hu­ man body parallel to the animal body, and the theory of evolution ultimately located it in a relationship of kinship with all living beings. As a result, the human being was divided not only into the general male and the particular fe­ male, as Honegger describes it, but also into the spheres of reason and psyche, the subject of the emerging humanities, on the one hand; and the sphere of the zoological body, the subject of biology and medicine, on the other hand. Whereas the integrative Romantic concept of the organism came to have less and less significance for biology and medicine in the mid-nineteenth cen­ tury, this concept continued io predominate in gynecology. There was a re­ newed mechanistic trend in zoology and medicine, which again conceived of the organism as a machine. But this machine no longer resembled ma­ chines driven by the Newtonian laws of mechanics, as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but was now like the steam engines that had become widespread in nineteenth-century European industry. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the living body appeared to be the mimetic embodiment of a mechanical engine provided with both mechani- 238 KERSTIN PALM cal functions and a capacity for autonomy. Like Newton's universe, which they mirrored, these machines were driven by various natural forces, including the mind and gravitation in particular. With the development of a new concept of force in the physics of the 1820s, all forces suddenly seemed to be variations of one force, called energy ever since. This new thermodynamic view made it impossible to conceive of a self-moving force, because a force could no longer come into being of its own accord but instead existed in a fixed reservoir from which it could change into different kinds of energy. In this context the organism became an energy-transforming machine which could be described in terms of the production of mechanical work and heat. All life processes were seen as taking place on the basis of division of labor and cooperation, as in a well-organized state, controlled by one central instance, the brain, which sent its commands through the whole body with a system of nerves like a telegraph network. Haeckel, for instance, described this concept of the body that emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century as follows: The arrangement and activity of this apparatus of the mind can be compared with an electrical telegraph system; the nerves are the transmitting wires, the brain is the central station, the muscles and sensory cells are the subordinate local stations. The motory nerve fibers transmit orders or impulses centrifugally from the nerve center to the muscles and cause them to move by contracting; while the sensitive nerve fibers transmit various perceptions centripetally from the peripheral sensory organs to the brain to report on their received impressions of the outside world. (168) In summary, the late nineteenth century saw the living organism as a steam en­ gine controlled by a driver, and as a state organization of cells with a clear eco­ nomic and political order. lt was a consistently organized system characterized by identity, capacity for action, division of labor, and hierarchy of functions. At this point it can be noted that the mechanistic concepts of the organ­ ism, in my view, were fundamentally guided by projections of two organiza­ tional abilities claimed by the male seif in a specific historical situation: first, a technical ability to produce something that can work, like a machine; and sec­ ond, a political and economical ability to guide and preserve state machinery. This production and preservation of an expediently structured and functioning whole, the organism, was in this way committed into the hands of a subject­ like authority, which was not the male subject itself, but appeared as its mirror image, its double, in terms of its capacity for construction. Then, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was an in­ creasing shift away from the idea of a solid-matter aggregate functioning eco­ nomically, circulating goods, and controlled by a communication network like a telegraph system, toward a fluid model which imagined the inner sphere of THE CONCEPT OF THE ÜRGANISM 239 the body as a liquid medium, which facilitated the transport of chemical mes­ sengers (see also Tanner). In 1905 these messengers were named hormones. This shift was initiated by the discussions on self-regulation which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1865 the French physiologist Claude Bemard introduced the term self-regulation to characterize the spe­ cific processes of a living organism as an autonomous whole ("Introduction," Bemard). According to the historian Jakob Tanner, this set off the substitution of the heteropoietic concept of the mechanical and energetic machine models with the biological autopoietic principle (138). In 1878 Bemard imagined the regulation of the organismic whole--quite in the tradition of the conceptual­ ization of architect and head of state-as follows: For every living being and every organ there is something like a predetermined blueprint, so that every phenomenon, taken singly, is in its economy dependent on general natural forces, but in its relationships to others a particular bond be­ comes apparent; it seems as though it were held to its particular path, having once embarked upon it, by an invisible leader and led to the place it finally occupies. ("Le\:ons," Bemard 50t) Until then, neuronal control, with its exact spatial and temporal nerve com­ mands, had held center stage. Associated with the notion of the primacy of the brain in controlling physical processes, its operation inspired the metaphors of wiring and electrical potential. Now, in the early twentieth century, attention tumed to the fluid control system, with an inner secretion of hormones from various organs and no central guidance system. Control was now-via a more interactive communication between the parts of the body---ensuring structural and functional integration in a more decentralized and diffuse way. The inner body space had thus become a fluid space of communication. Furthermore, it had become conspicuous that fluid control, like neuronal control, was of an increasingly unstable consistency. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the neuronal control system, a great nervous system centralized on the brain, still referred to a unity of b9dy and mind. But in the mid-nineteenth century more and more nerve centers were discovered in the autonomic nerve system, so that the nervous system increasingly came to resemble an unstable state at whose periphery numer­ ous autonomous and semiautcinomous regions were making trouble (Radkau). Moreover, at the end of the nineteenth century, general nervousness, associated with growing industrialization, speed of life, noise, piecework, and pressure to perform, seemed to be on the rise. Nerves were no langer only the guarantors of the vigor of mind and body but could now become overexcited and shat­ tered, or work in systems not subject to the central consciousness. The concept of the fluid control system on the other hand was shattered by the observation that hormones declared to be female were also found in male 240 KERSTIN PALM bodies, and vice versa (Oudshoorn). Sex hormones, localized in the tradition of different reproductive organs and at first regarded as the very chemical essence of masculinity and femininity, thus signaled a break with the familiar sex du­ alism and called into question a male identity defined as an entity separate from the female body. At the beginning of the twentieth century, this idea of chemical messengers ftoating through a liquefied body seemed for the time being to have put paid to mechanical metaphors for describing the organism. Against this backdrop Ludwig von Bertalanffy stated in 1928 that he categor­ ically rejected any recourse to machines to illustrate organismic functions and structures: on the one band because machines always point to a constructing agency and are therefore teleological and metaphysical models, and on the other band because machines cannot provide models of organismic processes such as regeneration, adaptation, self-preservation, growth, self-development, and reproduction. Likewise, a return to vitalistic notions with their postula­ tion of vague cryptic forces would provide no solution. Instead he suggested that an organism be interpreted as an open system with a hierarchical order of functions and structures and specific relations between the single parts, which maintains itself by exchanging compounds with the environment while keep­ ing its system characteristics constant. Bertalanffy played a decisive role in introducing system theory in biology, which, as in other disciplines such as sociology, is gradually leading to the disappearance of the idea of the subject. While the system theory in biology has been able to solve the problem of describing complex units with a cer­ tain internal order as well as of complex dynamic processes, which could now be represented as being functional-postholistic, that is, technological and no langer as vitalistic-holistic, that is, ontological, it has not been able to explain the regularities underlying system behavior any more than the origin of the living system. In the twentieth century two main lines of argumentation and research were prevalent, which picked up these two ideas of central control and dispersed self-regulation in order to tackle precisely these unsolved questions regard­ ing the regularity and origin of living systems. One very reductionistic line looked to the molecular level for a singular substance-the biological atom­ that could plan, construct, build, and control a living body. This substance was hypothetically called the gene or the genetic substance. Parallel to this, and following nineteenth-century ideas of self-regulation and ftuidity, new theories emerged about entities regulated by information circuits and communication systems. The guiding principle was that an organization as complex and dy­ nam~c as the organismic order requires continuous organizational communica­ tion. In this spirit the biologist Wolfgang Wieser remarked in 1959 in bis book Organismen - Strukturen - Maschinen, which reviews the biological research THE CONCEPT OF THE ÜRGANISM 241 of the 1940s and 1950s: "without communication no order, without order no whole" (13). In the first half of the twentieth century this organismic commu­ nication system was still precybernetically determined by neural transmitters and hormones. In the second half of the twentieth century, concepts of the organism were increasingly formulated in terms of cybernetics and informa­ tion theory, with reference to new self-regulating or data-processing machines, such as self-guiding air defense missiles or computers. For example, the fa­ mous development biologist Conrad H. Waddington remarked in 1971 that "an autopilot, a target-seeking gunsight, and an embryo all show characteristic features of target-orientated behavior" (20). These new machines now serving as theory models were no longer engines but communication and control machines producing not energy but informa­ tion and organization. In the nineteenth century, holism and process, seen as central characteristics of organisms, could only be theorized in terms of vital­ ism and not in terms of mechanics with the machines then existing. But now they could also be theorized in terms of postmechanistic machine concepts. The metaphysical purpose of vitalistic processes was thus replaced by functional feedback processes and rendered scientific. In the twentieth cen­ tury structure and organization also took over the central position occupied in the nineteenth century by energy and substance. Thus, for example, Wolfgang Wieser wrote in 1959: Organization is a principle that cannot be attributed to either of the two categories force and substance, because it is an independent quality, neither energy nor sub­ stance, but rather a third thing, expressed in the scope and nature of the order ... in a system. (13) My interpretation of these two currents-gene discourse and self-regulation theory-is that genetics, aiming for a restoration of the sovereign male double of the seif, has increasingly been confronted by the decentralization of this seif. This second current, as I will show in the following, became dominant in the latter course of the twentieth century. In the first half of the twentieth century genes were still only a hypothetical concept as carriers of heredity, and most biologists assumed that genes bad a clear, deterrninable structure and function and acted as a small and powerful life subject, controlling the development and maintenance of organisms. The peak as well as the turning point of gene-centered research came in 1953 with the chemical and physical characterization of DNA as a double-helix macro­ molecule embodying a code much like a machine language. The gene as a magic entity was gradually demystified. In the 1950s Watson and Crick proposed the central theory of genetics which describes the linear model of a hierarchical one-way flow of command information from the DNA via the RNA to the final product, the proteins. The 242 KERSTIN PALM use of metaphors like information, program, and command reinforced the im­ age of one-way communication being directed down from the top. But it was not long before this theory, developed with reference to single-cell organisms, was no longer plausible. Every cell in a multi-cell organism has the same set of genes, since all cells derive from one and the same cell, but differ from one another structurally and functionally in a complex spatial and temporal pat­ tem. The question arose as to how one and the same set of genes "knows" which specific genetic products it is supposed to produce. The answer, which gradually emerged during the late l 950s, was gene regulation. The first regulation model by Francois Jacob and Jaques Monod suggested the regulation of one gene by another gene. Further models then situated the gene in more and more wide-ranging regulation circuits and loops, involving not only the content of the cell, but also the concrete context of the cell in an organism, and finally the extemal environment of the organism (Keller). lt is now assumed that DNA is not itself active, but needs complex activation, editing, correction, and repair mechanisms to activate it._ In the past ten years the term "program" has become problematic, and other terms are being ~con­ sidered to replace it. For example, it may be preferable to describe DNA as a collection of data in a simultaneous computer network embedded in the phys­ ical and biochemical structure of the cell (Atlan 335). Or, as another biologist proposed, "[Genes] are passive stores of material, from which a cell can take what it needs" (Nijhout 441). This decentralization of the gene is just one example of the wide-ranging questioning of the existence of a central life principle. Study of the immune system and the endocrinal hormone system, too, has shown ever more exten­ sive integration of mechanisms into comprehensive regulation systems. Donna Haraway, for instance, summarizes the shift in the visualization of the immune system as follows: From the joke of one single central mechanism controlling the harmony of the organism in the symphonic system which is responsible for the integrity of the self came a postmodern pastiche of varied centers and peripheries. (168) Current biology speaks less and less about central control. The biologist An­ tonio Garcia-Bellido remarked in 1998, for example, that "development re­ sults from local effects and there is no brain or mysterious entity controlling it all. There are local calculations, and they can explain the specific charac­ teristics of a historically deterrnined process" (112). "Historically deterrnined" here means "come into being through evolution." The organism has become a communications system with a fluid and dis­ persed cybemetic network of various systems, such as genes, nervous system, hormones, and immune system, without distinct hierarchies or any clear unity, but with many feedback loops and functional fragmentations. Because of its THE CONCEPT OF THE ÜRGANISM 243 capacity for communicative self-regulation the organism also resembles an ar­ tificial intelligence system which organizes and maintains itself with inherent and unconscious "cleverness." Finally, 1 quote Haraway again as she compares the organism as visualized in present-day biology with the nineteenth-century organism: The body ceases to be a stable, spatial mapping of normalized functions and emerges instead as a highly-mobile field of strategic differences. (174) lt seems to me that the models of the organism, as they shift through the vari­ ous images, from the mechanical engine to the energy-transforming machine, from the fluid matrix of discrete communication to the fragmentary, multicen­ tered, postmechanical cybermachine, have brought about a radical decentering of the double of the male self reflected in earlier concepts of the organism. In the process, gendered dualisms, principles, and categories such as body and mind or heteronomy and autonomy have lost their clear contours. But find­ ings regarding the structure of the organism should not lead us to conclude that gender binarities as a whole have been eradicated. This has to do with the contingent relation between the structural and the ideological levels of how the organism is visualized. In other words, the ideological arguments put forward in biology to legitimize a certain gender order follow impulses and influences other than those of the structural conception of the organism, which appears to reflect certain gender constellations and takes up, unnoticed, certain processes of reflection circulating among discourses, such as the decentralization of the subject in the modern and postmodern age. As we can see with the description of various concepts of the organism, whether steam engine, fluid matrix, or cybernetic, the ideological visualiza­ tion of the gender order still follows a pattern similar to that described by Laqueur and Honegger for various ancient and modern images of the body. Since the mid-nineteenth century a confusing muddle of different arguments has emerged. The more mechanistic or reductionist models prefer the descrip­ tion of the general organism on the one band, and see the particular female body, subject to reproduction processes, as divergent and defective in relation to the general organism, on the other. The postmechanistic, fluid, and self­ regulatory models, which haye a more integrative view of the body, find in these self-regulatory processes a wealth of various gender-specific strategies, which give the body a specific structure, defined behavior, and gender-specific role behavior in a community. Changes are taking place on this ideolo.gical level too-but that is another story. 244 KERSTIN PALM Notes 1. My special thanks goes to Catherine Haies for her excellent stylistic ad­ vice. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. Works Cited Atlan, Henri, and Moshe Koppel. "The cellular computer DNA: program or data." Bulletin of Math. Biology 52.3 (1990): 335-348. Bemard, Claude. lntroduction a l'etude de la medicine experimentale. Paris: Bailliere, 1865. Bemard, Claude. Ler;ons sur les phenomenes de la vie, communs aux animaux et aux vetetaux. Paris: Bailliere, 1878. Bertalanffy, Ludwig. Kritische Theorie der Formbildung. Berlin: Gebrüder Bomtraeger, 1928. Garcia-Bellindo, Antonio. "Discussion of S. Brenner's 'Biological Computa­ tion."' The Limits of Reductionism in Biology. Ed. Gregory R. Bock and Jamie A. Goode. Chichester, New York: J. Wiley, 1998: 106-116. Haeckel, Ernst. Die Welträthsel. Gemeinverständliche Studien über monistis­ che Philosophie. Bonn: E. Strauss, 1899: 168. Haraway, Donna. "The Biopolitics of Postmodem Bodies: Determinations of Seif in the Immune System Discourse." dijferences 1.1 (1989): 3-43. Honegger, Claudia. Die Ordnung der Geschlechter. Die Wissenschaften vom Menschen und das Weib 1750-1850. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996. Keller, Evelyn Fox. The Century of the Gene. Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2000. Laqueur, Thomas. Making Sex. Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. Nijhout, H. Frederic. "Metaphors and the Role of Genes in Development." Bioessays 12.9 (1990): 441-446. Oudshoom, Nelly. Beyond the Natural Body. An Archeology of Sex Hormones. London, New York: Routledge, 1994. Radkau, Joachim. Das Zeitalter der Nervosität. München, Wien: Hanser, 1998. Tauner, Jakob. '"Weisheit des Körpers' und soziale Homöostase. Physiolo­ gie und das Konzept der Selbstregulation." Physiologie und industrielle Gesellschaft. Studien zur Verwissenschaftlichung des Körpers im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Ed. Jakob Tauner And Philipp Sarasin. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998: 129-169. Waddington, Conrad H. Biology, Purpose and Ethics. Worcester: Clark Uni­ versity Press, 1971. THE CONCEPT OF THE ÜRGANISM 245 Wieser, Wolfgang. Organismen, Strukturen, Maschinen. Zu einer Lehre vom Organismus. Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg: Fischer, 1959.